This new pkey handler module supports the conversion of
Ultravisor retrievable secrets to protected keys.
The new module pkey-uv.ko is able to retrieve and verify
protected keys backed up by the Ultravisor layer which is
only available within protected execution environment.
The module is only automatically loaded if there is the
UV CPU feature flagged as available. Additionally on module
init there is a check for protected execution environment
and for UV supporting retrievable secrets. Also if the kernel
is not running as a protected execution guest, the module
unloads itself with errno ENODEV.
The pkey UV module currently supports these Ultravisor
secrets and is able to retrieve a protected key for these
UV secret types:
- UV_SECRET_AES_128
- UV_SECRET_AES_192
- UV_SECRET_AES_256
- UV_SECRET_AES_XTS_128
- UV_SECRET_AES_XTS_256
- UV_SECRET_HMAC_SHA_256
- UV_SECRET_HMAC_SHA_512
- UV_SECRET_ECDSA_P256
- UV_SECRET_ECDSA_P384
- UV_SECRET_ECDSA_P521
- UV_SECRET_ECDSA_ED25519
- UV_SECRET_ECDSA_ED448
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Fix all the complains from checkpatch for the pkey header file:
CHECK: No space is necessary after a cast
+ PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA = (__u32) 1,
CHECK: Please use a blank line after function/struct/union/enum declarations
+};
+#define PKEY_GENSECK _IOWR(PKEY_IOCTL_MAGIC, 0x01, struct pkey_genseck)
Suggested-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Add support for deriving protected keys from clear key token for
AES xts and HMAC keys via PCKMO instruction. Add support for
protected key generation and unwrap of protected key tokens for
these key types. Furthermore 4 new sysfs attributes are introduced:
- /sys/devices/virtual/misc/pkey/protkey/protkey_aes_xts_128
- /sys/devices/virtual/misc/pkey/protkey/protkey_aes_xts_256
- /sys/devices/virtual/misc/pkey/protkey/protkey_hmac_512
- /sys/devices/virtual/misc/pkey/protkey/protkey_hmac_1024
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Introduce pkey base kernel code with a simple pkey handler registry.
Regroup the pkey code into these kernel modules:
- pkey is the pkey api supporting the ioctls, sysfs and in-kernel api.
Also the pkey base code which offers the handler registry and
handler wrapping invocation functions is integrated there. This
module is automatically loaded in via CPU feature if the MSA feature
is available.
- pkey-cca is the CCA related handler code kernel module a offering
CCA specific implementation for pkey. This module is loaded in
via MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE when a CEX[4-8] card becomes available.
- pkey-ep11 is the EP11 related handler code kernel module offering an
EP11 specific implementation for pkey. This module is loaded in via
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE when a CEX[4-8] card becomes available.
- pkey-pckmo is the PCKMO related handler code kernel module. This
module is loaded in via CPU feature if the MSA feature is available,
but on init a check for availability of the pckmo instruction is
performed.
The handler modules register via a pkey_handler struct at the pkey
base code and the pkey customer (that is currently the pkey api code
fetches a handler via pkey handler registry functions and calls the
unified handler functions via the pkey base handler functions.
As a result the pkey-cca, pkey-ep11 and pkey-pckmo modules get
independent from each other and it becomes possible to write new
handlers which offer another kind of implementation without implicit
dependencies to other handler implementations and/or kernel device
drivers.
For each of these 4 kernel modules there is an individual Kconfig
entry: CONFIG_PKEY for the base and api, CONFIG_PKEY_CCA for the PKEY
CCA support handler, CONFIG_PKEY_EP11 for the EP11 support handler and
CONFIG_PKEY_PCKMO for the pckmo support. The both CEX related handler
modules (PKEY CCA and PKEY EP11) have a dependency to the zcrypt api
of the zcrypt device driver.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Commit 'fa6999e326fe ("s390/pkey: support CCA and EP11 secure ECC
private keys")' introduced a new PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES securekey type as
a supplement to the existing PKEY_TYPE_EP11 (which won't work in
environments with session-bound keys). The pkey EP11 securekey
attributes use PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES (instead of PKEY_TYPE_EP11)
keyblobs, to make the generated keyblobs usable also in environments,
where session-bound keys are required.
There should be no negative impacts to userspace because the internal
structure of the keyblobs is opaque. The increased size of the
generated keyblobs is reflected by the changed size of the attributes.
Fixes: fa6999e326 ("s390/pkey: support CCA and EP11 secure ECC private keys")
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Add support for a new 'non CCA clear key token' with these
ECC clear keys supported:
- ECC P256
- ECC P384
- ECC P521
- ECC ED25519
- ECC ED448
This makes it possible to derive a protected key from this
ECC clear key input via PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK3 ioctl. As of now
the only way to derive protected keys from these clear key
tokens is via PCKMO instruction. For AES keys an alternate
path via creating a secure key from the clear key and then
derive a protected key from the secure key exists. This
alternate path is not implemented for ECC keys as it would
require to rearrange and maybe recalculate the clear key
material for input to derive an CCA or EP11 ECC secure key.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
This patch tries to fix as much as possible of the
checkpatch.pl --strict findings:
CHECK: Logical continuations should be on the previous line
CHECK: No space is necessary after a cast
CHECK: Alignment should match open parenthesis
CHECK: 'useable' may be misspelled - perhaps 'usable'?
WARNING: Possible repeated word: 'is'
CHECK: spaces preferred around that '*' (ctx:VxV)
CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!msg"
CHECK: Prefer kzalloc(sizeof(*zc)...) over kzalloc(sizeof(struct...)...)
CHECK: Unnecessary parentheses around resp_type->work
CHECK: Avoid CamelCase: <xcRB>
There is no functional change comming with this patch, only
code cleanup, renaming, whitespaces, indenting, ... but no
semantic change in any way. Also the API (zcrypt and pkey
header file) is semantically unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jürgen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
This patch extends the pkey kernel module to support CCA
and EP11 secure ECC (private) keys as source for deriving
ECC protected (private) keys.
There is yet another new ioctl to support this: PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK3
can handle all the old keys plus CCA and EP11 secure ECC keys.
For details see ioctl description in pkey.h.
The CPACF unit currently only supports a subset of 5
different ECC curves (P-256, P-384, P-521, ED25519, ED448) and
so only keys of this curve type can be transformed into
protected keys. However, the pkey and the cca/ep11 low level
functions do not check this but simple pass-through the key
blob to the firmware onto the crypto cards. So most likely
the failure will be a response carrying an error code
resulting in user space errno value EIO instead of EINVAL.
Deriving a protected key from an EP11 ECC secure key
requires a CEX7 in EP11 mode. Deriving a protected key from
an CCA ECC secure key requires a CEX7 in CCA mode.
Together with this new ioctl the ioctls for querying lists
of apqns (PKEY_APQNS4K and PKEY_APQNS4KT) have been extended
to support EP11 and CCA ECC secure key type and key blobs.
Together with this ioctl there comes a new struct ep11kblob_header
which is to be prepended onto the EP11 key blob. See details
in pkey.h for the fields in there. The older EP11 AES key blob
with some info stored in the (unused) session field is also
supported with this new ioctl.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Extend the low level ep11 misc functions implementation by
several functions to support EP11 key objects for paes and pkey:
- EP11 AES secure key generation
- EP11 AES secure key generation from given clear key value
- EP11 AES secure key blob check
- findcard function returns list of apqns based on given criterias
- EP11 AES secure key derive to CPACF protected key
Extend the pkey module to be able to generate and handle EP11
secure keys and also use them as base for deriving protected
keys for CPACF usage. These ioctls are extended to support
EP11 keys: PKEY_GENSECK2, PKEY_CLR2SECK2, PKEY_VERIFYKEY2,
PKEY_APQNS4K, PKEY_APQNS4KT, PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2.
Additionally the 'clear key' token to protected key now uses
an EP11 card if the other ways (via PCKMO, via CCA) fail.
The PAES cipher implementation needed a new upper limit for
the max key size, but is now also working with EP11 keys.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls
which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys:
PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2.
Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key.
PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2.
Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given
clear key value.
PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2.
Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also
check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and
domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn
able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key
verification patterns of the key matching to the current or
alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked
for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure
keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the
future).
PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into
a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that
this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of
apqns to be used for the transformation.
PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given.
Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES
secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching
crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA
AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is
further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either
the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA
adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the
matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the
current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the
PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return
apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no
matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the
apqn_entries value is 0.
PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given.
Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further
restrict the list by given master key verification patterns.
For different key types there may be different ways to match the
master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA
cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp
value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the
old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or
alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is
given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with
the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to
return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp
matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but
the apqn_entries value is 0.
These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key
blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key
blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte
array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and
pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional
info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a
list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the
operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card
type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the
list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is
reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to
be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There
are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on
a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or
alternate master key verifcation pattern.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Introduce a new ioctl API and in-kernel API to transform
a variable length key blob of any supported type into a
protected key.
Transforming a secure key blob uses the already existing
function pkey_sec2protk().
Transforming a protected key blob also verifies if the
protected key is still valid. If not, -ENODEV is returned.
Both APIs are described in detail in the header files
arch/s390/include/asm/pkey.h and arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Introduce a new ioctl API and in-kernel API to verify if a
random protected key is still valid. A protected key is
invalid when its wrapping key verification pattern does not
match the verification pattern of the LPAR. Each time an LPAR
is activated, a new LPAR wrapping key is generated and the
wrapping key verification pattern is updated.
Both APIs are described in detail in the header files
arch/s390/include/asm/pkey.h and arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
This patch introduces a new ioctl API and in-kernel API to
generate a random protected key. The protected key is generated
in a way that the effective clear key is never exposed in clear.
Both APIs are described in detail in the header files
arch/s390/include/asm/pkey.h and arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Many user space API headers are missing licensing information, which
makes it hard for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default are files without license information under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPLV2. Marking them GPLV2 would exclude
them from being included in non GPLV2 code, which is obviously not
intended. The user space API headers fall under the syscall exception
which is in the kernels COPYING file:
NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel
services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use
of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work".
otherwise syscall usage would not be possible.
Update the files which contain no license information with an SPDX
license identifier. The chosen identifier is 'GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note' which is the officially assigned identifier for the
Linux syscall exception. SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne. See the previous patch in this series for the
methodology of how this patch was researched.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
User space needs some information about the secure key(s)
before actually invoking the pkey and/or paes funcionality.
This patch introduces a new ioctl API and in kernel API to
verify the the secure key blob and give back some
information about the key (type, bitsize, old MKVP).
Both APIs are described in detail in the header files
arch/s390/include/asm/pkey.h and arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
This patch introcudes a new kernel module pkey which is providing
protected key handling and management functions. The pkey API is
available within the kernel for other s390 specific code to create
and manage protected keys. Additionally the functions are exported
to user space via IOCTL calls. The implementation makes extensive
use of functions provided by the zcrypt device driver. For
generating protected keys from secure keys there is also a CEX
coprocessor card needed.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
