rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)

Implement the basic parts of the yfs-rxgk security class (security index 6)
to support GSSAPI-negotiated security.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250411095303.2316168-9-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Howells 2025-04-11 10:52:53 +01:00 committed by Jakub Kicinski
parent c86f9b963d
commit 9d1d2b5934
12 changed files with 1694 additions and 5 deletions

View file

@ -1182,6 +1182,7 @@ API Function Reference
.. kernel-doc:: net/rxrpc/oob.c
.. kernel-doc:: net/rxrpc/peer_object.c
.. kernel-doc:: net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
.. kernel-doc:: net/rxrpc/rxgk.c
.. kernel-doc:: net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
.. kernel-doc:: net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c
.. kernel-doc:: net/rxrpc/server_key.c

View file

@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <crypto/krb5.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "afs_fs.h"
#include "protocol_yfs.h"
@ -17,6 +18,9 @@
*/
static int afs_respond_to_challenge(struct sk_buff *challenge)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_RXGK
struct krb5_buffer appdata = {};
#endif
struct rxrpc_peer *peer;
unsigned long peer_data;
u16 service_id;
@ -44,8 +48,16 @@ static int afs_respond_to_challenge(struct sk_buff *challenge)
}
switch (security_index) {
#ifdef CONFIG_RXKAD
case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD:
return rxkad_kernel_respond_to_challenge(challenge);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RXGK
case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXGK:
case RXRPC_SECURITY_YFS_RXGK:
return rxgk_kernel_respond_to_challenge(challenge, &appdata);
#endif
default:
return rxrpc_kernel_reject_challenge(challenge, RX_USER_ABORT, -EPROTO,

View file

@ -69,6 +69,38 @@
EM(rxkad_abort_resp_tkt_sname, "rxkad-resp-tk-sname") \
EM(rxkad_abort_resp_unknown_tkt, "rxkad-resp-unknown-tkt") \
EM(rxkad_abort_resp_version, "rxkad-resp-version") \
/* RxGK security errors */ \
EM(rxgk_abort_1_verify_mic_eproto, "rxgk1-vfy-mic-eproto") \
EM(rxgk_abort_2_decrypt_eproto, "rxgk2-dec-eproto") \
EM(rxgk_abort_2_short_data, "rxgk2-short-data") \
EM(rxgk_abort_2_short_encdata, "rxgk2-short-encdata") \
EM(rxgk_abort_2_short_header, "rxgk2-short-hdr") \
EM(rxgk_abort_bad_key_number, "rxgk-bad-key-num") \
EM(rxgk_abort_chall_key_expired, "rxgk-chall-key-exp") \
EM(rxgk_abort_chall_no_key, "rxgk-chall-nokey") \
EM(rxgk_abort_chall_short, "rxgk-chall-short") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_auth_dec, "rxgk-resp-auth-dec") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_bad_callid, "rxgk-resp-bad-callid") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_bad_nonce, "rxgk-resp-bad-nonce") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_bad_param, "rxgk-resp-bad-param") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_call_ctr, "rxgk-resp-call-ctr") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_call_state, "rxgk-resp-call-state") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_internal_error, "rxgk-resp-int-error") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_nopkg, "rxgk-resp-nopkg") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_short_applen, "rxgk-resp-short-applen") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_short_auth, "rxgk-resp-short-auth") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_short_call_list, "rxgk-resp-short-callls") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_short_packet, "rxgk-resp-short-packet") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_short_yfs_klen, "rxgk-resp-short-yfs-klen") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_short_yfs_key, "rxgk-resp-short-yfs-key") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_short_yfs_tkt, "rxgk-resp-short-yfs-tkt") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_tok_dec, "rxgk-resp-tok-dec") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_tok_internal_error, "rxgk-resp-tok-int-err") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_tok_keyerr, "rxgk-resp-tok-keyerr") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_tok_nokey, "rxgk-resp-tok-nokey") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_tok_nopkg, "rxgk-resp-tok-nopkg") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_tok_short, "rxgk-resp-tok-short") \
EM(rxgk_abort_resp_xdr_align, "rxgk-resp-xdr-align") \
/* rxrpc errors */ \
EM(rxrpc_abort_call_improper_term, "call-improper-term") \
EM(rxrpc_abort_call_reset, "call-reset") \
@ -471,6 +503,7 @@
EM(rxrpc_tx_point_call_final_resend, "CallFinalResend") \
EM(rxrpc_tx_point_conn_abort, "ConnAbort") \
EM(rxrpc_tx_point_reject, "Reject") \
EM(rxrpc_tx_point_rxgk_challenge, "RxGKChall") \
EM(rxrpc_tx_point_rxkad_challenge, "RxkadChall") \
EM(rxrpc_tx_point_response, "Response") \
EM(rxrpc_tx_point_version_keepalive, "VerKeepalive") \
@ -489,6 +522,7 @@
#define rxrpc_txbuf_traces \
EM(rxrpc_txbuf_alloc_data, "ALLOC DATA ") \
EM(rxrpc_txbuf_alloc_response, "ALLOC RESP ") \
EM(rxrpc_txbuf_free, "FREE ") \
EM(rxrpc_txbuf_get_buffer, "GET BUFFER ") \
EM(rxrpc_txbuf_get_trans, "GET TRANS ") \
@ -496,6 +530,7 @@
EM(rxrpc_txbuf_put_cleaned, "PUT CLEANED") \
EM(rxrpc_txbuf_put_nomem, "PUT NOMEM ") \
EM(rxrpc_txbuf_put_rotated, "PUT ROTATED") \
EM(rxrpc_txbuf_put_response_tx, "PUT RESP TX") \
EM(rxrpc_txbuf_put_send_aborted, "PUT SEND-X ") \
EM(rxrpc_txbuf_put_trans, "PUT TRANS ") \
EM(rxrpc_txbuf_see_lost, "SEE LOST ") \
@ -1178,6 +1213,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(rxrpc_rx_challenge,
__field(u32, version)
__field(u32, nonce)
__field(u32, min_level)
__field(u8, security_ix)
),
TP_fast_assign(
@ -1186,11 +1222,13 @@ TRACE_EVENT(rxrpc_rx_challenge,
__entry->version = version;
__entry->nonce = nonce;
__entry->min_level = min_level;
__entry->security_ix = conn->security_ix;
),
TP_printk("C=%08x CHALLENGE %08x v=%x n=%x ml=%x",
TP_printk("C=%08x CHALLENGE r=%08x sx=%u v=%x n=%x ml=%x",
__entry->conn,
__entry->serial,
__entry->security_ix,
__entry->version,
__entry->nonce,
__entry->min_level)
@ -1208,6 +1246,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(rxrpc_rx_response,
__field(u32, version)
__field(u32, kvno)
__field(u32, ticket_len)
__field(u8, security_ix)
),
TP_fast_assign(
@ -1216,11 +1255,13 @@ TRACE_EVENT(rxrpc_rx_response,
__entry->version = version;
__entry->kvno = kvno;
__entry->ticket_len = ticket_len;
__entry->security_ix = conn->security_ix;
),
TP_printk("C=%08x RESPONSE %08x v=%x kvno=%x tl=%x",
TP_printk("C=%08x RESPONSE r=%08x sx=%u v=%x kvno=%x tl=%x",
__entry->conn,
__entry->serial,
__entry->security_ix,
__entry->version,
__entry->kvno,
__entry->ticket_len)

View file

@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ rxrpc-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
rxrpc-$(CONFIG_RXKAD) += rxkad.o
rxrpc-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
rxrpc-$(CONFIG_RXGK) += \
rxgk.o \
rxgk_app.o \
rxgk_kdf.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RXPERF) += rxperf.o

View file

@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ struct key_preparsed_payload;
struct rxrpc_connection;
struct rxrpc_txbuf;
struct rxrpc_txqueue;
struct rxgk_context;
/*
* Mark applied to socket buffers in skb->mark. skb->priority is used
@ -312,6 +313,11 @@ struct rxrpc_security {
/* clear connection security */
void (*clear)(struct rxrpc_connection *);
/* Default ticket -> key decoder */
int (*default_decode_ticket)(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int ticket_offset, unsigned int ticket_len,
struct key **_key);
};
/*
@ -559,7 +565,10 @@ struct rxrpc_connection {
u32 nonce; /* response re-use preventer */
} rxkad;
struct {
struct rxgk_context *keys[1];
u64 start_time; /* The start time for TK derivation */
u8 nonce[20]; /* Response re-use preventer */
u32 enctype; /* Kerberos 5 encoding type */
} rxgk;
};
struct sk_buff *tx_response; /* Response packet to be transmitted */
@ -903,6 +912,8 @@ struct rxrpc_txbuf {
unsigned short len; /* Amount of data in buffer */
unsigned short space; /* Remaining data space */
unsigned short offset; /* Offset of fill point */
unsigned short crypto_header; /* Size of crypto header */
unsigned short sec_header; /* Size of security header */
unsigned short pkt_len; /* Size of packet content */
unsigned short alloc_size; /* Amount of bufferage allocated */
unsigned int flags;
@ -1339,6 +1350,7 @@ int rxrpc_sendmsg_oob(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len);
/*
* output.c
*/
ssize_t do_udp_sendmsg(struct socket *socket, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len);
void rxrpc_send_ACK(struct rxrpc_call *call, u8 ack_reason,
rxrpc_serial_t serial, enum rxrpc_propose_ack_trace why);
void rxrpc_send_probe_for_pmtud(struct rxrpc_call *call);
@ -1411,6 +1423,11 @@ void rxrpc_call_add_rtt(struct rxrpc_call *call, enum rxrpc_rtt_rx_trace why,
ktime_t rxrpc_get_rto_backoff(struct rxrpc_call *call, bool retrans);
void rxrpc_call_init_rtt(struct rxrpc_call *call);
/*
* rxgk.c
*/
extern const struct rxrpc_security rxgk_yfs;
/*
* rxkad.c
*/

View file

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
extern int udpv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len);
static ssize_t do_udp_sendmsg(struct socket *socket, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
ssize_t do_udp_sendmsg(struct socket *socket, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sockaddr *sa = msg->msg_name;
struct sock *sk = socket->sk;

View file

@ -181,4 +181,24 @@ struct rxkad_response {
__be32 ticket_len; /* Kerberos ticket length */
} __packed;
/*
* GSSAPI security type-4 and type-6 data header.
*/
struct rxgk_header {
__be32 epoch;
__be32 cid;
__be32 call_number;
__be32 seq;
__be32 sec_index;
__be32 data_len;
} __packed;
/*
* GSSAPI security type-4 and type-6 response packet header.
*/
struct rxgk_response {
__be64 start_time;
__be32 token_len;
} __packed;
#endif /* _LINUX_RXRPC_PACKET_H */

1215
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c Normal file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

285
net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/* Application-specific bits for GSSAPI-based RxRPC security
*
* Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include "ar-internal.h"
#include "rxgk_common.h"
/*
* Decode a default-style YFS ticket in a response and turn it into an
* rxrpc-type key.
*
* struct rxgk_key {
* afs_uint32 enctype;
* opaque key<>;
* };
*
* struct RXGK_AuthName {
* afs_int32 kind;
* opaque data<AUTHDATAMAX>;
* opaque display<AUTHPRINTABLEMAX>;
* };
*
* struct RXGK_Token {
* rxgk_key K0;
* RXGK_Level level;
* rxgkTime starttime;
* afs_int32 lifetime;
* afs_int32 bytelife;
* rxgkTime expirationtime;
* struct RXGK_AuthName identities<>;
* };
*/
int rxgk_yfs_decode_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int ticket_offset, unsigned int ticket_len,
struct key **_key)
{
struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); // TODO - use socket creds
struct key *key;
size_t pre_ticket_len, payload_len;
unsigned int klen, enctype;
void *payload, *ticket;
__be32 *t, *p, *q, tmp[2];
int ret;
_enter("");
/* Get the session key length */
ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, ticket_offset, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
if (ret < 0)
return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_INCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO,
rxgk_abort_resp_short_yfs_klen);
enctype = ntohl(tmp[0]);
klen = ntohl(tmp[1]);
if (klen > ticket_len - 10 * sizeof(__be32))
return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_INCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO,
rxgk_abort_resp_short_yfs_key);
pre_ticket_len = ((5 + 14) * sizeof(__be32) +
xdr_round_up(klen) +
sizeof(__be32));
payload_len = pre_ticket_len + xdr_round_up(ticket_len);
payload = kzalloc(payload_len, GFP_NOFS);
if (!payload)
return -ENOMEM;
/* We need to fill out the XDR form for a key payload that we can pass
* to add_key(). Start by copying in the ticket so that we can parse
* it.
*/
ticket = payload + pre_ticket_len;
ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, ticket_offset, ticket, ticket_len);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_INCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO,
rxgk_abort_resp_short_yfs_tkt);
goto error;
}
/* Fill out the form header. */
p = payload;
p[0] = htonl(0); /* Flags */
p[1] = htonl(1); /* len(cellname) */
p[2] = htonl(0x20000000); /* Cellname " " */
p[3] = htonl(1); /* #tokens */
p[4] = htonl(15 * sizeof(__be32) + xdr_round_up(klen) +
xdr_round_up(ticket_len)); /* Token len */
/* Now fill in the body. Most of this we can just scrape directly from
* the ticket.
*/
t = ticket + sizeof(__be32) * 2 + xdr_round_up(klen);
q = payload + 5 * sizeof(__be32);
q[0] = htonl(RXRPC_SECURITY_YFS_RXGK);
q[1] = t[1]; /* begintime - msw */
q[2] = t[2]; /* - lsw */
q[3] = t[5]; /* endtime - msw */
q[4] = t[6]; /* - lsw */
q[5] = 0; /* level - msw */
q[6] = t[0]; /* - lsw */
q[7] = 0; /* lifetime - msw */
q[8] = t[3]; /* - lsw */
q[9] = 0; /* bytelife - msw */
q[10] = t[4]; /* - lsw */
q[11] = 0; /* enctype - msw */
q[12] = htonl(enctype); /* - lsw */
q[13] = htonl(klen); /* Key length */
q += 14;
memcpy(q, ticket + sizeof(__be32) * 2, klen);
q += xdr_round_up(klen) / 4;
q[0] = htonl(ticket_len);
q++;
if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)q != (unsigned long)ticket)) {
ret = -EIO;
goto error;
}
/* Ticket read in with skb_copy_bits above */
q += xdr_round_up(ticket_len) / 4;
if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)q - (unsigned long)payload != payload_len)) {
ret = -EIO;
goto error;
}
/* Now turn that into a key. */
key = key_alloc(&key_type_rxrpc, "x",
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred, // TODO: Use socket owner
KEY_USR_VIEW,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
_leave(" = -ENOMEM [alloc %ld]", PTR_ERR(key));
goto error;
}
_debug("key %d", key_serial(key));
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(key, payload, payload_len, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_key;
token = key->payload.data[0];
token->no_leak_key = true;
*_key = key;
key = NULL;
ret = 0;
goto error;
error_key:
key_put(key);
error:
kfree_sensitive(payload);
_leave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
/*
* Extract the token and set up a session key from the details.
*
* struct RXGK_TokenContainer {
* afs_int32 kvno;
* afs_int32 enctype;
* opaque encrypted_token<>;
* };
*
* [tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wilkinson-afs3-rxgk-afs-08 sec 6.1]
*/
int rxgk_extract_token(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int token_offset, unsigned int token_len,
struct key **_key)
{
const struct krb5_enctype *krb5;
const struct krb5_buffer *server_secret;
struct crypto_aead *token_enc = NULL;
struct key *server_key;
unsigned int ticket_offset, ticket_len;
u32 kvno, enctype;
int ret, ec;
struct {
__be32 kvno;
__be32 enctype;
__be32 token_len;
} container;
/* Decode the RXGK_TokenContainer object. This tells us which server
* key we should be using. We can then fetch the key, get the secret
* and set up the crypto to extract the token.
*/
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, token_offset, &container, sizeof(container)) < 0)
return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT, -EPROTO,
rxgk_abort_resp_tok_short);
kvno = ntohl(container.kvno);
enctype = ntohl(container.enctype);
ticket_len = ntohl(container.token_len);
ticket_offset = token_offset + sizeof(container);
if (xdr_round_up(ticket_len) > token_len - 3 * 4)
return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT, -EPROTO,
rxgk_abort_resp_tok_short);
_debug("KVNO %u", kvno);
_debug("ENC %u", enctype);
_debug("TLEN %u", ticket_len);
server_key = rxrpc_look_up_server_security(conn, skb, kvno, enctype);
if (IS_ERR(server_key))
goto cant_get_server_key;
down_read(&server_key->sem);
server_secret = (const void *)&server_key->payload.data[2];
ret = rxgk_set_up_token_cipher(server_secret, &token_enc, enctype, &krb5, GFP_NOFS);
up_read(&server_key->sem);
key_put(server_key);
if (ret < 0)
goto cant_get_token;
/* We can now decrypt and parse the token/ticket. This allows us to
* gain access to K0, from which we can derive the transport key and
* thence decode the authenticator.
*/
ret = rxgk_decrypt_skb(krb5, token_enc, skb,
&ticket_offset, &ticket_len, &ec);
crypto_free_aead(token_enc);
token_enc = NULL;
if (ret < 0)
return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, ec, ret,
rxgk_abort_resp_tok_dec);
ret = conn->security->default_decode_ticket(conn, skb, ticket_offset,
ticket_len, _key);
if (ret < 0)
goto cant_get_token;
_leave(" = 0");
return ret;
cant_get_server_key:
ret = PTR_ERR(server_key);
switch (ret) {
case -ENOMEM:
goto temporary_error;
case -ENOKEY:
case -EKEYREJECTED:
case -EKEYEXPIRED:
case -EKEYREVOKED:
case -EPERM:
return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_BADKEYNO, -EKEYREJECTED,
rxgk_abort_resp_tok_nokey);
default:
return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EKEYREJECTED,
rxgk_abort_resp_tok_keyerr);
}
cant_get_token:
switch (ret) {
case -ENOMEM:
goto temporary_error;
case -EINVAL:
return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXGK_NOTAUTH, -EKEYREJECTED,
rxgk_abort_resp_tok_internal_error);
case -ENOPKG:
return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP,
-EKEYREJECTED, rxgk_abort_resp_tok_nopkg);
}
temporary_error:
/* Ignore the response packet if we got a temporary error such as
* ENOMEM. We just want to send the challenge again. Note that we
* also come out this way if the ticket decryption fails.
*/
return ret;
}

View file

@ -33,6 +33,19 @@ struct rxgk_context {
struct crypto_aead *resp_enc; /* Response packet enc key */
};
#define xdr_round_up(x) (round_up((x), sizeof(__be32)))
#define xdr_object_len(x) (4 + xdr_round_up(x))
/*
* rxgk_app.c
*/
int rxgk_yfs_decode_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int ticket_offset, unsigned int ticket_len,
struct key **_key);
int rxgk_extract_token(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int token_offset, unsigned int token_len,
struct key **_key);
/*
* rxgk_kdf.c
*/
@ -46,3 +59,81 @@ int rxgk_set_up_token_cipher(const struct krb5_buffer *server_key,
unsigned int enctype,
const struct krb5_enctype **_krb5,
gfp_t gfp);
/*
* Apply decryption and checksumming functions to part of an skbuff. The
* offset and length are updated to reflect the actual content of the encrypted
* region.
*/
static inline
int rxgk_decrypt_skb(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
struct crypto_aead *aead,
struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int *_offset, unsigned int *_len,
int *_error_code)
{
struct scatterlist sg[16];
size_t offset = 0, len = *_len;
int nr_sg, ret;
sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg));
nr_sg = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, *_offset, len);
if (unlikely(nr_sg < 0))
return nr_sg;
ret = crypto_krb5_decrypt(krb5, aead, sg, nr_sg,
&offset, &len);
switch (ret) {
case 0:
*_offset += offset;
*_len = len;
break;
case -EPROTO:
case -EBADMSG:
*_error_code = RXGK_SEALEDINCON;
break;
default:
break;
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Check the MIC on a region of an skbuff. The offset and length are updated
* to reflect the actual content of the secure region.
*/
static inline
int rxgk_verify_mic_skb(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
struct crypto_shash *shash,
const struct krb5_buffer *metadata,
struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int *_offset, unsigned int *_len,
u32 *_error_code)
{
struct scatterlist sg[16];
size_t offset = 0, len = *_len;
int nr_sg, ret;
sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg));
nr_sg = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, *_offset, len);
if (unlikely(nr_sg < 0))
return nr_sg;
ret = crypto_krb5_verify_mic(krb5, shash, metadata, sg, nr_sg,
&offset, &len);
switch (ret) {
case 0:
*_offset += offset;
*_len = len;
break;
case -EPROTO:
case -EBADMSG:
*_error_code = RXGK_SEALEDINCON;
break;
default:
break;
}
return ret;
}

View file

@ -177,8 +177,10 @@ static struct rxrpc_txbuf *rxkad_alloc_txbuf(struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t rem
if (!txb)
return NULL;
txb->offset += shdr;
txb->space = part;
txb->crypto_header = 0;
txb->sec_header = shdr;
txb->offset += shdr;
txb->space = part;
return txb;
}

View file

@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ static const struct rxrpc_security *rxrpc_security_types[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_RXKAD
[RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD] = &rxkad,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RXGK
[RXRPC_SECURITY_YFS_RXGK] = &rxgk_yfs,
#endif
};
int __init rxrpc_init_security(void)