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x86/its: Add "vmexit" option to skip mitigation on some CPUs
Ice Lake generation CPUs are not affected by guest/host isolation part of ITS. If a user is only concerned about KVM guests, they can now choose a new cmdline option "vmexit" that will not deploy the ITS mitigation when CPU is not affected by guest/host isolation. This saves the performance overhead of ITS mitigation on Ice Lake gen CPUs. When "vmexit" option selected, if the CPU is affected by ITS guest/host isolation, the default ITS mitigation is deployed. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
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f4818881c4
commit
2665281a07
4 changed files with 26 additions and 7 deletions
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@ -2210,6 +2210,8 @@
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off: Disable mitigation.
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force: Force the ITS bug and deploy default
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mitigation.
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vmexit: Only deploy mitigation if CPU is affected by
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guest/host isolation part of ITS.
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For details see:
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Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/indirect-target-selection.rst
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@ -535,4 +535,5 @@
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#define X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET X86_BUG(1*32 + 4) /* "ibpb_no_ret" IBPB omits return target predictions */
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#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER X86_BUG(1*32 + 5) /* "spectre_v2_user" CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack between user processes */
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#define X86_BUG_ITS X86_BUG(1*32 + 6) /* "its" CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
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#define X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY X86_BUG(1*32 + 7) /* "its_native_only" CPU is affected by ITS, VMX is not affected */
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#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
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@ -1203,16 +1203,19 @@ do_cmd_auto:
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enum its_mitigation_cmd {
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ITS_CMD_OFF,
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ITS_CMD_ON,
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ITS_CMD_VMEXIT,
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};
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enum its_mitigation {
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ITS_MITIGATION_OFF,
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ITS_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY,
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ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS,
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ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF,
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};
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static const char * const its_strings[] = {
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[ITS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
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[ITS_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY] = "Mitigation: Vulnerable, KVM: Not affected",
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[ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS] = "Mitigation: Aligned branch/return thunks",
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[ITS_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE_STUFF] = "Mitigation: Retpolines, Stuffing RSB",
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};
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@ -1239,6 +1242,8 @@ static int __init its_parse_cmdline(char *str)
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} else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) {
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its_cmd = ITS_CMD_ON;
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setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS);
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} else if (!strcmp(str, "vmexit")) {
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its_cmd = ITS_CMD_VMEXIT;
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} else {
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pr_err("Ignoring unknown indirect_target_selection option (%s).", str);
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}
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@ -1294,6 +1299,12 @@ static void __init its_select_mitigation(void)
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case ITS_CMD_OFF:
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its_mitigation = ITS_MITIGATION_OFF;
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break;
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case ITS_CMD_VMEXIT:
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if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY)) {
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its_mitigation = ITS_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY;
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goto out;
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}
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fallthrough;
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case ITS_CMD_ON:
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its_mitigation = ITS_MITIGATION_ALIGNED_THUNKS;
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if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE))
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@ -1229,6 +1229,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
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#define RFDS BIT(7)
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/* CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
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#define ITS BIT(8)
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/* CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection, but guest-host isolation is not affected */
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#define ITS_NATIVE_ONLY BIT(9)
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static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEP_MAX, SRBDS),
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@ -1249,16 +1251,16 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE, 0xc, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, RETBLEED),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS | ITS),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS | ITS),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L, 0x0, MMIO | RETBLEED | ITS),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS | ITS),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS | ITS),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_LAKEFIELD, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
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VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_ALDERLAKE, ATOM, RFDS),
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VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS),
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VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE, ATOM, RFDS),
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@ -1480,8 +1482,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
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if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET))
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setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET);
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if (vulnerable_to_its(x86_arch_cap_msr))
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if (vulnerable_to_its(x86_arch_cap_msr)) {
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setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS);
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if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, ITS_NATIVE_ONLY))
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setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY);
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}
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if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
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return;
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