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synced 2025-08-05 16:54:27 +00:00

The 'commit 35f96de041
("bpf: Introduce BPF token object")' added
BPF token as a new kind of BPF kernel object. And BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD
already used to get BPF object info, so we can also get token info with
this cmd.
One usage scenario, when program runs failed with token, because of
the permission failure, we can report what BPF token is allowing with
this API for debugging.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250716134654.1162635-1-chen.dylane@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
278 lines
6.8 KiB
C
278 lines
6.8 KiB
C
#include <linux/bpf.h>
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#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/idr.h>
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#include <linux/namei.h>
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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static bool bpf_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
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{
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return ns_capable(ns, cap) || (cap != CAP_SYS_ADMIN && ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN));
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}
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bool bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
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{
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struct user_namespace *userns;
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/* BPF token allows ns_capable() level of capabilities */
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userns = token ? token->userns : &init_user_ns;
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if (!bpf_ns_capable(userns, cap))
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return false;
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if (token && security_bpf_token_capable(token, cap) < 0)
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return false;
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return true;
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}
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void bpf_token_inc(struct bpf_token *token)
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{
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atomic64_inc(&token->refcnt);
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}
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static void bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
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{
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security_bpf_token_free(token);
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put_user_ns(token->userns);
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kfree(token);
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}
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static void bpf_token_put_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
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{
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struct bpf_token *token = container_of(work, struct bpf_token, work);
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bpf_token_free(token);
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}
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void bpf_token_put(struct bpf_token *token)
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{
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if (!token)
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return;
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if (!atomic64_dec_and_test(&token->refcnt))
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return;
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INIT_WORK(&token->work, bpf_token_put_deferred);
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schedule_work(&token->work);
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}
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static int bpf_token_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
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{
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struct bpf_token *token = filp->private_data;
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bpf_token_put(token);
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return 0;
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}
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static void bpf_token_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp)
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{
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struct bpf_token *token = filp->private_data;
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u64 mask;
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BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_CMD >= 64);
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mask = BIT_ULL(__MAX_BPF_CMD) - 1;
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if ((token->allowed_cmds & mask) == mask)
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_cmds:\tany\n");
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else
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_cmds:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_cmds);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE >= 64);
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mask = BIT_ULL(__MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE) - 1;
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if ((token->allowed_maps & mask) == mask)
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_maps:\tany\n");
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else
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_maps:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_maps);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_PROG_TYPE >= 64);
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mask = BIT_ULL(__MAX_BPF_PROG_TYPE) - 1;
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if ((token->allowed_progs & mask) == mask)
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_progs:\tany\n");
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else
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_progs:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_progs);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE >= 64);
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mask = BIT_ULL(__MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE) - 1;
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if ((token->allowed_attachs & mask) == mask)
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_attachs:\tany\n");
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else
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seq_printf(m, "allowed_attachs:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_attachs);
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}
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#define BPF_TOKEN_INODE_NAME "bpf-token"
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static const struct inode_operations bpf_token_iops = { };
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const struct file_operations bpf_token_fops = {
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.release = bpf_token_release,
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.show_fdinfo = bpf_token_show_fdinfo,
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};
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int bpf_token_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
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{
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struct bpf_mount_opts *mnt_opts;
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struct bpf_token *token = NULL;
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struct user_namespace *userns;
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struct inode *inode;
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struct file *file;
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CLASS(fd, f)(attr->token_create.bpffs_fd);
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struct path path;
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struct super_block *sb;
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umode_t mode;
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int err, fd;
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if (fd_empty(f))
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return -EBADF;
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path = fd_file(f)->f_path;
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sb = path.dentry->d_sb;
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if (path.dentry != sb->s_root)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (sb->s_op != &bpf_super_ops)
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return -EINVAL;
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err = path_permission(&path, MAY_ACCESS);
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if (err)
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return err;
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userns = sb->s_user_ns;
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/*
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* Enforce that creators of BPF tokens are in the same user
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* namespace as the BPF FS instance. This makes reasoning about
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* permissions a lot easier and we can always relax this later.
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*/
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if (current_user_ns() != userns)
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return -EPERM;
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if (!ns_capable(userns, CAP_BPF))
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return -EPERM;
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/* Creating BPF token in init_user_ns doesn't make much sense. */
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if (current_user_ns() == &init_user_ns)
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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mnt_opts = sb->s_fs_info;
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if (mnt_opts->delegate_cmds == 0 &&
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mnt_opts->delegate_maps == 0 &&
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mnt_opts->delegate_progs == 0 &&
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mnt_opts->delegate_attachs == 0)
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return -ENOENT; /* no BPF token delegation is set up */
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mode = S_IFREG | ((S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) & ~current_umask());
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inode = bpf_get_inode(sb, NULL, mode);
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if (IS_ERR(inode))
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return PTR_ERR(inode);
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inode->i_op = &bpf_token_iops;
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inode->i_fop = &bpf_token_fops;
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clear_nlink(inode); /* make sure it is unlinked */
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file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, path.mnt, BPF_TOKEN_INODE_NAME, O_RDWR, &bpf_token_fops);
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if (IS_ERR(file)) {
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iput(inode);
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return PTR_ERR(file);
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}
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token = kzalloc(sizeof(*token), GFP_USER);
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if (!token) {
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err = -ENOMEM;
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goto out_file;
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}
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atomic64_set(&token->refcnt, 1);
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/* remember bpffs owning userns for future ns_capable() checks */
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token->userns = get_user_ns(userns);
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token->allowed_cmds = mnt_opts->delegate_cmds;
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token->allowed_maps = mnt_opts->delegate_maps;
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token->allowed_progs = mnt_opts->delegate_progs;
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token->allowed_attachs = mnt_opts->delegate_attachs;
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err = security_bpf_token_create(token, attr, &path);
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if (err)
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goto out_token;
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fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC);
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if (fd < 0) {
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err = fd;
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goto out_token;
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}
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file->private_data = token;
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fd_install(fd, file);
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return fd;
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out_token:
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bpf_token_free(token);
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out_file:
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fput(file);
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return err;
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}
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int bpf_token_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_token *token,
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const union bpf_attr *attr,
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union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
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{
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struct bpf_token_info __user *uinfo = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->info.info);
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struct bpf_token_info info;
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u32 info_len = attr->info.info_len;
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info_len = min_t(u32, info_len, sizeof(info));
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memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
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info.allowed_cmds = token->allowed_cmds;
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info.allowed_maps = token->allowed_maps;
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info.allowed_progs = token->allowed_progs;
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info.allowed_attachs = token->allowed_attachs;
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if (copy_to_user(uinfo, &info, info_len) ||
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put_user(info_len, &uattr->info.info_len))
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return -EFAULT;
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return 0;
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}
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struct bpf_token *bpf_token_get_from_fd(u32 ufd)
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{
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CLASS(fd, f)(ufd);
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struct bpf_token *token;
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if (fd_empty(f))
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return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
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if (fd_file(f)->f_op != &bpf_token_fops)
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return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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token = fd_file(f)->private_data;
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bpf_token_inc(token);
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return token;
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}
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bool bpf_token_allow_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
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{
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if (!token)
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return false;
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if (!(token->allowed_cmds & BIT_ULL(cmd)))
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return false;
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return security_bpf_token_cmd(token, cmd) == 0;
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}
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bool bpf_token_allow_map_type(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_map_type type)
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{
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if (!token || type >= __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE)
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return false;
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return token->allowed_maps & BIT_ULL(type);
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}
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bool bpf_token_allow_prog_type(const struct bpf_token *token,
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enum bpf_prog_type prog_type,
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enum bpf_attach_type attach_type)
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{
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if (!token || prog_type >= __MAX_BPF_PROG_TYPE || attach_type >= __MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE)
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return false;
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return (token->allowed_progs & BIT_ULL(prog_type)) &&
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(token->allowed_attachs & BIT_ULL(attach_type));
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}
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