mirror of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
synced 2025-08-05 16:54:27 +00:00
13633 commits
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
---|---|---|---|---|
![]() |
ed8fd8d5dd |
for-6.13-rc7-tag
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE8rQSAMVO+zA4DBdWxWXV+ddtWDsFAmeI5MAACgkQxWXV+ddt WDtMIg//WwV2p/gQmFMfFu7txZQQrt6m6nMuq/2y0qAA+d2e9oXFr3jNLlho0RwL hvSM5IEsxzL1ujh67tqxUBojvRjq+CRwiI6fxFO13dLIMrlKoiINtuOEiIhgZr/Q K+weXC4yHCFSB4q82dcr5i++/GVdY8wBoLHGe4zdJ0TVtM0xHrYVQ/4PXAGMX97V Bmv038aAMpRJTxJ6rcObloNxOb+WoyM0DIRbJ2UWVmy+bOLHMEa/jSkkQDWwcuPV UJjQgXz21FXiJqhtcndM58mEsKfe1WV9gG3lihedyb/xNeCPggqkDbfSzZU55Lkm vRXSgklbkifK6RTqrozg7e38MV+rZMwwNzqysMxNtlvrC5R+0A6of4t2Ny1vaeGG flcVncbLi/ip9J4fMLUpVS0fbAZjQgIJca6fbgM7Ajdzvm9rIDGpR078GW1zDlg2 20f7isQWqSkj3i9kPElGbDT65RvcxR5EpJQfwr78+bsgSsyBGwghhAJ5F7vqZh5L wdmJOYxkwq5r1YxeuEQPVv404WPrwZE2Gyk6TGXkzpA+l6isCViY3NTyQPBOMH9y 2GEelW61QSKtc5BPp1h85Aw74wtSCpGkCY+t/v03oQ6PBssWIsVcXZ7NnjJh9+72 U+JY0H7UPyyczEzicEGlwWYBWs2/KeBuCrladNCkv3S5TWgB5yQ= =sF6v -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-6.13-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux Pull btrfs fix from David Sterba: - handle d_path() errors when canonicalizing device mapper paths during device scan * tag 'for-6.13-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: btrfs: add the missing error handling inside get_canonical_dev_path |
||
![]() |
fe4de594f7 |
btrfs: add the missing error handling inside get_canonical_dev_path
Inside function get_canonical_dev_path(), we call d_path() to get the
final device path.
But d_path() can return error, and in that case the next strscpy() call
will trigger an invalid memory access.
Add back the missing error handling for d_path().
Reported-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
643e2e259c |
for-6.13-rc6-tag
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE8rQSAMVO+zA4DBdWxWXV+ddtWDsFAmd/7dYACgkQxWXV+ddt WDuX7Q//UkrNtVh7UEiyNyujLjjvczfMXhpD1fAdVU0zMon6ux3RQ3JSs3xvAGrb jFFa9c9+Db8/kWzdWp5n1u9Q/+sy4XBaeKGuzPRLPPGT1yXfKEa4mrm1sCrWRJoS c8b07Kfuepldcim80x8WSa2qhr5gmDmSZBgvjKt63ppp5/jaNKCZg+d3BhwqhHbI XA9JjIk9j0ZsAYauYflQTwgUpkyvXV1a9YyeKv4U6mYA1r+rXl2aolcndNkS1U/D dDGuiDpOjKtIUecRi4YbOkt2zvwREDdQCbRV/QLsZajHxqeHV5QH0TBI/URikx2z 1shwYMzLfLtQIW0+PhHCGKiftMIb4NliyMUxxviPdN78nCFmocrR/ZkPx+a5M9Io d7oqwS/8U3pFGeB4bAey8WvMzQI5BtCCYJY+3HreNTDkiubqcRtTCtJ9dNDTAMFH FMZ6DA8wTsqSA2e9Q8OwKNjvMCLAKevXn/4wiJi5b75Fiu5ZB/imTfJ+geEMUZCR 3uq9oybFCKti7lestM0z06K19AKtmPWLoq5YJ1Hg69DsafS2aR3CBeYOi7uQ+56D 7uwAFjVrGPrxOgGkCohYpPLCUikJ0y3Nl/k5fnybsnLPWr0cenLroUeP7Rao4fFU 8hLzMSv3ImL+Io0RjH0XBAM8YLN+xO3CLYCv6D8d42AlQTgAIVw= =QYC1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-6.13-rc6-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba: "A few more fixes. Besides the one-liners in Btrfs there's fix to the io_uring and encoded read integration (added in this development cycle). The update to io_uring provides more space for the ongoing command that is then used in Btrfs to handle some cases. - io_uring and encoded read: - provide stable storage for io_uring command data - make a copy of encoded read ioctl call, reuse that in case the call would block and will be called again - properly initialize zlib context for hardware compression on s390 - fix max extent size calculation on filesystems with non-zoned devices - fix crash in scrub on crafted image due to invalid extent tree" * tag 'for-6.13-rc6-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: btrfs: zlib: fix avail_in bytes for s390 zlib HW compression path btrfs: zoned: calculate max_extent_size properly on non-zoned setup btrfs: avoid NULL pointer dereference if no valid extent tree btrfs: don't read from userspace twice in btrfs_uring_encoded_read() io_uring: add io_uring_cmd_get_async_data helper io_uring/cmd: add per-op data to struct io_uring_cmd_data io_uring/cmd: rename struct uring_cache to io_uring_cmd_data |
||
![]() |
0ee4736c00 |
btrfs: zlib: fix avail_in bytes for s390 zlib HW compression path
Since the input data length passed to zlib_compress_folios() can be
arbitrary, always setting strm.avail_in to a multiple of PAGE_SIZE may
cause read-in bytes to exceed the input range. Currently this triggers
an assert in btrfs_compress_folios() on the debug kernel (see below).
Fix strm.avail_in calculation for S390 hardware acceleration path.
assertion failed: *total_in <= orig_len, in fs/btrfs/compression.c:1041
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/compression.c:1041!
monitor event: 0040 ilc:2 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 325 Comm: kworker/u273:3 Not tainted 6.13.0-20241204.rc1.git6.fae3b21430ca.300.fc41.s390x+debug #1
Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 703 (z/VM 7.4.0)
Workqueue: btrfs-delalloc btrfs_work_helper
Krnl PSW : 0704d00180000000 0000021761df6538 (btrfs_compress_folios+0x198/0x1a0)
R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:1 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
Krnl GPRS: 0000000080000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000047 0000000000000000
0000000000000006 ffffff01757bb000 000001976232fcc0 000000000000130c
000001976232fcd0 000001976232fcc8 00000118ff4a0e30 0000000000000001
00000111821ab400 0000011100000000 0000021761df6534 000001976232fb58
Krnl Code: 0000021761df6528: c020006f5ef4 larl %r2,0000021762be2310
0000021761df652e: c0e5ffbd09d5 brasl %r14,00000217615978d8
#0000021761df6534: af000000 mc 0,0
>0000021761df6538: 0707 bcr 0,%r7
0000021761df653a: 0707 bcr 0,%r7
0000021761df653c: 0707 bcr 0,%r7
0000021761df653e: 0707 bcr 0,%r7
0000021761df6540: c004004bb7ec brcl 0,000002176276d518
Call Trace:
[<0000021761df6538>] btrfs_compress_folios+0x198/0x1a0
([<0000021761df6534>] btrfs_compress_folios+0x194/0x1a0)
[<0000021761d97788>] compress_file_range+0x3b8/0x6d0
[<0000021761dcee7c>] btrfs_work_helper+0x10c/0x160
[<0000021761645760>] process_one_work+0x2b0/0x5d0
[<000002176164637e>] worker_thread+0x20e/0x3e0
[<000002176165221a>] kthread+0x15a/0x170
[<00000217615b859c>] __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[<00000217626e72d2>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x38
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
Last Breaking-Event-Address:
[<0000021761597924>] _printk+0x4c/0x58
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
7467bc5959 |
btrfs: zoned: calculate max_extent_size properly on non-zoned setup
Since commit |
||
![]() |
6aecd91a5c |
btrfs: avoid NULL pointer dereference if no valid extent tree
[BUG] Syzbot reported a crash with the following call trace: BTRFS info (device loop0): scrub: started on devid 1 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000208 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 106e70067 P4D 106e70067 PUD 107143067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 689 Comm: repro Kdump: loaded Tainted: G O 6.13.0-rc4-custom+ #206 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022 RIP: 0010:find_first_extent_item+0x26/0x1f0 [btrfs] Call Trace: <TASK> scrub_find_fill_first_stripe+0x13d/0x3b0 [btrfs] scrub_simple_mirror+0x175/0x260 [btrfs] scrub_stripe+0x5d4/0x6c0 [btrfs] scrub_chunk+0xbb/0x170 [btrfs] scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x2f4/0x5f0 [btrfs] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x240/0x600 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x1dc8/0x2fa0 [btrfs] ? do_sys_openat2+0xa5/0xf0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x120 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e </TASK> [CAUSE] The reproducer is using a corrupted image where extent tree root is corrupted, thus forcing to use "rescue=all,ro" mount option to mount the image. Then it triggered a scrub, but since scrub relies on extent tree to find where the data/metadata extents are, scrub_find_fill_first_stripe() relies on an non-empty extent root. But unfortunately scrub_find_fill_first_stripe() doesn't really expect an NULL pointer for extent root, it use extent_root to grab fs_info and triggered a NULL pointer dereference. [FIX] Add an extra check for a valid extent root at the beginning of scrub_find_fill_first_stripe(). The new error path is introduced by |
||
![]() |
c21b89d495 |
btrfs: don't read from userspace twice in btrfs_uring_encoded_read()
If we return -EAGAIN the first time because we need to block,
btrfs_uring_encoded_read() will get called twice. Take a copy of args,
the iovs, and the iter the first time, as by the time we are called the
second time these may have gone out of scope.
Reported-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
c059361673 |
for-6.13-rc4-tag
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE8rQSAMVO+zA4DBdWxWXV+ddtWDsFAmdw8AgACgkQxWXV+ddt WDsL4w/+Ib5WGmd2Rjn1+1X9U5dzrEb+/072UBAhwwaqOOUTlBofeyRSdYqFB0oZ aucRMXdXPpVe1xrXsj0WsOZmPsuZT46Eh2ALqqZP5fO1sgBkJ2WmQF0Ei7uypfb+ abQwiEO2IaMMwt2XgDNzbpZS7oVNGEXHzoHF0R/deL4FoBDNMsbCfRnW+L9++tWU dUSpafLhgMMwivJN07VJYwU4ZVXsBhmKv2qI8WpJ5w9kJb1ssN692CvBOVjhuSYd A8IMV84dW2KO37fmPqN36QAWotz4mKpv8yrhjJvrix7nAOcXe3TXFUhaFBh1Vmzg G5bhkqYcNP6UHT7CIcLZE1mdv6ZAKTp0zSNCh2Uu51+MJL2tIQVjTaUQhbkYLnLN 9DS2dXz4ksm9ISrjr2tmPe4kgyNQIrp5TCdwXu3CYs+AaU7yKeEBukZ7mXcp/e/W TdLKvzPRLMED8mGlFBwg2QbOvcJJ663UW2esyv6DvC61F3tXyiV2RXSC/1qF+RyZ FBJvvEevensQlASn1NScuQV+iEQpMo2lMURnRjSG8dGhwMmHpW3wifa2TJDyBzWS AH0MriQA9nsYQTkPGPnqr46/BAhFG2vEfVlX20Sk9S0PTBLu8YRy/o2evcV67J8v zGaa5pa7fQPbEjRv4Rthdb4R2VIFkZTOtIZSZfjHkPDjtvS7ahU= =NwGH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-6.13-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba: "A few more fixes that accumulated over the last two weeks, fixing some user reported problems: - swapfile fixes: - conditional reschedule in the activation loop - fix race with memory mapped file when activating - make activation loop interruptible - rework and fix extent sharing checks - folio fixes: - in send, recheck folio mapping after unlock - in relocation, recheck folio mapping after unlock - fix waiting for encoded read io_uring requests - fix transaction atomicity when enabling simple quotas - move COW block trace point before the block gets freed - print various sizes in sysfs with correct endianity" * tag 'for-6.13-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: btrfs: sysfs: fix direct super block member reads btrfs: fix transaction atomicity bug when enabling simple quotas btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file btrfs: allow swap activation to be interruptible btrfs: fix swap file activation failure due to extents that used to be shared btrfs: fix race with memory mapped writes when activating swap file btrfs: check folio mapping after unlock in put_file_data() btrfs: check folio mapping after unlock in relocate_one_folio() btrfs: fix use-after-free when COWing tree bock and tracing is enabled btrfs: fix use-after-free waiting for encoded read endios |
||
![]() |
fca432e73d |
btrfs: sysfs: fix direct super block member reads
The following sysfs entries are reading super block member directly,
which can have a different endian and cause wrong values:
- sys/fs/btrfs/<uuid>/nodesize
- sys/fs/btrfs/<uuid>/sectorsize
- sys/fs/btrfs/<uuid>/clone_alignment
Thankfully those values (nodesize and sectorsize) are always aligned
inside the btrfs_super_block, so it won't trigger unaligned read errors,
just endian problems.
Fix them by using the native cached members instead.
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
f2363e6fcc |
btrfs: fix transaction atomicity bug when enabling simple quotas
Set squota incompat bit before committing the transaction that enables
the feature.
With the config CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT enabled, an assertion
failure occurs regarding the simple quota feature.
[5.596534] assertion failed: btrfs_fs_incompat(fs_info, SIMPLE_QUOTA), in fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:365
[5.597098] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[5.597371] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:365!
[5.597946] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 268 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2-00031-gf92f4749861b #146
[5.598450] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
[5.599008] RIP: 0010:btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x74d/0x7a0
[5.604303] <TASK>
[5.605230] ? btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x74d/0x7a0
[5.605538] ? exc_invalid_op+0x56/0x70
[5.605775] ? btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x74d/0x7a0
[5.606066] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
[5.606441] ? btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x74d/0x7a0
[5.606741] ? btrfs_read_qgroup_config+0x74d/0x7a0
[5.607038] ? try_to_wake_up+0x317/0x760
[5.607286] open_ctree+0xd9c/0x1710
[5.607509] btrfs_get_tree+0x58a/0x7e0
[5.608002] vfs_get_tree+0x2e/0x100
[5.608224] fc_mount+0x16/0x60
[5.608420] btrfs_get_tree+0x2f8/0x7e0
[5.608897] vfs_get_tree+0x2e/0x100
[5.609121] path_mount+0x4c8/0xbc0
[5.609538] __x64_sys_mount+0x10d/0x150
The issue can be easily reproduced using the following reproducer:
root@q:linux# cat repro.sh
set -e
mkfs.btrfs -q -f /dev/sdb
mount /dev/sdb /mnt/btrfs
btrfs quota enable -s /mnt/btrfs
umount /mnt/btrfs
mount /dev/sdb /mnt/btrfs
The issue is that when enabling quotas, at btrfs_quota_enable(), we set
BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_SIMPLE_MODE at fs_info->qgroup_flags and persist
it in the quota root in the item with the key BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_KEY, but
we only set the incompat bit BTRFS_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SIMPLE_QUOTA after we
commit the transaction used to enable simple quotas.
This means that if after that transaction commit we unmount the filesystem
without starting and committing any other transaction, or we have a power
failure, the next time we mount the filesystem we will find the flag
BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_SIMPLE_MODE set in the item with the key
BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_KEY but we will not find the incompat bit
BTRFS_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SIMPLE_QUOTA set in the superblock, triggering an
assertion failure at:
btrfs_read_qgroup_config() -> qgroup_read_enable_gen()
To fix this issue, set the BTRFS_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SIMPLE_QUOTA flag
immediately after setting the BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_SIMPLE_MODE.
This ensures that both flags are flushed to disk within the same
transaction.
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
2c8507c63f |
btrfs: avoid monopolizing a core when activating a swap file
During swap activation we iterate over the extents of a file and we can have many thousands of them, so we can end up in a busy loop monopolizing a core. Avoid this by doing a voluntary reschedule after processing each extent. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
![]() |
9a45022a0e |
btrfs: allow swap activation to be interruptible
During swap activation we iterate over the extents of a file, then do several checks for each extent, some of which may take some significant time such as checking if an extent is shared. Since a file can have many thousands of extents, this can be a very slow operation and it's currently not interruptible. I had a bug during development of a previous patch that resulted in an infinite loop when iterating the extents, so a core was busy looping and I couldn't cancel the operation, which is very annoying and requires a reboot. So make the loop interruptible by checking for fatal signals at the end of each iteration and stopping immediately if there is one. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
![]() |
03018e5d85 |
btrfs: fix swap file activation failure due to extents that used to be shared
When activating a swap file, to determine if an extent is shared we use can_nocow_extent(), which ends up at btrfs_cross_ref_exist(). That helper is meant to be quick because it's used in the NOCOW write path, when flushing delalloc and when doing a direct IO write, however it does return some false positives, meaning it may indicate that an extent is shared even if it's no longer the case. For the write path this is fine, we just do a unnecessary COW operation instead of doing a more rigorous check which would be too heavy (calling btrfs_is_data_extent_shared()). However when activating a swap file, the false positives simply result in a failure, which is confusing for users/applications. One particular case where this happens is when a data extent only has 1 reference but that reference is not inlined in the extent item located in the extent tree - this happens when we create more than 33 references for an extent and then delete those 33 references plus every other non-inline reference except one. The function check_committed_ref() assumes that if the size of an extent item doesn't match the size of struct btrfs_extent_item plus the size of an inline reference (plus an owner reference in case simple quotas are enabled), then the extent is shared - that is not the case however, we can have a single reference but it's not inlined - the reason we do this is to be fast and avoid inspecting non-inline references which may be located in another leaf of the extent tree, slowing down write paths. The following test script reproduces the bug: $ cat test.sh #!/bin/bash DEV=/dev/sdi MNT=/mnt/sdi NUM_CLONES=50 umount $DEV &> /dev/null run_test() { local sync_after_add_reflinks=$1 local sync_after_remove_reflinks=$2 mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV > /dev/null #mkfs.xfs -f $DEV > /dev/null mount $DEV $MNT touch $MNT/foo chmod 0600 $MNT/foo # On btrfs the file must be NOCOW. chattr +C $MNT/foo &> /dev/null xfs_io -s -c "pwrite -b 1M 0 1M" $MNT/foo mkswap $MNT/foo for ((i = 1; i <= $NUM_CLONES; i++)); do touch $MNT/foo_clone_$i chmod 0600 $MNT/foo_clone_$i # On btrfs the file must be NOCOW. chattr +C $MNT/foo_clone_$i &> /dev/null cp --reflink=always $MNT/foo $MNT/foo_clone_$i done if [ $sync_after_add_reflinks -ne 0 ]; then # Flush delayed refs and commit current transaction. sync -f $MNT fi # Remove the original file and all clones except the last. rm -f $MNT/foo for ((i = 1; i < $NUM_CLONES; i++)); do rm -f $MNT/foo_clone_$i done if [ $sync_after_remove_reflinks -ne 0 ]; then # Flush delayed refs and commit current transaction. sync -f $MNT fi # Now use the last clone as a swap file. It should work since # its extent are not shared anymore. swapon $MNT/foo_clone_${NUM_CLONES} swapoff $MNT/foo_clone_${NUM_CLONES} umount $MNT } echo -e "\nTest without sync after creating and removing clones" run_test 0 0 echo -e "\nTest with sync after creating clones" run_test 1 0 echo -e "\nTest with sync after removing clones" run_test 0 1 echo -e "\nTest with sync after creating and removing clones" run_test 1 1 Running the test: $ ./test.sh Test without sync after creating and removing clones wrote 1048576/1048576 bytes at offset 0 1 MiB, 1 ops; 0.0017 sec (556.793 MiB/sec and 556.7929 ops/sec) Setting up swapspace version 1, size = 1020 KiB (1044480 bytes) no label, UUID=a6b9c29e-5ef4-4689-a8ac-bc199c750f02 swapon: /mnt/sdi/foo_clone_50: swapon failed: Invalid argument swapoff: /mnt/sdi/foo_clone_50: swapoff failed: Invalid argument Test with sync after creating clones wrote 1048576/1048576 bytes at offset 0 1 MiB, 1 ops; 0.0036 sec (271.739 MiB/sec and 271.7391 ops/sec) Setting up swapspace version 1, size = 1020 KiB (1044480 bytes) no label, UUID=5e9008d6-1f7a-4948-a1b4-3f30aba20a33 swapon: /mnt/sdi/foo_clone_50: swapon failed: Invalid argument swapoff: /mnt/sdi/foo_clone_50: swapoff failed: Invalid argument Test with sync after removing clones wrote 1048576/1048576 bytes at offset 0 1 MiB, 1 ops; 0.0103 sec (96.665 MiB/sec and 96.6651 ops/sec) Setting up swapspace version 1, size = 1020 KiB (1044480 bytes) no label, UUID=916c2740-fa9f-4385-9f06-29c3f89e4764 Test with sync after creating and removing clones wrote 1048576/1048576 bytes at offset 0 1 MiB, 1 ops; 0.0031 sec (314.268 MiB/sec and 314.2678 ops/sec) Setting up swapspace version 1, size = 1020 KiB (1044480 bytes) no label, UUID=06aab1dd-4d90-49c0-bd9f-3a8db4e2f912 swapon: /mnt/sdi/foo_clone_50: swapon failed: Invalid argument swapoff: /mnt/sdi/foo_clone_50: swapoff failed: Invalid argument Fix this by reworking btrfs_swap_activate() to instead of using extent maps and checking for shared extents with can_nocow_extent(), iterate over the inode's file extent items and use the accurate btrfs_is_data_extent_shared(). CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
![]() |
0525064bb8 |
btrfs: fix race with memory mapped writes when activating swap file
When activating the swap file we flush all delalloc and wait for ordered extent completion, so that we don't miss any delalloc and extents before we check that the file's extent layout is usable for a swap file and activate the swap file. We are called with the inode's VFS lock acquired, so we won't race with buffered and direct IO writes, however we can still race with memory mapped writes since they don't acquire the inode's VFS lock. The race window is between flushing all delalloc and locking the whole file's extent range, since memory mapped writes lock an extent range with the length of a page. Fix this by acquiring the inode's mmap lock before we flush delalloc. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
![]() |
0fba7be1ca |
btrfs: check folio mapping after unlock in put_file_data()
When we call btrfs_read_folio() we get an unlocked folio, so it is possible for a different thread to concurrently modify folio->mapping. We must check that this hasn't happened once we do have the lock. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.12+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
![]() |
3e74859ee3 |
btrfs: check folio mapping after unlock in relocate_one_folio()
When we call btrfs_read_folio() to bring a folio uptodate, we unlock the
folio. The result of that is that a different thread can modify the
mapping (like remove it with invalidate) before we call folio_lock().
This results in an invalid page and we need to try again.
In particular, if we are relocating concurrently with aborting a
transaction, this can result in a crash like the following:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 76 PID: 1411631 Comm: kworker/u322:5
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_reclaim_bgs_work
RIP: 0010:set_page_extent_mapped+0x20/0xb0
RSP: 0018:ffffc900516a7be8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffffea009e851d08 RBX: ffffea009e0b1880 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc900516a7b90 RDI: ffffea009e0b1880
RBP: 0000000003573000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88c07fd2f3f0
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000194754b575be R12: 0000000003572000
R13: 0000000003572fff R14: 0000000000100cca R15: 0000000005582fff
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88c07fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000407d00f002 CR4: 00000000007706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x78/0xc0
? page_fault_oops+0x2a8/0x3a0
? __switch_to+0x133/0x530
? wq_worker_running+0xa/0x40
? exc_page_fault+0x63/0x130
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? set_page_extent_mapped+0x20/0xb0
relocate_file_extent_cluster+0x1a7/0x940
relocate_data_extent+0xaf/0x120
relocate_block_group+0x20f/0x480
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x152/0x320
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x3d/0x120
btrfs_reclaim_bgs_work+0x2ae/0x4e0
process_scheduled_works+0x184/0x370
worker_thread+0xc6/0x3e0
? blk_add_timer+0xb0/0xb0
kthread+0xae/0xe0
? flush_tlb_kernel_range+0x90/0x90
ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40
? flush_tlb_kernel_range+0x90/0x90
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
This occurs because cleanup_one_transaction() calls
destroy_delalloc_inodes() which calls invalidate_inode_pages2() which
takes the folio_lock before setting mapping to NULL. We fail to check
this, and subsequently call set_extent_mapping(), which assumes that
mapping != NULL (in fact it asserts that in debug mode)
Note that the "fixes" patch here is not the one that introduced the
race (the very first iteration of this code from 2009) but a more recent
change that made this particular crash happen in practice.
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
44f52bbe96 |
btrfs: fix use-after-free when COWing tree bock and tracing is enabled
When a COWing a tree block, at btrfs_cow_block(), and we have the tracepoint trace_btrfs_cow_block() enabled and preemption is also enabled (CONFIG_PREEMPT=y), we can trigger a use-after-free in the COWed extent buffer while inside the tracepoint code. This is because in some paths that call btrfs_cow_block(), such as btrfs_search_slot(), we are holding the last reference on the extent buffer @buf so btrfs_force_cow_block() drops the last reference on the @buf extent buffer when it calls free_extent_buffer_stale(buf), which schedules the release of the extent buffer with RCU. This means that if we are on a kernel with preemption, the current task may be preempted before calling trace_btrfs_cow_block() and the extent buffer already released by the time trace_btrfs_cow_block() is called, resulting in a use-after-free. Fix this by moving the trace_btrfs_cow_block() from btrfs_cow_block() to btrfs_force_cow_block() before the COWed extent buffer is freed. This also has a side effect of invoking the tracepoint in the tree defrag code, at defrag.c:btrfs_realloc_node(), since btrfs_force_cow_block() is called there, but this is fine and it was actually missing there. Reported-by: syzbot+8517da8635307182c8a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/6759a9b9.050a0220.1ac542.000d.GAE@google.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
![]() |
d29662695e |
btrfs: fix use-after-free waiting for encoded read endios
Fix a use-after-free in the I/O completion path for encoded reads by
using a completion instead of a wait_queue for synchronizing the
destruction of 'struct btrfs_encoded_read_private'.
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
eabcdba3ad |
for-6.13-rc3-tag
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE8rQSAMVO+zA4DBdWxWXV+ddtWDsFAmdhyQAACgkQxWXV+ddt WDuveg//bJSuXHrA7jkijst8rdoAFrceiUXuQPZ6bqb9QrSqlDZlP5/XQpdXZ3yU qJh/aE13cy0zWTQ2+fMcc770WSvU1cRW/f5BZ+fdXgvO8lS516suXGYd2Q06Cl9/ DriAKGKtRfJn1BrEEv8+fjKS/chxZg6IR/W4kN6AinW31myY9jE5mEDAn+vyTDgQ 8USZ/ar/3KuWo+wO5h5JzrvGnhzK0W0HRs/A0NZ3gG8J5T4yj+8zG0VJR4Gf93AL iBlsnAR8VzAYJOZCi36SD3j3/eDxJio5GhDYsdt28tk1bL8FqSuI4Yxt+LuiZ2Fg Cq/31lELEkyEH8AoVFm9pX3HNyRmV6JhpvDXiyofHaOUZ3VeivVE59gOShLUUMkn f9Pl/uh5/t/ioWWHBnCMyRpI9GZUGCvW24k7HjT7QZhsDGFLTm07diCiRgZ7eaOu LZRKMOL5jifAnfxNSvIJV19H4lQLTZfbdjmJyb6Il39tIU/1U9pXicgih3iyidW2 N5n4pHf3OQFwG8kNw1mR1g1CPBALP62ja8kMv//IgH4YXXnm1Mo7B3CcJogAAmo4 HB9f/gFqZ8kWaiuIUJKfPZkkLFt5x0TNZQyyOhVUd7V4mFdtEzVtZRWo3juYuLGk 7Shp/MTlYokwnEropiWHU5ab3Bb9vLxlh8daGK/OmwBz01DaApI= =AAmb -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-6.13-rc3-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba: - tree-checker catches invalid number of inline extent references - zoned mode fixes: - enhance zone append IO command so it also detects emulated writes - handle bio splitting at sectorsize boundary - when deleting a snapshot, fix a condition for visiting nodes in reloc trees * tag 'for-6.13-rc3-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: btrfs: tree-checker: reject inline extent items with 0 ref count btrfs: split bios to the fs sector size boundary btrfs: use bio_is_zone_append() in the completion handler btrfs: fix improper generation check in snapshot delete |
||
![]() |
dfb92681a1 |
btrfs: tree-checker: reject inline extent items with 0 ref count
[BUG] There is a bug report in the mailing list where btrfs_run_delayed_refs() failed to drop the ref count for logical 25870311358464 num_bytes 2113536. The involved leaf dump looks like this: item 166 key (25870311358464 168 2113536) itemoff 10091 itemsize 50 extent refs 1 gen 84178 flags 1 ref#0: shared data backref parent 32399126528000 count 0 <<< ref#1: shared data backref parent 31808973717504 count 1 Notice the count number is 0. [CAUSE] There is no concrete evidence yet, but considering 0 -> 1 is also a single bit flipped, it's possible that hardware memory bitflip is involved, causing the on-disk extent tree to be corrupted. [FIX] To prevent us reading such corrupted extent item, or writing such damaged extent item back to disk, enhance the handling of BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_REF_KEY and BTRFS_SHARED_DATA_REF_KEY keys for both inlined and key items, to detect such 0 ref count and reject them. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/7c69dd49-c346-4806-86e7-e6f863a66f48@app.fastmail.com/ Reported-by: Frankie Fisher <frankie@terrorise.me.uk> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
![]() |
be691b5e59 |
btrfs: split bios to the fs sector size boundary
Btrfs like other file systems can't really deal with I/O not aligned to
it's internal block size (which strangely is called sector size in
btrfs, for historical reasons), but the block layer split helper doesn't
even know about that.
Round down the split boundary so that all I/Os are aligned.
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
6c3864e055 |
btrfs: use bio_is_zone_append() in the completion handler
Otherwise it won't catch bios turned into regular writes by the block
level zone write plugging. The additional test it adds is for emulated
zone append.
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
d75d72a858 |
btrfs: fix improper generation check in snapshot delete
We have been using the following check if (generation <= root->root_key.offset) to make decisions about whether or not to visit a node during snapshot delete. This is because for normal subvolumes this is set to 0, and for snapshots it's set to the creation generation. The idea being that if the generation of the node is less than or equal to our creation generation then we don't need to visit that node, because it doesn't belong to us, we can simply drop our reference and move on. However reloc roots don't have their generation stored in root->root_key.offset, instead that is the objectid of their corresponding fs root. This means we can incorrectly not walk into nodes that need to be dropped when deleting a reloc root. There are a variety of consequences to making the wrong choice in two distinct areas. visit_node_for_delete() 1. False positive. We think we are newer than the block when we really aren't. We don't visit the node and drop our reference to the node and carry on. This would result in leaked space. 2. False negative. We do decide to walk down into a block that we should have just dropped our reference to. However this means that the child node will have refs > 1, so we will switch to UPDATE_BACKREF, and then the subsequent walk_down_proc() will notice that btrfs_header_owner(node) != root->root_key.objectid and it'll break out of the loop, and then walk_up_proc() will drop our reference, so this appears to be ok. do_walk_down() 1. False positive. We are in UPDATE_BACKREF and incorrectly decide that we are done and don't need to update the backref for our lower nodes. This is another case that simply won't happen with relocation, as we only have to do UPDATE_BACKREF if the node below us was shared and didn't have FULL_BACKREF set, and since we don't own that node because we're a reloc root we actually won't end up in this case. 2. False negative. Again this is tricky because as described above, we simply wouldn't be here from relocation, because we don't own any of the nodes because we never set btrfs_header_owner() to the reloc root objectid, and we always use FULL_BACKREF, we never actually need to set FULL_BACKREF on any children. Having spent a lot of time stressing relocation/snapshot delete recently I've not seen this pop in practice. But this is objectively incorrect, so fix this to get the correct starting generation based on the root we're dropping to keep me from thinking there's a problem here. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
![]() |
5a087a6b17 |
for-6.13-rc2-tag
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE8rQSAMVO+zA4DBdWxWXV+ddtWDsFAmdYzmoACgkQxWXV+ddt WDv5GxAAnCsGctNax89x/VpCDZynRghrkxlzu/4kG/pqxsJyzlgXDFtzHAEewSMs MYL+WCZLYpeKB5FpZq98mDJVLGNMG+9wqkx1bH/xy2ajBGZTeQe5pnkXMNlv9U1O SX34t8nzOdTCENDnQeRc5I2vTcsQRhgHoVjJkAYdWdhcD9fs6xHKZRe+himlstSn 46ioKzEKSR3ztEUW4ycPF379g7d4kTR0hkk3pu5Nxe7ER8iq+jNSWXj0mzKg7mpJ KxP56VgY0OrsiUcJr2qFZ1hQIp810puaAuM4C1lLgRplECHxtLbP9JvL9Rr7a8Ox 68tuThyLEpQtR59078jIX3RK6CwVi15rKb/ZkLZkW19TNSAAfM5qrB146hLBUM4T 16WaiJ0x9lVkH2oYQv8zbNZiqDxPhPUdS/JArNAcQYk9ma+C1hCsxPQ/N5yoWH/C OABJddNR83sm4VTXu3Nci1EB8QuEoOuihYO6CdRkJ3PPNDuQiG6gwnoA2zqSihhy L5fQaLSWAUsLczarHZrvAi9Y0rfG66QzqGR+A1K/8qMTQ8pSCupd+LfqVa21QpI1 Awx/wVFzsAm7z9CrnPTRJe+JSlBDQdeXWX7pDhhkXgwbCsMVSf3dbBweCD3o1EiM BVI7SfEgImlbatd0QvDp9FcsnEqp90SCi+99U+zZCmQ1SW8CEC0= =+DUB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-6.13-rc2-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba: "A few more fixes. Apart from the one liners and updated bio splitting error handling there's a fix for subvolume mount with different flags. This was known and fixed for some time but I've delayed it to give it more testing. - fix unbalanced locking when swapfile activation fails when the subvolume gets deleted in the meantime - add btrfs error handling after bio_split() calls that got error handling recently - during unmount, flush delalloc workers at the right time before the cleaner thread is shut down - fix regression in buffered write folio conversion, explicitly wait for writeback as FGP_STABLE flag is currently a no-op on btrfs - handle race in subvolume mount with different flags, the conversion to the new mount API did not handle the case where multiple subvolumes get mounted in parallel, which is a distro use case" * tag 'for-6.13-rc2-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: btrfs: flush delalloc workers queue before stopping cleaner kthread during unmount btrfs: handle bio_split() errors btrfs: properly wait for writeback before buffered write btrfs: fix missing snapshot drew unlock when root is dead during swap activation btrfs: fix mount failure due to remount races |
||
![]() |
f10bef73fb |
btrfs: flush delalloc workers queue before stopping cleaner kthread during unmount
During the unmount path, at close_ctree(), we first stop the cleaner kthread, using kthread_stop() which frees the associated task_struct, and then stop and destroy all the work queues. However after we stopped the cleaner we may still have a worker from the delalloc_workers queue running inode.c:submit_compressed_extents(), which calls btrfs_add_delayed_iput(), which in turn tries to wake up the cleaner kthread - which was already destroyed before, resulting in a use-after-free on the task_struct. Syzbot reported this with the following stack traces: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x78/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5089 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880259d2818 by task kworker/u8:3/52 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 52 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-syzkaller-00002-gcdd30ebb1b9f #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Workqueue: btrfs-delalloc btrfs_work_helper Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:489 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602 __lock_acquire+0x78/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5089 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 class_raw_spinlock_irqsave_constructor include/linux/spinlock.h:551 [inline] try_to_wake_up+0xc2/0x1470 kernel/sched/core.c:4205 submit_compressed_extents+0xdf/0x16e0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:1615 run_ordered_work fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:288 [inline] btrfs_work_helper+0x96f/0xc40 fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:324 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa66/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Allocated by task 2: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:319 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:345 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:250 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4104 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4153 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x1d9/0x380 mm/slub.c:4205 alloc_task_struct_node kernel/fork.c:180 [inline] dup_task_struct+0x57/0x8c0 kernel/fork.c:1113 copy_process+0x5d1/0x3d50 kernel/fork.c:2225 kernel_clone+0x223/0x870 kernel/fork.c:2807 kernel_thread+0x1bc/0x240 kernel/fork.c:2869 create_kthread kernel/kthread.c:412 [inline] kthreadd+0x60d/0x810 kernel/kthread.c:767 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Freed by task 24: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:582 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2338 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4598 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x195/0x410 mm/slub.c:4700 put_task_struct include/linux/sched/task.h:144 [inline] delayed_put_task_struct+0x125/0x300 kernel/exit.c:227 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2567 [inline] rcu_core+0xaaa/0x17a0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2823 handle_softirqs+0x2d4/0x9b0 kernel/softirq.c:554 run_ksoftirqd+0xca/0x130 kernel/softirq.c:943 smpboot_thread_fn+0x544/0xa30 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3f/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xac/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:544 __call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:3086 [inline] call_rcu+0x167/0xa70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3190 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5372 [inline] __schedule+0x1803/0x4be0 kernel/sched/core.c:6756 __schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6833 [inline] schedule+0x14b/0x320 kernel/sched/core.c:6848 schedule_timeout+0xb0/0x290 kernel/time/sleep_timeout.c:75 do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:95 [inline] __wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:116 [inline] wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:127 [inline] wait_for_completion+0x355/0x620 kernel/sched/completion.c:148 kthread_stop+0x19e/0x640 kernel/kthread.c:712 close_ctree+0x524/0xd60 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4328 generic_shutdown_super+0x139/0x2d0 fs/super.c:642 kill_anon_super+0x3b/0x70 fs/super.c:1237 btrfs_kill_super+0x41/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2112 deactivate_locked_super+0xc4/0x130 fs/super.c:473 cleanup_mnt+0x41f/0x4b0 fs/namespace.c:1373 task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:239 ptrace_notify+0x2d2/0x380 kernel/signal.c:2503 ptrace_report_syscall include/linux/ptrace.h:415 [inline] ptrace_report_syscall_exit include/linux/ptrace.h:477 [inline] syscall_exit_work+0xc7/0x1d0 kernel/entry/common.c:173 syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare kernel/entry/common.c:200 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:205 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x24a/0x340 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0x100/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880259d1e00 which belongs to the cache task_struct of size 7424 The buggy address is located 2584 bytes inside of freed 7424-byte region [ffff8880259d1e00, ffff8880259d3b00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x259d0 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 memcg:ffff88802f4b56c1 flags: 0xfff00000000040(head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801bafe500 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000040004 00000001f5000000 ffff88802f4b56c1 head: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801bafe500 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 head: 0000000000000000 0000000000040004 00000001f5000000 ffff88802f4b56c1 head: 00fff00000000003 ffffea0000967401 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 12, tgid 12 (kworker/u8:1), ts 7328037942, free_ts 0 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1556 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1564 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x3651/0x37a0 mm/page_alloc.c:3474 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x292/0x710 mm/page_alloc.c:4751 alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x3e8/0x680 mm/mempolicy.c:2265 alloc_slab_page+0x6a/0x140 mm/slub.c:2408 allocate_slab+0x5a/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2574 new_slab mm/slub.c:2627 [inline] ___slab_alloc+0xcd1/0x14b0 mm/slub.c:3815 __slab_alloc+0x58/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3905 __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4141 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x269/0x380 mm/slub.c:4205 alloc_task_struct_node kernel/fork.c:180 [inline] dup_task_struct+0x57/0x8c0 kernel/fork.c:1113 copy_process+0x5d1/0x3d50 kernel/fork.c:2225 kernel_clone+0x223/0x870 kernel/fork.c:2807 user_mode_thread+0x132/0x1a0 kernel/fork.c:2885 call_usermodehelper_exec_work+0x5c/0x230 kernel/umh.c:171 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa66/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 page_owner free stack trace missing Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880259d2700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880259d2780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff8880259d2800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8880259d2880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880259d2900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Fix this by flushing the delalloc workers queue before stopping the cleaner kthread. Reported-by: syzbot+b7cf50a0c173770dcb14@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/674ed7e8.050a0220.48a03.0031.GAE@google.com/ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
![]() |
c7c97ceff9 |
btrfs: handle bio_split() errors
Commit
|
||
![]() |
c83d77eb0f |
btrfs: properly wait for writeback before buffered write
[BUG] Before commit |
||
![]() |
9c803c474c |
btrfs: fix missing snapshot drew unlock when root is dead during swap activation
When activating a swap file we acquire the root's snapshot drew lock and
then check if the root is dead, failing and returning with -EPERM if it's
dead but without unlocking the root's snapshot lock. Fix this by adding
the missing unlock.
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
951a3f59d2 |
btrfs: fix mount failure due to remount races
[BUG]
The following reproducer can cause btrfs mount to fail:
dev="/dev/test/scratch1"
mnt1="/mnt/test"
mnt2="/mnt/scratch"
mkfs.btrfs -f $dev
mount $dev $mnt1
btrfs subvolume create $mnt1/subvol1
btrfs subvolume create $mnt1/subvol2
umount $mnt1
mount $dev $mnt1 -o subvol=subvol1
while mount -o remount,ro $mnt1; do mount -o remount,rw $mnt1; done &
bg=$!
while mount $dev $mnt2 -o subvol=subvol2; do umount $mnt2; done
kill $bg
wait
umount -R $mnt1
umount -R $mnt2
The script will fail with the following error:
mount: /mnt/scratch: /dev/mapper/test-scratch1 already mounted on /mnt/test.
dmesg(1) may have more information after failed mount system call.
umount: /mnt/test: target is busy.
umount: /mnt/scratch/: not mounted
And there is no kernel error message.
[CAUSE]
During the btrfs mount, to support mounting different subvolumes with
different RO/RW flags, we need to detect that and retry if needed:
Retry with matching RO flags if the initial mount fail with -EBUSY.
The problem is, during that retry we do not hold any super block lock
(s_umount), this means there can be a remount process changing the RO
flags of the original fs super block.
If so, we can have an EBUSY error during retry. And this time we treat
any failure as an error, without any retry and cause the above EBUSY
mount failure.
[FIX]
The current retry behavior is racy because we do not have a super block
thus no way to hold s_umount to prevent the race with remount.
Solve the root problem by allowing fc->sb_flags to mismatch from the
sb->s_flags at btrfs_get_tree_super().
Then at the re-entry point btrfs_get_tree_subvol(), manually check the
fc->s_flags against sb->s_flags, if it's a RO->RW mismatch, then
reconfigure with s_umount lock hold.
Reported-by: Enno Gotthold <egotthold@suse.com>
Reported-by: Fabian Vogt <fvogt@suse.com>
[ Special thanks for the reproducer and early analysis pointing to btrfs. ]
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
feffde684a |
for-6.13-rc1-tag
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE8rQSAMVO+zA4DBdWxWXV+ddtWDsFAmdPMbMACgkQxWXV+ddt WDtFSA/+Kd61BPKaiZFF0yjOsjBOlu8WMHFLO5xa2ZRqV3HUzm6rdO4wUSq3Eyqg lrFszPfLA0REZIEdY2rqDKJduk1MZZg6NY7Pvn+/ByGOorM0Ym1BJoydtlUN5o2Y AWeaDxs6LBMwRqpai0+AkikufK/jK7QfhHci+Oo2XmOv1C39DQbkXO76SYh/yERt CcZNaSjm9DUlLxOOpkefxYvpPW4Uv4NSBfh9aymX/u1VxXqeuMuzPZqwZO+nwl/p M1yr9fcbrqh3yKC+JjhD7xmOJM3x4c2PmzSkQTdepOuAlQvuQ/iFD+Zc1YjY0XlT Fl938rdTKULgCarR5rdsXqdlFRnOprlgt0J1Pdf+GipTVU0EY3WU343HCz6h8pmG F/NPvlCahkEtk1UCguL92NOBeAf0adWhuYfKjkuxYuL5ZTvzsOl2ymF6Vlja0Y39 VK4exjG4ilDESxweinJe53k3QLDwvUc2h0D291QVoo2X06dhXda8oOVK+6lR5mij zDtXqurjlCybT1W7op6RcWMY0TaA8IR3Bo9oU1YbVcctuc86/X8SERv1G8MQtXhh tevOVb/cKy7gEw9q73OtrH/J2EAklnsesnpH2sdt7WUEzOQPw9BIwEa/NRbjvoqn n2ts5KktBhNjM1s0elHBf7o4+OaTrTlTrp0HelXyONZucPrzDQ4= =4mFO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-6.13-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba: - add lockdep annotations for io_uring/encoded read integration, inode lock is held when returning to userspace - properly reflect experimental config option to sysfs - handle NULL root in case the rescue mode accepts invalid/damaged tree roots (rescue=ibadroot) - regression fix of a deadlock between transaction and extent locks - fix pending bio accounting bug in encoded read ioctl - fix NOWAIT mode when checking references for NOCOW files - fix use-after-free in a rb-tree cleanup in ref-verify debugging tool * tag 'for-6.13-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: btrfs: fix lockdep warnings on io_uring encoded reads btrfs: ref-verify: fix use-after-free after invalid ref action btrfs: add a sanity check for btrfs root in btrfs_search_slot() btrfs: don't loop for nowait writes when checking for cross references btrfs: sysfs: advertise experimental features only if CONFIG_BTRFS_EXPERIMENTAL=y btrfs: fix deadlock between transaction commits and extent locks btrfs: fix use-after-free in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() |
||
![]() |
22d2e48e31 |
btrfs: fix lockdep warnings on io_uring encoded reads
Lockdep doesn't like the fact that btrfs_uring_read_extent() returns to
userspace still holding the inode lock, even though we release it once
the I/O finishes. Add calls to rwsem_release() and rwsem_acquire_read() to
work round this.
Reported-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
|
||
![]() |
7c4e39f9d2 |
btrfs: ref-verify: fix use-after-free after invalid ref action
At btrfs_ref_tree_mod() after we successfully inserted the new ref entry
(local variable 'ref') into the respective block entry's rbtree (local
variable 'be'), if we find an unexpected action of BTRFS_DROP_DELAYED_REF,
we error out and free the ref entry without removing it from the block
entry's rbtree. Then in the error path of btrfs_ref_tree_mod() we call
btrfs_free_ref_cache(), which iterates over all block entries and then
calls free_block_entry() for each one, and there we will trigger a
use-after-free when we are called against the block entry to which we
added the freed ref entry to its rbtree, since the rbtree still points
to the block entry, as we didn't remove it from the rbtree before freeing
it in the error path at btrfs_ref_tree_mod(). Fix this by removing the
new ref entry from the rbtree before freeing it.
Syzbot report this with the following stack traces:
BTRFS error (device loop0 state EA): Ref action 2, root 5, ref_root 0, parent 8564736, owner 0, offset 0, num_refs 18446744073709551615
__btrfs_mod_ref+0x7dd/0xac0 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:2523
update_ref_for_cow+0x9cd/0x11f0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:512
btrfs_force_cow_block+0x9f6/0x1da0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:594
btrfs_cow_block+0x35e/0xa40 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:754
btrfs_search_slot+0xbdd/0x30d0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2116
btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x1a0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4314
btrfs_insert_empty_item fs/btrfs/ctree.h:669 [inline]
btrfs_insert_orphan_item+0x1f1/0x320 fs/btrfs/orphan.c:23
btrfs_orphan_add+0x6d/0x1a0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:3482
btrfs_unlink+0x267/0x350 fs/btrfs/inode.c:4293
vfs_unlink+0x365/0x650 fs/namei.c:4469
do_unlinkat+0x4ae/0x830 fs/namei.c:4533
__do_sys_unlinkat fs/namei.c:4576 [inline]
__se_sys_unlinkat fs/namei.c:4569 [inline]
__x64_sys_unlinkat+0xcc/0xf0 fs/namei.c:4569
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
BTRFS error (device loop0 state EA): Ref action 1, root 5, ref_root 5, parent 0, owner 260, offset 0, num_refs 1
__btrfs_mod_ref+0x76b/0xac0 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:2521
update_ref_for_cow+0x96a/0x11f0
btrfs_force_cow_block+0x9f6/0x1da0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:594
btrfs_cow_block+0x35e/0xa40 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:754
btrfs_search_slot+0xbdd/0x30d0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2116
btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:411
__btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x1e7/0xb90 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1030
btrfs_update_delayed_inode fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1114 [inline]
__btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x2318/0x24a0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1137
__btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x213/0x490 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1171
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x8a8/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2313
prepare_to_relocate+0x3c4/0x4c0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3586
relocate_block_group+0x16c/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3611
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4081
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3377
__btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4161
btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4538
BTRFS error (device loop0 state EA): Ref action 2, root 5, ref_root 0, parent 8564736, owner 0, offset 0, num_refs 18446744073709551615
__btrfs_mod_ref+0x7dd/0xac0 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:2523
update_ref_for_cow+0x9cd/0x11f0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:512
btrfs_force_cow_block+0x9f6/0x1da0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:594
btrfs_cow_block+0x35e/0xa40 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:754
btrfs_search_slot+0xbdd/0x30d0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2116
btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:411
__btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x1e7/0xb90 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1030
btrfs_update_delayed_inode fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1114 [inline]
__btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x2318/0x24a0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1137
__btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x213/0x490 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1171
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x8a8/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2313
prepare_to_relocate+0x3c4/0x4c0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3586
relocate_block_group+0x16c/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3611
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4081
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3377
__btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4161
btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4538
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rb_first+0x69/0x70 lib/rbtree.c:473
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888042d1af38 by task syz.0.0/5329
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5329 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
rb_first+0x69/0x70 lib/rbtree.c:473
free_block_entry+0x78/0x230 fs/btrfs/ref-verify.c:248
btrfs_free_ref_cache+0xa3/0x100 fs/btrfs/ref-verify.c:917
btrfs_ref_tree_mod+0x139f/0x15e0 fs/btrfs/ref-verify.c:898
btrfs_free_extent+0x33c/0x380 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:3544
__btrfs_mod_ref+0x7dd/0xac0 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:2523
update_ref_for_cow+0x9cd/0x11f0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:512
btrfs_force_cow_block+0x9f6/0x1da0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:594
btrfs_cow_block+0x35e/0xa40 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:754
btrfs_search_slot+0xbdd/0x30d0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2116
btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:411
__btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x1e7/0xb90 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1030
btrfs_update_delayed_inode fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1114 [inline]
__btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x2318/0x24a0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1137
__btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x213/0x490 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1171
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x8a8/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2313
prepare_to_relocate+0x3c4/0x4c0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3586
relocate_block_group+0x16c/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3611
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4081
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3377
__btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4161
btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4538
btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3673
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f996df7e719
RSP: 002b:00007f996ede7038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f996e135f80 RCX: 00007f996df7e719
RDX: 0000000020000180 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f996dff139e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f996e135f80 R15: 00007fff79f32e68
</TASK>
Allocated by task 5329:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:257 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x19c/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:4295
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:878 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1014 [inline]
btrfs_ref_tree_mod+0x264/0x15e0 fs/btrfs/ref-verify.c:701
btrfs_free_extent+0x33c/0x380 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:3544
__btrfs_mod_ref+0x7dd/0xac0 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:2523
update_ref_for_cow+0x9cd/0x11f0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:512
btrfs_force_cow_block+0x9f6/0x1da0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:594
btrfs_cow_block+0x35e/0xa40 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:754
btrfs_search_slot+0xbdd/0x30d0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2116
btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:411
__btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x1e7/0xb90 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1030
btrfs_update_delayed_inode fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1114 [inline]
__btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x2318/0x24a0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1137
__btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x213/0x490 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1171
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x8a8/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2313
prepare_to_relocate+0x3c4/0x4c0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3586
relocate_block_group+0x16c/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3611
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4081
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3377
__btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4161
btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4538
btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3673
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 5329:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:230 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2342 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4579 [inline]
kfree+0x1a0/0x440 mm/slub.c:4727
btrfs_ref_tree_mod+0x136c/0x15e0
btrfs_free_extent+0x33c/0x380 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:3544
__btrfs_mod_ref+0x7dd/0xac0 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:2523
update_ref_for_cow+0x9cd/0x11f0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:512
btrfs_force_cow_block+0x9f6/0x1da0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:594
btrfs_cow_block+0x35e/0xa40 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:754
btrfs_search_slot+0xbdd/0x30d0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2116
btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:411
__btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x1e7/0xb90 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1030
btrfs_update_delayed_inode fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1114 [inline]
__btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x2318/0x24a0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1137
__btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x213/0x490 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1171
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x8a8/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2313
prepare_to_relocate+0x3c4/0x4c0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3586
relocate_block_group+0x16c/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3611
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4081
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3377
__btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4161
btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4538
btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3673
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888042d1af00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of
freed 64-byte region [ffff888042d1af00, ffff888042d1af40)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x42d1a
anon flags: 0x4fff00000000000(node=1|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 04fff00000000000 ffff88801ac418c0 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x52c40(GFP_NOFS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP), pid 5055, tgid 5055 (dhcpcd-run-hook), ts 40377240074, free_ts 40376848335
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1541
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1549 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x3649/0x3790 mm/page_alloc.c:3459
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x292/0x710 mm/page_alloc.c:4735
alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x3e8/0x680 mm/mempolicy.c:2265
alloc_slab_page+0x6a/0x140 mm/slub.c:2412
allocate_slab+0x5a/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2578
new_slab mm/slub.c:2631 [inline]
___slab_alloc+0xcd1/0x14b0 mm/slub.c:3818
__slab_alloc+0x58/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3908
__slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3961 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4122 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4263 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x25a/0x400 mm/slub.c:4276
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:882 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1014 [inline]
tomoyo_encode2 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:45 [inline]
tomoyo_encode+0x26f/0x540 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:80
tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0x59e/0x5e0 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:283
tomoyo_get_realpath security/tomoyo/file.c:151 [inline]
tomoyo_check_open_permission+0x255/0x500 security/tomoyo/file.c:771
security_file_open+0x777/0x990 security/security.c:3109
do_dentry_open+0x369/0x1460 fs/open.c:945
vfs_open+0x3e/0x330 fs/open.c:1088
do_open fs/namei.c:3774 [inline]
path_openat+0x2c84/0x3590 fs/namei.c:3933
page last free pid 5055 tgid 5055 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1112 [inline]
free_unref_page+0xcfb/0xf20 mm/page_alloc.c:2642
free_pipe_info+0x300/0x390 fs/pipe.c:860
put_pipe_info fs/pipe.c:719 [inline]
pipe_release+0x245/0x320 fs/pipe.c:742
__fput+0x23f/0x880 fs/file_table.c:431
__do_sys_close fs/open.c:1567 [inline]
__se_sys_close fs/open.c:1552 [inline]
__x64_sys_close+0x7f/0x110 fs/open.c:1552
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888042d1ae00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888042d1ae80: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888042d1af00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888042d1af80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888042d1b000: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc 00 00
Reported-by: syzbot+7325f164162e200000c1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/673723eb.050a0220.1324f8.00a8.GAE@google.com/T/#u
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
3ed51857a5 |
btrfs: add a sanity check for btrfs root in btrfs_search_slot()
Syzbot reports a null-ptr-deref in btrfs_search_slot().
The reproducer is using rescue=ibadroots, and the extent tree root is
corrupted thus the extent tree is NULL.
When scrub tries to search the extent tree to gather the needed extent
info, btrfs_search_slot() doesn't check if the target root is NULL or
not, resulting the null-ptr-deref.
Add sanity check for btrfs root before using it in btrfs_search_slot().
Reported-by: syzbot+3030e17bd57a73d39bd7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
ed67f2a913 |
btrfs: don't loop for nowait writes when checking for cross references
When checking for delayed refs when verifying if there are cross
references for a data extent, we stop if the path has nowait set and we
can't try lock the delayed ref head's mutex, returning -EAGAIN with the
goal of making a write fallback to a blocking context. However we ignore
the -EAGAIN at btrfs_cross_ref_exist() when check_delayed_ref() returns
it, and keep looping instead of immediately returning the -EAGAIN to the
caller.
Fix this by not looping if we get -EAGAIN and we have a nowait path.
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
b188ad7791 |
btrfs: sysfs: advertise experimental features only if CONFIG_BTRFS_EXPERIMENTAL=y
We are advertising experimental features through sysfs if
CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG is set, without looking if CONFIG_BTRFS_EXPERIMENTAL
is set. This is wrong as it will result in reporting experimental
features as supported when CONFIG_BTRFS_EXPERIMENTAL is not set but
CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG is set.
Fix this by checking for CONFIG_BTRFS_EXPERIMENTAL instead of
CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG.
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
7d6872ccbd |
btrfs: fix deadlock between transaction commits and extent locks
When running a workload with fsstress and duperemove (generic/561) we can hit a deadlock related to transaction commits and locking extent ranges, as described below. Task A hanging during a transaction commit, waiting for all other writers to complete: [178317.334817] INFO: task fsstress:555623 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [178317.335693] Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-btrfs-next-179+ #1 [178317.336528] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [178317.337673] task:fsstress state:D stack:0 pid:555623 tgid:555623 ppid:555620 flags:0x00004002 [178317.337679] Call Trace: [178317.337681] <TASK> [178317.337685] __schedule+0x364/0xbe0 [178317.337691] schedule+0x26/0xa0 [178317.337695] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x5c5/0x1050 [btrfs] [178317.337769] ? start_transaction+0xc4/0x800 [btrfs] [178317.337815] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 [178317.337819] btrfs_mksubvol+0x381/0x640 [btrfs] [178317.337878] btrfs_mksnapshot+0x7a/0xb0 [btrfs] [178317.337935] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x1bb/0x1d0 [btrfs] [178317.337995] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x103/0x130 [btrfs] [178317.338053] btrfs_ioctl+0x29b/0x2a90 [btrfs] [178317.338118] ? kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x5f/0x2c0 [178317.338126] ? getname_flags+0x45/0x1f0 [178317.338133] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x15/0x30 [178317.338145] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 [178317.338149] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 [178317.338152] do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x110 [178317.338160] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [178317.338190] RIP: 0033:0x7f13c28e271b Which corresponds to line 2361 of transaction.c: $ cat -n fs/btrfs/transaction.c (...) 2162 int btrfs_commit_transaction(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans) 2163 { (...) 2349 spin_lock(&fs_info->trans_lock); 2350 add_pending_snapshot(trans); 2351 cur_trans->state = TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING; 2352 spin_unlock(&fs_info->trans_lock); 2353 2354 /* 2355 * The thread has started/joined the transaction thus it holds the 2356 * lockdep map as a reader. It has to release it before acquiring the 2357 * lockdep map as a writer. 2358 */ 2359 btrfs_lockdep_release(fs_info, btrfs_trans_num_writers); 2360 btrfs_might_wait_for_event(fs_info, btrfs_trans_num_writers); 2361 wait_event(cur_trans->writer_wait, 2362 atomic_read(&cur_trans->num_writers) == 1); (...) The transaction is in the TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING state and so it's waiting for all other existing writers to complete and release their transaction handle. Task B is running ordered extent completion and blocked waiting to lock an extent range in an inode's io tree: [178317.327411] INFO: task kworker/u48:8:554545 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [178317.328630] Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-btrfs-next-179+ #1 [178317.329635] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [178317.330872] task:kworker/u48:8 state:D stack:0 pid:554545 tgid:554545 ppid:2 flags:0x00004000 [178317.330878] Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] [178317.330944] Call Trace: [178317.330945] <TASK> [178317.330947] __schedule+0x364/0xbe0 [178317.330952] schedule+0x26/0xa0 [178317.330955] __lock_extent+0x337/0x3a0 [btrfs] [178317.331014] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 [178317.331017] btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x47a/0xaa0 [btrfs] [178317.331074] ? psi_group_change+0x132/0x2d0 [178317.331078] btrfs_work_helper+0xbd/0x370 [btrfs] [178317.331140] process_scheduled_works+0xd3/0x460 [178317.331144] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [178317.331146] worker_thread+0x121/0x250 [178317.331149] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [178317.331151] kthread+0xe9/0x120 [178317.331154] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [178317.331157] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [178317.331159] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [178317.331162] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 This extent range locking happens after joining the current transaction, so task A is waiting for task B to release its transaction handle (decrementing the transaction's num_writers counter). Task C while doing a fiemap it tries to join the current transaction: [242682.812815] task:pool state:D stack:0 pid:560767 tgid:560724 ppid:555622 flags:0x00004006 [242682.812827] Call Trace: [242682.812856] <TASK> [242682.812864] __schedule+0x364/0xbe0 [242682.812879] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x23/0x40 [242682.812897] schedule+0x26/0xa0 [242682.812909] wait_current_trans+0xd6/0x130 [btrfs] [242682.813148] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 [242682.813162] start_transaction+0x3d4/0x800 [btrfs] [242682.813399] btrfs_is_data_extent_shared+0xd2/0x440 [btrfs] [242682.813723] fiemap_process_hole+0x2a2/0x300 [btrfs] [242682.813995] extent_fiemap+0x9b8/0xb80 [btrfs] [242682.814249] btrfs_fiemap+0x78/0xc0 [btrfs] [242682.814501] do_vfs_ioctl+0x2db/0xa50 [242682.814519] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x6a/0xc0 [242682.814531] do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x110 [242682.814544] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [242682.814556] RIP: 0033:0x7efff595e71b It tries to join the current transaction, but it can't because the transaction is in the TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING state, so join_transaction() returns -EBUSY to start_transaction() and makes it wait for the current transaction to complete. And while it's waiting for the transaction to complete, it's holding an extent range locked in the same inode that task B is operating, which causes a deadlock between these 3 tasks. The extent range for the inode was locked at the start of the fiemap operation, early at extent_fiemap(). In short these tasks deadlock because: 1) Task A is waiting for task B to release its transaction handle; 2) Task B is waiting to lock an extent range for an inode while holding a transaction handle open; 3) Task C is waiting for the current transaction to complete (for task A to finish the transaction commit) while holding the extent range for the inode locked, so task B can't progress and release its transaction handle. This results in an ABBA deadlock involving transaction commits and extent locks. Extent locks are higher level locks, like inode VFS locks, and should always be acquired before joining or starting a transaction, but recently commit |
||
![]() |
05b36b04d7 |
btrfs: fix use-after-free in btrfs_encoded_read_endio()
Shinichiro reported the following use-after free that sometimes is
happening in our CI system when running fstests' btrfs/284 on a TCMU
runner device:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_release+0x708/0x780
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888106a83f18 by task kworker/u80:6/219
CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 219 Comm: kworker/u80:6 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-kts+ #15
Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPi-TF, BIOS 3.3 02/21/2020
Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_end_bio_work [btrfs]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0
? lock_release+0x708/0x780
print_report+0x174/0x505
? lock_release+0x708/0x780
? __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x410
? lock_release+0x708/0x780
kasan_report+0xda/0x1b0
? lock_release+0x708/0x780
? __wake_up+0x44/0x60
lock_release+0x708/0x780
? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x60
__wake_up+0x44/0x60
btrfs_encoded_read_endio+0x14b/0x190 [btrfs]
btrfs_check_read_bio+0x8d9/0x1360 [btrfs]
? lock_release+0x1b0/0x780
? trace_lock_acquire+0x12f/0x1a0
? __pfx_btrfs_check_read_bio+0x10/0x10 [btrfs]
? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460
? lock_acquire+0x31/0xc0
? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460
process_one_work+0x85c/0x1460
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? assign_work+0x16c/0x240
worker_thread+0x5e6/0xfc0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x2c3/0x3a0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 3661:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x16c/0x6d0 [btrfs]
send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs]
process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs]
changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs]
_btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0
do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 3661:
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70
__kasan_slab_free+0x4f/0x70
kfree+0x143/0x490
btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x531/0x6d0 [btrfs]
send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs]
process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs]
changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs]
_btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0
do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106a83f00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-rnd-07-96 of size 96
The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
freed 96-byte region [ffff888106a83f00, ffff888106a83f60)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888106a83800 pfn:0x106a83
flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0017ffffc0000000 ffff888100053680 ffffea0004917200 0000000000000004
raw: ffff888106a83800 0000000080200019 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888106a83e00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
ffff888106a83e80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
>ffff888106a83f00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888106a83f80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
ffff888106a84000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================
Further analyzing the trace and the crash dump's vmcore file shows that
the wake_up() call in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is calling wake_up() on
the wait_queue that is in the private data passed to the end_io handler.
Commit 4ff47df40447 ("btrfs: move priv off stack in
btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages()") moved 'struct
btrfs_encoded_read_private' off the stack.
Before that commit one can see a corruption of the private data when
analyzing the vmcore after a crash:
*(struct btrfs_encoded_read_private *)0xffff88815626eec8 = {
.wait = (wait_queue_head_t){
.lock = (spinlock_t){
.rlock = (struct raw_spinlock){
.raw_lock = (arch_spinlock_t){
.val = (atomic_t){
.counter = (int)-2005885696,
},
.locked = (u8)0,
.pending = (u8)157,
.locked_pending = (u16)40192,
.tail = (u16)34928,
},
.magic = (unsigned int)536325682,
.owner_cpu = (unsigned int)29,
.owner = (void *)__SCT__tp_func_btrfs_transaction_commit+0x0 = 0x0,
.dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){
.key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c,
.class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 },
.name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "",
.wait_type_outer = (u8)37,
.wait_type_inner = (u8)178,
.lock_type = (u8)154,
},
},
.__padding = (u8 [24]){ 0, 157, 112, 136, 50, 174, 247, 31, 29 },
.dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){
.key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c,
.class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 },
.name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "",
.wait_type_outer = (u8)37,
.wait_type_inner = (u8)178,
.lock_type = (u8)154,
},
},
.head = (struct list_head){
.next = (struct list_head *)0x112cca,
.prev = (struct list_head *)0x47,
},
},
.pending = (atomic_t){
.counter = (int)-1491499288,
},
.status = (blk_status_t)130,
}
Here we can see several indicators of in-memory data corruption, e.g. the
large negative atomic values of ->pending or
->wait->lock->rlock->raw_lock->val, as well as the bogus spinlock magic
0x1ff7ae32 (decimal 536325682 above) instead of 0xdead4ead or the bogus
pointer values for ->wait->head.
To fix this, change atomic_dec_return() to atomic_dec_and_test() to fix the
corruption, as atomic_dec_return() is defined as two instructions on
x86_64, whereas atomic_dec_and_test() is defined as a single atomic
operation. This can lead to a situation where counter value is already
decremented but the if statement in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is not
completely processed, i.e. the 0 test has not completed. If another thread
continues executing btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages() the
atomic_dec_return() there can see an already updated ->pending counter and
continues by freeing the private data. Continuing in the endio handler the
test for 0 succeeds and the wait_queue is woken up, resulting in a
use-after-free.
Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com>
Suggested-by: Damien Le Moal <Damien.LeMoal@wdc.com>
Fixes:
|
||
![]() |
563cb0b1e7 |
cxl changes for v6.13
- Constify range_contains() input parameters to prevent changes. - Add support for displaying RCD capabilities in sysfs to support lspci for CXL device. - Downgrade warning message to debug in cxl_probe_component_regs(). - Add support for adding a printf specifier '$pra' to emit 'struct range' content. - Add sanity tests for 'struct resource'. - Add documentation for special case. - Add %pra for 'struct range'. - Add %pra usage in CXL code. - Add preparation code for DCD support - Add range_overlaps(). - Add CDAT DSMAS table shared and read only flag in ACPICA. - Add documentation to 'struct dev_dax_range'. - Delay event buffer allocation in CXL PCI code until needed. - Use guard() in cxl_dpa_set_mode(). - Refactor create region code to consolidate common code. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEE5DAy15EJMCV1R6v9YGjFFmlTOEoFAmc84dMACgkQYGjFFmlT OEoGTg//cSJlQ9X7+xZDbngnzpJwcLzQkR/FXDfe3obtmgs7woDJgNNcYnKSlgyf wal47Q0UM/1Hv8Dtfrt62Ay1fmOvDL2GSpey35NVJGCEpIsfOqqk1zTCgfgwRHTO MZJLnOSFUIlDYlVz8ljLNHnNqPjr7dCoUh9tdBefvkw59FqbkHNcWI8hG1lh1SR4 2frtJcqVg54S6vJa2eeWmNVpxz7RZvPFrb8TJzhdrGM8PkTMNFA2oJINAf0j00Ev 8/T6HXTxXvFtNhBH0dtMO1MFh1d6Qr/zFnX/gmrnPWl1l/12HFDMBIZIzq/Whjpo +7hQ5xK3cwkMevFgFrAhwdZMj8maR84x1dbFItoThaoeDIQ4sGfyQEMPsbkZP/Sc 67i5hQFIBZc+ORLB0W+z9Da52ZFGyVw/xsCmDRzXCw4s7N2twpydIoA7Pvu9NN1X 3JVF35NrsRZ+PyuGWEitNjo0Rj6swNpBC5Xv/T1mgFtSgvVuk1T2QtSHJcPoQyzQ zbijsCKmvJYbdJBnPiotdrBs1BUxBsP9dBT9IxWzMy6lcEpTJrYpUheRCk2tSHFa Kk8O8IYNiBKZaSpN9UHKaGzr43H8gNbLf4svSIiu1lZJTSSdtWqfZZYjXFBgB1Vb l2gBCDmPJ0y7WKZSCa53UmQiOusr+l3Pi+OflZEfCy6JxbSqTTM= =GNlu -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'cxl-for-6.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxl Pull cxl updates from Dave Jiang: - Constify range_contains() input parameters to prevent changes - Add support for displaying RCD capabilities in sysfs to support lspci for CXL device - Downgrade warning message to debug in cxl_probe_component_regs() - Add support for adding a printf specifier '%pra' to emit 'struct range' content: - Add sanity tests for 'struct resource' - Add documentation for special case - Add %pra for 'struct range' - Add %pra usage in CXL code - Add preparation code for DCD support: - Add range_overlaps() - Add CDAT DSMAS table shared and read only flag in ACPICA - Add documentation to 'struct dev_dax_range' - Delay event buffer allocation in CXL PCI code until needed - Use guard() in cxl_dpa_set_mode() - Refactor create region code to consolidate common code * tag 'cxl-for-6.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxl: cxl/region: Refactor common create region code cxl/hdm: Use guard() in cxl_dpa_set_mode() cxl/pci: Delay event buffer allocation dax: Document struct dev_dax_range ACPI/CDAT: Add CDAT/DSMAS shared and read only flag values range: Add range_overlaps() cxl/cdat: Use %pra for dpa range outputs printf: Add print format (%pra) for struct range Documentation/printf: struct resource add start == end special case test printf: Add very basic struct resource tests cxl: downgrade a warning message to debug level in cxl_probe_component_regs() cxl/pci: Add sysfs attribute for CXL 1.1 device link status cxl/core/regs: Add rcd_pcie_cap initialization kernel/range: Const-ify range_contains parameters |
||
![]() |
77a0cfafa9 |
for-6.13/block-20241118
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJEBAABCAAuFiEEwPw5LcreJtl1+l5K99NY+ylx4KYFAmc7S40QHGF4Ym9lQGtl cm5lbC5kawAKCRD301j7KXHgpjHVD/43rDZ8ehs+IAAr6S0RemNX1SRG0mK2UOEb kMoNogS7StO/c4JYW3JuzCyLRn5ZsgeWV/muqxwDEWQrmTGrvi+V45KikrZPwm3k p0ump33qV9EU2jiR1MKZjtwK2P0CI7/DD3W8ww6IOvKbTT7RcqQcdHznvXArFBtc xCuQPpayFG7ZasC+N9VaBwtiUEVgU3Ek9AFT7UVZRWajjHPNalQwaooJWayO0rEG KdoW5yG0ryLrgCY2ACSvRLS+2s14EJtb8hgT08WKHTNgd5LxhSKxfsTapamua+7U FdVS6Ij0tEkgu2jpvgj7QKO0Uw10Cnep2gj7RHts/LVewvkliS6XcheOzqRS1jWU I2EI+UaGOZ11OUiw52VIveEVS5zV/NWhgy5BSP9LYEvXw0BUAHRDYGMem8o5G1V1 SWqjIM1UWvcQDlAnMF9FDVzojvjVUmYWvcAlFFztO8J0B7SavHR3NcfHwEf57reH rNoUbi/9c4/wjJJF33gejiR5pU+ewy/Mk75GrtX3xpEqlztfRbf9/FbPCMEAO1KR DF/b3lkUV9i2/BRW6a0SpZ5RDSmSYMnateel6TrPyVSRnpiSSFO8FrbynwUOa17b 6i49YDFWzzXOrR1YWDg6IEtTrcmBEmvi7F6aoDs020qUnL0hwLn1ZuoIxuiFEpor Z0iFF1B/nw== =PWTH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-6.13/block-20241118' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux Pull block updates from Jens Axboe: - NVMe updates via Keith: - Use uring_cmd helper (Pavel) - Host Memory Buffer allocation enhancements (Christoph) - Target persistent reservation support (Guixin) - Persistent reservation tracing (Guixen) - NVMe 2.1 specification support (Keith) - Rotational Meta Support (Matias, Wang, Keith) - Volatile cache detection enhancment (Guixen) - MD updates via Song: - Maintainers update - raid5 sync IO fix - Enhance handling of faulty and blocked devices - raid5-ppl atomic improvement - md-bitmap fix - Support for manually defining embedded partition tables - Zone append fixes and cleanups - Stop sending the queued requests in the plug list to the driver ->queue_rqs() handle in reverse order. - Zoned write plug cleanups - Cleanups disk stats tracking and add support for disk stats for passthrough IO - Add preparatory support for file system atomic writes - Add lockdep support for queue freezing. Already found a bunch of issues, and some fixes for that are in here. More will be coming. - Fix race between queue stopping/quiescing and IO queueing - ublk recovery improvements - Fix ublk mmap for 64k pages - Various fixes and cleanups * tag 'for-6.13/block-20241118' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux: (118 commits) MAINTAINERS: Update git tree for mdraid subsystem block: make struct rq_list available for !CONFIG_BLOCK block/genhd: use seq_put_decimal_ull for diskstats decimal values block: don't reorder requests in blk_mq_add_to_batch block: don't reorder requests in blk_add_rq_to_plug block: add a rq_list type block: remove rq_list_move virtio_blk: reverse request order in virtio_queue_rqs nvme-pci: reverse request order in nvme_queue_rqs btrfs: validate queue limits block: export blk_validate_limits nvmet: add tracing of reservation commands nvme: parse reservation commands's action and rtype to string nvmet: report ns's vwc not present md/raid5: Increase r5conf.cache_name size block: remove the ioprio field from struct request block: remove the write_hint field from struct request nvme: check ns's volatile write cache not present nvme: add rotational support nvme: use command set independent id ns if available ... |
||
![]() |
c14a8a4c04 |
for-6.13-tag
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE8rQSAMVO+zA4DBdWxWXV+ddtWDsFAmc0zT4ACgkQxWXV+ddt WDtThRAAhzSSiHcJqTfCL5nHh7w85MNEVw28o1ETgXSYJmx0JOWLE7Znlp2FV7jj IbYkFfF2gXJzYvRZkcXB/TAHV9KJG5yZIBZfccbM+9db9f8xkImVKMuqQRXPU41R ppSCmqZTeujtt8ucsaJkMpm6pzECKJCJaGOsMJ8fiqKpo89dKO3eGAVboSbpPF4C r0YmppiBwSP/cCXQCqWxZRbqPGN+lUgZpIGNRi157kehfmRHlVVJTO1pgqK8PCXb uIT09Kulppfez8+1A10CPcniDTyinLik/qLTNlzdWoDBL4iNJMg0A0wsA04AJVf0 PdOS0REusiv3QcEIO6PefuRFRRfXcSLPpPDUceltJT5O0uM2gUqf2C7dEHXUGU3o TdgYlbQpsJWpZ7VGWQDZeGGV04lOPQvu0LGLPgEerUQd5H9ABa0dX8Fn0sPhKsa8 whpAcdfE4rdNxB2OJFnqQeFq0z3cSjP/rvKlluCmAj97QYI+kiu3QyhemcT1YSC9 U7n5Ya9IzIYCN3ml54q3hEgyD0IVGGG20GuUmqC9XSP9mrQRC8I1g7v26AiOTrrk VhgSdtMmphDxXudifsnYMaQ0Z1QqiUrW1SM/prAEOnBYCo75+HDsTgrq9ithgHoI 4xz4YXJyMRs18qfTJctXC1wmGuz5plTdQrwarHdNsELN5HEyqX4= =aAcf -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-6.13-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux Pull btrfs updates from David Sterba: "Changes outside of btrfs: add io_uring command flag to track a dying task (the rest will go via the block git tree). User visible changes: - wire encoded read (ioctl) to io_uring commands, this can be used on itself, in the future this will allow 'send' to be asynchronous. As a consequence, the encoded read ioctl can also work in non-blocking mode - new ioctl to wait for cleaned subvolumes, no need to use the generic and root-only SEARCH_TREE ioctl, will be used by "btrfs subvol sync" - recognize different paths/symlinks for the same devices and don't report them during rescanning, this can be observed with LVM or DM - seeding device use case change, the sprout device (the one capturing new writes) will not clear the read-only status of the super block; this prevents accumulating space from deleted snapshots Performance improvements: - reduce lock contention when traversing extent buffers - reduce extent tree lock contention when searching for inline backref - switch from rb-trees to xarray for delayed ref tracking, improvements due to better cache locality, branching factors and more compact data structures - enable extent map shrinker again (prevent memory exhaustion under some types of IO load), reworked to run in a single worker thread (there used to be problems causing long stalls under memory pressure) Core changes: - raid-stripe-tree feature updates: - make device replace and scrub work - implement partial deletion of stripe extents - new selftests - split the config option BTRFS_DEBUG and add EXPERIMENTAL for features that are experimental or with known problems so we don't misuse debugging config for that - subpage mode updates (sector < page): - update compression implementations - update writepage, writeback - continued folio API conversions: - buffered writes - make buffered write copy one page at a time, preparatory work for future integration with large folios, may cause performance drop - proper locking of root item regarding starting send - error handling improvements - code cleanups and refactoring: - dead code removal - unused parameter reduction - lockdep assertions" * tag 'for-6.13-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: (119 commits) btrfs: send: check for read-only send root under critical section btrfs: send: check for dead send root under critical section btrfs: remove check for NULL fs_info at btrfs_folio_end_lock_bitmap() btrfs: fix warning on PTR_ERR() against NULL device at btrfs_control_ioctl() btrfs: fix a typo in btrfs_use_zone_append btrfs: avoid superfluous calls to free_extent_map() in btrfs_encoded_read() btrfs: simplify logic to decrement snapshot counter at btrfs_mksnapshot() btrfs: remove hole from struct btrfs_delayed_node btrfs: update stale comment for struct btrfs_delayed_ref_node::add_list btrfs: add new ioctl to wait for cleaned subvolumes btrfs: simplify range tracking in cow_file_range() btrfs: remove conditional path allocation in btrfs_read_locked_inode() btrfs: push cleanup into btrfs_read_locked_inode() io_uring/cmd: let cmds to know about dying task btrfs: add struct io_btrfs_cmd as type for io_uring_cmd_to_pdu() btrfs: add io_uring command for encoded reads (ENCODED_READ ioctl) btrfs: move priv off stack in btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages() btrfs: don't sleep in btrfs_encoded_read() if IOCB_NOWAIT is set btrfs: change btrfs_encoded_read() so that reading of extent is done by caller btrfs: remove pointless iocb::ki_pos addition in btrfs_encoded_read() ... |
||
![]() |
0f25f0e4ef |
the bulk of struct fd memory safety stuff
Making sure that struct fd instances are destroyed in the same scope where they'd been created, getting rid of reassignments and passing them by reference, converting to CLASS(fd{,_pos,_raw}). We are getting very close to having the memory safety of that stuff trivial to verify. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYIAB0WIQQqUNBr3gm4hGXdBJlZ7Krx/gZQ6wUCZzdikAAKCRBZ7Krx/gZQ 69nJAQCmbQHK3TGUbQhOw6MJXOK9ezpyEDN3FZb4jsu38vTIdgEA6OxAYDO2m2g9 CN18glYmD3wRyU6Bwl4vGODouSJvDgA= =gVH3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'pull-fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull 'struct fd' class updates from Al Viro: "The bulk of struct fd memory safety stuff Making sure that struct fd instances are destroyed in the same scope where they'd been created, getting rid of reassignments and passing them by reference, converting to CLASS(fd{,_pos,_raw}). We are getting very close to having the memory safety of that stuff trivial to verify" * tag 'pull-fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (28 commits) deal with the last remaing boolean uses of fd_file() css_set_fork(): switch to CLASS(fd_raw, ...) memcg_write_event_control(): switch to CLASS(fd) assorted variants of irqfd setup: convert to CLASS(fd) do_pollfd(): convert to CLASS(fd) convert do_select() convert vfs_dedupe_file_range(). convert cifs_ioctl_copychunk() convert media_request_get_by_fd() convert spu_run(2) switch spufs_calls_{get,put}() to CLASS() use convert cachestat(2) convert do_preadv()/do_pwritev() fdget(), more trivial conversions fdget(), trivial conversions privcmd_ioeventfd_assign(): don't open-code eventfd_ctx_fdget() o2hb_region_dev_store(): avoid goto around fdget()/fdput() introduce "fd_pos" class, convert fdget_pos() users to it. fdget_raw() users: switch to CLASS(fd_raw) convert vmsplice() to CLASS(fd) ... |
||
![]() |
56be9aaf98 |
vfs-6.13.pagecache
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCZzcUQAAKCRCRxhvAZXjc onEpAQCUdwIBHpwmSIFvJFA9aNGpbLzi0dDSEIxuWYtp5qVuogD+ImccwqpG3kEi Zq9vokdPpB1zbahxKl1mkvBG4G0GFQE= =LbP6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'vfs-6.13.pagecache' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs Pull vfs pagecache updates from Christian Brauner: "Cleanup filesystem page flag usage: This continues the work to make the mappedtodisk/owner_2 flag available to filesystems which don't use buffer heads. Further patches remove uses of Private2. This brings us very close to being rid of it entirely" * tag 'vfs-6.13.pagecache' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: migrate: Remove references to Private2 ceph: Remove call to PagePrivate2() btrfs: Switch from using the private_2 flag to owner_2 mm: Remove PageMappedToDisk nilfs2: Convert nilfs_copy_buffer() to use folios fs: Move clearing of mappedtodisk to buffer.c |
||
![]() |
70e7730c2a |
vfs-6.13.misc
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCZzcToAAKCRCRxhvAZXjc osL9AP948FFumJRC28gDJ4xp+X4eohNOfkgoEG8FTbF2zU6ulwD+O0pr26FqpFli pqlG+38UdATImpfqqWjPbb72sBYcfQg= =wLUh -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'vfs-6.13.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs Pull misc vfs updates from Christian Brauner: "Features: - Fixup and improve NLM and kNFSD file lock callbacks Last year both GFS2 and OCFS2 had some work done to make their locking more robust when exported over NFS. Unfortunately, part of that work caused both NLM (for NFS v3 exports) and kNFSD (for NFSv4.1+ exports) to no longer send lock notifications to clients This in itself is not a huge problem because most NFS clients will still poll the server in order to acquire a conflicted lock It's important for NLM and kNFSD that they do not block their kernel threads inside filesystem's file_lock implementations because that can produce deadlocks. We used to make sure of this by only trusting that posix_lock_file() can correctly handle blocking lock calls asynchronously, so the lock managers would only setup their file_lock requests for async callbacks if the filesystem did not define its own lock() file operation However, when GFS2 and OCFS2 grew the capability to correctly handle blocking lock requests asynchronously, they started signalling this behavior with EXPORT_OP_ASYNC_LOCK, and the check for also trusting posix_lock_file() was inadvertently dropped, so now most filesystems no longer produce lock notifications when exported over NFS Fix this by using an fop_flag which greatly simplifies the problem and grooms the way for future uses by both filesystems and lock managers alike - Add a sysctl to delete the dentry when a file is removed instead of making it a negative dentry Commit |
||
![]() |
6ac81fd55e |
vfs-6.13.mgtime
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCZzcScQAKCRCRxhvAZXjc oj+5AP4k822a77wc/3iPFk379naIvQ4dsrgemh0/Pb6ZvzvkFQEAi3vFCfzCDR2x SkJF/RwXXKZv6U31QXMRt2Qo6wfBuAc= =nVlm -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'vfs-6.13.mgtime' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs Pull vfs multigrain timestamps from Christian Brauner: "This is another try at implementing multigrain timestamps. This time with significant help from the timekeeping maintainers to reduce the performance impact. Thomas provided a base branch that contains the required timekeeping interfaces for the VFS. It serves as the base for the multi-grain timestamp work: - Multigrain timestamps allow the kernel to use fine-grained timestamps when an inode's attributes is being actively observed via ->getattr(). With this support, it's possible for a file to get a fine-grained timestamp, and another modified after it to get a coarse-grained stamp that is earlier than the fine-grained time. If this happens then the files can appear to have been modified in reverse order, which breaks VFS ordering guarantees. To prevent this, a floor value is maintained for multigrain timestamps. Whenever a fine-grained timestamp is handed out, record it, and when later coarse-grained stamps are handed out, ensure they are not earlier than that value. If the coarse-grained timestamp is earlier than the fine-grained floor, return the floor value instead. The timekeeper changes add a static singleton atomic64_t into timekeeper.c that is used to keep track of the latest fine-grained time ever handed out. This is tracked as a monotonic ktime_t value to ensure that it isn't affected by clock jumps. Because it is updated at different times than the rest of the timekeeper object, the floor value is managed independently of the timekeeper via a cmpxchg() operation, and sits on its own cacheline. Two new public timekeeper interfaces are added: (1) ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64_mg() fills a timespec64 with the later of the coarse-grained clock and the floor time (2) ktime_get_real_ts64_mg() gets the fine-grained clock value, and tries to swap it into the floor. A timespec64 is filled with the result. - The VFS has always used coarse-grained timestamps when updating the ctime and mtime after a change. This has the benefit of allowing filesystems to optimize away a lot metadata updates, down to around 1 per jiffy, even when a file is under heavy writes. Unfortunately, this has always been an issue when we're exporting via NFSv3, which relies on timestamps to validate caches. A lot of changes can happen in a jiffy, so timestamps aren't sufficient to help the client decide when to invalidate the cache. Even with NFSv4, a lot of exported filesystems don't properly support a change attribute and are subject to the same problems with timestamp granularity. Other applications have similar issues with timestamps (e.g backup applications). If we were to always use fine-grained timestamps, that would improve the situation, but that becomes rather expensive, as the underlying filesystem would have to log a lot more metadata updates. This adds a way to only use fine-grained timestamps when they are being actively queried. Use the (unused) top bit in inode->i_ctime_nsec as a flag that indicates whether the current timestamps have been queried via stat() or the like. When it's set, we allow the kernel to use a fine-grained timestamp iff it's necessary to make the ctime show a different value. This solves the problem of being able to distinguish the timestamp between updates, but introduces a new problem: it's now possible for a file being changed to get a fine-grained timestamp. A file that is altered just a bit later can then get a coarse-grained one that appears older than the earlier fine-grained time. This violates timestamp ordering guarantees. This is where the earlier mentioned timkeeping interfaces help. A global monotonic atomic64_t value is kept that acts as a timestamp floor. When we go to stamp a file, we first get the latter of the current floor value and the current coarse-grained time. If the inode ctime hasn't been queried then we just attempt to stamp it with that value. If it has been queried, then first see whether the current coarse time is later than the existing ctime. If it is, then we accept that value. If it isn't, then we get a fine-grained time and try to swap that into the global floor. Whether that succeeds or fails, we take the resulting floor time, convert it to realtime and try to swap that into the ctime. We take the result of the ctime swap whether it succeeds or fails, since either is just as valid. Filesystems can opt into this by setting the FS_MGTIME fstype flag. Others should be unaffected (other than being subject to the same floor value as multigrain filesystems)" * tag 'vfs-6.13.mgtime' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: fs: reduce pointer chasing in is_mgtime() test tmpfs: add support for multigrain timestamps btrfs: convert to multigrain timestamps ext4: switch to multigrain timestamps xfs: switch to multigrain timestamps Documentation: add a new file documenting multigrain timestamps fs: add percpu counters for significant multigrain timestamp events fs: tracepoints around multigrain timestamp events fs: handle delegated timestamps in setattr_copy_mgtime timekeeping: Add percpu counter for tracking floor swap events timekeeping: Add interfaces for handling timestamps with a floor value fs: have setattr_copy handle multigrain timestamps appropriately fs: add infrastructure for multigrain timestamps |
||
![]() |
c9dd4571ad |
for-6.12-rc7-tag
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE8rQSAMVO+zA4DBdWxWXV+ddtWDsFAmc2aGIACgkQxWXV+ddt WDu0AQ/9FLfC/e3X2GjZ0auna/7A/rF8MPoATUdAyHn75Md6Hc8PXpi1YvMph+ba pvoufOqrU66/g0UNeacgsp6rF4rKJHg0q9Id+7wueLnDr41g9paXjsLYItq4j26w GusDiZvUDwuDmb70vlTXrgAfnjooIdSwqJTlIzJxvl4wrNzOiUlUJtTMzmUrwn/9 Lf/iByWlGcPKKBc+1ZzFz4HlVOZZSt9YePeJw2/Aul2OMtuI3RTTAL/NtjaFIlYc pb+NHVqFrrfgC+xo68hLBmnsBfS41EGR58rYRjEuQo0+hARa8WbxL3DNA/E/Vi5X dsq/wQVlD7IVIWCoF9J94/iyDdwlDOGFMoL6FUrJwDtPGN/v/xxtA6ruvuC7k5zy bHCR8ZVrJWVaxE7u0Gtl+hFPpDTwNTR7SfvK69gxPfci1cN0m2wCNK02SEUJwV09 N82N2ENGGwyWS+nOl/ERB+7A0QxViMr3JpUrPzSYqsmn8bwDvovSjK2fFouJoSey bpAzbFWj+OS0O9nnRqabTJDM/Tk9O0s0Ye76aUS+Vfk9d5EuVfAg6pHiOBcFDhsK UEG9QbPltfh6LPDHCdV93HOOsC0uNxCTCSpbQ9LFGKBICQsPIX/vZeV45fNFJDLX j5kEtHFVU3snU+jA97nvYXPRANDnnNx/EzXv7zo0Ye8L+plecBs= =ssYj -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-6.12-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux Pull btrfs fix from David Sterba: "One more fix that seems urgent and good to have in 6.12 final. It could potentially lead to unexpected transaction aborts, due to wrong comparison and order of processing of delayed refs" * tag 'for-6.12-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: btrfs: fix incorrect comparison for delayed refs |
||
![]() |
7d493a5ecc |
btrfs: fix incorrect comparison for delayed refs
When I reworked delayed ref comparison in |
||
![]() |
e559ee0226 |
btrfs: validate queue limits
Call blk_validate_limits on the queue limits used for zone append splitting so that calculated values get filled in and any stacking conflicts get cought. Without this there isn't a max_zone_append_sectors limits as of commit |
||
![]() |
e82c936293 |
btrfs: send: check for read-only send root under critical section
We're checking if the send root is read-only without being under the protection of the root's root_item_lock spinlock, which is what protects the root's flags when clearing the read-only flag, done at btrfs_ioctl_subvol_setflags(). Furthermore, it should be done in the same critical section that increments the root's send_in_progress counter, as btrfs_ioctl_subvol_setflags() clears the read-only flag in the same critical section that checks the counter's value. So fix this by moving the read-only check under the critical section delimited by the root's root_item_lock which also increments the root's send_in_progress counter. Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
![]() |
dc058f5fda |
btrfs: send: check for dead send root under critical section
We're checking if the send root is dead without the protection of the root's root_item_lock spinlock, which is what protects the root's flags. The inverse, setting the dead flag on a root, is done under the protection of that lock, at btrfs_delete_subvolume(). Also checking and updating the root's send_in_progress counter is supposed to be done in the same critical section as checking for or setting the root dead flag, so that these operations are done atomically as a single step (which is correctly done by btrfs_delete_subvolume()). So fix this by checking if the send root is dead in the same critical section that updates the send_in_progress counter, which is protected by the root's root_item_lock spinlock. Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
![]() |
722d343f12 |
btrfs: remove check for NULL fs_info at btrfs_folio_end_lock_bitmap()
Smatch complains about possibly dereferencing a NULL fs_info at btrfs_folio_end_lock_bitmap(): fs/btrfs/subpage.c:332 btrfs_folio_end_lock_bitmap() warn: variable dereferenced before check 'fs_info' (see line 326) because we access fs_info to set the 'start_bit' variable before doing the check for a NULL fs_info. However fs_info is never NULL, since in the only caller of btrfs_folio_end_lock_bitmap() is extent_writepage(), where we have an inode which always as a non-NULL fs_info. So remove the check for a NULL fs_info at btrfs_folio_end_lock_bitmap(). Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |