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perf: Fix required permissions if sigtrap is requested
If perf_event_open() is called with another task as target and
perf_event_attr::sigtrap is set, and the target task's user does not
match the calling user, also require the CAP_KILL capability or
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH permissions.
Otherwise, with the CAP_PERFMON capability alone it would be possible
for a user to send SIGTRAP signals via perf events to another user's
tasks. This could potentially result in those tasks being terminated if
they cannot handle SIGTRAP signals.
Note: The check complements the existing capability check, but is not
supposed to supersede the ptrace_may_access() check. At a high level we
now have:
capable of CAP_PERFMON and (CAP_KILL if sigtrap)
OR
ptrace_may_access(...) // also checks for same thread-group and uid
Fixes: 97ba62b278
("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.13+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210705084453.2151729-1-elver@google.com
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1 changed files with 24 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -12158,10 +12158,33 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
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}
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}
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if (task) {
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if (task) {
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unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS;
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bool is_capable;
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err = down_read_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
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err = down_read_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
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if (err)
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if (err)
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goto err_file;
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goto err_file;
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is_capable = perfmon_capable();
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if (attr.sigtrap) {
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/*
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* perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other
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* task. Require the current task to also have
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* CAP_KILL.
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*/
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rcu_read_lock();
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is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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/*
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* If the required capabilities aren't available, checks
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* for ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since
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* sending signals can effectively change the target
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* task.
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*/
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ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS;
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}
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/*
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/*
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* Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
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* Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
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*
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*
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@ -12171,7 +12194,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
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* perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
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* perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
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*/
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*/
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err = -EACCES;
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err = -EACCES;
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if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
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if (!is_capable && !ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode))
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goto err_cred;
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goto err_cred;
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}
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}
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