Commit graph

379 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Daniel Borkmann
abad3d0bad bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage
Lonial reported that an out-of-bounds access in cgroup local storage
can be crafted via tail calls. Given two programs each utilizing a
cgroup local storage with a different value size, and one program
doing a tail call into the other. The verifier will validate each of
the indivial programs just fine. However, in the runtime context
the bpf_cg_run_ctx holds an bpf_prog_array_item which contains the
BPF program as well as any cgroup local storage flavor the program
uses. Helpers such as bpf_get_local_storage() pick this up from the
runtime context:

  ctx = container_of(current->bpf_ctx, struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, run_ctx);
  storage = ctx->prog_item->cgroup_storage[stype];

  if (stype == BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_SHARED)
    ptr = &READ_ONCE(storage->buf)->data[0];
  else
    ptr = this_cpu_ptr(storage->percpu_buf);

For the second program which was called from the originally attached
one, this means bpf_get_local_storage() will pick up the former
program's map, not its own. With mismatching sizes, this can result
in an unintended out-of-bounds access.

To fix this issue, we need to extend bpf_map_owner with an array of
storage_cookie[] to match on i) the exact maps from the original
program if the second program was using bpf_get_local_storage(), or
ii) allow the tail call combination if the second program was not
using any of the cgroup local storage maps.

Fixes: 7d9c342789 ("bpf: Make cgroup storages shared between programs on the same cgroup")
Reported-by: Lonial Con <kongln9170@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-4-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-07-31 11:30:05 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann
fd1c98f0ef bpf: Move bpf map owner out of common struct
Given this is only relevant for BPF tail call maps, it is adding up space
and penalizing other map types. We also need to extend this with further
objects to track / compare to. Therefore, lets move this out into a separate
structure and dynamically allocate it only for BPF tail call maps.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250730234733.530041-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-07-31 11:30:05 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
d9104cec3e bpf-next-6.17
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCAAdFiEE+soXsSLHKoYyzcli6rmadz2vbToFAmiINnEACgkQ6rmadz2v
 bToBnA/9F+A3R6rTwGk4HK3xpfc/nm2Tanl3oRN7S2ub/mskDOtWSIyG6cVFZ0UG
 1fK6IkByyRIpAF/5qhdlw8drRXHkQtGLA0lP2L9llm4X1mHLofB18y9OeLrDE1WN
 KwNP06+IGX9W802lCGSIXOY+VmRscVfXSMokyQt2ilHplKjOnDqJcYkWupi3T2rC
 mz79FY9aEl2YrIcpj9RXz+8nwP49pZBuW2P0IM5PAIj4BJBXShrUp8T1nz94okNe
 NFsnAyRxjWpUT0McEgtA9WvpD9lZqujYD8Qp0KlGZWmI3vNpV5d9S1+dBcEb1n7q
 dyNMkTF3oRrJhhg4VqoHc6fVpzSEoZ9ZxV5Hx4cs+ganH75D4YbdGqx/7mR3DUgH
 MZh6rHF1pGnK7TAm7h5gl3ZRAOkZOaahbe1i01NKo9CEe5fSh3AqMyzJYoyGHRKi
 xDN39eQdWBNA+hm1VkbK2Bv93Rbjrka2Kj+D3sSSO9Bo/u3ntcknr7LW39idKz62
 Q8dkKHcCEtun7gjk0YXPF013y81nEohj1C+52BmJ2l5JitM57xfr6YOaQpu7DPDE
 AJbHx6ASxKdyEETecd0b+cXUPQ349zmRXy0+CDMAGKpBicC0H0mHhL14cwOY1Hfu
 EIpIjmIJGI3JNF6T5kybcQGSBOYebdV0FFgwSllzPvuYt7YsHCs=
 =/O3j
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'bpf-next-6.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next

Pull bpf updates from Alexei Starovoitov:

 - Remove usermode driver (UMD) framework (Thomas Weißschuh)

 - Introduce Strongly Connected Component (SCC) in the verifier to
   detect loops and refine register liveness (Eduard Zingerman)

 - Allow 'void *' cast using bpf_rdonly_cast() and corresponding
   '__arg_untrusted' for global function parameters (Eduard Zingerman)

 - Improve precision for BPF_ADD and BPF_SUB operations in the verifier
   (Harishankar Vishwanathan)

 - Teach the verifier that constant pointer to a map cannot be NULL
   (Ihor Solodrai)

 - Introduce BPF streams for error reporting of various conditions
   detected by BPF runtime (Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi)

 - Teach the verifier to insert runtime speculation barrier (lfence on
   x86) to mitigate speculative execution instead of rejecting the
   programs (Luis Gerhorst)

 - Various improvements for 'veristat' (Mykyta Yatsenko)

 - For CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL config warn on internal verifier errors to
   improve bug detection by syzbot (Paul Chaignon)

 - Support BPF private stack on arm64 (Puranjay Mohan)

 - Introduce bpf_cgroup_read_xattr() kfunc to read xattr of cgroup's
   node (Song Liu)

 - Introduce kfuncs for read-only string opreations (Viktor Malik)

 - Implement show_fdinfo() for bpf_links (Tao Chen)

 - Reduce verifier's stack consumption (Yonghong Song)

 - Implement mprog API for cgroup-bpf programs (Yonghong Song)

* tag 'bpf-next-6.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (192 commits)
  selftests/bpf: Migrate fexit_noreturns case into tracing_failure test suite
  selftests/bpf: Add selftest for attaching tracing programs to functions in deny list
  bpf: Add log for attaching tracing programs to functions in deny list
  bpf: Show precise rejected function when attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn functions
  bpf: Fix various typos in verifier.c comments
  bpf: Add third round of bounds deduction
  selftests/bpf: Test invariants on JSLT crossing sign
  selftests/bpf: Test cross-sign 64bits range refinement
  selftests/bpf: Update reg_bound range refinement logic
  bpf: Improve bounds when s64 crosses sign boundary
  bpf: Simplify bounds refinement from s32
  selftests/bpf: Enable private stack tests for arm64
  bpf, arm64: JIT support for private stack
  bpf: Move bpf_jit_get_prog_name() to core.c
  bpf, arm64: Fix fp initialization for exception boundary
  umd: Remove usermode driver framework
  bpf/preload: Don't select USERMODE_DRIVER
  selftests/bpf: Fix test dynptr/test_dynptr_memset_xdp_chunks failure
  selftests/bpf: Fix test dynptr/test_dynptr_copy_xdp failure
  selftests/bpf: Increase xdp data size for arm64 64K page size
  ...
2025-07-30 09:58:50 -07:00
Puranjay Mohan
3ba58312e6 bpf: Move bpf_jit_get_prog_name() to core.c
bpf_jit_get_prog_name() will be used by all JITs when enabling support
for private stack. This function is currently implemented in the x86
JIT.

Move the function to core.c so that other JITs can easily use it in
their implementation of private stack.

Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250724120257.7299-2-puranjay@kernel.org
2025-07-26 21:26:51 +02:00
Eric Biggers
9503ca2cca lib/crypto: sha1: Rename sha1_init() to sha1_init_raw()
Rename the existing sha1_init() to sha1_init_raw(), since it conflicts
with the upcoming library function.  This will later be removed, but
this keeps the kernel building for the introduction of the library.

Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250712232329.818226-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
2025-07-14 08:22:31 -07:00
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
116c8f4747 bpf: Fix bounds for bpf_prog_get_file_line linfo loop
We may overrun the bounds because linfo and jited_linfo are already
advanced to prog->aux->linfo_idx, hence we must only iterate the
remaining elements until we reach prog->aux->nr_linfo. Adjust the
nr_linfo calculation to fix this. Reported in [0].

  [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/f3527af3b0620ce36e299e97e7532d2555018de2.camel@gmail.com

Reported-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Fixes: 0e521efaf3 ("bpf: Add function to extract program source info")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250705053035.3020320-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-07-07 08:30:15 -07:00
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
e8d0133022 bpf: Report may_goto timeout to BPF stderr
Begin reporting may_goto timeouts to BPF program's stderr stream.

Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703204818.925464-8-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-07-03 19:30:07 -07:00
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
f0c53fd4a7 bpf: Add function to find program from stack trace
In preparation of figuring out the closest program that led to the
current point in the kernel, implement a function that scans through the
stack trace and finds out the closest BPF program when walking down the
stack trace.

Special care needs to be taken to skip over kernel and BPF subprog
frames. We basically scan until we find a BPF main prog frame. The
assumption is that if a program calls into us transitively, we'll
hit it along the way. If not, we end up returning NULL.

Contextually the function will be used in places where we know the
program may have called into us.

Due to reliance on arch_bpf_stack_walk(), this function only works on
x86 with CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC, arm64, and s390. Remove the warning from
arch_bpf_stack_walk as well since we call it outside bpf_throw()
context.

Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703204818.925464-6-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-07-03 19:30:06 -07:00
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
d090326860 bpf: Ensure RCU lock is held around bpf_prog_ksym_find
Add a warning to ensure RCU lock is held around tree lookup, and then
fix one of the invocations in bpf_stack_walker. The program has an
active stack frame and won't disappear. Use the opportunity to remove
unneeded invocation of is_bpf_text_address.

Fixes: f18b03faba ("bpf: Implement BPF exceptions")
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703204818.925464-5-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-07-03 19:30:06 -07:00
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
0e521efaf3 bpf: Add function to extract program source info
Prepare a function for use in future patches that can extract the file
info, line info, and the source line number for a given BPF program
provided it's program counter.

Only the basename of the file path is provided, given it can be
excessively long in some cases.

This will be used in later patches to print source info to the BPF
stream.

Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703204818.925464-4-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-07-03 19:30:06 -07:00
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
5ab154f146 bpf: Introduce BPF standard streams
Add support for a stream API to the kernel and expose related kfuncs to
BPF programs. Two streams are exposed, BPF_STDOUT and BPF_STDERR. These
can be used for printing messages that can be consumed from user space,
thus it's similar in spirit to existing trace_pipe interface.

The kernel will use the BPF_STDERR stream to notify the program of any
errors encountered at runtime. BPF programs themselves may use both
streams for writing debug messages. BPF library-like code may use
BPF_STDERR to print warnings or errors on misuse at runtime.

The implementation of a stream is as follows. Everytime a message is
emitted from the kernel (directly, or through a BPF program), a record
is allocated by bump allocating from per-cpu region backed by a page
obtained using alloc_pages_nolock(). This ensures that we can allocate
memory from any context. The eventual plan is to discard this scheme in
favor of Alexei's kmalloc_nolock() [0].

This record is then locklessly inserted into a list (llist_add()) so
that the printing side doesn't require holding any locks, and works in
any context. Each stream has a maximum capacity of 4MB of text, and each
printed message is accounted against this limit.

Messages from a program are emitted using the bpf_stream_vprintk kfunc,
which takes a stream_id argument in addition to working otherwise
similar to bpf_trace_vprintk.

The bprintf buffer helpers are extracted out to be reused for printing
the string into them before copying it into the stream, so that we can
(with the defined max limit) format a string and know its true length
before performing allocations of the stream element.

For consuming elements from a stream, we expose a bpf(2) syscall command
named BPF_PROG_STREAM_READ_BY_FD, which allows reading data from the
stream of a given prog_fd into a user space buffer. The main logic is
implemented in bpf_stream_read(). The log messages are queued in
bpf_stream::log by the bpf_stream_vprintk kfunc, and then pulled and
ordered correctly in the stream backlog.

For this purpose, we hold a lock around bpf_stream_backlog_peek(), as
llist_del_first() (if we maintained a second lockless list for the
backlog) wouldn't be safe from multiple threads anyway. Then, if we
fail to find something in the backlog log, we splice out everything from
the lockless log, and place it in the backlog log, and then return the
head of the backlog. Once the full length of the element is consumed, we
will pop it and free it.

The lockless list bpf_stream::log is a LIFO stack. Elements obtained
using a llist_del_all() operation are in LIFO order, thus would break
the chronological ordering if printed directly. Hence, this batch of
messages is first reversed. Then, it is stashed into a separate list in
the stream, i.e. the backlog_log. The head of this list is the actual
message that should always be returned to the caller. All of this is
done in bpf_stream_backlog_fill().

From the kernel side, the writing into the stream will be a bit more
involved than the typical printk. First, the kernel typically may print
a collection of messages into the stream, and parallel writers into the
stream may suffer from interleaving of messages. To ensure each group of
messages is visible atomically, we can lift the advantage of using a
lockless list for pushing in messages.

To enable this, we add a bpf_stream_stage() macro, and require kernel
users to use bpf_stream_printk statements for the passed expression to
write into the stream. Underneath the macro, we have a message staging
API, where a bpf_stream_stage object on the stack accumulates the
messages being printed into a local llist_head, and then a commit
operation splices the whole batch into the stream's lockless log list.

This is especially pertinent for rqspinlock deadlock messages printed to
program streams. After this change, we see each deadlock invocation as a
non-interleaving contiguous message without any confusion on the
reader's part, improving their user experience in debugging the fault.

While programs cannot benefit from this staged stream writing API, they
could just as well hold an rqspinlock around their print statements to
serialize messages, hence this is kept kernel-internal for now.

Overall, this infrastructure provides NMI-safe any context printing of
messages to two dedicated streams.

Later patches will add support for printing splats in case of BPF arena
page faults, rqspinlock deadlocks, and cond_break timeouts, and
integration of this facility into bpftool for dumping messages to user
space.

  [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250501032718.65476-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com

Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703204818.925464-3-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-07-03 19:30:06 -07:00
Luis Gerhorst
dff883d9e9 bpf, arm64, powerpc: Change nospec to include v1 barrier
This changes the semantics of BPF_NOSPEC (previously a v4-only barrier)
to always emit a speculation barrier that works against both Spectre v1
AND v4. If mitigation is not needed on an architecture, the backend
should set bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v4/v1().

As of now, this commit only has the user-visible implication that unpriv
BPF's performance on PowerPC is reduced. This is the case because we
have to emit additional v1 barrier instructions for BPF_NOSPEC now.

This commit is required for a future commit to allow us to rely on
BPF_NOSPEC for Spectre v1 mitigation. As of this commit, the feature
that nospec acts as a v1 barrier is unused.

Commit f5e81d1117 ("bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction for
mitigating Spectre v4") noted that mitigation instructions for v1 and v4
might be different on some archs. While this would potentially offer
improved performance on PowerPC, it was dismissed after the following
considerations:

* Only having one barrier simplifies the verifier and allows us to
  easily rely on v4-induced barriers for reducing the complexity of
  v1-induced speculative path verification.

* For the architectures that implemented BPF_NOSPEC, only PowerPC has
  distinct instructions for v1 and v4. Even there, some insns may be
  shared between the barriers for v1 and v4 (e.g., 'ori 31,31,0' and
  'sync'). If this is still found to impact performance in an
  unacceptable way, BPF_NOSPEC can be split into BPF_NOSPEC_V1 and
  BPF_NOSPEC_V4 later. As an optimization, we can already skip v1/v4
  insns from being emitted for PowerPC with this setup if
  bypass_spec_v1/v4 is set.

Vulnerability-status for BPF_NOSPEC-based Spectre mitigations (v4 as of
this commit, v1 in the future) is therefore:

* x86 (32-bit and 64-bit), ARM64, and PowerPC (64-bit): Mitigated - This
  patch implements BPF_NOSPEC for these architectures. The previous
  v4-only version was supported since commit f5e81d1117 ("bpf:
  Introduce BPF nospec instruction for mitigating Spectre v4") and
  commit b7540d6250 ("powerpc/bpf: Emit stf barrier instruction
  sequences for BPF_NOSPEC").

* LoongArch: Not Vulnerable - Commit a6f6a95f25 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix
  jit to skip speculation barrier opcode") is the only other past commit
  related to BPF_NOSPEC and indicates that the insn is not required
  there.

* MIPS: Vulnerable (if unprivileged BPF is enabled) -
  Commit a6f6a95f2580 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix jit to skip speculation
  barrier opcode") indicates that it is not vulnerable, but this
  contradicts the kernel and Debian documentation. Therefore, I assume
  that there exist vulnerable MIPS CPUs (but maybe not from Loongson?).
  In the future, BPF_NOSPEC could be implemented for MIPS based on the
  GCC speculation_barrier [1]. For now, we rely on unprivileged BPF
  being disabled by default.

* Other: Unknown - To the best of my knowledge there is no definitive
  information available that indicates that any other arch is
  vulnerable. They are therefore left untouched (BPF_NOSPEC is not
  implemented, but bypass_spec_v1/v4 is also not set).

I did the following testing to ensure the insn encoding is correct:

* ARM64:
  * 'dsb nsh; isb' was successfully tested with the BPF CI in [2]
  * 'sb' locally using QEMU v7.2.15 -cpu max (emitted sb insn is
    executed for example with './test_progs -t verifier_array_access')

* PowerPC: The following configs were tested locally with ppc64le QEMU
  v8.2 '-machine pseries -cpu POWER9':
  * STF_BARRIER_EIEIO + CONFIG_PPC_BOOK32_64
  * STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI (forced on) + CONFIG_PPC_BOOK32_64
  * STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK (forced on) + CONFIG_PPC_BOOK32_64
  * CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_EIEIO
  * CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI (forced on)
  * CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK (forced on)
  * CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_NONE (forced on)
  Most of those cobinations should not occur in practice, but I was not
  able to get an PPC e6500 rootfs (for testing PPC_E500 without forcing
  it on). In any case, this should ensure that there are no unexpected
  conflicts between the insns when combined like this. Individual v1/v4
  barriers were already emitted elsewhere.

Hari's ack is for the PowerPC changes only.

[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=29b74545531f6afbee9fc38c267524326dbfbedf
    ("MIPS: Add speculation_barrier support")
[2] https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/pull/8576

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603211703.337860-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-09 20:11:09 -07:00
Luis Gerhorst
03c68a0f8c bpf, arm64, powerpc: Add bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4()
JITs can set bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() if they want the verifier to
skip analysis/patching for the respective vulnerability. For v4, this
will reduce the number of barriers the verifier inserts. For v1, it
allows more programs to be accepted.

The primary motivation for this is to not regress unpriv BPF's
performance on ARM64 in a future commit where BPF_NOSPEC is also used
against Spectre v1.

This has the user-visible change that v1-induced rejections on
non-vulnerable PowerPC CPUs are avoided.

For now, this does not change the semantics of BPF_NOSPEC. It is still a
v4-only barrier and must not be implemented if bypass_spec_v4 is always
true for the arch. Changing it to a v1 AND v4-barrier is done in a
future commit.

As an alternative to bypass_spec_v1/v4, one could introduce NOSPEC_V1
AND NOSPEC_V4 instructions and allow backends to skip their lowering as
suggested by commit f5e81d1117 ("bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction
for mitigating Spectre v4"). Adding bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() was
found to be preferable for the following reason:

* bypass_spec_v1/v4 benefits non-vulnerable CPUs: Always performing the
  same analysis (not taking into account whether the current CPU is
  vulnerable), needlessly restricts users of CPUs that are not
  vulnerable. The only use case for this would be portability-testing,
  but this can later be added easily when needed by allowing users to
  force bypass_spec_v1/v4 to false.

* Portability is still acceptable: Directly disabling the analysis
  instead of skipping the lowering of BPF_NOSPEC(_V1/V4) might allow
  programs on non-vulnerable CPUs to be accepted while the program will
  be rejected on vulnerable CPUs. With the fallback to speculation
  barriers for Spectre v1 implemented in a future commit, this will only
  affect programs that do variable stack-accesses or are very complex.

For PowerPC, the SEC_FTR checking in bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v4() is based
on the check that was previously located in the BPF_NOSPEC case.

For LoongArch, it would likely be safe to set both
bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1() and _v4() according to
commit a6f6a95f2580 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix jit to skip speculation
barrier opcode"). This is omitted here as I am unable to do any testing
for LoongArch.

Hari's ack concerns the PowerPC part only.

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603211318.337474-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-06-09 20:11:09 -07:00
KaFai Wan
86bc9c7424 bpf: Avoid __bpf_prog_ret0_warn when jit fails
syzkaller reported an issue:

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 217 at kernel/bpf/core.c:2357 __bpf_prog_ret0_warn+0xa/0x20 kernel/bpf/core.c:2357
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/u32:6 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc4-syzkaller-00040-g8bac8898fe39
RIP: 0010:__bpf_prog_ret0_warn+0xa/0x20 kernel/bpf/core.c:2357
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1316 [inline]
 __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:718 [inline]
 bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:725 [inline]
 cls_bpf_classify+0x74a/0x1110 net/sched/cls_bpf.c:105
 ...

When creating bpf program, 'fp->jit_requested' depends on bpf_jit_enable.
This issue is triggered because of CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is not set
and bpf_jit_enable is set to 1, causing the arch to attempt JIT the prog,
but jit failed due to FAULT_INJECTION. As a result, incorrectly
treats the program as valid, when the program runs it calls
`__bpf_prog_ret0_warn` and triggers the WARN_ON_ONCE(1).

Reported-by: syzbot+0903f6d7f285e41cdf10@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/6816e34e.a70a0220.254cdc.002c.GAE@google.com
Fixes: fa9dd599b4 ("bpf: get rid of pure_initcall dependency to enable jits")
Signed-off-by: KaFai Wan <mannkafai@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250526133358.2594176-1-mannkafai@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-05-27 10:43:10 -07:00
Lorenzo Bianconi
714070c4cb bpf: Allow XDP dev-bound programs to perform XDP_REDIRECT into maps
In the current implementation if the program is dev-bound to a specific
device, it will not be possible to perform XDP_REDIRECT into a DEVMAP
or CPUMAP even if the program is running in the driver NAPI context and
it is not attached to any map entry. This seems in contrast with the
explanation available in bpf_prog_map_compatible routine.
Fix the issue introducing __bpf_prog_map_compatible utility routine in
order to avoid bpf_prog_is_dev_bound() check running bpf_check_tail_call()
at program load time (bpf_prog_select_runtime()).
Continue forbidding to attach a dev-bound program to XDP maps
(BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY, BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP and BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP).

Fixes: 3d76a4d3d4 ("bpf: XDP metadata RX kfuncs")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>
2025-05-01 12:54:06 -07:00
Emil Tsalapatis
ae0a457f5d bpf: Make perf_event_read_output accessible in all program types.
The perf_event_read_event_output helper is currently only available to
tracing protrams, but is useful for other BPF programs like sched_ext
schedulers. When the helper is available, provide its bpf_func_proto
directly from the bpf base_proto.

Signed-off-by: Emil Tsalapatis (Meta) <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318030753.10949-1-emil@etsalapatis.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-03-18 10:21:59 -07:00
Peilin Ye
880442305a bpf: Introduce load-acquire and store-release instructions
Introduce BPF instructions with load-acquire and store-release
semantics, as discussed in [1].  Define 2 new flags:

  #define BPF_LOAD_ACQ    0x100
  #define BPF_STORE_REL   0x110

A "load-acquire" is a BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC instruction with the 'imm'
field set to BPF_LOAD_ACQ (0x100).

Similarly, a "store-release" is a BPF_STX | BPF_ATOMIC instruction with
the 'imm' field set to BPF_STORE_REL (0x110).

Unlike existing atomic read-modify-write operations that only support
BPF_W (32-bit) and BPF_DW (64-bit) size modifiers, load-acquires and
store-releases also support BPF_B (8-bit) and BPF_H (16-bit).  As an
exception, however, 64-bit load-acquires/store-releases are not
supported on 32-bit architectures (to fix a build error reported by the
kernel test robot).

An 8- or 16-bit load-acquire zero-extends the value before writing it to
a 32-bit register, just like ARM64 instruction LDARH and friends.

Similar to existing atomic read-modify-write operations, misaligned
load-acquires/store-releases are not allowed (even if
BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT is set).

As an example, consider the following 64-bit load-acquire BPF
instruction (assuming little-endian):

  db 10 00 00 00 01 00 00  r0 = load_acquire((u64 *)(r1 + 0x0))

  opcode (0xdb): BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_DW | BPF_STX
  imm (0x00000100): BPF_LOAD_ACQ

Similarly, a 16-bit BPF store-release:

  cb 21 00 00 10 01 00 00  store_release((u16 *)(r1 + 0x0), w2)

  opcode (0xcb): BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_H | BPF_STX
  imm (0x00000110): BPF_STORE_REL

In arch/{arm64,s390,x86}/net/bpf_jit_comp.c, have
bpf_jit_supports_insn(..., /*in_arena=*/true) return false for the new
instructions, until the corresponding JIT compiler supports them in
arena.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240729183246.4110549-1-yepeilin@google.com/

Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a217f46f0e445fbd573a1a024be5c6bf1d5fe716.1741049567.git.yepeilin@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-03-15 11:48:28 -07:00
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
e723608bf4 bpf: Add verifier support for timed may_goto
Implement support in the verifier for replacing may_goto implementation
from a counter-based approach to one which samples time on the local CPU
to have a bigger loop bound.

We implement it by maintaining 16-bytes per-stack frame, and using 8
bytes for maintaining the count for amortizing time sampling, and 8
bytes for the starting timestamp. To minimize overhead, we need to avoid
spilling and filling of registers around this sequence, so we push this
cost into the time sampling function 'arch_bpf_timed_may_goto'. This is
a JIT-specific wrapper around bpf_check_timed_may_goto which returns us
the count to store into the stack through BPF_REG_AX. All caller-saved
registers (r0-r5) are guaranteed to remain untouched.

The loop can be broken by returning count as 0, otherwise we dispatch
into the function when the count drops to 0, and the runtime chooses to
refresh it (by returning count as BPF_MAX_TIMED_LOOPS) or returning 0
and aborting the loop on next iteration.

Since the check for 0 is done right after loading the count from the
stack, all subsequent cond_break sequences should immediately break as
well, of the same loop or subsequent loops in the program.

We pass in the stack_depth of the count (and thus the timestamp, by
adding 8 to it) to the arch_bpf_timed_may_goto call so that it can be
passed in to bpf_check_timed_may_goto as an argument after r1 is saved,
by adding the offset to r10/fp. This adjustment will be arch specific,
and the next patch will introduce support for x86.

Note that depending on loop complexity, time spent in the loop can be
more than the current limit (250 ms), but imposing an upper bound on
program runtime is an orthogonal problem which will be addressed when
program cancellations are supported.

The current time afforded by cond_break may not be enough for cases
where BPF programs want to implement locking algorithms inline, and use
cond_break as a promise to the verifier that they will eventually
terminate.

Below are some benchmarking numbers on the time taken per-iteration for
an empty loop that counts the number of iterations until cond_break
fires. For comparison, we compare it against bpf_for/bpf_repeat which is
another way to achieve the same number of spins (BPF_MAX_LOOPS).  The
hardware used for benchmarking was a Sapphire Rapids Intel server with
performance governor enabled, mitigations were enabled.

+-----------------------------+--------------+--------------+------------------+
| Loop type                   | Iterations   |  Time (ms)   |   Time/iter (ns) |
+-----------------------------|--------------+--------------+------------------+
| may_goto                    | 8388608      |  3           |   0.36           |
| timed_may_goto (count=65535)| 589674932    |  250         |   0.42           |
| bpf_for                     | 8388608      |  10          |   1.19           |
+-----------------------------+--------------+--------------+------------------+

This gives a good approximation at low overhead while staying close to
the current implementation.

Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250304003239.2390751-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-03-15 11:48:28 -07:00
Jiayuan Chen
6ebc5030e0 bpf: Fix array bounds error with may_goto
may_goto uses an additional 8 bytes on the stack, which causes the
interpreters[] array to go out of bounds when calculating index by
stack_size.

1. If a BPF program is rewritten, re-evaluate the stack size. For non-JIT
cases, reject loading directly.

2. For non-JIT cases, calculating interpreters[idx] may still cause
out-of-bounds array access, and just warn about it.

3. For jit_requested cases, the execution of bpf_func also needs to be
warned. So move the definition of function __bpf_prog_ret0_warn out of
the macro definition CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON.

Reported-by: syzbot+d2a2c639d03ac200a4f1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0000000000000f823606139faa5d@google.com/
Fixes: 011832b97b ("bpf: Introduce may_goto instruction")
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <mrpre@163.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250214091823.46042-2-mrpre@163.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-02-14 19:55:15 -08:00
Anton Protopopov
c4441ca86a bpf: fix potential error return
The bpf_remove_insns() function returns WARN_ON_ONCE(error), where
error is a result of bpf_adj_branches(), and thus should be always 0
However, if for any reason it is not 0, then it will be converted to
boolean by WARN_ON_ONCE and returned to user space as 1, not an actual
error value. Fix this by returning the original err after the WARN check.

Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <aspsk@isovalent.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241210114245.836164-1-aspsk@isovalent.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-12-10 11:17:53 -08:00
Eduard Zingerman
b238e187b4 bpf: refactor bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data to use helper number
Use BPF helper number instead of function pointer in
bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(). This would simplify usage of this
function in verifier.c:check_cfg() (in a follow-up patch),
where only helper number is easily available and there is no real need
to lookup helper proto.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241210041100.1898468-3-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-12-10 10:24:57 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
6e95ef0258 bpf-next-bpf-next-6.13
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCAAdFiEE+soXsSLHKoYyzcli6rmadz2vbToFAmc7hIQACgkQ6rmadz2v
 bTrcRA/+MsUOzJPnjokonHwk8X4KQM21gOua/sUcGArLVGF/JoW5/b1W8UBQ0y5+
 +okYaRNGpwF0/2S8M5FAYpM7VSPLl1U7Rihr55I63D9kbAo0pDQwpn4afQFuZhaC
 l7MzkhBHS7XXx5/70APOzy3kz1GDYvz39jiWuAAhRqVejFO+fa4pDz4W+Ht7jYTQ
 jJOLn4vJna9fSfVf/U/bbdz5lL0lncIiEnRIEbF7EszbF2CA7sa+/KFENGM7ChEo
 UlxK2Xz5fpzgT6htZRjMr6jmupfg7gzdT4moOysQQcjkllvv6/4MD0s/GLShtG9H
 SmpaptpYCEGXLuApGzkSddwiT6iUMTqQr7zs6LPp0gPh+4Z0sSPNoBtBp2v0aVDl
 w0zhVhMfoF66rMG+IZY684CsMGg5h8UsOS46KLjSU0fW2HpGM7+zZLpXOaGkU3OH
 UV0womPT/C2kS2fpOn9F91O8qMjOZ4EXd+zuRtIRv9CeuVIpCT9R13lEYn+wfr6d
 aUci8wybha1UOAvkRiXiqWOPS+0Z/arrSbCSDMQF6DevLpQl0noVbTVssWXcRdUE
 9Ve6J0yS29WxNWFtuuw4xP5NcG1AnRXVGh215TuVBX7xK9X/hnDDhfalltsjXfnd
 m1f64FxU2SGp2D7X8BX/6Aeyo6mITE6I3SNMUrcvk1Zid36zhy8=
 =TXGS
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'bpf-next-6.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next

Pull bpf updates from Alexei Starovoitov:

 - Add BPF uprobe session support (Jiri Olsa)

 - Optimize uprobe performance (Andrii Nakryiko)

 - Add bpf_fastcall support to helpers and kfuncs (Eduard Zingerman)

 - Avoid calling free_htab_elem() under hash map bucket lock (Hou Tao)

 - Prevent tailcall infinite loop caused by freplace (Leon Hwang)

 - Mark raw_tracepoint arguments as nullable (Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi)

 - Introduce uptr support in the task local storage map (Martin KaFai
   Lau)

 - Stringify errno log messages in libbpf (Mykyta Yatsenko)

 - Add kmem_cache BPF iterator for perf's lock profiling (Namhyung Kim)

 - Support BPF objects of either endianness in libbpf (Tony Ambardar)

 - Add ksym to struct_ops trampoline to fix stack trace (Xu Kuohai)

 - Introduce private stack for eligible BPF programs (Yonghong Song)

 - Migrate samples/bpf tests to selftests/bpf test_progs (Daniel T. Lee)

 - Migrate test_sock to selftests/bpf test_progs (Jordan Rife)

* tag 'bpf-next-6.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (152 commits)
  libbpf: Change hash_combine parameters from long to unsigned long
  selftests/bpf: Fix build error with llvm 19
  libbpf: Fix memory leak in bpf_program__attach_uprobe_multi
  bpf: use common instruction history across all states
  bpf: Add necessary migrate_disable to range_tree.
  bpf: Do not alloc arena on unsupported arches
  selftests/bpf: Set test path for token/obj_priv_implicit_token_envvar
  selftests/bpf: Add a test for arena range tree algorithm
  bpf: Introduce range_tree data structure and use it in bpf arena
  samples/bpf: Remove unused variable in xdp2skb_meta_kern.c
  samples/bpf: Remove unused variables in tc_l2_redirect_kern.c
  bpftool: Cast variable `var` to long long
  bpf, x86: Propagate tailcall info only for subprogs
  bpf: Add kernel symbol for struct_ops trampoline
  bpf: Use function pointers count as struct_ops links count
  bpf: Remove unused member rcu from bpf_struct_ops_map
  selftests/bpf: Add struct_ops prog private stack tests
  bpf: Support private stack for struct_ops progs
  selftests/bpf: Add tracing prog private stack tests
  bpf, x86: Support private stack in jit
  ...
2024-11-21 08:11:04 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
8a7fa81137 Random number generator updates for Linux 6.13-rc1.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEq5lC5tSkz8NBJiCnSfxwEqXeA64FAmc6oE0ACgkQSfxwEqXe
 A65n5BAAtNmfBJhYRiC6Svsg7+ktHmhCAHoHwnP7sv+bjs81FRAEv21CsfI+02Nb
 zUvaPuyiLtYzlWxzE5Yg44v1cADHAq+QZE1Fg5yl7ge6zPZ3+S1pv/8suNSyyI2M
 PKvh1sb4OkUtqplveYSuP1J87u55zAtV9mP9qC3hSlY3XkeQUObt9Awss8peOMdv
 sH2AxwBlRkqFXpY2worxlfg3p5iLemb3AUZ3f0Jc6fRmOagSJCt7i4mDrWo3EXke
 90Ao8ypY0x3YVGRFACHnxCS53X20HGwLxm7jdicfriMCzAJ6JQR6asO+NYnXR+Ev
 9Za3UquVHP6HbQGWj6d1k5k2nF+IbkTHTgFBPRK/CY9ZpVbP04B2K7tE1gmT81wj
 AscRGi9RBVBPKAUguyi99MXYlprFG/ZTLOux3hvdarv5u0bP94eXmy1FrRM+IO0r
 u4BiQ39FlkDdtRxjzKfCiKkMrf3NmFEciZJhxCnflzmOBaj64r1hRt/ea8Bjxvp3
 a4k0MfULmcEn2JwPiT1/Swz45ypZQc4OgbP87SCU8P0a23r21r2oK+9v3No/rCzB
 TI0fP6ykDTFQoiKUOSg1mJmkipdjeDyQ9E+0XIDsKd+T8Yv9rFoaV6RWoMrkt4AJ
 Yea9+V+XEI8F3SjhdD4OL/s3/+bjTjnRHDaXnJf2XzGmXcuvnbs=
 =o4ww
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'random-6.13-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random

Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld:
 "This contains a single series from Uros to replace uses of
  <linux/random.h> with prandom.h or other more specific headers
  as needed, in order to avoid a circular header issue.

  Uros' goal is to be able to use percpu.h from prandom.h, which
  will then allow him to define __percpu in percpu.h rather than
  in compiler_types.h"

* tag 'random-6.13-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random:
  prandom: Include <linux/percpu.h> in <linux/prandom.h>
  random: Do not include <linux/prandom.h> in <linux/random.h>
  netem: Include <linux/prandom.h> in sch_netem.c
  lib/test_scanf: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h>
  lib/test_parman: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h>
  bpf/tests: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h>
  lib/rbtree-test: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h>
  random32: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h>
  kunit: string-stream-test: Include <linux/prandom.h>
  lib/interval_tree_test.c: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h>
  bpf: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h>
  scsi: libfcoe: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h>
  fscrypt: Include <linux/once.h> in fs/crypto/keyring.c
  mtd: tests: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h>
  media: vivid: Include <linux/prandom.h> in vivid-vid-cap.c
  drm/lib: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h>
  drm/i915/selftests: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h>
  crypto: testmgr: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h>
  x86/kaslr: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h>
2024-11-19 10:43:44 -08:00
Yonghong Song
a76ab5731e bpf: Find eligible subprogs for private stack support
Private stack will be allocated with percpu allocator in jit time.
To avoid complexity at runtime, only one copy of private stack is
available per cpu per prog. So runtime recursion check is necessary
to avoid stack corruption.

Current private stack only supports kprobe/perf_event/tp/raw_tp
which has recursion check in the kernel, and prog types that use
bpf trampoline recursion check. For trampoline related prog types,
currently only tracing progs have recursion checking.

To avoid complexity, all async_cb subprogs use normal kernel stack
including those subprogs used by both main prog subtree and async_cb
subtree. Any prog having tail call also uses kernel stack.

To avoid jit penalty with private stack support, a subprog stack
size threshold is set such that only if the stack size is no less
than the threshold, private stack is supported. The current threshold
is 64 bytes. This avoids jit penality if the stack usage is small.

A useless 'continue' is also removed from a loop in func
check_max_stack_depth().

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241112163907.2223839-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-11-12 16:26:24 -08:00
Leon Hwang
d6083f040d bpf: Prevent tailcall infinite loop caused by freplace
There is a potential infinite loop issue that can occur when using a
combination of tail calls and freplace.

In an upcoming selftest, the attach target for entry_freplace of
tailcall_freplace.c is subprog_tc of tc_bpf2bpf.c, while the tail call in
entry_freplace leads to entry_tc. This results in an infinite loop:

entry_tc -> subprog_tc -> entry_freplace --tailcall-> entry_tc.

The problem arises because the tail_call_cnt in entry_freplace resets to
zero each time entry_freplace is executed, causing the tail call mechanism
to never terminate, eventually leading to a kernel panic.

To fix this issue, the solution is twofold:

1. Prevent updating a program extended by an freplace program to a
   prog_array map.
2. Prevent extending a program that is already part of a prog_array map
   with an freplace program.

This ensures that:

* If a program or its subprogram has been extended by an freplace program,
  it can no longer be updated to a prog_array map.
* If a program has been added to a prog_array map, neither it nor its
  subprograms can be extended by an freplace program.

Moreover, an extension program should not be tailcalled. As such, return
-EINVAL if the program has a type of BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT when adding it to a
prog_array map.

Additionally, fix a minor code style issue by replacing eight spaces with a
tab for proper formatting.

Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241015150207.70264-2-leon.hwang@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-10-16 09:21:18 -07:00
Uros Bizjak
aaedc2ff97 bpf: Include <linux/prandom.h> instead of <linux/random.h>
Substitute the inclusion of <linux/random.h> header with
<linux/prandom.h> to allow the removal of legacy inclusion
of <linux/prandom.h> from <linux/random.h>.

Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
Cc: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>
Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2024-10-03 18:20:08 +02:00
Al Viro
5f60d5f6bb move asm/unaligned.h to linux/unaligned.h
asm/unaligned.h is always an include of asm-generic/unaligned.h;
might as well move that thing to linux/unaligned.h and include
that - there's nothing arch-specific in that header.

auto-generated by the following:

for i in `git grep -l -w asm/unaligned.h`; do
	sed -i -e "s/asm\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
for i in `git grep -l -w asm-generic/unaligned.h`; do
	sed -i -e "s/asm-generic\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
git mv include/asm-generic/unaligned.h include/linux/unaligned.h
git mv tools/include/asm-generic/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
sed -i -e "/unaligned.h/d" include/asm-generic/Kbuild
sed -i -e "s/__ASM_GENERIC/__LINUX/" include/linux/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
2024-10-02 17:23:23 -04:00
Xu Kuohai
28ead3eaab bpf: Prevent tail call between progs attached to different hooks
bpf progs can be attached to kernel functions, and the attached functions
can take different parameters or return different return values. If
prog attached to one kernel function tail calls prog attached to another
kernel function, the ctx access or return value verification could be
bypassed.

For example, if prog1 is attached to func1 which takes only 1 parameter
and prog2 is attached to func2 which takes two parameters. Since verifier
assumes the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed based on func2's
prototype, verifier allows prog2 to access the second parameter from
the bpf ctx passed to it. The problem is that verifier does not prevent
prog1 from passing its bpf ctx to prog2 via tail call. In this case,
the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed from func1 instead of func2,
that is, the assumption for ctx access verification is bypassed.

Another example, if BPF LSM prog1 is attached to hook file_alloc_security,
and BPF LSM prog2 is attached to hook bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known. Verifier
knows the return value rules for these two hooks, e.g. it is legal for
bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known to return positive number 1, and it is illegal
for file_alloc_security to return positive number. So verifier allows
prog2 to return positive number 1, but does not allow prog1 to return
positive number. The problem is that verifier does not prevent prog1
from calling prog2 via tail call. In this case, prog2's return value 1
will be used as the return value for prog1's hook file_alloc_security.
That is, the return value rule is bypassed.

This patch adds restriction for tail call to prevent such bypasses.

Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240719110059.797546-4-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
2024-07-29 13:09:26 -07:00
Paolo Abeni
7b769adc26 bpf-next-for-netdev
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iHUEABYIAB0WIQTFp0I1jqZrAX+hPRXbK58LschIgwUCZoxN0AAKCRDbK58LschI
 g0c5AQDa3ZV9gfbN42y1zSDoM1uOgO60fb+ydxyOYh8l3+OiQQD/fLfpTY3gBFSY
 9yi/pZhw/QdNzQskHNIBrHFGtJbMxgs=
 =p1Zz
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next

Daniel Borkmann says:

====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2024-07-08

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.

We've added 102 non-merge commits during the last 28 day(s) which contain
a total of 127 files changed, 4606 insertions(+), 980 deletions(-).

The main changes are:

1) Support resilient split BTF which cuts down on duplication and makes BTF
   as compact as possible wrt BTF from modules, from Alan Maguire & Eduard Zingerman.

2) Add support for dumping kfunc prototypes from BTF which enables both detecting
   as well as dumping compilable prototypes for kfuncs, from Daniel Xu.

3) Batch of s390x BPF JIT improvements to add support for BPF arena and to implement
   support for BPF exceptions, from Ilya Leoshkevich.

4) Batch of riscv64 BPF JIT improvements in particular to add 12-argument support
   for BPF trampolines and to utilize bpf_prog_pack for the latter, from Pu Lehui.

5) Extend BPF test infrastructure to add a CHECKSUM_COMPLETE validation option
   for skbs and add coverage along with it, from Vadim Fedorenko.

6) Inline bpf_get_current_task/_btf() helpers in the arm64 BPF JIT which gives
   a small 1% performance improvement in micro-benchmarks, from Puranjay Mohan.

7) Extend the BPF verifier to track the delta between linked registers in order
   to better deal with recent LLVM code optimizations, from Alexei Starovoitov.

8) Fix bpf_wq_set_callback_impl() kfunc signature where the third argument should
   have been a pointer to the map value, from Benjamin Tissoires.

9) Extend BPF selftests to add regular expression support for test output matching
   and adjust some of the selftest when compiled under gcc, from Cupertino Miranda.

10) Simplify task_file_seq_get_next() and remove an unnecessary loop which always
    iterates exactly once anyway, from Dan Carpenter.

11) Add the capability to offload the netfilter flowtable in XDP layer through
    kfuncs, from Florian Westphal & Lorenzo Bianconi.

12) Various cleanups in networking helpers in BPF selftests to shave off a few
    lines of open-coded functions on client/server handling, from Geliang Tang.

13) Properly propagate prog->aux->tail_call_reachable out of BPF verifier, so
    that x86 JIT does not need to implement detection, from Leon Hwang.

14) Fix BPF verifier to add a missing check_func_arg_reg_off() to prevent an
    out-of-bounds memory access for dynpointers, from Matt Bobrowski.

15) Fix bpf_session_cookie() kfunc to return __u64 instead of long pointer as
    it might lead to problems on 32-bit archs, from Jiri Olsa.

16) Enhance traffic validation and dynamic batch size support in xsk selftests,
    from Tushar Vyavahare.

bpf-next-for-netdev

* tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (102 commits)
  selftests/bpf: DENYLIST.aarch64: Remove fexit_sleep
  selftests/bpf: amend for wrong bpf_wq_set_callback_impl signature
  bpf: helpers: fix bpf_wq_set_callback_impl signature
  libbpf: Add NULL checks to bpf_object__{prev_map,next_map}
  selftests/bpf: Remove exceptions tests from DENYLIST.s390x
  s390/bpf: Implement exceptions
  s390/bpf: Change seen_reg to a mask
  bpf: Remove unnecessary loop in task_file_seq_get_next()
  riscv, bpf: Optimize stack usage of trampoline
  bpf, devmap: Add .map_alloc_check
  selftests/bpf: Remove arena tests from DENYLIST.s390x
  selftests/bpf: Add UAF tests for arena atomics
  selftests/bpf: Introduce __arena_global
  s390/bpf: Support arena atomics
  s390/bpf: Enable arena
  s390/bpf: Support address space cast instruction
  s390/bpf: Support BPF_PROBE_MEM32
  s390/bpf: Land on the next JITed instruction after exception
  s390/bpf: Introduce pre- and post- probe functions
  s390/bpf: Get rid of get_probe_mem_regno()
  ...
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240708221438.10974-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2024-07-09 17:01:46 +02:00
Arnd Bergmann
7e1f4eb9a6 kallsyms: rework symbol lookup return codes
Building with W=1 in some configurations produces a false positive
warning for kallsyms:

kernel/kallsyms.c: In function '__sprint_symbol.isra':
kernel/kallsyms.c:503:17: error: 'strcpy' source argument is the same as destination [-Werror=restrict]
  503 |                 strcpy(buffer, name);
      |                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

This originally showed up while building with -O3, but later started
happening in other configurations as well, depending on inlining
decisions. The underlying issue is that the local 'name' variable is
always initialized to the be the same as 'buffer' in the called functions
that fill the buffer, which gcc notices while inlining, though it could
see that the address check always skips the copy.

The calling conventions here are rather unusual, as all of the internal
lookup functions (bpf_address_lookup, ftrace_mod_address_lookup,
ftrace_func_address_lookup, module_address_lookup and
kallsyms_lookup_buildid) already use the provided buffer and either return
the address of that buffer to indicate success, or NULL for failure,
but the callers are written to also expect an arbitrary other buffer
to be returned.

Rework the calling conventions to return the length of the filled buffer
instead of its address, which is simpler and easier to follow as well
as avoiding the warning. Leave only the kallsyms_lookup() calling conventions
unchanged, since that is called from 16 different functions and
adapting this would be a much bigger change.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200107214042.855757-1-arnd@arndb.de/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240326130647.7bfb1d92@gandalf.local.home/
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2024-06-27 17:43:40 +02:00
Rafael Passos
ab224b9ef7 bpf: remove unused parameter in __bpf_free_used_btfs
Fixes a compiler warning. The __bpf_free_used_btfs function
was taking an extra unused struct bpf_prog_aux *aux param

Signed-off-by: Rafael Passos <rafael@rcpassos.me>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240615022641.210320-3-rafael@rcpassos.me
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-06-20 19:50:26 -07:00
Rafael Passos
9919c5c98c bpf: remove unused parameter in bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize
Fixes a compiler warning. the bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize function
was taking an extra bpf_prog parameter that went unused.
This removves it and updates the callers accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Rafael Passos <rafael@rcpassos.me>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240615022641.210320-2-rafael@rcpassos.me
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-06-20 19:50:26 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
a49468240e Modules changes for v6.10-rc1
Finally something fun. Mike Rapoport does some cleanup to allow us to
 take out module_alloc() out of modules into a new paint shedded execmem_alloc()
 and execmem_free() so to make emphasis these helpers are actually used outside
 of modules. It starts with a no-functional changes API rename / placeholders
 to then allow architectures to define their requirements into a new shiny
 struct execmem_info with ranges, and requirements for those ranges. Archs
 now can intitialize this execmem_info as the last part of mm_core_init() if
 they have to diverge from the norm. Each range is a known type clearly
 articulated and spelled out in enum execmem_type.
 
 Although a lot of this is major cleanup and prep work for future enhancements an
 immediate clear gain is we get to enable KPROBES without MODULES now. That is
 ultimately what motiviated to pick this work up again, now with smaller goal as
 concrete stepping stone.
 
 This has been sitting on linux-next for a little less than a month, a few issues
 were found already and fixed, in particular an odd mips boot issue. Arch folks
 reviewed the code too. This is ready for wider exposure and testing.
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJGBAABCgAwFiEENnNq2KuOejlQLZofziMdCjCSiKcFAmZDHfMSHG1jZ3JvZkBr
 ZXJuZWwub3JnAAoJEM4jHQowkoinfIwP/iFsr89v9BjWdRTqzufuHwjOxvFymWxU
 BbEpOppRny3CckDU9ag9hLIlUaSL1Bg56Zb+znzp5stKOoiQYMDBvjSYdfybPxW2
 mRS6SClMF1ubWbzdysdp5Ld9u8T0MQPCLX+P2pKhZRGi0wjkBf5WEkTje+muJKI3
 4vYkXS7bNhuTwRQ+EGfze4+AeleGdQJKDWFY00TW9mZTTBADjfHyYU5o0m9ijf5l
 3V/weUznODvjVJStbIF7wEQ845Ae02LN1zXfsloIOuBMhcMju+x8IjPgPbD0KhX2
 yA48q7mVWkirYp0L5GSQchtqV1GBiP0NK1xXWEpyx6EqQZ4RJCsQhlhjijoExYBR
 ylP4bqiGVuE3IN075X0OzGCnmOStuzwssfDmug0sMAZH/MvmOQ21WzZdet2nLMas
 wwJArHqZsBI9BnBlvH9ZM4Y9f1zC7iR1wULaNGwXLPx34X9PIch8Yk+RElP1kMFQ
 +YrjOuWPjl63pmSkrkk+Pe2eesMPcPB41M6Q2iCjDlp0iBp63LIx2XISUbTf0ljM
 EsI4ZQseYpx+BmC7AuQfmXvEOjuXII9z072/artVWcB2u/87ixIprnqZVhcs/spy
 73DnXB4ufor2PCCC5Xrb/6kT6G+PzF3VwTbHQ1D+fYZ5n2qdyG+LKxgXbtxsRVTp
 oUg+Z/AJaCMt
 =Nsg4
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'modules-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mcgrof/linux

Pull modules updates from Luis Chamberlain:
 "Finally something fun. Mike Rapoport does some cleanup to allow us to
  take out module_alloc() out of modules into a new paint shedded
  execmem_alloc() and execmem_free() so to make emphasis these helpers
  are actually used outside of modules.

  It starts with a non-functional changes API rename / placeholders to
  then allow architectures to define their requirements into a new shiny
  struct execmem_info with ranges, and requirements for those ranges.

  Archs now can intitialize this execmem_info as the last part of
  mm_core_init() if they have to diverge from the norm. Each range is a
  known type clearly articulated and spelled out in enum execmem_type.

  Although a lot of this is major cleanup and prep work for future
  enhancements an immediate clear gain is we get to enable KPROBES
  without MODULES now. That is ultimately what motiviated to pick this
  work up again, now with smaller goal as concrete stepping stone"

* tag 'modules-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mcgrof/linux:
  bpf: remove CONFIG_BPF_JIT dependency on CONFIG_MODULES of
  kprobes: remove dependency on CONFIG_MODULES
  powerpc: use CONFIG_EXECMEM instead of CONFIG_MODULES where appropriate
  x86/ftrace: enable dynamic ftrace without CONFIG_MODULES
  arch: make execmem setup available regardless of CONFIG_MODULES
  powerpc: extend execmem_params for kprobes allocations
  arm64: extend execmem_info for generated code allocations
  riscv: extend execmem_params for generated code allocations
  mm/execmem, arch: convert remaining overrides of module_alloc to execmem
  mm/execmem, arch: convert simple overrides of module_alloc to execmem
  mm: introduce execmem_alloc() and execmem_free()
  module: make module_memory_{alloc,free} more self-contained
  sparc: simplify module_alloc()
  nios2: define virtual address space for modules
  mips: module: rename MODULE_START to MODULES_VADDR
  arm64: module: remove unneeded call to kasan_alloc_module_shadow()
  kallsyms: replace deprecated strncpy with strscpy
  module: allow UNUSED_KSYMS_WHITELIST to be relative against objtree.
2024-05-15 14:05:08 -07:00
Mike Rapoport (IBM)
12af2b83d0 mm: introduce execmem_alloc() and execmem_free()
module_alloc() is used everywhere as a mean to allocate memory for code.

Beside being semantically wrong, this unnecessarily ties all subsystems
that need to allocate code, such as ftrace, kprobes and BPF to modules and
puts the burden of code allocation to the modules code.

Several architectures override module_alloc() because of various
constraints where the executable memory can be located and this causes
additional obstacles for improvements of code allocation.

Start splitting code allocation from modules by introducing execmem_alloc()
and execmem_free() APIs.

Initially, execmem_alloc() is a wrapper for module_alloc() and
execmem_free() is a replacement of module_memfree() to allow updating all
call sites to use the new APIs.

Since architectures define different restrictions on placement,
permissions, alignment and other parameters for memory that can be used by
different subsystems that allocate executable memory, execmem_alloc() takes
a type argument, that will be used to identify the calling subsystem and to
allow architectures define parameters for ranges suitable for that
subsystem.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
2024-05-14 00:31:43 -07:00
Jakub Kicinski
6e62702feb bpf-next-for-netdev
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iHUEABYIAB0WIQTFp0I1jqZrAX+hPRXbK58LschIgwUCZkGcZAAKCRDbK58LschI
 g6o6APwLsqhrM2w71VUN5ciCxu4H5VDtZp6wkdqtVbxxU4qNxQEApKgYgKt8ZLF3
 Kily5c7m+S4ZXhMX21rb8JhSAz0dfQk=
 =5Dk7
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next

Daniel Borkmann says:

====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2024-05-13

We've added 119 non-merge commits during the last 14 day(s) which contain
a total of 134 files changed, 9462 insertions(+), 4742 deletions(-).

The main changes are:

1) Add BPF JIT support for 32-bit ARCv2 processors, from Shahab Vahedi.

2) Add BPF range computation improvements to the verifier in particular
   around XOR and OR operators, refactoring of checks for range computation
   and relaxing MUL range computation so that src_reg can also be an unknown
   scalar, from Cupertino Miranda.

3) Add support to attach kprobe BPF programs through kprobe_multi link in
   a session mode, meaning, a BPF program is attached to both function entry
   and return, the entry program can decide if the return program gets
   executed and the entry program can share u64 cookie value with return
   program. Session mode is a common use-case for tetragon and bpftrace,
   from Jiri Olsa.

4) Fix a potential overflow in libbpf's ring__consume_n() and improve libbpf
   as well as BPF selftest's struct_ops handling, from Andrii Nakryiko.

5) Improvements to BPF selftests in context of BPF gcc backend,
   from Jose E. Marchesi & David Faust.

6) Migrate remaining BPF selftest tests from test_sock_addr.c to prog_test-
   -style in order to retire the old test, run it in BPF CI and additionally
   expand test coverage, from Jordan Rife.

7) Big batch for BPF selftest refactoring in order to remove duplicate code
   around common network helpers, from Geliang Tang.

8) Another batch of improvements to BPF selftests to retire obsolete
   bpf_tcp_helpers.h as everything is available vmlinux.h,
   from Martin KaFai Lau.

9) Fix BPF map tear-down to not walk the map twice on free when both timer
   and wq is used, from Benjamin Tissoires.

10) Fix BPF verifier assumptions about socket->sk that it can be non-NULL,
    from Alexei Starovoitov.

11) Change BTF build scripts to using --btf_features for pahole v1.26+,
    from Alan Maguire.

12) Small improvements to BPF reusing struct_size() and krealloc_array(),
    from Andy Shevchenko.

13) Fix s390 JIT to emit a barrier for BPF_FETCH instructions,
    from Ilya Leoshkevich.

14) Extend TCP ->cong_control() callback in order to feed in ack and
    flag parameters and allow write-access to tp->snd_cwnd_stamp
    from BPF program, from Miao Xu.

15) Add support for internal-only per-CPU instructions to inline
    bpf_get_smp_processor_id() helper call for arm64 and riscv64 BPF JITs,
    from Puranjay Mohan.

16) Follow-up to remove the redundant ethtool.h from tooling infrastructure,
    from Tushar Vyavahare.

17) Extend libbpf to support "module:<function>" syntax for tracing
    programs, from Viktor Malik.

* tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (119 commits)
  bpf: make list_for_each_entry portable
  bpf: ignore expected GCC warning in test_global_func10.c
  bpf: disable strict aliasing in test_global_func9.c
  selftests/bpf: Free strdup memory in xdp_hw_metadata
  selftests/bpf: Fix a few tests for GCC related warnings.
  bpf: avoid gcc overflow warning in test_xdp_vlan.c
  tools: remove redundant ethtool.h from tooling infra
  selftests/bpf: Expand ATTACH_REJECT tests
  selftests/bpf: Expand getsockname and getpeername tests
  sefltests/bpf: Expand sockaddr hook deny tests
  selftests/bpf: Expand sockaddr program return value tests
  selftests/bpf: Retire test_sock_addr.(c|sh)
  selftests/bpf: Remove redundant sendmsg test cases
  selftests/bpf: Migrate ATTACH_REJECT test cases
  selftests/bpf: Migrate expected_attach_type tests
  selftests/bpf: Migrate wildcard destination rewrite test
  selftests/bpf: Migrate sendmsg6 v4 mapped address tests
  selftests/bpf: Migrate sendmsg deny test cases
  selftests/bpf: Migrate WILDCARD_IP test
  selftests/bpf: Handle SYSCALL_EPERM and SYSCALL_ENOTSUPP test cases
  ...
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240513134114.17575-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-05-13 16:41:10 -07:00
Puranjay Mohan
2ddec2c80b riscv, bpf: inline bpf_get_smp_processor_id()
Inline the calls to bpf_get_smp_processor_id() in the riscv bpf jit.

RISCV saves the pointer to the CPU's task_struct in the TP (thread
pointer) register. This makes it trivial to get the CPU's processor id.
As thread_info is the first member of task_struct, we can read the
processor id from TP + offsetof(struct thread_info, cpu).

          RISCV64 JIT output for `call bpf_get_smp_processor_id`
	  ======================================================

                Before                           After
               --------                         -------

         auipc   t1,0x848c                  ld    a5,32(tp)
         jalr    604(t1)
         mv      a5,a0

Benchmark using [1] on Qemu.

./benchs/run_bench_trigger.sh glob-arr-inc arr-inc hash-inc

+---------------+------------------+------------------+--------------+
|      Name     |     Before       |       After      |   % change   |
|---------------+------------------+------------------+--------------|
| glob-arr-inc  | 1.077 ± 0.006M/s | 1.336 ± 0.010M/s |   + 24.04%   |
| arr-inc       | 1.078 ± 0.002M/s | 1.332 ± 0.015M/s |   + 23.56%   |
| hash-inc      | 0.494 ± 0.004M/s | 0.653 ± 0.001M/s |   + 32.18%   |
+---------------+------------------+------------------+--------------+

NOTE: This benchmark includes changes from this patch and the previous
      patch that implemented the per-cpu insn.

[1] https://github.com/anakryiko/linux/commit/8dec900975ef

Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502151854.9810-3-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-05-12 16:54:34 -07:00
Jakub Kicinski
e958da0ddb Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.

Conflicts:

include/linux/filter.h
kernel/bpf/core.c
  66e13b615a ("bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access")
  d503a04f8b ("bpf: Add support for certain atomics in bpf_arena to x86 JIT")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240429114939.210328b0@canb.auug.org.au/

No adjacent changes.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-05-02 12:06:25 -07:00
Andy Shevchenko
a3034872cd bpf: Switch to krealloc_array()
Let the krealloc_array() copy the original data and
check for a multiplication overflow.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240429120005.3539116-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
2024-04-29 16:13:14 -07:00
Andy Shevchenko
cb01621b6d bpf: Use struct_size()
Use struct_size() instead of hand writing it.
This is less verbose and more robust.

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240429121323.3818497-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
2024-04-29 16:12:03 -07:00
Puranjay Mohan
66e13b615a bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access
With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer. To
thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry
for all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset is a userspace
address, the BPF program might read that memory if the user has
mapped it.

Make the verifier add guard instructions around such memory accesses and
skip the load if the address falls into the userspace region.

The JITs need to implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() to define where
the userspace addresses end for that architecture or TASK_SIZE is taken
as default.

The implementation is as follows:

REG_AX =  SRC_REG
if(offset)
	REG_AX += offset;
REG_AX >>= 32;
if (REG_AX <= (uaddress_limit >> 32))
	DST_REG = 0;
else
	DST_REG = *(size *)(SRC_REG + offset);

Comparing just the upper 32 bits of the load address with the upper
32 bits of uaddress_limit implies that the values are being aligned down
to a 4GB boundary before comparison.

The above means that all loads with address <= uaddress_limit + 4GB are
skipped. This is acceptable because there is a large hole (much larger
than 4GB) between userspace and kernel space memory, therefore a
correctly functioning BPF program should not access this 4GB memory
above the userspace.

Let's analyze what this patch does to the following fentry program
dereferencing an untrusted pointer:

  SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect")
  int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk)
  {
                *(volatile long *)sk;
                return 0;
  }

    BPF Program before              |           BPF Program after
    ------------------              |           -----------------

  0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)          0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) --\      1: (bf) r11 = r1
  ----------------------------\   \     2: (77) r11 >>= 32
  2: (b7) r0 = 0               \   \    3: (b5) if r11 <= 0x8000 goto pc+2
  3: (95) exit                  \   \-> 4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
                                 \      5: (05) goto pc+1
                                  \     6: (b7) r1 = 0
                                   \--------------------------------------
                                        7: (b7) r0 = 0
                                        8: (95) exit

As you can see from above, in the best case (off=0), 5 extra instructions
are emitted.

Now, we analyze the same program after it has gone through the JITs of
ARM64 and RISC-V architectures. We follow the single load instruction
that has the untrusted pointer and see what instrumentation has been
added around it.

                                x86-64 JIT
                                ==========
     JIT's Instrumentation
          (upstream)
     ---------------------

   0:   nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
   5:   xchg   %ax,%ax
   7:   push   %rbp
   8:   mov    %rsp,%rbp
   b:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi
  ---------------------------------
   f:   movabs $0x800000000000,%r11
  19:   cmp    %r11,%rdi
  1c:   jb     0x000000000000002a
  1e:   mov    %rdi,%r11
  21:   add    $0x0,%r11
  28:   jae    0x000000000000002e
  2a:   xor    %edi,%edi
  2c:   jmp    0x0000000000000032
  2e:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi
  ---------------------------------
  32:   xor    %eax,%eax
  34:   leave
  35:   ret

The x86-64 JIT already emits some instructions to protect against user
memory access. This patch doesn't make any changes for the x86-64 JIT.

                                  ARM64 JIT
                                  =========

        No Intrumentation                       Verifier's Instrumentation
           (upstream)                                  (This patch)
        -----------------                       --------------------------

   0:   add     x9, x30, #0x0                0:   add     x9, x30, #0x0
   4:   nop                                  4:   nop
   8:   paciasp                              8:   paciasp
   c:   stp     x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!        c:   stp     x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
  10:   mov     x29, sp                     10:   mov     x29, sp
  14:   stp     x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!       14:   stp     x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!
  18:   stp     x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!       18:   stp     x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!
  1c:   stp     x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!       1c:   stp     x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!
  20:   stp     x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!       20:   stp     x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!
  24:   mov     x25, sp                     24:   mov     x25, sp
  28:   mov     x26, #0x0                   28:   mov     x26, #0x0
  2c:   sub     x27, x25, #0x0              2c:   sub     x27, x25, #0x0
  30:   sub     sp, sp, #0x0                30:   sub     sp, sp, #0x0
  34:   ldr     x0, [x0]                    34:   ldr     x0, [x0]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  38:   ldr     x0, [x0] ----------\        38:   add     x9, x0, #0x0
-----------------------------------\\       3c:   lsr     x9, x9, #32
  3c:   mov     x7, #0x0            \\      40:   cmp     x9, #0x10, lsl #12
  40:   mov     sp, sp               \\     44:   b.ls    0x0000000000000050
  44:   ldp     x27, x28, [sp], #16   \\--> 48:   ldr     x0, [x0]
  48:   ldp     x25, x26, [sp], #16    \    4c:   b       0x0000000000000054
  4c:   ldp     x21, x22, [sp], #16     \   50:   mov     x0, #0x0
  50:   ldp     x19, x20, [sp], #16      \---------------------------------------
  54:   ldp     x29, x30, [sp], #16         54:   mov     x7, #0x0
  58:   add     x0, x7, #0x0                58:   mov     sp, sp
  5c:   autiasp                             5c:   ldp     x27, x28, [sp], #16
  60:   ret                                 60:   ldp     x25, x26, [sp], #16
  64:   nop                                 64:   ldp     x21, x22, [sp], #16
  68:   ldr     x10, 0x0000000000000070     68:   ldp     x19, x20, [sp], #16
  6c:   br      x10                         6c:   ldp     x29, x30, [sp], #16
                                            70:   add     x0, x7, #0x0
                                            74:   autiasp
                                            78:   ret
                                            7c:   nop
                                            80:   ldr     x10, 0x0000000000000088
                                            84:   br      x10

There are 6 extra instructions added in ARM64 in the best case. This will
become 7 in the worst case (off != 0).

                           RISC-V JIT (RISCV_ISA_C Disabled)
                           ==========

        No Intrumentation           Verifier's Instrumentation
           (upstream)                      (This patch)
        -----------------           --------------------------

   0:   nop                            0:   nop
   4:   nop                            4:   nop
   8:   li      a6, 33                 8:   li      a6, 33
   c:   addi    sp, sp, -16            c:   addi    sp, sp, -16
  10:   sd      s0, 8(sp)             10:   sd      s0, 8(sp)
  14:   addi    s0, sp, 16            14:   addi    s0, sp, 16
  18:   ld      a0, 0(a0)             18:   ld      a0, 0(a0)
---------------------------------------------------------------
  1c:   ld      a0, 0(a0) --\         1c:   mv      t0, a0
--------------------------\  \        20:   srli    t0, t0, 32
  20:   li      a5, 0      \  \       24:   lui     t1, 4096
  24:   ld      s0, 8(sp)   \  \      28:   sext.w  t1, t1
  28:   addi    sp, sp, 16   \  \     2c:   bgeu    t1, t0, 12
  2c:   sext.w  a0, a5        \  \--> 30:   ld      a0, 0(a0)
  30:   ret                    \      34:   j       8
                                \     38:   li      a0, 0
                                 \------------------------------
                                      3c:   li      a5, 0
                                      40:   ld      s0, 8(sp)
                                      44:   addi    sp, sp, 16
                                      48:   sext.w  a0, a5
                                      4c:   ret

There are 7 extra instructions added in RISC-V.

Fixes: 8008342853 ("bpf, arm64: Add BPF exception tables")
Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-2-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-04-26 09:45:18 -07:00
Rafael Passos
a7de265cb2 bpf: Fix typos in comments
Found the following typos in comments, and fixed them:

s/unpriviledged/unprivileged/
s/reponsible/responsible/
s/possiblities/possibilities/
s/Divison/Division/
s/precsion/precision/
s/havea/have a/
s/reponsible/responsible/
s/responsibile/responsible/
s/tigher/tighter/
s/respecitve/respective/

Signed-off-by: Rafael Passos <rafael@rcpassos.me>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/6af7deb4-bb24-49e8-b3f1-8dd410597337@smtp-relay.sendinblue.com
2024-04-22 17:48:08 +02:00
Alexei Starovoitov
d503a04f8b bpf: Add support for certain atomics in bpf_arena to x86 JIT
Support atomics in bpf_arena that can be JITed as a single x86 instruction.
Instructions that are JITed as loops are not supported at the moment,
since they require more complex extable and loop logic.

JITs can choose to do smarter things with bpf_jit_supports_insn().
Like arm64 may decide to support all bpf atomics instructions
when emit_lse_atomic is available and none in ll_sc mode.

bpf_jit_supports_percpu_insn(), bpf_jit_supports_ptr_xchg() and
other such callbacks can be replaced with bpf_jit_supports_insn()
in the future.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240405231134.17274-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
2024-04-09 10:24:26 -07:00
Andrii Nakryiko
7bdbf74463 bpf: add special internal-only MOV instruction to resolve per-CPU addrs
Add a new BPF instruction for resolving absolute addresses of per-CPU
data from their per-CPU offsets. This instruction is internal-only and
users are not allowed to use them directly. They will only be used for
internal inlining optimizations for now between BPF verifier and BPF JITs.

We use a special BPF_MOV | BPF_ALU64 | BPF_X form with insn->off field
set to BPF_ADDR_PERCPU = -1. I used negative offset value to distinguish
them from positive ones used by user-exposed instructions.

Such instruction performs a resolution of a per-CPU offset stored in
a register to a valid kernel address which can be dereferenced. It is
useful in any use case where absolute address of a per-CPU data has to
be resolved (e.g., in inlining bpf_map_lookup_elem()).

BPF disassembler is also taught to recognize them to support dumping
final BPF assembly code (non-JIT'ed version).

Add arch-specific way for BPF JITs to mark support for this instructions.

This patch also adds support for these instructions in x86-64 BPF JIT.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240402021307.1012571-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-04-03 10:29:55 -07:00
Justin Stitt
2e114248e0 bpf: Replace deprecated strncpy with strscpy
strncpy() is deprecated for use on NUL-terminated destination strings
[1] and as such we should prefer more robust and less ambiguous string
interfaces.

bpf sym names get looked up and compared/cleaned with various string
apis. This suggests they need to be NUL-terminated (strncpy() suggests
this but does not guarantee it).

|	static int compare_symbol_name(const char *name, char *namebuf)
|	{
|		cleanup_symbol_name(namebuf);
|		return strcmp(name, namebuf);
|	}

|	static void cleanup_symbol_name(char *s)
|	{
|		...
|		res = strstr(s, ".llvm.");
|		...
|	}

Use strscpy() as this method guarantees NUL-termination on the
destination buffer.

This patch also replaces two uses of strncpy() used in log.c. These are
simple replacements as postfix has been zero-initialized on the stack
and has source arguments with a size less than the destination's size.

Note that this patch uses the new 2-argument version of strscpy
introduced in commit e6584c3964 ("string: Allow 2-argument strscpy()").

Signed-off-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strncpy-on-nul-terminated-strings [1]
Link: https://manpages.debian.org/testing/linux-manual-4.8/strscpy.9.en.html [2]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/90
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240402-strncpy-kernel-bpf-core-c-v1-1-7cb07a426e78@google.com
2024-04-03 16:57:41 +02:00
Martin KaFai Lau
e8742081db bpf: Mark bpf prog stack with kmsan_unposion_memory in interpreter mode
syzbot reported uninit memory usages during map_{lookup,delete}_elem.

==========
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __dev_map_lookup_elem kernel/bpf/devmap.c:441 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in dev_map_lookup_elem+0xf3/0x170 kernel/bpf/devmap.c:796
__dev_map_lookup_elem kernel/bpf/devmap.c:441 [inline]
dev_map_lookup_elem+0xf3/0x170 kernel/bpf/devmap.c:796
____bpf_map_lookup_elem kernel/bpf/helpers.c:42 [inline]
bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x5c/0x80 kernel/bpf/helpers.c:38
___bpf_prog_run+0x13fe/0xe0f0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1997
__bpf_prog_run256+0xb5/0xe0 kernel/bpf/core.c:2237
==========

The reproducer should be in the interpreter mode.

The C reproducer is trying to run the following bpf prog:

    0: (18) r0 = 0x0
    2: (18) r1 = map[id:49]
    4: (b7) r8 = 16777216
    5: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r8
    6: (bf) r2 = r10
    7: (07) r2 += -229
            ^^^^^^^^^^

    8: (b7) r3 = 8
    9: (b7) r4 = 0
   10: (85) call dev_map_lookup_elem#1543472
   11: (95) exit

It is due to the "void *key" (r2) passed to the helper. bpf allows uninit
stack memory access for bpf prog with the right privileges. This patch
uses kmsan_unpoison_memory() to mark the stack as initialized.

This should address different syzbot reports on the uninit "void *key"
argument during map_{lookup,delete}_elem.

Reported-by: syzbot+603bcd9b0bf1d94dbb9b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000f9ce6d061494e694@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+eb02dc7f03dce0ef39f3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000a5c69c06147c2238@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+b4e65ca24fd4d0c734c3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000ac56fb06143b6cfa@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+d2b113dc9fea5e1d2848@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0000000000000d69b206142d1ff7@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+1a3cf6f08d68868f9db3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0000000000006f876b061478e878@google.com/
Tested-by: syzbot+1a3cf6f08d68868f9db3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328185801.1843078-1-martin.lau@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-03-28 19:00:59 -07:00
Christophe Leroy
c733239f8f bpf: Check return from set_memory_rox()
arch_protect_bpf_trampoline() and alloc_new_pack() call
set_memory_rox() which can fail, leading to unprotected memory.

Take into account return from set_memory_rox() function and add
__must_check flag to arch_protect_bpf_trampoline().

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fe1c163c83767fde5cab31d209a4a6be3ddb3a73.1710574353.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
2024-03-18 14:18:47 -07:00
Christophe Leroy
7d2cc63eca bpf: Take return from set_memory_ro() into account with bpf_prog_lock_ro()
set_memory_ro() can fail, leaving memory unprotected.

Check its return and take it into account as an error.

Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/7
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Message-ID: <286def78955e04382b227cb3e4b6ba272a7442e3.1709850515.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-03-14 19:28:52 -07:00
Andrii Nakryiko
66c8473135 bpf: move sleepable flag from bpf_prog_aux to bpf_prog
prog->aux->sleepable is checked very frequently as part of (some) BPF
program run hot paths. So this extra aux indirection seems wasteful and
on busy systems might cause unnecessary memory cache misses.

Let's move sleepable flag into prog itself to eliminate unnecessary
pointer dereference.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Message-ID: <20240309004739.2961431-1-andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-03-11 16:41:25 -07:00
Puranjay Mohan
d6170e4aaf bpf: hardcode BPF_PROG_PACK_SIZE to 2MB * num_possible_nodes()
On some architectures like ARM64, PMD_SIZE can be really large in some
configurations. Like with CONFIG_ARM64_64K_PAGES=y the PMD_SIZE is
512MB.

Use 2MB * num_possible_nodes() as the size for allocations done through
the prog pack allocator. On most architectures, PMD_SIZE will be equal
to 2MB in case of 4KB pages and will be greater than 2MB for bigger page
sizes.

Fixes: ea2babac63 ("bpf: Simplify bpf_prog_pack_[size|mask]")
Reported-by: "kernelci.org bot" <bot@kernelci.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7e216c88-77ee-47b8-becc-a0f780868d3c@sirena.org.uk/
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202403092219.dhgcuz2G-lkp@intel.com/
Suggested-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20240311122722.86232-1-puranjay12@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-03-11 16:33:30 -07:00
Alexei Starovoitov
142fd4d2dc bpf: Add x86-64 JIT support for bpf_addr_space_cast instruction.
LLVM generates bpf_addr_space_cast instruction while translating
pointers between native (zero) address space and
__attribute__((address_space(N))).
The addr_space=1 is reserved as bpf_arena address space.

rY = addr_space_cast(rX, 0, 1) is processed by the verifier and
converted to normal 32-bit move: wX = wY

rY = addr_space_cast(rX, 1, 0) has to be converted by JIT:

aux_reg = upper_32_bits of arena->user_vm_start
aux_reg <<= 32
wX = wY // clear upper 32 bits of dst register
if (wX) // if not zero add upper bits of user_vm_start
  wX |= aux_reg

JIT can do it more efficiently:

mov dst_reg32, src_reg32  // 32-bit move
shl dst_reg, 32
or dst_reg, user_vm_start
rol dst_reg, 32
xor r11, r11
test dst_reg32, dst_reg32 // check if lower 32-bit are zero
cmove r11, dst_reg	  // if so, set dst_reg to zero
			  // Intel swapped src/dst register encoding in CMOVcc

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240308010812.89848-5-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
2024-03-11 15:37:24 -07:00