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			Drop the repeated word "the". Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200801173822.14973-13-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
		
			
				
	
	
		
			309 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			9.5 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			309 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			9.5 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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| /*
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|  * This implements the various checks for CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY*,
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|  * which are designed to protect kernel memory from needless exposure
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|  * and overwrite under many unintended conditions. This code is based
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|  * on PAX_USERCOPY, which is:
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|  *
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|  * Copyright (C) 2001-2016 PaX Team, Bradley Spengler, Open Source
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|  * Security Inc.
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|  */
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| #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
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| 
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| #include <linux/mm.h>
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| #include <linux/highmem.h>
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| #include <linux/slab.h>
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| #include <linux/sched.h>
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| #include <linux/sched/task.h>
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| #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
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| #include <linux/thread_info.h>
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| #include <linux/atomic.h>
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| #include <linux/jump_label.h>
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| #include <asm/sections.h>
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| 
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| /*
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|  * Checks if a given pointer and length is contained by the current
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|  * stack frame (if possible).
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|  *
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|  * Returns:
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|  *	NOT_STACK: not at all on the stack
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|  *	GOOD_FRAME: fully within a valid stack frame
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|  *	GOOD_STACK: fully on the stack (when can't do frame-checking)
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|  *	BAD_STACK: error condition (invalid stack position or bad stack frame)
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|  */
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| static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
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| {
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| 	const void * const stack = task_stack_page(current);
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| 	const void * const stackend = stack + THREAD_SIZE;
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| 	int ret;
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| 
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| 	/* Object is not on the stack at all. */
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| 	if (obj + len <= stack || stackend <= obj)
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| 		return NOT_STACK;
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * Reject: object partially overlaps the stack (passing the
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| 	 * check above means at least one end is within the stack,
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| 	 * so if this check fails, the other end is outside the stack).
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| 	 */
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| 	if (obj < stack || stackend < obj + len)
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| 		return BAD_STACK;
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| 
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| 	/* Check if object is safely within a valid frame. */
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| 	ret = arch_within_stack_frames(stack, stackend, obj, len);
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| 	if (ret)
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| 		return ret;
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| 
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| 	return GOOD_STACK;
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| }
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| 
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| /*
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|  * If these functions are reached, then CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY has found
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|  * an unexpected state during a copy_from_user() or copy_to_user() call.
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|  * There are several checks being performed on the buffer by the
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|  * __check_object_size() function. Normal stack buffer usage should never
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|  * trip the checks, and kernel text addressing will always trip the check.
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|  * For cache objects, it is checking that only the whitelisted range of
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|  * bytes for a given cache is being accessed (via the cache's usersize and
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|  * useroffset fields). To adjust a cache whitelist, use the usercopy-aware
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|  * kmem_cache_create_usercopy() function to create the cache (and
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|  * carefully audit the whitelist range).
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|  */
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| void usercopy_warn(const char *name, const char *detail, bool to_user,
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| 		   unsigned long offset, unsigned long len)
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| {
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| 	WARN_ONCE(1, "Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %s%s%s%s (offset %lu, size %lu)!\n",
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| 		 to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
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| 		 to_user ? "from" : "to",
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| 		 name ? : "unknown?!",
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| 		 detail ? " '" : "", detail ? : "", detail ? "'" : "",
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| 		 offset, len);
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| }
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| 
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| void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail,
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| 			       bool to_user, unsigned long offset,
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| 			       unsigned long len)
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| {
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| 	pr_emerg("Kernel memory %s attempt detected %s %s%s%s%s (offset %lu, size %lu)!\n",
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| 		 to_user ? "exposure" : "overwrite",
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| 		 to_user ? "from" : "to",
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| 		 name ? : "unknown?!",
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| 		 detail ? " '" : "", detail ? : "", detail ? "'" : "",
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| 		 offset, len);
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * For greater effect, it would be nice to do do_group_exit(),
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| 	 * but BUG() actually hooks all the lock-breaking and per-arch
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| 	 * Oops code, so that is used here instead.
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| 	 */
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| 	BUG();
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| }
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| 
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| /* Returns true if any portion of [ptr,ptr+n) over laps with [low,high). */
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| static bool overlaps(const unsigned long ptr, unsigned long n,
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| 		     unsigned long low, unsigned long high)
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| {
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| 	const unsigned long check_low = ptr;
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| 	unsigned long check_high = check_low + n;
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| 
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| 	/* Does not overlap if entirely above or entirely below. */
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| 	if (check_low >= high || check_high <= low)
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| 		return false;
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| 
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| 	return true;
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| }
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| 
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| /* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */
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| static inline void check_kernel_text_object(const unsigned long ptr,
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| 					    unsigned long n, bool to_user)
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| {
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| 	unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
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| 	unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
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| 	unsigned long textlow_linear, texthigh_linear;
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| 
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| 	if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
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| 		usercopy_abort("kernel text", NULL, to_user, ptr - textlow, n);
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * Some architectures have virtual memory mappings with a secondary
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| 	 * mapping of the kernel text, i.e. there is more than one virtual
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| 	 * kernel address that points to the kernel image. It is usually
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| 	 * when there is a separate linear physical memory mapping, in that
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| 	 * __pa() is not just the reverse of __va(). This can be detected
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| 	 * and checked:
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| 	 */
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| 	textlow_linear = (unsigned long)lm_alias(textlow);
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| 	/* No different mapping: we're done. */
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| 	if (textlow_linear == textlow)
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| 		return;
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| 
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| 	/* Check the secondary mapping... */
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| 	texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)lm_alias(texthigh);
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| 	if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear))
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| 		usercopy_abort("linear kernel text", NULL, to_user,
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| 			       ptr - textlow_linear, n);
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| }
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| 
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| static inline void check_bogus_address(const unsigned long ptr, unsigned long n,
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| 				       bool to_user)
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| {
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| 	/* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */
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| 	if (ptr + (n - 1) < ptr)
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| 		usercopy_abort("wrapped address", NULL, to_user, 0, ptr + n);
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| 
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| 	/* Reject if NULL or ZERO-allocation. */
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| 	if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(ptr))
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| 		usercopy_abort("null address", NULL, to_user, ptr, n);
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| }
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| 
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| /* Checks for allocs that are marked in some way as spanning multiple pages. */
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| static inline void check_page_span(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
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| 				   struct page *page, bool to_user)
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| {
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| #ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
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| 	const void *end = ptr + n - 1;
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| 	struct page *endpage;
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| 	bool is_reserved, is_cma;
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * Sometimes the kernel data regions are not marked Reserved (see
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| 	 * check below). And sometimes [_sdata,_edata) does not cover
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| 	 * rodata and/or bss, so check each range explicitly.
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| 	 */
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| 
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| 	/* Allow reads of kernel rodata region (if not marked as Reserved). */
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| 	if (ptr >= (const void *)__start_rodata &&
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| 	    end <= (const void *)__end_rodata) {
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| 		if (!to_user)
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| 			usercopy_abort("rodata", NULL, to_user, 0, n);
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| 		return;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	/* Allow kernel data region (if not marked as Reserved). */
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| 	if (ptr >= (const void *)_sdata && end <= (const void *)_edata)
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| 		return;
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| 
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| 	/* Allow kernel bss region (if not marked as Reserved). */
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| 	if (ptr >= (const void *)__bss_start &&
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| 	    end <= (const void *)__bss_stop)
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| 		return;
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| 
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| 	/* Is the object wholly within one base page? */
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| 	if (likely(((unsigned long)ptr & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK) ==
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| 		   ((unsigned long)end & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK)))
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| 		return;
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| 
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| 	/* Allow if fully inside the same compound (__GFP_COMP) page. */
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| 	endpage = virt_to_head_page(end);
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| 	if (likely(endpage == page))
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| 		return;
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * Reject if range is entirely either Reserved (i.e. special or
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| 	 * device memory), or CMA. Otherwise, reject since the object spans
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| 	 * several independently allocated pages.
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| 	 */
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| 	is_reserved = PageReserved(page);
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| 	is_cma = is_migrate_cma_page(page);
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| 	if (!is_reserved && !is_cma)
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| 		usercopy_abort("spans multiple pages", NULL, to_user, 0, n);
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| 
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| 	for (ptr += PAGE_SIZE; ptr <= end; ptr += PAGE_SIZE) {
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| 		page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
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| 		if (is_reserved && !PageReserved(page))
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| 			usercopy_abort("spans Reserved and non-Reserved pages",
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| 				       NULL, to_user, 0, n);
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| 		if (is_cma && !is_migrate_cma_page(page))
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| 			usercopy_abort("spans CMA and non-CMA pages", NULL,
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| 				       to_user, 0, n);
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| 	}
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| #endif
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| }
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| 
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| static inline void check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
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| 				     bool to_user)
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| {
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| 	struct page *page;
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| 
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| 	if (!virt_addr_valid(ptr))
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| 		return;
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * When CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y, kmap_to_page() will give either the
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| 	 * highmem page or fallback to virt_to_page(). The following
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| 	 * is effectively a highmem-aware virt_to_head_page().
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| 	 */
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| 	page = compound_head(kmap_to_page((void *)ptr));
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| 
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| 	if (PageSlab(page)) {
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| 		/* Check slab allocator for flags and size. */
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| 		__check_heap_object(ptr, n, page, to_user);
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| 	} else {
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| 		/* Verify object does not incorrectly span multiple pages. */
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| 		check_page_span(ptr, n, page, to_user);
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| 	}
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| }
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| 
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| static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(bypass_usercopy_checks);
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| 
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| /*
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|  * Validates that the given object is:
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|  * - not bogus address
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|  * - fully contained by stack (or stack frame, when available)
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|  * - fully within SLAB object (or object whitelist area, when available)
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|  * - not in kernel text
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|  */
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| void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user)
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| {
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| 	if (static_branch_unlikely(&bypass_usercopy_checks))
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| 		return;
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| 
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| 	/* Skip all tests if size is zero. */
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| 	if (!n)
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| 		return;
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| 
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| 	/* Check for invalid addresses. */
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| 	check_bogus_address((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user);
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| 
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| 	/* Check for bad stack object. */
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| 	switch (check_stack_object(ptr, n)) {
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| 	case NOT_STACK:
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| 		/* Object is not touching the current process stack. */
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| 		break;
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| 	case GOOD_FRAME:
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| 	case GOOD_STACK:
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| 		/*
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| 		 * Object is either in the correct frame (when it
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| 		 * is possible to check) or just generally on the
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| 		 * process stack (when frame checking not available).
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| 		 */
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| 		return;
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| 	default:
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| 		usercopy_abort("process stack", NULL, to_user, 0, n);
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	/* Check for bad heap object. */
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| 	check_heap_object(ptr, n, to_user);
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| 
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| 	/* Check for object in kernel to avoid text exposure. */
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| 	check_kernel_text_object((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user);
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| }
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| EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_object_size);
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| 
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| static bool enable_checks __initdata = true;
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| 
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| static int __init parse_hardened_usercopy(char *str)
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| {
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| 	return strtobool(str, &enable_checks);
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| }
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| 
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| __setup("hardened_usercopy=", parse_hardened_usercopy);
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| 
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| static int __init set_hardened_usercopy(void)
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| {
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| 	if (enable_checks == false)
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| 		static_branch_enable(&bypass_usercopy_checks);
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| 	return 1;
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| }
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| 
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| late_initcall(set_hardened_usercopy);
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