x86/its: Add "vmexit" option to skip mitigation on some CPUs

Ice Lake generation CPUs are not affected by guest/host isolation part of
ITS. If a user is only concerned about KVM guests, they can now choose a
new cmdline option "vmexit" that will not deploy the ITS mitigation when
CPU is not affected by guest/host isolation. This saves the performance
overhead of ITS mitigation on Ice Lake gen CPUs.

When "vmexit" option selected, if the CPU is affected by ITS guest/host
isolation, the default ITS mitigation is deployed.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
This commit is contained in:
Pawan Gupta 2024-11-18 09:53:12 -08:00 committed by Dave Hansen
parent f4818881c4
commit 2665281a07
4 changed files with 26 additions and 7 deletions

View file

@ -2210,6 +2210,8 @@
off: Disable mitigation.
force: Force the ITS bug and deploy default
mitigation.
vmexit: Only deploy mitigation if CPU is affected by
guest/host isolation part of ITS.
For details see:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/indirect-target-selection.rst

View file

@ -535,4 +535,5 @@
#define X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET X86_BUG(1*32 + 4) /* "ibpb_no_ret" IBPB omits return target predictions */
#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER X86_BUG(1*32 + 5) /* "spectre_v2_user" CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack between user processes */
#define X86_BUG_ITS X86_BUG(1*32 + 6) /* "its" CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
#define X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY X86_BUG(1*32 + 7) /* "its_native_only" CPU is affected by ITS, VMX is not affected */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */

View file

@ -1203,16 +1203,19 @@ do_cmd_auto:
enum its_mitigation_cmd {
ITS_CMD_OFF,
ITS_CMD_ON,
ITS_CMD_VMEXIT,
};
enum its_mitigation {
ITS_MITIGATION_OFF,
ITS_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY,
ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS,
ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF,
};
static const char * const its_strings[] = {
[ITS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
[ITS_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY] = "Mitigation: Vulnerable, KVM: Not affected",
[ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS] = "Mitigation: Aligned branch/return thunks",
[ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF] = "Mitigation: Retpolines, Stuffing RSB",
};
@ -1239,6 +1242,8 @@ static int __init its_parse_cmdline(char *str)
} else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) {
its_cmd = ITS_CMD_ON;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS);
} else if (!strcmp(str, "vmexit")) {
its_cmd = ITS_CMD_VMEXIT;
} else {
pr_err("Ignoring unknown indirect_target_selection option (%s).", str);
}
@ -1294,6 +1299,12 @@ static void __init its_select_mitigation(void)
case ITS_CMD_OFF:
its_mitigation = ITS_MITIGATION_OFF;
break;
case ITS_CMD_VMEXIT:
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY)) {
its_mitigation = ITS_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY;
goto out;
}
fallthrough;
case ITS_CMD_ON:
its_mitigation = ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE))

View file

@ -1229,6 +1229,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
#define RFDS BIT(7)
/* CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
#define ITS BIT(8)
/* CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection, but guest-host isolation is not affected */
#define ITS_NATIVE_ONLY BIT(9)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEP_MAX, SRBDS),
@ -1249,16 +1251,16 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE, 0xc, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS | ITS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS | ITS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L, 0x0, MMIO | RETBLEED | ITS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS | ITS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS | ITS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_LAKEFIELD, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_ALDERLAKE, ATOM, RFDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE, ATOM, RFDS),
@ -1480,8 +1482,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET);
if (vulnerable_to_its(x86_arch_cap_msr))
if (vulnerable_to_its(x86_arch_cap_msr)) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS);
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, ITS_NATIVE_ONLY))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY);
}
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;