linux/drivers/net/ovpn/crypto_aead.c
Antonio Quartulli 40d48527a5 ovpn: fix check for skb_to_sgvec_nomark() return value
Depending on the data offset, skb_to_sgvec_nomark() may use
less scatterlist elements than what was forecasted by the
previous call to skb_cow_data().

It specifically happens when 'skbheadlen(skb) < offset', because
in this case we entirely skip the skb's head, which would have
required its own scatterlist element.

For this reason, it doesn't make sense to check that
skb_to_sgvec_nomark() returns the same value as skb_cow_data(),
but we can rather check for errors only, as it happens in
other parts of the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@openvpn.net>
2025-05-15 13:09:36 +02:00

389 lines
10 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/* OpenVPN data channel offload
*
* Copyright (C) 2020-2025 OpenVPN, Inc.
*
* Author: James Yonan <james@openvpn.net>
* Antonio Quartulli <antonio@openvpn.net>
*/
#include <crypto/aead.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
#include "ovpnpriv.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "io.h"
#include "pktid.h"
#include "crypto_aead.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#include "peer.h"
#include "proto.h"
#include "skb.h"
#define OVPN_AUTH_TAG_SIZE 16
#define OVPN_AAD_SIZE (OVPN_OPCODE_SIZE + OVPN_NONCE_WIRE_SIZE)
#define ALG_NAME_AES "gcm(aes)"
#define ALG_NAME_CHACHAPOLY "rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)"
static int ovpn_aead_encap_overhead(const struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks)
{
return OVPN_OPCODE_SIZE + /* OP header size */
sizeof(u32) + /* Packet ID */
crypto_aead_authsize(ks->encrypt); /* Auth Tag */
}
int ovpn_aead_encrypt(struct ovpn_peer *peer, struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const unsigned int tag_size = crypto_aead_authsize(ks->encrypt);
struct aead_request *req;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
struct scatterlist *sg;
int nfrags, ret;
u32 pktid, op;
u8 *iv;
ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->peer = peer;
ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->ks = ks;
/* Sample AEAD header format:
* 48000001 00000005 7e7046bd 444a7e28 cc6387b1 64a4d6c1 380275a...
* [ OP32 ] [seq # ] [ auth tag ] [ payload ... ]
* [4-byte
* IV head]
*/
/* check that there's enough headroom in the skb for packet
* encapsulation
*/
if (unlikely(skb_cow_head(skb, OVPN_HEAD_ROOM)))
return -ENOBUFS;
/* get number of skb frags and ensure that packet data is writable */
nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
if (unlikely(nfrags < 0))
return nfrags;
if (unlikely(nfrags + 2 > (MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2)))
return -ENOSPC;
/* sg may be required by async crypto */
ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->sg = kmalloc(sizeof(*ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->sg) *
(nfrags + 2), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->sg))
return -ENOMEM;
sg = ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->sg;
/* sg table:
* 0: op, wire nonce (AD, len=OVPN_OP_SIZE_V2+OVPN_NONCE_WIRE_SIZE),
* 1, 2, 3, ..., n: payload,
* n+1: auth_tag (len=tag_size)
*/
sg_init_table(sg, nfrags + 2);
/* build scatterlist to encrypt packet payload */
ret = skb_to_sgvec_nomark(skb, sg + 1, 0, skb->len);
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
netdev_err(peer->ovpn->dev,
"encrypt: cannot map skb to sg: %d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
/* append auth_tag onto scatterlist */
__skb_push(skb, tag_size);
sg_set_buf(sg + ret + 1, skb->data, tag_size);
/* obtain packet ID, which is used both as a first
* 4 bytes of nonce and last 4 bytes of associated data.
*/
ret = ovpn_pktid_xmit_next(&ks->pid_xmit, &pktid);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
return ret;
/* iv may be required by async crypto */
ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->iv = kmalloc(OVPN_NONCE_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->iv))
return -ENOMEM;
iv = ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->iv;
/* concat 4 bytes packet id and 8 bytes nonce tail into 12 bytes
* nonce
*/
ovpn_pktid_aead_write(pktid, ks->nonce_tail_xmit, iv);
/* make space for packet id and push it to the front */
__skb_push(skb, OVPN_NONCE_WIRE_SIZE);
memcpy(skb->data, iv, OVPN_NONCE_WIRE_SIZE);
/* add packet op as head of additional data */
op = ovpn_opcode_compose(OVPN_DATA_V2, ks->key_id, peer->id);
__skb_push(skb, OVPN_OPCODE_SIZE);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(op) != OVPN_OPCODE_SIZE);
*((__force __be32 *)skb->data) = htonl(op);
/* AEAD Additional data */
sg_set_buf(sg, skb->data, OVPN_AAD_SIZE);
req = aead_request_alloc(ks->encrypt, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!req))
return -ENOMEM;
ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->req = req;
/* setup async crypto operation */
aead_request_set_tfm(req, ks->encrypt);
aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, ovpn_encrypt_post, skb);
aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg,
skb->len - ovpn_aead_encap_overhead(ks), iv);
aead_request_set_ad(req, OVPN_AAD_SIZE);
/* encrypt it */
return crypto_aead_encrypt(req);
}
int ovpn_aead_decrypt(struct ovpn_peer *peer, struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const unsigned int tag_size = crypto_aead_authsize(ks->decrypt);
int ret, payload_len, nfrags;
unsigned int payload_offset;
struct aead_request *req;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
struct scatterlist *sg;
u8 *iv;
payload_offset = OVPN_AAD_SIZE + tag_size;
payload_len = skb->len - payload_offset;
ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->payload_offset = payload_offset;
ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->peer = peer;
ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->ks = ks;
/* sanity check on packet size, payload size must be >= 0 */
if (unlikely(payload_len < 0))
return -EINVAL;
/* Prepare the skb data buffer to be accessed up until the auth tag.
* This is required because this area is directly mapped into the sg
* list.
*/
if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, payload_offset)))
return -ENODATA;
/* get number of skb frags and ensure that packet data is writable */
nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
if (unlikely(nfrags < 0))
return nfrags;
if (unlikely(nfrags + 2 > (MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2)))
return -ENOSPC;
/* sg may be required by async crypto */
ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->sg = kmalloc(sizeof(*ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->sg) *
(nfrags + 2), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->sg))
return -ENOMEM;
sg = ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->sg;
/* sg table:
* 0: op, wire nonce (AD, len=OVPN_OPCODE_SIZE+OVPN_NONCE_WIRE_SIZE),
* 1, 2, 3, ..., n: payload,
* n+1: auth_tag (len=tag_size)
*/
sg_init_table(sg, nfrags + 2);
/* packet op is head of additional data */
sg_set_buf(sg, skb->data, OVPN_AAD_SIZE);
/* build scatterlist to decrypt packet payload */
ret = skb_to_sgvec_nomark(skb, sg + 1, payload_offset, payload_len);
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
netdev_err(peer->ovpn->dev,
"decrypt: cannot map skb to sg: %d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
/* append auth_tag onto scatterlist */
sg_set_buf(sg + ret + 1, skb->data + OVPN_AAD_SIZE, tag_size);
/* iv may be required by async crypto */
ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->iv = kmalloc(OVPN_NONCE_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->iv))
return -ENOMEM;
iv = ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->iv;
/* copy nonce into IV buffer */
memcpy(iv, skb->data + OVPN_OPCODE_SIZE, OVPN_NONCE_WIRE_SIZE);
memcpy(iv + OVPN_NONCE_WIRE_SIZE, ks->nonce_tail_recv,
OVPN_NONCE_TAIL_SIZE);
req = aead_request_alloc(ks->decrypt, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!req))
return -ENOMEM;
ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->req = req;
/* setup async crypto operation */
aead_request_set_tfm(req, ks->decrypt);
aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, ovpn_decrypt_post, skb);
aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, payload_len + tag_size, iv);
aead_request_set_ad(req, OVPN_AAD_SIZE);
/* decrypt it */
return crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
}
/* Initialize a struct crypto_aead object */
static struct crypto_aead *ovpn_aead_init(const char *title,
const char *alg_name,
const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct crypto_aead *aead;
int ret;
aead = crypto_alloc_aead(alg_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(aead)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(aead);
pr_err("%s crypto_alloc_aead failed, err=%d\n", title, ret);
aead = NULL;
goto error;
}
ret = crypto_aead_setkey(aead, key, keylen);
if (ret) {
pr_err("%s crypto_aead_setkey size=%u failed, err=%d\n", title,
keylen, ret);
goto error;
}
ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(aead, OVPN_AUTH_TAG_SIZE);
if (ret) {
pr_err("%s crypto_aead_setauthsize failed, err=%d\n", title,
ret);
goto error;
}
/* basic AEAD assumption */
if (crypto_aead_ivsize(aead) != OVPN_NONCE_SIZE) {
pr_err("%s IV size must be %d\n", title, OVPN_NONCE_SIZE);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
pr_debug("********* Cipher %s (%s)\n", alg_name, title);
pr_debug("*** IV size=%u\n", crypto_aead_ivsize(aead));
pr_debug("*** req size=%u\n", crypto_aead_reqsize(aead));
pr_debug("*** block size=%u\n", crypto_aead_blocksize(aead));
pr_debug("*** auth size=%u\n", crypto_aead_authsize(aead));
pr_debug("*** alignmask=0x%x\n", crypto_aead_alignmask(aead));
return aead;
error:
crypto_free_aead(aead);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
void ovpn_aead_crypto_key_slot_destroy(struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks)
{
if (!ks)
return;
crypto_free_aead(ks->encrypt);
crypto_free_aead(ks->decrypt);
kfree(ks);
}
struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *
ovpn_aead_crypto_key_slot_new(const struct ovpn_key_config *kc)
{
struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks = NULL;
const char *alg_name;
int ret;
/* validate crypto alg */
switch (kc->cipher_alg) {
case OVPN_CIPHER_ALG_AES_GCM:
alg_name = ALG_NAME_AES;
break;
case OVPN_CIPHER_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
alg_name = ALG_NAME_CHACHAPOLY;
break;
default:
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
if (kc->encrypt.nonce_tail_size != OVPN_NONCE_TAIL_SIZE ||
kc->decrypt.nonce_tail_size != OVPN_NONCE_TAIL_SIZE)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/* build the key slot */
ks = kmalloc(sizeof(*ks), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ks)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ks->encrypt = NULL;
ks->decrypt = NULL;
kref_init(&ks->refcount);
ks->key_id = kc->key_id;
ks->encrypt = ovpn_aead_init("encrypt", alg_name,
kc->encrypt.cipher_key,
kc->encrypt.cipher_key_size);
if (IS_ERR(ks->encrypt)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(ks->encrypt);
ks->encrypt = NULL;
goto destroy_ks;
}
ks->decrypt = ovpn_aead_init("decrypt", alg_name,
kc->decrypt.cipher_key,
kc->decrypt.cipher_key_size);
if (IS_ERR(ks->decrypt)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(ks->decrypt);
ks->decrypt = NULL;
goto destroy_ks;
}
memcpy(ks->nonce_tail_xmit, kc->encrypt.nonce_tail,
OVPN_NONCE_TAIL_SIZE);
memcpy(ks->nonce_tail_recv, kc->decrypt.nonce_tail,
OVPN_NONCE_TAIL_SIZE);
/* init packet ID generation/validation */
ovpn_pktid_xmit_init(&ks->pid_xmit);
ovpn_pktid_recv_init(&ks->pid_recv);
return ks;
destroy_ks:
ovpn_aead_crypto_key_slot_destroy(ks);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
enum ovpn_cipher_alg ovpn_aead_crypto_alg(struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks)
{
const char *alg_name;
if (!ks->encrypt)
return OVPN_CIPHER_ALG_NONE;
alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(ks->encrypt));
if (!strcmp(alg_name, ALG_NAME_AES))
return OVPN_CIPHER_ALG_AES_GCM;
else if (!strcmp(alg_name, ALG_NAME_CHACHAPOLY))
return OVPN_CIPHER_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
else
return OVPN_CIPHER_ALG_NONE;
}