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Both Intel and AMD CPUs support 5-level paging, which is expected to become more widely adopted in the future. All major x86 Linux distributions have the feature enabled. Remove CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL and related #ifdeffery for it to make it more readable. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250516123306.3812286-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
217 lines
6.5 KiB
C
217 lines
6.5 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/linkage.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/pgtable.h>
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#include <asm/init.h>
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#include <asm/sections.h>
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#include <asm/setup.h>
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#include <asm/sev.h>
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extern pmd_t early_dynamic_pgts[EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES][PTRS_PER_PMD];
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extern unsigned int next_early_pgt;
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static inline bool check_la57_support(void)
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{
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/*
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* 5-level paging is detected and enabled at kernel decompression
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* stage. Only check if it has been enabled there.
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*/
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if (!(native_read_cr4() & X86_CR4_LA57))
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return false;
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__pgtable_l5_enabled = 1;
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pgdir_shift = 48;
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ptrs_per_p4d = 512;
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return true;
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}
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static unsigned long __head sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp,
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pmdval_t *pmd,
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unsigned long p2v_offset)
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{
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unsigned long paddr, paddr_end;
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int i;
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/* Encrypt the kernel and related (if SME is active) */
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sme_encrypt_kernel(bp);
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/*
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* Clear the memory encryption mask from the .bss..decrypted section.
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* The bss section will be memset to zero later in the initialization so
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* there is no need to zero it after changing the memory encryption
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* attribute.
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*/
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if (sme_get_me_mask()) {
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paddr = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(__start_bss_decrypted);
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paddr_end = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(__end_bss_decrypted);
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for (; paddr < paddr_end; paddr += PMD_SIZE) {
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/*
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* On SNP, transition the page to shared in the RMP table so that
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* it is consistent with the page table attribute change.
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*
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* __start_bss_decrypted has a virtual address in the high range
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* mapping (kernel .text). PVALIDATE, by way of
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* early_snp_set_memory_shared(), requires a valid virtual
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* address but the kernel is currently running off of the identity
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* mapping so use the PA to get a *currently* valid virtual address.
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*/
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early_snp_set_memory_shared(paddr, paddr, PTRS_PER_PMD);
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i = pmd_index(paddr - p2v_offset);
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pmd[i] -= sme_get_me_mask();
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}
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}
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/*
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* Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a
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* modifier for the initial pgdir entry programmed into CR3.
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*/
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return sme_get_me_mask();
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}
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/*
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* This code is compiled using PIC codegen because it will execute from the
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* early 1:1 mapping of memory, which deviates from the mapping expected by the
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* linker. Due to this deviation, taking the address of a global variable will
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* produce an ambiguous result when using the plain & operator. Instead,
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* rip_rel_ptr() must be used, which will return the RIP-relative address in
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* the 1:1 mapping of memory. Kernel virtual addresses can be determined by
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* subtracting p2v_offset from the RIP-relative address.
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*/
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unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset,
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struct boot_params *bp)
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{
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pmd_t (*early_pgts)[PTRS_PER_PMD] = rip_rel_ptr(early_dynamic_pgts);
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unsigned long physaddr = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(_text);
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unsigned long va_text, va_end;
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unsigned long pgtable_flags;
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unsigned long load_delta;
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pgdval_t *pgd;
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p4dval_t *p4d;
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pudval_t *pud;
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pmdval_t *pmd, pmd_entry;
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bool la57;
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int i;
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la57 = check_la57_support();
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/* Is the address too large? */
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if (physaddr >> MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS)
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for (;;);
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/*
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* Compute the delta between the address I am compiled to run at
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* and the address I am actually running at.
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*/
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phys_base = load_delta = __START_KERNEL_map + p2v_offset;
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/* Is the address not 2M aligned? */
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if (load_delta & ~PMD_MASK)
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for (;;);
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va_text = physaddr - p2v_offset;
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va_end = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(_end) - p2v_offset;
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/* Include the SME encryption mask in the fixup value */
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load_delta += sme_get_me_mask();
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/* Fixup the physical addresses in the page table */
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pgd = rip_rel_ptr(early_top_pgt);
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pgd[pgd_index(__START_KERNEL_map)] += load_delta;
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if (la57) {
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p4d = (p4dval_t *)rip_rel_ptr(level4_kernel_pgt);
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p4d[MAX_PTRS_PER_P4D - 1] += load_delta;
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pgd[pgd_index(__START_KERNEL_map)] = (pgdval_t)p4d | _PAGE_TABLE;
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}
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level3_kernel_pgt[PTRS_PER_PUD - 2].pud += load_delta;
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level3_kernel_pgt[PTRS_PER_PUD - 1].pud += load_delta;
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for (i = FIXMAP_PMD_TOP; i > FIXMAP_PMD_TOP - FIXMAP_PMD_NUM; i--)
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level2_fixmap_pgt[i].pmd += load_delta;
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/*
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* Set up the identity mapping for the switchover. These
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* entries should *NOT* have the global bit set! This also
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* creates a bunch of nonsense entries but that is fine --
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* it avoids problems around wraparound.
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*/
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pud = &early_pgts[0]->pmd;
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pmd = &early_pgts[1]->pmd;
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next_early_pgt = 2;
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pgtable_flags = _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC + sme_get_me_mask();
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if (la57) {
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p4d = &early_pgts[next_early_pgt++]->pmd;
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i = (physaddr >> PGDIR_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PGD;
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pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)p4d + pgtable_flags;
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pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)p4d + pgtable_flags;
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i = physaddr >> P4D_SHIFT;
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p4d[(i + 0) % PTRS_PER_P4D] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
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p4d[(i + 1) % PTRS_PER_P4D] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
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} else {
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i = (physaddr >> PGDIR_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PGD;
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pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
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pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
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}
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i = physaddr >> PUD_SHIFT;
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pud[(i + 0) % PTRS_PER_PUD] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags;
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pud[(i + 1) % PTRS_PER_PUD] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags;
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pmd_entry = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL;
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pmd_entry += sme_get_me_mask();
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pmd_entry += physaddr;
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for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(va_end - va_text, PMD_SIZE); i++) {
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int idx = i + (physaddr >> PMD_SHIFT);
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pmd[idx % PTRS_PER_PMD] = pmd_entry + i * PMD_SIZE;
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}
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/*
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* Fixup the kernel text+data virtual addresses. Note that
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* we might write invalid pmds, when the kernel is relocated
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* cleanup_highmap() fixes this up along with the mappings
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* beyond _end.
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*
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* Only the region occupied by the kernel image has so far
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* been checked against the table of usable memory regions
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* provided by the firmware, so invalidate pages outside that
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* region. A page table entry that maps to a reserved area of
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* memory would allow processor speculation into that area,
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* and on some hardware (particularly the UV platform) even
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* speculative access to some reserved areas is caught as an
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* error, causing the BIOS to halt the system.
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*/
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pmd = rip_rel_ptr(level2_kernel_pgt);
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/* invalidate pages before the kernel image */
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for (i = 0; i < pmd_index(va_text); i++)
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pmd[i] &= ~_PAGE_PRESENT;
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/* fixup pages that are part of the kernel image */
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for (; i <= pmd_index(va_end); i++)
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if (pmd[i] & _PAGE_PRESENT)
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pmd[i] += load_delta;
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/* invalidate pages after the kernel image */
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for (; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++)
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pmd[i] &= ~_PAGE_PRESENT;
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return sme_postprocess_startup(bp, pmd, p2v_offset);
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}
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