linux/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
Lukas Wunner d6793ff974 crypto: ecdsa - Move X9.62 signature decoding into template
Unlike the rsa driver, which separates signature decoding and
signature verification into two steps, the ecdsa driver does both in one.

This restricts users to the one signature format currently supported
(X9.62) and prevents addition of others such as P1363, which is needed
by the forthcoming SPDM library (Security Protocol and Data Model) for
PCI device authentication.

Per Herbert's suggestion, change ecdsa to use a "raw" signature encoding
and then implement X9.62 and P1363 as templates which convert their
respective encodings to the raw one.  One may then specify
"x962(ecdsa-nist-XXX)" or "p1363(ecdsa-nist-XXX)" to pick the encoding.

The present commit moves X9.62 decoding to a template.  A separate
commit is going to introduce another template for P1363 decoding.

The ecdsa driver internally represents a signature as two u64 arrays of
size ECC_MAX_BYTES.  This appears to be the most natural choice for the
raw format as it can directly be used for verification without having to
further decode signature data or copy it around.

Repurpose all the existing test vectors for "x962(ecdsa-nist-XXX)" and
create a duplicate of them to test the raw encoding.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZoHXyGwRzVvYkcTP@gondor.apana.org.au/
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2024-10-05 13:22:04 +08:00

490 lines
12 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/* In-software asymmetric public-key crypto subtype
*
* See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst
*
* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKEY: "fmt
#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <crypto/sig.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <linux/asn1.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("In-software asymmetric public-key subtype");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
/*
* Provide a part of a description of the key for /proc/keys.
*/
static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key,
struct seq_file *m)
{
struct public_key *key = asymmetric_key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
if (key)
seq_printf(m, "%s.%s", key->id_type, key->pkey_algo);
}
/*
* Destroy a public key algorithm key.
*/
void public_key_free(struct public_key *key)
{
if (key) {
kfree_sensitive(key->key);
kfree(key->params);
kfree(key);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_free);
/*
* Destroy a public key algorithm key.
*/
static void public_key_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3)
{
public_key_free(payload0);
public_key_signature_free(payload3);
}
/*
* Given a public_key, and an encoding and hash_algo to be used for signing
* and/or verification with that key, determine the name of the corresponding
* akcipher algorithm. Also check that encoding and hash_algo are allowed.
*/
static int
software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey,
const char *encoding, const char *hash_algo,
char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME], bool *sig,
enum kernel_pkey_operation op)
{
int n;
*sig = true;
if (!encoding)
return -EINVAL;
if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "rsa") == 0) {
/*
* RSA signatures usually use EMSA-PKCS1-1_5 [RFC3447 sec 8.2].
*/
if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) {
*sig = op == kernel_pkey_sign ||
op == kernel_pkey_verify;
if (!*sig) {
/*
* For encrypt/decrypt, hash_algo is not used
* but allowed to be set for historic reasons.
*/
n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"pkcs1pad(%s)",
pkey->pkey_algo);
} else {
if (!hash_algo)
return -EINVAL;
n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"pkcs1(%s,%s)",
pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo);
}
return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Raw RSA cannot differentiate between different hash
* algorithms.
*/
if (hash_algo)
return -EINVAL;
*sig = false;
} else if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) {
if (strcmp(encoding, "x962") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* ECDSA signatures are taken over a raw hash, so they don't
* differentiate between different hash algorithms. That means
* that the verifier should hard-code a specific hash algorithm.
* Unfortunately, in practice ECDSA is used with multiple SHAs,
* so we have to allow all of them and not just one.
*/
if (!hash_algo)
return -EINVAL;
if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sha1") != 0 &&
strcmp(hash_algo, "sha224") != 0 &&
strcmp(hash_algo, "sha256") != 0 &&
strcmp(hash_algo, "sha384") != 0 &&
strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0 &&
strcmp(hash_algo, "sha3-256") != 0 &&
strcmp(hash_algo, "sha3-384") != 0 &&
strcmp(hash_algo, "sha3-512") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s(%s)",
encoding, pkey->pkey_algo);
return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0;
} else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0) {
if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (!hash_algo)
return -EINVAL;
if (strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog256") != 0 &&
strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog512") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
} else {
/* Unknown public key algorithm */
return -ENOPKG;
}
if (strscpy(alg_name, pkey->pkey_algo, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
static u8 *pkey_pack_u32(u8 *dst, u32 val)
{
memcpy(dst, &val, sizeof(val));
return dst + sizeof(val);
}
/*
* Query information about a key.
*/
static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
struct kernel_pkey_query *info)
{
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
struct public_key *pkey = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
struct crypto_sig *sig;
u8 *key, *ptr;
int ret, len;
bool issig;
ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding,
params->hash_algo, alg_name,
&issig, kernel_pkey_sign);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
ptr = key + pkey->keylen;
ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo);
ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen);
memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen);
if (issig) {
sig = crypto_alloc_sig(alg_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(sig)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(sig);
goto error_free_key;
}
if (pkey->key_is_private)
ret = crypto_sig_set_privkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
else
ret = crypto_sig_set_pubkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free_tfm;
len = crypto_sig_maxsize(sig);
info->supported_ops = KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_VERIFY;
if (pkey->key_is_private)
info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_SIGN;
if (strcmp(params->encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) {
info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT;
if (pkey->key_is_private)
info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT;
}
} else {
tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
goto error_free_key;
}
if (pkey->key_is_private)
ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
else
ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free_tfm;
len = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
info->supported_ops = KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT;
if (pkey->key_is_private)
info->supported_ops |= KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT;
}
info->key_size = len * 8;
if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) {
int slen = len;
/*
* ECDSA key sizes are much smaller than RSA, and thus could
* operate on (hashed) inputs that are larger than key size.
* For example SHA384-hashed input used with secp256r1
* based keys. Set max_data_size to be at least as large as
* the largest supported hash size (SHA512)
*/
info->max_data_size = 64;
/*
* Verify takes ECDSA-Sig (described in RFC 5480) as input,
* which is actually 2 'key_size'-bit integers encoded in
* ASN.1. Account for the ASN.1 encoding overhead here.
*
* NIST P192/256/384 may prepend a '0' to a coordinate to
* indicate a positive integer. NIST P521 never needs it.
*/
if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-nist-p521") != 0)
slen += 1;
/* Length of encoding the x & y coordinates */
slen = 2 * (slen + 2);
/*
* If coordinate encoding takes at least 128 bytes then an
* additional byte for length encoding is needed.
*/
info->max_sig_size = 1 + (slen >= 128) + 1 + slen;
} else {
info->max_data_size = len;
info->max_sig_size = len;
}
info->max_enc_size = len;
info->max_dec_size = len;
ret = 0;
error_free_tfm:
if (issig)
crypto_free_sig(sig);
else
crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
error_free_key:
kfree_sensitive(key);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
/*
* Do encryption, decryption and signing ops.
*/
static int software_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, void *out)
{
const struct public_key *pkey = params->key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
struct crypto_sig *sig;
char *key, *ptr;
bool issig;
int ksz;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding,
params->hash_algo, alg_name,
&issig, params->op);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
ptr = key + pkey->keylen;
ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo);
ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen);
memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen);
if (issig) {
sig = crypto_alloc_sig(alg_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(sig)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(sig);
goto error_free_key;
}
if (pkey->key_is_private)
ret = crypto_sig_set_privkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
else
ret = crypto_sig_set_pubkey(sig, key, pkey->keylen);
if (ret)
goto error_free_tfm;
ksz = crypto_sig_maxsize(sig);
} else {
tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
goto error_free_key;
}
if (pkey->key_is_private)
ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
else
ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
if (ret)
goto error_free_tfm;
ksz = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
}
ret = -EINVAL;
/* Perform the encryption calculation. */
switch (params->op) {
case kernel_pkey_encrypt:
if (issig)
break;
ret = crypto_akcipher_sync_encrypt(tfm, in, params->in_len,
out, params->out_len);
break;
case kernel_pkey_decrypt:
if (issig)
break;
ret = crypto_akcipher_sync_decrypt(tfm, in, params->in_len,
out, params->out_len);
break;
case kernel_pkey_sign:
if (!issig)
break;
ret = crypto_sig_sign(sig, in, params->in_len,
out, params->out_len);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
if (ret == 0)
ret = ksz;
error_free_tfm:
if (issig)
crypto_free_sig(sig);
else
crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
error_free_key:
kfree_sensitive(key);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
/*
* Verify a signature using a public key.
*/
int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
const struct public_key_signature *sig)
{
char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
struct crypto_sig *tfm;
char *key, *ptr;
bool issig;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
BUG_ON(!pkey);
BUG_ON(!sig);
BUG_ON(!sig->s);
/*
* If the signature specifies a public key algorithm, it *must* match
* the key's actual public key algorithm.
*
* Small exception: ECDSA signatures don't specify the curve, but ECDSA
* keys do. So the strings can mismatch slightly in that case:
* "ecdsa-nist-*" for the key, but "ecdsa" for the signature.
*/
if (sig->pkey_algo) {
if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, sig->pkey_algo) != 0 &&
(strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6) != 0 ||
strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") != 0))
return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, sig->encoding,
sig->hash_algo, alg_name,
&issig, kernel_pkey_verify);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
tfm = crypto_alloc_sig(alg_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error_free_tfm;
}
memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
ptr = key + pkey->keylen;
ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo);
ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen);
memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen);
if (pkey->key_is_private)
ret = crypto_sig_set_privkey(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
else
ret = crypto_sig_set_pubkey(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
if (ret)
goto error_free_key;
ret = crypto_sig_verify(tfm, sig->s, sig->s_size,
sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
error_free_key:
kfree_sensitive(key);
error_free_tfm:
crypto_free_sig(tfm);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret > 0))
ret = -EINVAL;
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_verify_signature);
static int public_key_verify_signature_2(const struct key *key,
const struct public_key_signature *sig)
{
const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
return public_key_verify_signature(pk, sig);
}
/*
* Public key algorithm asymmetric key subtype
*/
struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.name = "public_key",
.name_len = sizeof("public_key") - 1,
.describe = public_key_describe,
.destroy = public_key_destroy,
.query = software_key_query,
.eds_op = software_key_eds_op,
.verify_signature = public_key_verify_signature_2,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_subtype);