linux/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 15:07:57 +01:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Common EFI (Extensible Firmware Interface) support functions
* Based on Extensible Firmware Interface Specification version 1.0
*
* Copyright (C) 1999 VA Linux Systems
* Copyright (C) 1999 Walt Drummond <drummond@valinux.com>
* Copyright (C) 1999-2002 Hewlett-Packard Co.
* David Mosberger-Tang <davidm@hpl.hp.com>
* Stephane Eranian <eranian@hpl.hp.com>
* Copyright (C) 2005-2008 Intel Co.
* Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
* Bibo Mao <bibo.mao@intel.com>
* Chandramouli Narayanan <mouli@linux.intel.com>
* Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
* Copyright (C) 2013 SuSE Labs
* Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> - runtime services VA mapping
*
* Copied from efi_32.c to eliminate the duplicated code between EFI
* 32/64 support code. --ying 2007-10-26
*
* All EFI Runtime Services are not implemented yet as EFI only
* supports physical mode addressing on SoftSDV. This is to be fixed
* in a future version. --drummond 1999-07-20
*
* Implemented EFI runtime services and virtual mode calls. --davidm
*
* Goutham Rao: <goutham.rao@intel.com>
* Skip non-WB memory and ignore empty memory ranges.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/efi-bgrt.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
mm: remove include/linux/bootmem.h Move remaining definitions and declarations from include/linux/bootmem.h into include/linux/memblock.h and remove the redundant header. The includes were replaced with the semantic patch below and then semi-automated removal of duplicated '#include <linux/memblock.h> @@ @@ - #include <linux/bootmem.h> + #include <linux/memblock.h> [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: dma-direct: fix up for the removal of linux/bootmem.h] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002185342.133d1680@canb.auug.org.au [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: powerpc: fix up for removal of linux/bootmem.h] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181005161406.73ef8727@canb.auug.org.au [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: x86/kaslr, ACPI/NUMA: fix for linux/bootmem.h removal] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181008190341.5e396491@canb.auug.org.au Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536927045-23536-30-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-30 15:09:49 -07:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/bcd.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
#include <asm/time.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
#include <asm/uv/uv.h>
static unsigned long efi_systab_phys __initdata;
static unsigned long prop_phys = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR;
static unsigned long uga_phys = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR;
static unsigned long efi_runtime, efi_nr_tables;
unsigned long efi_fw_vendor, efi_config_table;
static const efi_config_table_type_t arch_tables[] __initconst = {
{EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE_GUID, &prop_phys, "PROP" },
{UGA_IO_PROTOCOL_GUID, &uga_phys, "UGA" },
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_UV
{UV_SYSTEM_TABLE_GUID, &uv_systab_phys, "UVsystab" },
#endif
{},
};
static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = {
&efi.acpi,
&efi.acpi20,
&efi.smbios,
&efi.smbios3,
&uga_phys,
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_UV
&uv_systab_phys,
#endif
&efi_fw_vendor,
&efi_runtime,
&efi_config_table,
&efi.esrt,
&prop_phys,
&efi_mem_attr_table,
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE
&rci2_table_phys,
#endif
&efi.tpm_log,
&efi.tpm_final_log,
&efi_rng_seed,
#ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
&efi.mokvar_table,
#endif
};
u64 efi_setup; /* efi setup_data physical address */
static int add_efi_memmap __initdata;
static int __init setup_add_efi_memmap(char *arg)
{
add_efi_memmap = 1;
return 0;
}
early_param("add_efi_memmap", setup_add_efi_memmap);
void __init efi_find_mirror(void)
{
efi_memory_desc_t *md;
u64 mirror_size = 0, total_size = 0;
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP))
return;
for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) {
unsigned long long start = md->phys_addr;
unsigned long long size = md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT;
total_size += size;
if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE) {
memblock_mark_mirror(start, size);
mirror_size += size;
}
}
if (mirror_size)
pr_info("Memory: %lldM/%lldM mirrored memory\n",
mirror_size>>20, total_size>>20);
}
/*
* Tell the kernel about the EFI memory map. This might include
x86/efi: EFI soft reservation to E820 enumeration UEFI 2.8 defines an EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute bit to augment the interpretation of the EFI Memory Types as "reserved for a specific purpose". The proposed Linux behavior for specific purpose memory is that it is reserved for direct-access (device-dax) by default and not available for any kernel usage, not even as an OOM fallback. Later, through udev scripts or another init mechanism, these device-dax claimed ranges can be reconfigured and hot-added to the available System-RAM with a unique node identifier. This device-dax management scheme implements "soft" in the "soft reserved" designation by allowing some or all of the reservation to be recovered as typical memory. This policy can be disabled at compile-time with CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=n, or runtime with efi=nosoftreserve. This patch introduces 2 new concepts at once given the entanglement between early boot enumeration relative to memory that can optionally be reserved from the kernel page allocator by default. The new concepts are: - E820_TYPE_SOFT_RESERVED: Upon detecting the EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute on EFI_CONVENTIONAL memory, update the E820 map with this new type. Only perform this classification if the CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=y policy is enabled, otherwise treat it as typical ram. - IORES_DESC_SOFT_RESERVED: Add a new I/O resource descriptor for a device driver to search iomem resources for application specific memory. Teach the iomem code to identify such ranges as "Soft Reserved". Note that the comment for do_add_efi_memmap() needed refreshing since it seemed to imply that the efi map might overflow the e820 table, but that is not an issue as of commit 7b6e4ba3cb1f "x86/boot/e820: Clean up the E820_X_MAX definition" that removed the 128 entry limit for e820__range_add(). A follow-on change integrates parsing of the ACPI HMAT to identify the node and sub-range boundaries of EFI_MEMORY_SP designated memory. For now, just identify and reserve memory of this type. Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2019-11-06 17:43:16 -08:00
* more than the max 128 entries that can fit in the passed in e820
* legacy (zeropage) memory map, but the kernel's e820 table can hold
* E820_MAX_ENTRIES.
*/
static void __init do_add_efi_memmap(void)
{
efi_memory_desc_t *md;
x86/efi: EFI soft reservation to E820 enumeration UEFI 2.8 defines an EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute bit to augment the interpretation of the EFI Memory Types as "reserved for a specific purpose". The proposed Linux behavior for specific purpose memory is that it is reserved for direct-access (device-dax) by default and not available for any kernel usage, not even as an OOM fallback. Later, through udev scripts or another init mechanism, these device-dax claimed ranges can be reconfigured and hot-added to the available System-RAM with a unique node identifier. This device-dax management scheme implements "soft" in the "soft reserved" designation by allowing some or all of the reservation to be recovered as typical memory. This policy can be disabled at compile-time with CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=n, or runtime with efi=nosoftreserve. This patch introduces 2 new concepts at once given the entanglement between early boot enumeration relative to memory that can optionally be reserved from the kernel page allocator by default. The new concepts are: - E820_TYPE_SOFT_RESERVED: Upon detecting the EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute on EFI_CONVENTIONAL memory, update the E820 map with this new type. Only perform this classification if the CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=y policy is enabled, otherwise treat it as typical ram. - IORES_DESC_SOFT_RESERVED: Add a new I/O resource descriptor for a device driver to search iomem resources for application specific memory. Teach the iomem code to identify such ranges as "Soft Reserved". Note that the comment for do_add_efi_memmap() needed refreshing since it seemed to imply that the efi map might overflow the e820 table, but that is not an issue as of commit 7b6e4ba3cb1f "x86/boot/e820: Clean up the E820_X_MAX definition" that removed the 128 entry limit for e820__range_add(). A follow-on change integrates parsing of the ACPI HMAT to identify the node and sub-range boundaries of EFI_MEMORY_SP designated memory. For now, just identify and reserve memory of this type. Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2019-11-06 17:43:16 -08:00
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP))
return;
for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) {
unsigned long long start = md->phys_addr;
unsigned long long size = md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT;
int e820_type;
switch (md->type) {
case EFI_LOADER_CODE:
case EFI_LOADER_DATA:
case EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE:
case EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA:
case EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY:
x86/efi: EFI soft reservation to E820 enumeration UEFI 2.8 defines an EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute bit to augment the interpretation of the EFI Memory Types as "reserved for a specific purpose". The proposed Linux behavior for specific purpose memory is that it is reserved for direct-access (device-dax) by default and not available for any kernel usage, not even as an OOM fallback. Later, through udev scripts or another init mechanism, these device-dax claimed ranges can be reconfigured and hot-added to the available System-RAM with a unique node identifier. This device-dax management scheme implements "soft" in the "soft reserved" designation by allowing some or all of the reservation to be recovered as typical memory. This policy can be disabled at compile-time with CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=n, or runtime with efi=nosoftreserve. This patch introduces 2 new concepts at once given the entanglement between early boot enumeration relative to memory that can optionally be reserved from the kernel page allocator by default. The new concepts are: - E820_TYPE_SOFT_RESERVED: Upon detecting the EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute on EFI_CONVENTIONAL memory, update the E820 map with this new type. Only perform this classification if the CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=y policy is enabled, otherwise treat it as typical ram. - IORES_DESC_SOFT_RESERVED: Add a new I/O resource descriptor for a device driver to search iomem resources for application specific memory. Teach the iomem code to identify such ranges as "Soft Reserved". Note that the comment for do_add_efi_memmap() needed refreshing since it seemed to imply that the efi map might overflow the e820 table, but that is not an issue as of commit 7b6e4ba3cb1f "x86/boot/e820: Clean up the E820_X_MAX definition" that removed the 128 entry limit for e820__range_add(). A follow-on change integrates parsing of the ACPI HMAT to identify the node and sub-range boundaries of EFI_MEMORY_SP designated memory. For now, just identify and reserve memory of this type. Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2019-11-06 17:43:16 -08:00
if (efi_soft_reserve_enabled()
&& (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_SP))
e820_type = E820_TYPE_SOFT_RESERVED;
else if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB)
e820_type = E820_TYPE_RAM;
else
e820_type = E820_TYPE_RESERVED;
break;
case EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY:
e820_type = E820_TYPE_ACPI;
break;
case EFI_ACPI_MEMORY_NVS:
e820_type = E820_TYPE_NVS;
break;
case EFI_UNUSABLE_MEMORY:
e820_type = E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE;
break;
case EFI_PERSISTENT_MEMORY:
e820_type = E820_TYPE_PMEM;
break;
default:
/*
* EFI_RESERVED_TYPE EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE
* EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO
* EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO_PORT_SPACE EFI_PAL_CODE
*/
e820_type = E820_TYPE_RESERVED;
break;
}
x86/efi: EFI soft reservation to E820 enumeration UEFI 2.8 defines an EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute bit to augment the interpretation of the EFI Memory Types as "reserved for a specific purpose". The proposed Linux behavior for specific purpose memory is that it is reserved for direct-access (device-dax) by default and not available for any kernel usage, not even as an OOM fallback. Later, through udev scripts or another init mechanism, these device-dax claimed ranges can be reconfigured and hot-added to the available System-RAM with a unique node identifier. This device-dax management scheme implements "soft" in the "soft reserved" designation by allowing some or all of the reservation to be recovered as typical memory. This policy can be disabled at compile-time with CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=n, or runtime with efi=nosoftreserve. This patch introduces 2 new concepts at once given the entanglement between early boot enumeration relative to memory that can optionally be reserved from the kernel page allocator by default. The new concepts are: - E820_TYPE_SOFT_RESERVED: Upon detecting the EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute on EFI_CONVENTIONAL memory, update the E820 map with this new type. Only perform this classification if the CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=y policy is enabled, otherwise treat it as typical ram. - IORES_DESC_SOFT_RESERVED: Add a new I/O resource descriptor for a device driver to search iomem resources for application specific memory. Teach the iomem code to identify such ranges as "Soft Reserved". Note that the comment for do_add_efi_memmap() needed refreshing since it seemed to imply that the efi map might overflow the e820 table, but that is not an issue as of commit 7b6e4ba3cb1f "x86/boot/e820: Clean up the E820_X_MAX definition" that removed the 128 entry limit for e820__range_add(). A follow-on change integrates parsing of the ACPI HMAT to identify the node and sub-range boundaries of EFI_MEMORY_SP designated memory. For now, just identify and reserve memory of this type. Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2019-11-06 17:43:16 -08:00
x86/boot/e820: Create coherent API function names for E820 range operations We have these three related functions: extern void e820_add_region(u64 start, u64 size, int type); extern u64 e820_update_range(u64 start, u64 size, unsigned old_type, unsigned new_type); extern u64 e820_remove_range(u64 start, u64 size, unsigned old_type, int checktype); But it's not clear from the naming that they are 3 operations based around the same 'memory range' concept. Rename them to better signal this, and move the prototypes next to each other: extern void e820__range_add (u64 start, u64 size, int type); extern u64 e820__range_update(u64 start, u64 size, unsigned old_type, unsigned new_type); extern u64 e820__range_remove(u64 start, u64 size, unsigned old_type, int checktype); Note that this improved organization of the functions shows another problem that was easy to miss before: sometimes the E820 entry type is 'int', sometimes 'unsigned int' - but this will be fixed in a separate patch. No change in functionality. Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-28 14:19:36 +01:00
e820__range_add(start, size, e820_type);
}
x86/boot/e820: Simplify the e820__update_table() interface The e820__update_table() parameters are pretty complex: arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h:extern int e820__update_table(struct e820_entry *biosmap, int max_nr_map, u32 *pnr_map); But 90% of the usage is trivial: arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: if (e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries)) arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: if (e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries) < 0) arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(boot_params.e820_table, ARRAY_SIZE(boot_params.e820_table), &new_nr); arch/x86/kernel/early-quirks.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/kernel/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/kernel/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(xen_e820_table.entries, ARRAY_SIZE(xen_e820_table.entries), arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table->entries, ARRAY_SIZE(e820_table->entries), &e820_table->nr_entries); arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(xen_e820_table.entries, ARRAY_SIZE(xen_e820_table.entries), as it only uses an exiting struct e820_table's entries array, its size and its current number of entries as input and output arguments. Only one use is non-trivial: arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(boot_params.e820_table, ARRAY_SIZE(boot_params.e820_table), &new_nr); ... which call updates the E820 table in the zeropage in-situ, and the layout there does not match that of 'struct e820_table' (in particular nr_entries is at a different offset, hardcoded by the boot protocol). Simplify all this by introducing a low level __e820__update_table() API that the zeropage update call can use, and simplifying the main e820__update_table() call signature down to: int e820__update_table(struct e820_table *table); This visibly simplifies all the call sites: arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h:extern int e820__update_table(struct e820_table *table); arch/x86/include/asm/e820/types.h: * call to e820__update_table() to remove duplicates. The allowance arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: * The return value from e820__update_table() is zero if it arch/x86/kernel/e820.c:int __init e820__update_table(struct e820_table *table) arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: if (e820__update_table(e820_table)) arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(e820_table_firmware); arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/kernel/e820.c: if (e820__update_table(e820_table) < 0) arch/x86/kernel/early-quirks.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/kernel/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/kernel/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(&xen_e820_table); arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(e820_table); arch/x86/xen/setup.c: e820__update_table(&xen_e820_table); No change in functionality. Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-28 18:00:35 +01:00
e820__update_table(e820_table);
}
x86/efi: EFI soft reservation to E820 enumeration UEFI 2.8 defines an EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute bit to augment the interpretation of the EFI Memory Types as "reserved for a specific purpose". The proposed Linux behavior for specific purpose memory is that it is reserved for direct-access (device-dax) by default and not available for any kernel usage, not even as an OOM fallback. Later, through udev scripts or another init mechanism, these device-dax claimed ranges can be reconfigured and hot-added to the available System-RAM with a unique node identifier. This device-dax management scheme implements "soft" in the "soft reserved" designation by allowing some or all of the reservation to be recovered as typical memory. This policy can be disabled at compile-time with CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=n, or runtime with efi=nosoftreserve. This patch introduces 2 new concepts at once given the entanglement between early boot enumeration relative to memory that can optionally be reserved from the kernel page allocator by default. The new concepts are: - E820_TYPE_SOFT_RESERVED: Upon detecting the EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute on EFI_CONVENTIONAL memory, update the E820 map with this new type. Only perform this classification if the CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=y policy is enabled, otherwise treat it as typical ram. - IORES_DESC_SOFT_RESERVED: Add a new I/O resource descriptor for a device driver to search iomem resources for application specific memory. Teach the iomem code to identify such ranges as "Soft Reserved". Note that the comment for do_add_efi_memmap() needed refreshing since it seemed to imply that the efi map might overflow the e820 table, but that is not an issue as of commit 7b6e4ba3cb1f "x86/boot/e820: Clean up the E820_X_MAX definition" that removed the 128 entry limit for e820__range_add(). A follow-on change integrates parsing of the ACPI HMAT to identify the node and sub-range boundaries of EFI_MEMORY_SP designated memory. For now, just identify and reserve memory of this type. Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2019-11-06 17:43:16 -08:00
/*
* Given add_efi_memmap defaults to 0 and there there is no alternative
* e820 mechanism for soft-reserved memory, import the full EFI memory
* map if soft reservations are present and enabled. Otherwise, the
* mechanism to disable the kernel's consideration of EFI_MEMORY_SP is
* the efi=nosoftreserve option.
*/
static bool do_efi_soft_reserve(void)
{
efi_memory_desc_t *md;
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP))
return false;
if (!efi_soft_reserve_enabled())
return false;
for_each_efi_memory_desc(md)
if (md->type == EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY &&
(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_SP))
return true;
return false;
}
int __init efi_memblock_x86_reserve_range(void)
{
struct efi_info *e = &boot_params.efi_info;
efi: Refactor efi_memmap_init_early() into arch-neutral code Every EFI architecture apart from ia64 needs to setup the EFI memory map at efi.memmap, and the code for doing that is essentially the same across all implementations. Therefore, it makes sense to factor this out into the common code under drivers/firmware/efi/. The only slight variation is the data structure out of which we pull the initial memory map information, such as physical address, memory descriptor size and version, etc. We can address this by passing a generic data structure (struct efi_memory_map_data) as the argument to efi_memmap_init_early() which contains the minimum info required for initialising the memory map. In the process, this patch also fixes a few undesirable implementation differences: - ARM and arm64 were failing to clear the EFI_MEMMAP bit when unmapping the early EFI memory map. EFI_MEMMAP indicates whether the EFI memory map is mapped (not the regions contained within) and can be traversed. It's more correct to set the bit as soon as we memremap() the passed in EFI memmap. - Rename efi_unmmap_memmap() to efi_memmap_unmap() to adhere to the regular naming scheme. This patch also uses a read-write mapping for the memory map instead of the read-only mapping currently used on ARM and arm64. x86 needs the ability to update the memory map in-place when assigning virtual addresses to regions (efi_map_region()) and tagging regions when reserving boot services (efi_reserve_boot_services()). There's no way for the generic fake_mem code to know which mapping to use without introducing some arch-specific constant/hook, so just use read-write since read-only is of dubious value for the EFI memory map. Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> [kexec/kdump] Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> [arm] Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
2016-02-26 21:22:05 +00:00
struct efi_memory_map_data data;
phys_addr_t pmap;
efi: Refactor efi_memmap_init_early() into arch-neutral code Every EFI architecture apart from ia64 needs to setup the EFI memory map at efi.memmap, and the code for doing that is essentially the same across all implementations. Therefore, it makes sense to factor this out into the common code under drivers/firmware/efi/. The only slight variation is the data structure out of which we pull the initial memory map information, such as physical address, memory descriptor size and version, etc. We can address this by passing a generic data structure (struct efi_memory_map_data) as the argument to efi_memmap_init_early() which contains the minimum info required for initialising the memory map. In the process, this patch also fixes a few undesirable implementation differences: - ARM and arm64 were failing to clear the EFI_MEMMAP bit when unmapping the early EFI memory map. EFI_MEMMAP indicates whether the EFI memory map is mapped (not the regions contained within) and can be traversed. It's more correct to set the bit as soon as we memremap() the passed in EFI memmap. - Rename efi_unmmap_memmap() to efi_memmap_unmap() to adhere to the regular naming scheme. This patch also uses a read-write mapping for the memory map instead of the read-only mapping currently used on ARM and arm64. x86 needs the ability to update the memory map in-place when assigning virtual addresses to regions (efi_map_region()) and tagging regions when reserving boot services (efi_reserve_boot_services()). There's no way for the generic fake_mem code to know which mapping to use without introducing some arch-specific constant/hook, so just use read-write since read-only is of dubious value for the EFI memory map. Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> [kexec/kdump] Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> [arm] Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
2016-02-26 21:22:05 +00:00
int rv;
if (efi_enabled(EFI_PARAVIRT))
return 0;
/* Can't handle firmware tables above 4GB on i386 */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) && e->efi_memmap_hi > 0) {
pr_err("Memory map is above 4GB, disabling EFI.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
pmap = (phys_addr_t)(e->efi_memmap | ((u64)e->efi_memmap_hi << 32));
efi: Refactor efi_memmap_init_early() into arch-neutral code Every EFI architecture apart from ia64 needs to setup the EFI memory map at efi.memmap, and the code for doing that is essentially the same across all implementations. Therefore, it makes sense to factor this out into the common code under drivers/firmware/efi/. The only slight variation is the data structure out of which we pull the initial memory map information, such as physical address, memory descriptor size and version, etc. We can address this by passing a generic data structure (struct efi_memory_map_data) as the argument to efi_memmap_init_early() which contains the minimum info required for initialising the memory map. In the process, this patch also fixes a few undesirable implementation differences: - ARM and arm64 were failing to clear the EFI_MEMMAP bit when unmapping the early EFI memory map. EFI_MEMMAP indicates whether the EFI memory map is mapped (not the regions contained within) and can be traversed. It's more correct to set the bit as soon as we memremap() the passed in EFI memmap. - Rename efi_unmmap_memmap() to efi_memmap_unmap() to adhere to the regular naming scheme. This patch also uses a read-write mapping for the memory map instead of the read-only mapping currently used on ARM and arm64. x86 needs the ability to update the memory map in-place when assigning virtual addresses to regions (efi_map_region()) and tagging regions when reserving boot services (efi_reserve_boot_services()). There's no way for the generic fake_mem code to know which mapping to use without introducing some arch-specific constant/hook, so just use read-write since read-only is of dubious value for the EFI memory map. Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> [kexec/kdump] Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> [arm] Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
2016-02-26 21:22:05 +00:00
data.phys_map = pmap;
data.size = e->efi_memmap_size;
data.desc_size = e->efi_memdesc_size;
data.desc_version = e->efi_memdesc_version;
rv = efi_memmap_init_early(&data);
if (rv)
return rv;
x86/efi: EFI soft reservation to E820 enumeration UEFI 2.8 defines an EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute bit to augment the interpretation of the EFI Memory Types as "reserved for a specific purpose". The proposed Linux behavior for specific purpose memory is that it is reserved for direct-access (device-dax) by default and not available for any kernel usage, not even as an OOM fallback. Later, through udev scripts or another init mechanism, these device-dax claimed ranges can be reconfigured and hot-added to the available System-RAM with a unique node identifier. This device-dax management scheme implements "soft" in the "soft reserved" designation by allowing some or all of the reservation to be recovered as typical memory. This policy can be disabled at compile-time with CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=n, or runtime with efi=nosoftreserve. This patch introduces 2 new concepts at once given the entanglement between early boot enumeration relative to memory that can optionally be reserved from the kernel page allocator by default. The new concepts are: - E820_TYPE_SOFT_RESERVED: Upon detecting the EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute on EFI_CONVENTIONAL memory, update the E820 map with this new type. Only perform this classification if the CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=y policy is enabled, otherwise treat it as typical ram. - IORES_DESC_SOFT_RESERVED: Add a new I/O resource descriptor for a device driver to search iomem resources for application specific memory. Teach the iomem code to identify such ranges as "Soft Reserved". Note that the comment for do_add_efi_memmap() needed refreshing since it seemed to imply that the efi map might overflow the e820 table, but that is not an issue as of commit 7b6e4ba3cb1f "x86/boot/e820: Clean up the E820_X_MAX definition" that removed the 128 entry limit for e820__range_add(). A follow-on change integrates parsing of the ACPI HMAT to identify the node and sub-range boundaries of EFI_MEMORY_SP designated memory. For now, just identify and reserve memory of this type. Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2019-11-06 17:43:16 -08:00
if (add_efi_memmap || do_efi_soft_reserve())
efi: Refactor efi_memmap_init_early() into arch-neutral code Every EFI architecture apart from ia64 needs to setup the EFI memory map at efi.memmap, and the code for doing that is essentially the same across all implementations. Therefore, it makes sense to factor this out into the common code under drivers/firmware/efi/. The only slight variation is the data structure out of which we pull the initial memory map information, such as physical address, memory descriptor size and version, etc. We can address this by passing a generic data structure (struct efi_memory_map_data) as the argument to efi_memmap_init_early() which contains the minimum info required for initialising the memory map. In the process, this patch also fixes a few undesirable implementation differences: - ARM and arm64 were failing to clear the EFI_MEMMAP bit when unmapping the early EFI memory map. EFI_MEMMAP indicates whether the EFI memory map is mapped (not the regions contained within) and can be traversed. It's more correct to set the bit as soon as we memremap() the passed in EFI memmap. - Rename efi_unmmap_memmap() to efi_memmap_unmap() to adhere to the regular naming scheme. This patch also uses a read-write mapping for the memory map instead of the read-only mapping currently used on ARM and arm64. x86 needs the ability to update the memory map in-place when assigning virtual addresses to regions (efi_map_region()) and tagging regions when reserving boot services (efi_reserve_boot_services()). There's no way for the generic fake_mem code to know which mapping to use without introducing some arch-specific constant/hook, so just use read-write since read-only is of dubious value for the EFI memory map. Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> [kexec/kdump] Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> [arm] Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
2016-02-26 21:22:05 +00:00
do_add_efi_memmap();
efi_fake_memmap_early();
WARN(efi.memmap.desc_version != 1,
"Unexpected EFI_MEMORY_DESCRIPTOR version %ld",
efi.memmap.desc_version);
memblock_reserve(pmap, efi.memmap.nr_map * efi.memmap.desc_size);
set_bit(EFI_PRESERVE_BS_REGIONS, &efi.flags);
return 0;
}
efi/x86: Prune invalid memory map entries and fix boot regression Some machines, such as the Lenovo ThinkPad W541 with firmware GNET80WW (2.28), include memory map entries with phys_addr=0x0 and num_pages=0. These machines fail to boot after the following commit, commit 8e80632fb23f ("efi/esrt: Use efi_mem_reserve() and avoid a kmalloc()") Fix this by removing such bogus entries from the memory map. Furthermore, currently the log output for this case (with efi=debug) looks like: [ 0.000000] efi: mem45: [Reserved | | | | | | | | | | | | ] range=[0x0000000000000000-0xffffffffffffffff] (0MB) This is clearly wrong, and also not as informative as it could be. This patch changes it so that if we find obviously invalid memory map entries, we print an error and skip those entries. It also detects the display of the address range calculation overflow, so the new output is: [ 0.000000] efi: [Firmware Bug]: Invalid EFI memory map entries: [ 0.000000] efi: mem45: [Reserved | | | | | | | | | | | | ] range=[0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000000] (invalid) It also detects memory map sizes that would overflow the physical address, for example phys_addr=0xfffffffffffff000 and num_pages=0x0200000000000001, and prints: [ 0.000000] efi: [Firmware Bug]: Invalid EFI memory map entries: [ 0.000000] efi: mem45: [Reserved | | | | | | | | | | | | ] range=[phys_addr=0xfffffffffffff000-0x20ffffffffffffffff] (invalid) It then removes these entries from the memory map. Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> [ardb: refactor for clarity with no functional changes, avoid PAGE_SHIFT] Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> [Matt: Include bugzilla info in commit log] Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.9+ Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=191121 Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-12-12 18:42:28 -05:00
#define OVERFLOW_ADDR_SHIFT (64 - EFI_PAGE_SHIFT)
#define OVERFLOW_ADDR_MASK (U64_MAX << OVERFLOW_ADDR_SHIFT)
#define U64_HIGH_BIT (~(U64_MAX >> 1))
static bool __init efi_memmap_entry_valid(const efi_memory_desc_t *md, int i)
{
u64 end = (md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT) + md->phys_addr - 1;
u64 end_hi = 0;
char buf[64];
if (md->num_pages == 0) {
end = 0;
} else if (md->num_pages > EFI_PAGES_MAX ||
EFI_PAGES_MAX - md->num_pages <
(md->phys_addr >> EFI_PAGE_SHIFT)) {
end_hi = (md->num_pages & OVERFLOW_ADDR_MASK)
>> OVERFLOW_ADDR_SHIFT;
if ((md->phys_addr & U64_HIGH_BIT) && !(end & U64_HIGH_BIT))
end_hi += 1;
} else {
return true;
}
pr_warn_once(FW_BUG "Invalid EFI memory map entries:\n");
if (end_hi) {
pr_warn("mem%02u: %s range=[0x%016llx-0x%llx%016llx] (invalid)\n",
i, efi_md_typeattr_format(buf, sizeof(buf), md),
md->phys_addr, end_hi, end);
} else {
pr_warn("mem%02u: %s range=[0x%016llx-0x%016llx] (invalid)\n",
i, efi_md_typeattr_format(buf, sizeof(buf), md),
md->phys_addr, end);
}
return false;
}
static void __init efi_clean_memmap(void)
{
efi_memory_desc_t *out = efi.memmap.map;
const efi_memory_desc_t *in = out;
const efi_memory_desc_t *end = efi.memmap.map_end;
int i, n_removal;
for (i = n_removal = 0; in < end; i++) {
if (efi_memmap_entry_valid(in, i)) {
if (out != in)
memcpy(out, in, efi.memmap.desc_size);
out = (void *)out + efi.memmap.desc_size;
} else {
n_removal++;
}
in = (void *)in + efi.memmap.desc_size;
}
if (n_removal > 0) {
struct efi_memory_map_data data = {
.phys_map = efi.memmap.phys_map,
.desc_version = efi.memmap.desc_version,
.desc_size = efi.memmap.desc_size,
.size = efi.memmap.desc_size * (efi.memmap.nr_map - n_removal),
.flags = 0,
};
efi/x86: Prune invalid memory map entries and fix boot regression Some machines, such as the Lenovo ThinkPad W541 with firmware GNET80WW (2.28), include memory map entries with phys_addr=0x0 and num_pages=0. These machines fail to boot after the following commit, commit 8e80632fb23f ("efi/esrt: Use efi_mem_reserve() and avoid a kmalloc()") Fix this by removing such bogus entries from the memory map. Furthermore, currently the log output for this case (with efi=debug) looks like: [ 0.000000] efi: mem45: [Reserved | | | | | | | | | | | | ] range=[0x0000000000000000-0xffffffffffffffff] (0MB) This is clearly wrong, and also not as informative as it could be. This patch changes it so that if we find obviously invalid memory map entries, we print an error and skip those entries. It also detects the display of the address range calculation overflow, so the new output is: [ 0.000000] efi: [Firmware Bug]: Invalid EFI memory map entries: [ 0.000000] efi: mem45: [Reserved | | | | | | | | | | | | ] range=[0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000000] (invalid) It also detects memory map sizes that would overflow the physical address, for example phys_addr=0xfffffffffffff000 and num_pages=0x0200000000000001, and prints: [ 0.000000] efi: [Firmware Bug]: Invalid EFI memory map entries: [ 0.000000] efi: mem45: [Reserved | | | | | | | | | | | | ] range=[phys_addr=0xfffffffffffff000-0x20ffffffffffffffff] (invalid) It then removes these entries from the memory map. Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> [ardb: refactor for clarity with no functional changes, avoid PAGE_SHIFT] Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> [Matt: Include bugzilla info in commit log] Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.9+ Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=191121 Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-12-12 18:42:28 -05:00
pr_warn("Removing %d invalid memory map entries.\n", n_removal);
efi_memmap_install(&data);
efi/x86: Prune invalid memory map entries and fix boot regression Some machines, such as the Lenovo ThinkPad W541 with firmware GNET80WW (2.28), include memory map entries with phys_addr=0x0 and num_pages=0. These machines fail to boot after the following commit, commit 8e80632fb23f ("efi/esrt: Use efi_mem_reserve() and avoid a kmalloc()") Fix this by removing such bogus entries from the memory map. Furthermore, currently the log output for this case (with efi=debug) looks like: [ 0.000000] efi: mem45: [Reserved | | | | | | | | | | | | ] range=[0x0000000000000000-0xffffffffffffffff] (0MB) This is clearly wrong, and also not as informative as it could be. This patch changes it so that if we find obviously invalid memory map entries, we print an error and skip those entries. It also detects the display of the address range calculation overflow, so the new output is: [ 0.000000] efi: [Firmware Bug]: Invalid EFI memory map entries: [ 0.000000] efi: mem45: [Reserved | | | | | | | | | | | | ] range=[0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000000] (invalid) It also detects memory map sizes that would overflow the physical address, for example phys_addr=0xfffffffffffff000 and num_pages=0x0200000000000001, and prints: [ 0.000000] efi: [Firmware Bug]: Invalid EFI memory map entries: [ 0.000000] efi: mem45: [Reserved | | | | | | | | | | | | ] range=[phys_addr=0xfffffffffffff000-0x20ffffffffffffffff] (invalid) It then removes these entries from the memory map. Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> [ardb: refactor for clarity with no functional changes, avoid PAGE_SHIFT] Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> [Matt: Include bugzilla info in commit log] Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.9+ Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=191121 Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-12-12 18:42:28 -05:00
}
}
void __init efi_print_memmap(void)
{
efi_memory_desc_t *md;
int i = 0;
for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) {
x86: efi: Format EFI memory type & attrs with efi_md_typeattr_format() An example log excerpt demonstrating the change: Before the patch: > efi: mem00: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009f000) (0MB) > efi: mem01: type=2, attr=0xf, range=[0x000000000009f000-0x00000000000a0000) (0MB) > efi: mem02: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000000100000-0x0000000000400000) (3MB) > efi: mem03: type=2, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000800000) (4MB) > efi: mem04: type=10, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000000800000-0x0000000000808000) (0MB) > efi: mem05: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000000808000-0x0000000000810000) (0MB) > efi: mem06: type=10, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000000810000-0x0000000000900000) (0MB) > efi: mem07: type=4, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000000900000-0x0000000001100000) (8MB) > efi: mem08: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000001100000-0x0000000001400000) (3MB) > efi: mem09: type=2, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000001400000-0x0000000002613000) (18MB) > efi: mem10: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000002613000-0x0000000004000000) (25MB) > efi: mem11: type=4, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000004000000-0x0000000004020000) (0MB) > efi: mem12: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000004020000-0x00000000068ea000) (40MB) > efi: mem13: type=2, attr=0xf, range=[0x00000000068ea000-0x00000000068f0000) (0MB) > efi: mem14: type=3, attr=0xf, range=[0x00000000068f0000-0x0000000006c7b000) (3MB) > efi: mem15: type=6, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000006c7b000-0x0000000006c7d000) (0MB) > efi: mem16: type=5, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000006c7d000-0x0000000006c85000) (0MB) > efi: mem17: type=6, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000006c85000-0x0000000006c87000) (0MB) > efi: mem18: type=3, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000006c87000-0x0000000006ca3000) (0MB) > efi: mem19: type=6, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000006ca3000-0x0000000006ca6000) (0MB) > efi: mem20: type=10, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000006ca6000-0x0000000006cc6000) (0MB) > efi: mem21: type=6, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000006cc6000-0x0000000006d95000) (0MB) > efi: mem22: type=5, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000006d95000-0x0000000006e22000) (0MB) > efi: mem23: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000006e22000-0x0000000007165000) (3MB) > efi: mem24: type=4, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007165000-0x0000000007d22000) (11MB) > efi: mem25: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007d22000-0x0000000007d25000) (0MB) > efi: mem26: type=3, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007d25000-0x0000000007ea2000) (1MB) > efi: mem27: type=5, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000007ea2000-0x0000000007ed2000) (0MB) > efi: mem28: type=6, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000007ed2000-0x0000000007ef6000) (0MB) > efi: mem29: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007ef6000-0x0000000007f00000) (0MB) > efi: mem30: type=9, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007f00000-0x0000000007f02000) (0MB) > efi: mem31: type=10, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007f02000-0x0000000007f06000) (0MB) > efi: mem32: type=4, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007f06000-0x0000000007fd0000) (0MB) > efi: mem33: type=6, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000007fd0000-0x0000000007ff0000) (0MB) > efi: mem34: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007ff0000-0x0000000008000000) (0MB) After the patch: > efi: mem00: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009f000) (0MB) > efi: mem01: [Loader Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x000000000009f000-0x00000000000a0000) (0MB) > efi: mem02: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000000100000-0x0000000000400000) (3MB) > efi: mem03: [Loader Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000800000) (4MB) > efi: mem04: [ACPI Memory NVS | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000000800000-0x0000000000808000) (0MB) > efi: mem05: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000000808000-0x0000000000810000) (0MB) > efi: mem06: [ACPI Memory NVS | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000000810000-0x0000000000900000) (0MB) > efi: mem07: [Boot Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000000900000-0x0000000001100000) (8MB) > efi: mem08: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000001100000-0x0000000001400000) (3MB) > efi: mem09: [Loader Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000001400000-0x0000000002613000) (18MB) > efi: mem10: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000002613000-0x0000000004000000) (25MB) > efi: mem11: [Boot Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000004000000-0x0000000004020000) (0MB) > efi: mem12: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000004020000-0x00000000068ea000) (40MB) > efi: mem13: [Loader Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x00000000068ea000-0x00000000068f0000) (0MB) > efi: mem14: [Boot Code | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x00000000068f0000-0x0000000006c7b000) (3MB) > efi: mem15: [Runtime Data |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006c7b000-0x0000000006c7d000) (0MB) > efi: mem16: [Runtime Code |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006c7d000-0x0000000006c85000) (0MB) > efi: mem17: [Runtime Data |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006c85000-0x0000000006c87000) (0MB) > efi: mem18: [Boot Code | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006c87000-0x0000000006ca3000) (0MB) > efi: mem19: [Runtime Data |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006ca3000-0x0000000006ca6000) (0MB) > efi: mem20: [ACPI Memory NVS | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006ca6000-0x0000000006cc6000) (0MB) > efi: mem21: [Runtime Data |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006cc6000-0x0000000006d95000) (0MB) > efi: mem22: [Runtime Code |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006d95000-0x0000000006e22000) (0MB) > efi: mem23: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006e22000-0x0000000007165000) (3MB) > efi: mem24: [Boot Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007165000-0x0000000007d22000) (11MB) > efi: mem25: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007d22000-0x0000000007d25000) (0MB) > efi: mem26: [Boot Code | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007d25000-0x0000000007ea2000) (1MB) > efi: mem27: [Runtime Code |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007ea2000-0x0000000007ed2000) (0MB) > efi: mem28: [Runtime Data |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007ed2000-0x0000000007ef6000) (0MB) > efi: mem29: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007ef6000-0x0000000007f00000) (0MB) > efi: mem30: [ACPI Reclaim Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007f00000-0x0000000007f02000) (0MB) > efi: mem31: [ACPI Memory NVS | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007f02000-0x0000000007f06000) (0MB) > efi: mem32: [Boot Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007f06000-0x0000000007fd0000) (0MB) > efi: mem33: [Runtime Data |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007fd0000-0x0000000007ff0000) (0MB) > efi: mem34: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007ff0000-0x0000000008000000) (0MB) Both the type enum and the attribute bitmap are decoded, with the additional benefit that the memory ranges line up as well. Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2014-09-03 13:32:21 +02:00
char buf[64];
x86/efi: Show actual ending addresses in efi_print_memmap Adjust efi_print_memmap to print the real end address of each range, not 1 byte beyond. This matches other prints like those for SRAT and nosave memory. While investigating grub persistent memory corruption issues, it was helpful to make this table match the ending address convention used by: * the kernel's e820 table prints BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000001680000000-0x0000001c7fffffff] reserved * the kernel's nosave memory prints PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x880000000-0xc7fffffff] * the kernel's ACPI System Resource Affinity Table prints SRAT: Node 1 PXM 1 [mem 0x480000000-0x87fffffff] * grub's lsmmap and lsefimmap commands reserved 0000001680000000-0000001c7fffffff 00600000 24GiB UC WC WT WB NV * the UEFI shell's memmap command Reserved 000000007FC00000-000000007FFFFFFF 0000000000000400 0000000000000001 For example, if you grep all the various logs for c7fffffff, you won't find the kernel's line if it uses c80000000. Also, change the closing ) to ] to match the opening [. old: efi: mem61: [Persistent Memory | | | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000880000000-0x0000000c80000000) (16384MB) new: efi: mem61: [Persistent Memory | | | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000880000000-0x0000000c7fffffff] (16384MB) Signed-off-by: Robert Elliott <elliott@hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1454364428-494-12-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-01 22:07:05 +00:00
pr_info("mem%02u: %s range=[0x%016llx-0x%016llx] (%lluMB)\n",
i++, efi_md_typeattr_format(buf, sizeof(buf), md),
x86: efi: Format EFI memory type & attrs with efi_md_typeattr_format() An example log excerpt demonstrating the change: Before the patch: > efi: mem00: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009f000) (0MB) > efi: mem01: type=2, attr=0xf, range=[0x000000000009f000-0x00000000000a0000) (0MB) > efi: mem02: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000000100000-0x0000000000400000) (3MB) > efi: mem03: type=2, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000800000) (4MB) > efi: mem04: type=10, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000000800000-0x0000000000808000) (0MB) > efi: mem05: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000000808000-0x0000000000810000) (0MB) > efi: mem06: type=10, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000000810000-0x0000000000900000) (0MB) > efi: mem07: type=4, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000000900000-0x0000000001100000) (8MB) > efi: mem08: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000001100000-0x0000000001400000) (3MB) > efi: mem09: type=2, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000001400000-0x0000000002613000) (18MB) > efi: mem10: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000002613000-0x0000000004000000) (25MB) > efi: mem11: type=4, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000004000000-0x0000000004020000) (0MB) > efi: mem12: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000004020000-0x00000000068ea000) (40MB) > efi: mem13: type=2, attr=0xf, range=[0x00000000068ea000-0x00000000068f0000) (0MB) > efi: mem14: type=3, attr=0xf, range=[0x00000000068f0000-0x0000000006c7b000) (3MB) > efi: mem15: type=6, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000006c7b000-0x0000000006c7d000) (0MB) > efi: mem16: type=5, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000006c7d000-0x0000000006c85000) (0MB) > efi: mem17: type=6, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000006c85000-0x0000000006c87000) (0MB) > efi: mem18: type=3, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000006c87000-0x0000000006ca3000) (0MB) > efi: mem19: type=6, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000006ca3000-0x0000000006ca6000) (0MB) > efi: mem20: type=10, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000006ca6000-0x0000000006cc6000) (0MB) > efi: mem21: type=6, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000006cc6000-0x0000000006d95000) (0MB) > efi: mem22: type=5, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000006d95000-0x0000000006e22000) (0MB) > efi: mem23: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000006e22000-0x0000000007165000) (3MB) > efi: mem24: type=4, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007165000-0x0000000007d22000) (11MB) > efi: mem25: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007d22000-0x0000000007d25000) (0MB) > efi: mem26: type=3, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007d25000-0x0000000007ea2000) (1MB) > efi: mem27: type=5, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000007ea2000-0x0000000007ed2000) (0MB) > efi: mem28: type=6, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000007ed2000-0x0000000007ef6000) (0MB) > efi: mem29: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007ef6000-0x0000000007f00000) (0MB) > efi: mem30: type=9, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007f00000-0x0000000007f02000) (0MB) > efi: mem31: type=10, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007f02000-0x0000000007f06000) (0MB) > efi: mem32: type=4, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007f06000-0x0000000007fd0000) (0MB) > efi: mem33: type=6, attr=0x800000000000000f, range=[0x0000000007fd0000-0x0000000007ff0000) (0MB) > efi: mem34: type=7, attr=0xf, range=[0x0000000007ff0000-0x0000000008000000) (0MB) After the patch: > efi: mem00: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009f000) (0MB) > efi: mem01: [Loader Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x000000000009f000-0x00000000000a0000) (0MB) > efi: mem02: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000000100000-0x0000000000400000) (3MB) > efi: mem03: [Loader Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000800000) (4MB) > efi: mem04: [ACPI Memory NVS | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000000800000-0x0000000000808000) (0MB) > efi: mem05: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000000808000-0x0000000000810000) (0MB) > efi: mem06: [ACPI Memory NVS | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000000810000-0x0000000000900000) (0MB) > efi: mem07: [Boot Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000000900000-0x0000000001100000) (8MB) > efi: mem08: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000001100000-0x0000000001400000) (3MB) > efi: mem09: [Loader Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000001400000-0x0000000002613000) (18MB) > efi: mem10: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000002613000-0x0000000004000000) (25MB) > efi: mem11: [Boot Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000004000000-0x0000000004020000) (0MB) > efi: mem12: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000004020000-0x00000000068ea000) (40MB) > efi: mem13: [Loader Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x00000000068ea000-0x00000000068f0000) (0MB) > efi: mem14: [Boot Code | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x00000000068f0000-0x0000000006c7b000) (3MB) > efi: mem15: [Runtime Data |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006c7b000-0x0000000006c7d000) (0MB) > efi: mem16: [Runtime Code |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006c7d000-0x0000000006c85000) (0MB) > efi: mem17: [Runtime Data |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006c85000-0x0000000006c87000) (0MB) > efi: mem18: [Boot Code | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006c87000-0x0000000006ca3000) (0MB) > efi: mem19: [Runtime Data |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006ca3000-0x0000000006ca6000) (0MB) > efi: mem20: [ACPI Memory NVS | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006ca6000-0x0000000006cc6000) (0MB) > efi: mem21: [Runtime Data |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006cc6000-0x0000000006d95000) (0MB) > efi: mem22: [Runtime Code |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006d95000-0x0000000006e22000) (0MB) > efi: mem23: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000006e22000-0x0000000007165000) (3MB) > efi: mem24: [Boot Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007165000-0x0000000007d22000) (11MB) > efi: mem25: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007d22000-0x0000000007d25000) (0MB) > efi: mem26: [Boot Code | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007d25000-0x0000000007ea2000) (1MB) > efi: mem27: [Runtime Code |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007ea2000-0x0000000007ed2000) (0MB) > efi: mem28: [Runtime Data |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007ed2000-0x0000000007ef6000) (0MB) > efi: mem29: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007ef6000-0x0000000007f00000) (0MB) > efi: mem30: [ACPI Reclaim Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007f00000-0x0000000007f02000) (0MB) > efi: mem31: [ACPI Memory NVS | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007f02000-0x0000000007f06000) (0MB) > efi: mem32: [Boot Data | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007f06000-0x0000000007fd0000) (0MB) > efi: mem33: [Runtime Data |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007fd0000-0x0000000007ff0000) (0MB) > efi: mem34: [Conventional Memory| | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000007ff0000-0x0000000008000000) (0MB) Both the type enum and the attribute bitmap are decoded, with the additional benefit that the memory ranges line up as well. Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2014-09-03 13:32:21 +02:00
md->phys_addr,
x86/efi: Show actual ending addresses in efi_print_memmap Adjust efi_print_memmap to print the real end address of each range, not 1 byte beyond. This matches other prints like those for SRAT and nosave memory. While investigating grub persistent memory corruption issues, it was helpful to make this table match the ending address convention used by: * the kernel's e820 table prints BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000001680000000-0x0000001c7fffffff] reserved * the kernel's nosave memory prints PM: Registered nosave memory: [mem 0x880000000-0xc7fffffff] * the kernel's ACPI System Resource Affinity Table prints SRAT: Node 1 PXM 1 [mem 0x480000000-0x87fffffff] * grub's lsmmap and lsefimmap commands reserved 0000001680000000-0000001c7fffffff 00600000 24GiB UC WC WT WB NV * the UEFI shell's memmap command Reserved 000000007FC00000-000000007FFFFFFF 0000000000000400 0000000000000001 For example, if you grep all the various logs for c7fffffff, you won't find the kernel's line if it uses c80000000. Also, change the closing ) to ] to match the opening [. old: efi: mem61: [Persistent Memory | | | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000880000000-0x0000000c80000000) (16384MB) new: efi: mem61: [Persistent Memory | | | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] range=[0x0000000880000000-0x0000000c7fffffff] (16384MB) Signed-off-by: Robert Elliott <elliott@hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1454364428-494-12-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-01 22:07:05 +00:00
md->phys_addr + (md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT) - 1,
(md->num_pages >> (20 - EFI_PAGE_SHIFT)));
}
}
static int __init efi_systab_init(unsigned long phys)
{
int size = efi_enabled(EFI_64BIT) ? sizeof(efi_system_table_64_t)
: sizeof(efi_system_table_32_t);
const efi_table_hdr_t *hdr;
bool over4g = false;
void *p;
int ret;
hdr = p = early_memremap_ro(phys, size);
if (p == NULL) {
pr_err("Couldn't map the system table!\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
ret = efi_systab_check_header(hdr, 1);
if (ret) {
early_memunmap(p, size);
return ret;
}
efi: Make 'efi_enabled' a function to query EFI facilities Originally 'efi_enabled' indicated whether a kernel was booted from EFI firmware. Over time its semantics have changed, and it now indicates whether or not we are booted on an EFI machine with bit-native firmware, e.g. 64-bit kernel with 64-bit firmware. The immediate motivation for this patch is the bug report at, https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu-cdimage/+bug/1040557 which details how running a platform driver on an EFI machine that is designed to run under BIOS can cause the machine to become bricked. Also, the following report, https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=47121 details how running said driver can also cause Machine Check Exceptions. Drivers need a new means of detecting whether they're running on an EFI machine, as sadly the expression, if (!efi_enabled) hasn't been a sufficient condition for quite some time. Users actually want to query 'efi_enabled' for different reasons - what they really want access to is the list of available EFI facilities. For instance, the x86 reboot code needs to know whether it can invoke the ResetSystem() function provided by the EFI runtime services, while the ACPI OSL code wants to know whether the EFI config tables were mapped successfully. There are also checks in some of the platform driver code to simply see if they're running on an EFI machine (which would make it a bad idea to do BIOS-y things). This patch is a prereq for the samsung-laptop fix patch. Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Corentin Chary <corentincj@iksaif.net> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Steve Langasek <steve.langasek@canonical.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad@kernel.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2012-11-14 09:42:35 +00:00
if (efi_enabled(EFI_64BIT)) {
const efi_system_table_64_t *systab64 = p;
efi_runtime = systab64->runtime;
over4g = systab64->runtime > U32_MAX;
if (efi_setup) {
struct efi_setup_data *data;
data = early_memremap_ro(efi_setup, sizeof(*data));
if (!data) {
early_memunmap(p, size);
return -ENOMEM;
}
efi_fw_vendor = (unsigned long)data->fw_vendor;
efi_config_table = (unsigned long)data->tables;
over4g |= data->fw_vendor > U32_MAX ||
data->tables > U32_MAX;
early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
} else {
efi_fw_vendor = systab64->fw_vendor;
efi_config_table = systab64->tables;
over4g |= systab64->fw_vendor > U32_MAX ||
systab64->tables > U32_MAX;
}
efi_nr_tables = systab64->nr_tables;
} else {
const efi_system_table_32_t *systab32 = p;
efi_fw_vendor = systab32->fw_vendor;
efi_runtime = systab32->runtime;
efi_config_table = systab32->tables;
efi_nr_tables = systab32->nr_tables;
}
efi.runtime_version = hdr->revision;
efi_systab_report_header(hdr, efi_fw_vendor);
early_memunmap(p, size);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) && over4g) {
pr_err("EFI data located above 4GB, disabling EFI.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
static int __init efi_config_init(const efi_config_table_type_t *arch_tables)
{
void *config_tables;
int sz, ret;
if (efi_nr_tables == 0)
return 0;
if (efi_enabled(EFI_64BIT))
sz = sizeof(efi_config_table_64_t);
else
sz = sizeof(efi_config_table_32_t);
/*
* Let's see what config tables the firmware passed to us.
*/
config_tables = early_memremap(efi_config_table, efi_nr_tables * sz);
if (config_tables == NULL) {
pr_err("Could not map Configuration table!\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
ret = efi_config_parse_tables(config_tables, efi_nr_tables,
arch_tables);
early_memunmap(config_tables, efi_nr_tables * sz);
return ret;
}
void __init efi_init(void)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) &&
(boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab_hi ||
boot_params.efi_info.efi_memmap_hi)) {
pr_info("Table located above 4GB, disabling EFI.\n");
return;
}
efi_systab_phys = boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab |
((__u64)boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab_hi << 32);
if (efi_systab_init(efi_systab_phys))
return;
efi: Make 'efi_enabled' a function to query EFI facilities Originally 'efi_enabled' indicated whether a kernel was booted from EFI firmware. Over time its semantics have changed, and it now indicates whether or not we are booted on an EFI machine with bit-native firmware, e.g. 64-bit kernel with 64-bit firmware. The immediate motivation for this patch is the bug report at, https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu-cdimage/+bug/1040557 which details how running a platform driver on an EFI machine that is designed to run under BIOS can cause the machine to become bricked. Also, the following report, https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=47121 details how running said driver can also cause Machine Check Exceptions. Drivers need a new means of detecting whether they're running on an EFI machine, as sadly the expression, if (!efi_enabled) hasn't been a sufficient condition for quite some time. Users actually want to query 'efi_enabled' for different reasons - what they really want access to is the list of available EFI facilities. For instance, the x86 reboot code needs to know whether it can invoke the ResetSystem() function provided by the EFI runtime services, while the ACPI OSL code wants to know whether the EFI config tables were mapped successfully. There are also checks in some of the platform driver code to simply see if they're running on an EFI machine (which would make it a bad idea to do BIOS-y things). This patch is a prereq for the samsung-laptop fix patch. Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Corentin Chary <corentincj@iksaif.net> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Steve Langasek <steve.langasek@canonical.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad@kernel.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2012-11-14 09:42:35 +00:00
if (efi_reuse_config(efi_config_table, efi_nr_tables))
return;
if (efi_config_init(arch_tables))
return;
efi: Make 'efi_enabled' a function to query EFI facilities Originally 'efi_enabled' indicated whether a kernel was booted from EFI firmware. Over time its semantics have changed, and it now indicates whether or not we are booted on an EFI machine with bit-native firmware, e.g. 64-bit kernel with 64-bit firmware. The immediate motivation for this patch is the bug report at, https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu-cdimage/+bug/1040557 which details how running a platform driver on an EFI machine that is designed to run under BIOS can cause the machine to become bricked. Also, the following report, https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=47121 details how running said driver can also cause Machine Check Exceptions. Drivers need a new means of detecting whether they're running on an EFI machine, as sadly the expression, if (!efi_enabled) hasn't been a sufficient condition for quite some time. Users actually want to query 'efi_enabled' for different reasons - what they really want access to is the list of available EFI facilities. For instance, the x86 reboot code needs to know whether it can invoke the ResetSystem() function provided by the EFI runtime services, while the ACPI OSL code wants to know whether the EFI config tables were mapped successfully. There are also checks in some of the platform driver code to simply see if they're running on an EFI machine (which would make it a bad idea to do BIOS-y things). This patch is a prereq for the samsung-laptop fix patch. Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Corentin Chary <corentincj@iksaif.net> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Steve Langasek <steve.langasek@canonical.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad@kernel.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2012-11-14 09:42:35 +00:00
/*
* Note: We currently don't support runtime services on an EFI
* that doesn't match the kernel 32/64-bit mode.
*/
if (!efi_runtime_supported())
pr_err("No EFI runtime due to 32/64-bit mismatch with kernel\n");
if (!efi_runtime_supported() || efi_runtime_disabled()) {
efi_memmap_unmap();
return;
}
efi: Make 'efi_enabled' a function to query EFI facilities Originally 'efi_enabled' indicated whether a kernel was booted from EFI firmware. Over time its semantics have changed, and it now indicates whether or not we are booted on an EFI machine with bit-native firmware, e.g. 64-bit kernel with 64-bit firmware. The immediate motivation for this patch is the bug report at, https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu-cdimage/+bug/1040557 which details how running a platform driver on an EFI machine that is designed to run under BIOS can cause the machine to become bricked. Also, the following report, https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=47121 details how running said driver can also cause Machine Check Exceptions. Drivers need a new means of detecting whether they're running on an EFI machine, as sadly the expression, if (!efi_enabled) hasn't been a sufficient condition for quite some time. Users actually want to query 'efi_enabled' for different reasons - what they really want access to is the list of available EFI facilities. For instance, the x86 reboot code needs to know whether it can invoke the ResetSystem() function provided by the EFI runtime services, while the ACPI OSL code wants to know whether the EFI config tables were mapped successfully. There are also checks in some of the platform driver code to simply see if they're running on an EFI machine (which would make it a bad idea to do BIOS-y things). This patch is a prereq for the samsung-laptop fix patch. Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Corentin Chary <corentincj@iksaif.net> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Steve Langasek <steve.langasek@canonical.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad@kernel.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2012-11-14 09:42:35 +00:00
/* Parse the EFI Properties table if it exists */
if (prop_phys != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
efi_properties_table_t *tbl;
tbl = early_memremap_ro(prop_phys, sizeof(*tbl));
if (tbl == NULL) {
pr_err("Could not map Properties table!\n");
} else {
if (tbl->memory_protection_attribute &
EFI_PROPERTIES_RUNTIME_MEMORY_PROTECTION_NON_EXECUTABLE_PE_DATA)
set_bit(EFI_NX_PE_DATA, &efi.flags);
early_memunmap(tbl, sizeof(*tbl));
}
}
set_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags);
efi/x86: Prune invalid memory map entries and fix boot regression Some machines, such as the Lenovo ThinkPad W541 with firmware GNET80WW (2.28), include memory map entries with phys_addr=0x0 and num_pages=0. These machines fail to boot after the following commit, commit 8e80632fb23f ("efi/esrt: Use efi_mem_reserve() and avoid a kmalloc()") Fix this by removing such bogus entries from the memory map. Furthermore, currently the log output for this case (with efi=debug) looks like: [ 0.000000] efi: mem45: [Reserved | | | | | | | | | | | | ] range=[0x0000000000000000-0xffffffffffffffff] (0MB) This is clearly wrong, and also not as informative as it could be. This patch changes it so that if we find obviously invalid memory map entries, we print an error and skip those entries. It also detects the display of the address range calculation overflow, so the new output is: [ 0.000000] efi: [Firmware Bug]: Invalid EFI memory map entries: [ 0.000000] efi: mem45: [Reserved | | | | | | | | | | | | ] range=[0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000000] (invalid) It also detects memory map sizes that would overflow the physical address, for example phys_addr=0xfffffffffffff000 and num_pages=0x0200000000000001, and prints: [ 0.000000] efi: [Firmware Bug]: Invalid EFI memory map entries: [ 0.000000] efi: mem45: [Reserved | | | | | | | | | | | | ] range=[phys_addr=0xfffffffffffff000-0x20ffffffffffffffff] (invalid) It then removes these entries from the memory map. Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> [ardb: refactor for clarity with no functional changes, avoid PAGE_SHIFT] Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> [Matt: Include bugzilla info in commit log] Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.9+ Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=191121 Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-12-12 18:42:28 -05:00
efi_clean_memmap();
if (efi_enabled(EFI_DBG))
efi_print_memmap();
}
/* Merge contiguous regions of the same type and attribute */
static void __init efi_merge_regions(void)
{
efi_memory_desc_t *md, *prev_md = NULL;
for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) {
u64 prev_size;
if (!prev_md) {
prev_md = md;
continue;
}
if (prev_md->type != md->type ||
prev_md->attribute != md->attribute) {
prev_md = md;
continue;
}
prev_size = prev_md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT;
if (md->phys_addr == (prev_md->phys_addr + prev_size)) {
prev_md->num_pages += md->num_pages;
md->type = EFI_RESERVED_TYPE;
md->attribute = 0;
continue;
}
prev_md = md;
}
}
static void *realloc_pages(void *old_memmap, int old_shift)
{
void *ret;
ret = (void *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, old_shift + 1);
if (!ret)
goto out;
/*
* A first-time allocation doesn't have anything to copy.
*/
if (!old_memmap)
return ret;
memcpy(ret, old_memmap, PAGE_SIZE << old_shift);
out:
free_pages((unsigned long)old_memmap, old_shift);
return ret;
}
x86/efi: Fix boot crash by mapping EFI memmap entries bottom-up at runtime, instead of top-down Beginning with UEFI v2.5 EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE was introduced that signals that the firmware PE/COFF loader supports splitting code and data sections of PE/COFF images into separate EFI memory map entries. This allows the kernel to map those regions with strict memory protections, e.g. EFI_MEMORY_RO for code, EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, etc. Unfortunately, an unwritten requirement of this new feature is that the regions need to be mapped with the same offsets relative to each other as observed in the EFI memory map. If this is not done crashes like this may occur, BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffefe6086dd IP: [<fffffffefe6086dd>] 0xfffffffefe6086dd Call Trace: [<ffffffff8104c90e>] efi_call+0x7e/0x100 [<ffffffff81602091>] ? virt_efi_set_variable+0x61/0x90 [<ffffffff8104c583>] efi_delete_dummy_variable+0x63/0x70 [<ffffffff81f4e4aa>] efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x383/0x392 [<ffffffff81f37e1b>] start_kernel+0x38a/0x417 [<ffffffff81f37495>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c [<ffffffff81f37582>] x86_64_start_kernel+0xeb/0xef Here 0xfffffffefe6086dd refers to an address the firmware expects to be mapped but which the OS never claimed was mapped. The issue is that included in these regions are relative addresses to other regions which were emitted by the firmware toolchain before the "splitting" of sections occurred at runtime. Needless to say, we don't satisfy this unwritten requirement on x86_64 and instead map the EFI memory map entries in reverse order. The above crash is almost certainly triggerable with any kernel newer than v3.13 because that's when we rewrote the EFI runtime region mapping code, in commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping"). For kernel versions before v3.13 things may work by pure luck depending on the fragmentation of the kernel virtual address space at the time we map the EFI regions. Instead of mapping the EFI memory map entries in reverse order, where entry N has a higher virtual address than entry N+1, map them in the same order as they appear in the EFI memory map to preserve this relative offset between regions. This patch has been kept as small as possible with the intention that it should be applied aggressively to stable and distribution kernels. It is very much a bugfix rather than support for a new feature, since when EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE is enabled we must map things as outlined above to even boot - we have no way of asking the firmware not to split the code/data regions. In fact, this patch doesn't even make use of the more strict memory protections available in UEFI v2.5. That will come later. Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443218539-7610-2-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-09-25 23:02:18 +01:00
/*
* Iterate the EFI memory map in reverse order because the regions
* will be mapped top-down. The end result is the same as if we had
* mapped things forward, but doesn't require us to change the
* existing implementation of efi_map_region().
*/
static inline void *efi_map_next_entry_reverse(void *entry)
{
/* Initial call */
if (!entry)
return efi.memmap.map_end - efi.memmap.desc_size;
x86/efi: Fix boot crash by mapping EFI memmap entries bottom-up at runtime, instead of top-down Beginning with UEFI v2.5 EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE was introduced that signals that the firmware PE/COFF loader supports splitting code and data sections of PE/COFF images into separate EFI memory map entries. This allows the kernel to map those regions with strict memory protections, e.g. EFI_MEMORY_RO for code, EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, etc. Unfortunately, an unwritten requirement of this new feature is that the regions need to be mapped with the same offsets relative to each other as observed in the EFI memory map. If this is not done crashes like this may occur, BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffefe6086dd IP: [<fffffffefe6086dd>] 0xfffffffefe6086dd Call Trace: [<ffffffff8104c90e>] efi_call+0x7e/0x100 [<ffffffff81602091>] ? virt_efi_set_variable+0x61/0x90 [<ffffffff8104c583>] efi_delete_dummy_variable+0x63/0x70 [<ffffffff81f4e4aa>] efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x383/0x392 [<ffffffff81f37e1b>] start_kernel+0x38a/0x417 [<ffffffff81f37495>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c [<ffffffff81f37582>] x86_64_start_kernel+0xeb/0xef Here 0xfffffffefe6086dd refers to an address the firmware expects to be mapped but which the OS never claimed was mapped. The issue is that included in these regions are relative addresses to other regions which were emitted by the firmware toolchain before the "splitting" of sections occurred at runtime. Needless to say, we don't satisfy this unwritten requirement on x86_64 and instead map the EFI memory map entries in reverse order. The above crash is almost certainly triggerable with any kernel newer than v3.13 because that's when we rewrote the EFI runtime region mapping code, in commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping"). For kernel versions before v3.13 things may work by pure luck depending on the fragmentation of the kernel virtual address space at the time we map the EFI regions. Instead of mapping the EFI memory map entries in reverse order, where entry N has a higher virtual address than entry N+1, map them in the same order as they appear in the EFI memory map to preserve this relative offset between regions. This patch has been kept as small as possible with the intention that it should be applied aggressively to stable and distribution kernels. It is very much a bugfix rather than support for a new feature, since when EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE is enabled we must map things as outlined above to even boot - we have no way of asking the firmware not to split the code/data regions. In fact, this patch doesn't even make use of the more strict memory protections available in UEFI v2.5. That will come later. Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443218539-7610-2-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-09-25 23:02:18 +01:00
entry -= efi.memmap.desc_size;
if (entry < efi.memmap.map)
x86/efi: Fix boot crash by mapping EFI memmap entries bottom-up at runtime, instead of top-down Beginning with UEFI v2.5 EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE was introduced that signals that the firmware PE/COFF loader supports splitting code and data sections of PE/COFF images into separate EFI memory map entries. This allows the kernel to map those regions with strict memory protections, e.g. EFI_MEMORY_RO for code, EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, etc. Unfortunately, an unwritten requirement of this new feature is that the regions need to be mapped with the same offsets relative to each other as observed in the EFI memory map. If this is not done crashes like this may occur, BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffefe6086dd IP: [<fffffffefe6086dd>] 0xfffffffefe6086dd Call Trace: [<ffffffff8104c90e>] efi_call+0x7e/0x100 [<ffffffff81602091>] ? virt_efi_set_variable+0x61/0x90 [<ffffffff8104c583>] efi_delete_dummy_variable+0x63/0x70 [<ffffffff81f4e4aa>] efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x383/0x392 [<ffffffff81f37e1b>] start_kernel+0x38a/0x417 [<ffffffff81f37495>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c [<ffffffff81f37582>] x86_64_start_kernel+0xeb/0xef Here 0xfffffffefe6086dd refers to an address the firmware expects to be mapped but which the OS never claimed was mapped. The issue is that included in these regions are relative addresses to other regions which were emitted by the firmware toolchain before the "splitting" of sections occurred at runtime. Needless to say, we don't satisfy this unwritten requirement on x86_64 and instead map the EFI memory map entries in reverse order. The above crash is almost certainly triggerable with any kernel newer than v3.13 because that's when we rewrote the EFI runtime region mapping code, in commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping"). For kernel versions before v3.13 things may work by pure luck depending on the fragmentation of the kernel virtual address space at the time we map the EFI regions. Instead of mapping the EFI memory map entries in reverse order, where entry N has a higher virtual address than entry N+1, map them in the same order as they appear in the EFI memory map to preserve this relative offset between regions. This patch has been kept as small as possible with the intention that it should be applied aggressively to stable and distribution kernels. It is very much a bugfix rather than support for a new feature, since when EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE is enabled we must map things as outlined above to even boot - we have no way of asking the firmware not to split the code/data regions. In fact, this patch doesn't even make use of the more strict memory protections available in UEFI v2.5. That will come later. Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443218539-7610-2-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-09-25 23:02:18 +01:00
return NULL;
return entry;
}
/*
* efi_map_next_entry - Return the next EFI memory map descriptor
* @entry: Previous EFI memory map descriptor
*
* This is a helper function to iterate over the EFI memory map, which
* we do in different orders depending on the current configuration.
*
* To begin traversing the memory map @entry must be %NULL.
*
* Returns %NULL when we reach the end of the memory map.
*/
static void *efi_map_next_entry(void *entry)
{
if (efi_enabled(EFI_64BIT)) {
x86/efi: Fix boot crash by mapping EFI memmap entries bottom-up at runtime, instead of top-down Beginning with UEFI v2.5 EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE was introduced that signals that the firmware PE/COFF loader supports splitting code and data sections of PE/COFF images into separate EFI memory map entries. This allows the kernel to map those regions with strict memory protections, e.g. EFI_MEMORY_RO for code, EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, etc. Unfortunately, an unwritten requirement of this new feature is that the regions need to be mapped with the same offsets relative to each other as observed in the EFI memory map. If this is not done crashes like this may occur, BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffefe6086dd IP: [<fffffffefe6086dd>] 0xfffffffefe6086dd Call Trace: [<ffffffff8104c90e>] efi_call+0x7e/0x100 [<ffffffff81602091>] ? virt_efi_set_variable+0x61/0x90 [<ffffffff8104c583>] efi_delete_dummy_variable+0x63/0x70 [<ffffffff81f4e4aa>] efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x383/0x392 [<ffffffff81f37e1b>] start_kernel+0x38a/0x417 [<ffffffff81f37495>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c [<ffffffff81f37582>] x86_64_start_kernel+0xeb/0xef Here 0xfffffffefe6086dd refers to an address the firmware expects to be mapped but which the OS never claimed was mapped. The issue is that included in these regions are relative addresses to other regions which were emitted by the firmware toolchain before the "splitting" of sections occurred at runtime. Needless to say, we don't satisfy this unwritten requirement on x86_64 and instead map the EFI memory map entries in reverse order. The above crash is almost certainly triggerable with any kernel newer than v3.13 because that's when we rewrote the EFI runtime region mapping code, in commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping"). For kernel versions before v3.13 things may work by pure luck depending on the fragmentation of the kernel virtual address space at the time we map the EFI regions. Instead of mapping the EFI memory map entries in reverse order, where entry N has a higher virtual address than entry N+1, map them in the same order as they appear in the EFI memory map to preserve this relative offset between regions. This patch has been kept as small as possible with the intention that it should be applied aggressively to stable and distribution kernels. It is very much a bugfix rather than support for a new feature, since when EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE is enabled we must map things as outlined above to even boot - we have no way of asking the firmware not to split the code/data regions. In fact, this patch doesn't even make use of the more strict memory protections available in UEFI v2.5. That will come later. Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443218539-7610-2-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-09-25 23:02:18 +01:00
/*
* Starting in UEFI v2.5 the EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE
* config table feature requires us to map all entries
* in the same order as they appear in the EFI memory
* map. That is to say, entry N must have a lower
* virtual address than entry N+1. This is because the
* firmware toolchain leaves relative references in
* the code/data sections, which are split and become
* separate EFI memory regions. Mapping things
* out-of-order leads to the firmware accessing
* unmapped addresses.
*
* Since we need to map things this way whether or not
* the kernel actually makes use of
* EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE, let's just switch to this
* scheme by default for 64-bit.
*/
return efi_map_next_entry_reverse(entry);
}
/* Initial call */
if (!entry)
return efi.memmap.map;
x86/efi: Fix boot crash by mapping EFI memmap entries bottom-up at runtime, instead of top-down Beginning with UEFI v2.5 EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE was introduced that signals that the firmware PE/COFF loader supports splitting code and data sections of PE/COFF images into separate EFI memory map entries. This allows the kernel to map those regions with strict memory protections, e.g. EFI_MEMORY_RO for code, EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, etc. Unfortunately, an unwritten requirement of this new feature is that the regions need to be mapped with the same offsets relative to each other as observed in the EFI memory map. If this is not done crashes like this may occur, BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffefe6086dd IP: [<fffffffefe6086dd>] 0xfffffffefe6086dd Call Trace: [<ffffffff8104c90e>] efi_call+0x7e/0x100 [<ffffffff81602091>] ? virt_efi_set_variable+0x61/0x90 [<ffffffff8104c583>] efi_delete_dummy_variable+0x63/0x70 [<ffffffff81f4e4aa>] efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x383/0x392 [<ffffffff81f37e1b>] start_kernel+0x38a/0x417 [<ffffffff81f37495>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c [<ffffffff81f37582>] x86_64_start_kernel+0xeb/0xef Here 0xfffffffefe6086dd refers to an address the firmware expects to be mapped but which the OS never claimed was mapped. The issue is that included in these regions are relative addresses to other regions which were emitted by the firmware toolchain before the "splitting" of sections occurred at runtime. Needless to say, we don't satisfy this unwritten requirement on x86_64 and instead map the EFI memory map entries in reverse order. The above crash is almost certainly triggerable with any kernel newer than v3.13 because that's when we rewrote the EFI runtime region mapping code, in commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping"). For kernel versions before v3.13 things may work by pure luck depending on the fragmentation of the kernel virtual address space at the time we map the EFI regions. Instead of mapping the EFI memory map entries in reverse order, where entry N has a higher virtual address than entry N+1, map them in the same order as they appear in the EFI memory map to preserve this relative offset between regions. This patch has been kept as small as possible with the intention that it should be applied aggressively to stable and distribution kernels. It is very much a bugfix rather than support for a new feature, since when EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE is enabled we must map things as outlined above to even boot - we have no way of asking the firmware not to split the code/data regions. In fact, this patch doesn't even make use of the more strict memory protections available in UEFI v2.5. That will come later. Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443218539-7610-2-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-09-25 23:02:18 +01:00
entry += efi.memmap.desc_size;
if (entry >= efi.memmap.map_end)
x86/efi: Fix boot crash by mapping EFI memmap entries bottom-up at runtime, instead of top-down Beginning with UEFI v2.5 EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE was introduced that signals that the firmware PE/COFF loader supports splitting code and data sections of PE/COFF images into separate EFI memory map entries. This allows the kernel to map those regions with strict memory protections, e.g. EFI_MEMORY_RO for code, EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, etc. Unfortunately, an unwritten requirement of this new feature is that the regions need to be mapped with the same offsets relative to each other as observed in the EFI memory map. If this is not done crashes like this may occur, BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffefe6086dd IP: [<fffffffefe6086dd>] 0xfffffffefe6086dd Call Trace: [<ffffffff8104c90e>] efi_call+0x7e/0x100 [<ffffffff81602091>] ? virt_efi_set_variable+0x61/0x90 [<ffffffff8104c583>] efi_delete_dummy_variable+0x63/0x70 [<ffffffff81f4e4aa>] efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x383/0x392 [<ffffffff81f37e1b>] start_kernel+0x38a/0x417 [<ffffffff81f37495>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c [<ffffffff81f37582>] x86_64_start_kernel+0xeb/0xef Here 0xfffffffefe6086dd refers to an address the firmware expects to be mapped but which the OS never claimed was mapped. The issue is that included in these regions are relative addresses to other regions which were emitted by the firmware toolchain before the "splitting" of sections occurred at runtime. Needless to say, we don't satisfy this unwritten requirement on x86_64 and instead map the EFI memory map entries in reverse order. The above crash is almost certainly triggerable with any kernel newer than v3.13 because that's when we rewrote the EFI runtime region mapping code, in commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping"). For kernel versions before v3.13 things may work by pure luck depending on the fragmentation of the kernel virtual address space at the time we map the EFI regions. Instead of mapping the EFI memory map entries in reverse order, where entry N has a higher virtual address than entry N+1, map them in the same order as they appear in the EFI memory map to preserve this relative offset between regions. This patch has been kept as small as possible with the intention that it should be applied aggressively to stable and distribution kernels. It is very much a bugfix rather than support for a new feature, since when EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE is enabled we must map things as outlined above to even boot - we have no way of asking the firmware not to split the code/data regions. In fact, this patch doesn't even make use of the more strict memory protections available in UEFI v2.5. That will come later. Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443218539-7610-2-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-09-25 23:02:18 +01:00
return NULL;
return entry;
}
static bool should_map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
{
/*
* Runtime regions always require runtime mappings (obviously).
*/
if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME)
return true;
/*
* 32-bit EFI doesn't suffer from the bug that requires us to
* reserve boot services regions, and mixed mode support
* doesn't exist for 32-bit kernels.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
return false;
x86/efi: EFI soft reservation to E820 enumeration UEFI 2.8 defines an EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute bit to augment the interpretation of the EFI Memory Types as "reserved for a specific purpose". The proposed Linux behavior for specific purpose memory is that it is reserved for direct-access (device-dax) by default and not available for any kernel usage, not even as an OOM fallback. Later, through udev scripts or another init mechanism, these device-dax claimed ranges can be reconfigured and hot-added to the available System-RAM with a unique node identifier. This device-dax management scheme implements "soft" in the "soft reserved" designation by allowing some or all of the reservation to be recovered as typical memory. This policy can be disabled at compile-time with CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=n, or runtime with efi=nosoftreserve. This patch introduces 2 new concepts at once given the entanglement between early boot enumeration relative to memory that can optionally be reserved from the kernel page allocator by default. The new concepts are: - E820_TYPE_SOFT_RESERVED: Upon detecting the EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute on EFI_CONVENTIONAL memory, update the E820 map with this new type. Only perform this classification if the CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=y policy is enabled, otherwise treat it as typical ram. - IORES_DESC_SOFT_RESERVED: Add a new I/O resource descriptor for a device driver to search iomem resources for application specific memory. Teach the iomem code to identify such ranges as "Soft Reserved". Note that the comment for do_add_efi_memmap() needed refreshing since it seemed to imply that the efi map might overflow the e820 table, but that is not an issue as of commit 7b6e4ba3cb1f "x86/boot/e820: Clean up the E820_X_MAX definition" that removed the 128 entry limit for e820__range_add(). A follow-on change integrates parsing of the ACPI HMAT to identify the node and sub-range boundaries of EFI_MEMORY_SP designated memory. For now, just identify and reserve memory of this type. Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2019-11-06 17:43:16 -08:00
/*
* EFI specific purpose memory may be reserved by default
* depending on kernel config and boot options.
*/
if (md->type == EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY &&
efi_soft_reserve_enabled() &&
(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_SP))
return false;
/*
* Map all of RAM so that we can access arguments in the 1:1
* mapping when making EFI runtime calls.
*/
if (efi_is_mixed()) {
if (md->type == EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY ||
md->type == EFI_LOADER_DATA ||
md->type == EFI_LOADER_CODE)
return true;
}
/*
* Map boot services regions as a workaround for buggy
* firmware that accesses them even when they shouldn't.
*
* See efi_{reserve,free}_boot_services().
*/
if (md->type == EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE ||
md->type == EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA)
return true;
return false;
}
/*
* Map the efi memory ranges of the runtime services and update new_mmap with
* virtual addresses.
*/
static void * __init efi_map_regions(int *count, int *pg_shift)
{
void *p, *new_memmap = NULL;
unsigned long left = 0;
unsigned long desc_size;
efi_memory_desc_t *md;
desc_size = efi.memmap.desc_size;
x86/efi: Fix boot crash by mapping EFI memmap entries bottom-up at runtime, instead of top-down Beginning with UEFI v2.5 EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE was introduced that signals that the firmware PE/COFF loader supports splitting code and data sections of PE/COFF images into separate EFI memory map entries. This allows the kernel to map those regions with strict memory protections, e.g. EFI_MEMORY_RO for code, EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, etc. Unfortunately, an unwritten requirement of this new feature is that the regions need to be mapped with the same offsets relative to each other as observed in the EFI memory map. If this is not done crashes like this may occur, BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffefe6086dd IP: [<fffffffefe6086dd>] 0xfffffffefe6086dd Call Trace: [<ffffffff8104c90e>] efi_call+0x7e/0x100 [<ffffffff81602091>] ? virt_efi_set_variable+0x61/0x90 [<ffffffff8104c583>] efi_delete_dummy_variable+0x63/0x70 [<ffffffff81f4e4aa>] efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x383/0x392 [<ffffffff81f37e1b>] start_kernel+0x38a/0x417 [<ffffffff81f37495>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c [<ffffffff81f37582>] x86_64_start_kernel+0xeb/0xef Here 0xfffffffefe6086dd refers to an address the firmware expects to be mapped but which the OS never claimed was mapped. The issue is that included in these regions are relative addresses to other regions which were emitted by the firmware toolchain before the "splitting" of sections occurred at runtime. Needless to say, we don't satisfy this unwritten requirement on x86_64 and instead map the EFI memory map entries in reverse order. The above crash is almost certainly triggerable with any kernel newer than v3.13 because that's when we rewrote the EFI runtime region mapping code, in commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping"). For kernel versions before v3.13 things may work by pure luck depending on the fragmentation of the kernel virtual address space at the time we map the EFI regions. Instead of mapping the EFI memory map entries in reverse order, where entry N has a higher virtual address than entry N+1, map them in the same order as they appear in the EFI memory map to preserve this relative offset between regions. This patch has been kept as small as possible with the intention that it should be applied aggressively to stable and distribution kernels. It is very much a bugfix rather than support for a new feature, since when EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE is enabled we must map things as outlined above to even boot - we have no way of asking the firmware not to split the code/data regions. In fact, this patch doesn't even make use of the more strict memory protections available in UEFI v2.5. That will come later. Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443218539-7610-2-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-09-25 23:02:18 +01:00
p = NULL;
while ((p = efi_map_next_entry(p))) {
md = p;
if (!should_map_region(md))
continue;
efi_map_region(md);
if (left < desc_size) {
new_memmap = realloc_pages(new_memmap, *pg_shift);
if (!new_memmap)
return NULL;
left += PAGE_SIZE << *pg_shift;
(*pg_shift)++;
}
memcpy(new_memmap + (*count * desc_size), md, desc_size);
left -= desc_size;
(*count)++;
}
return new_memmap;
}
static void __init kexec_enter_virtual_mode(void)
{
2015-09-09 15:38:55 -07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
efi_memory_desc_t *md;
x86/efi: Setup separate EFI page tables in kexec paths The switch to using a new dedicated page table for EFI runtime calls in commit commit 67a9108ed431 ("x86/efi: Build our own page table structures") failed to take into account changes required for the kexec code paths, which are unfortunately duplicated in the EFI code. Call the allocation and setup functions in kexec_enter_virtual_mode() just like we do for __efi_enter_virtual_mode() to avoid hitting NULL-pointer dereferences when making EFI runtime calls. At the very least, the call to efi_setup_page_tables() should have existed for kexec before the following commit: 67a9108ed431 ("x86/efi: Build our own page table structures") Things just magically worked because we were actually using the kernel's page tables that contained the required mappings. Reported-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1453385519-11477-1-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-01-21 14:11:59 +00:00
unsigned int num_pages;
/*
* We don't do virtual mode, since we don't do runtime services, on
* non-native EFI.
*/
if (efi_is_mixed()) {
efi: Refactor efi_memmap_init_early() into arch-neutral code Every EFI architecture apart from ia64 needs to setup the EFI memory map at efi.memmap, and the code for doing that is essentially the same across all implementations. Therefore, it makes sense to factor this out into the common code under drivers/firmware/efi/. The only slight variation is the data structure out of which we pull the initial memory map information, such as physical address, memory descriptor size and version, etc. We can address this by passing a generic data structure (struct efi_memory_map_data) as the argument to efi_memmap_init_early() which contains the minimum info required for initialising the memory map. In the process, this patch also fixes a few undesirable implementation differences: - ARM and arm64 were failing to clear the EFI_MEMMAP bit when unmapping the early EFI memory map. EFI_MEMMAP indicates whether the EFI memory map is mapped (not the regions contained within) and can be traversed. It's more correct to set the bit as soon as we memremap() the passed in EFI memmap. - Rename efi_unmmap_memmap() to efi_memmap_unmap() to adhere to the regular naming scheme. This patch also uses a read-write mapping for the memory map instead of the read-only mapping currently used on ARM and arm64. x86 needs the ability to update the memory map in-place when assigning virtual addresses to regions (efi_map_region()) and tagging regions when reserving boot services (efi_reserve_boot_services()). There's no way for the generic fake_mem code to know which mapping to use without introducing some arch-specific constant/hook, so just use read-write since read-only is of dubious value for the EFI memory map. Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> [kexec/kdump] Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> [arm] Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
2016-02-26 21:22:05 +00:00
efi_memmap_unmap();
clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags);
return;
}
x86/efi: Setup separate EFI page tables in kexec paths The switch to using a new dedicated page table for EFI runtime calls in commit commit 67a9108ed431 ("x86/efi: Build our own page table structures") failed to take into account changes required for the kexec code paths, which are unfortunately duplicated in the EFI code. Call the allocation and setup functions in kexec_enter_virtual_mode() just like we do for __efi_enter_virtual_mode() to avoid hitting NULL-pointer dereferences when making EFI runtime calls. At the very least, the call to efi_setup_page_tables() should have existed for kexec before the following commit: 67a9108ed431 ("x86/efi: Build our own page table structures") Things just magically worked because we were actually using the kernel's page tables that contained the required mappings. Reported-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1453385519-11477-1-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-01-21 14:11:59 +00:00
if (efi_alloc_page_tables()) {
pr_err("Failed to allocate EFI page tables\n");
clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags);
return;
}
/*
* Map efi regions which were passed via setup_data. The virt_addr is a
* fixed addr which was used in first kernel of a kexec boot.
*/
for_each_efi_memory_desc(md)
efi_map_region_fixed(md); /* FIXME: add error handling */
/*
* Unregister the early EFI memmap from efi_init() and install
* the new EFI memory map.
*/
efi_memmap_unmap();
if (efi_memmap_init_late(efi.memmap.phys_map,
efi.memmap.desc_size * efi.memmap.nr_map)) {
pr_err("Failed to remap late EFI memory map\n");
clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags);
return;
}
num_pages = ALIGN(efi.memmap.nr_map * efi.memmap.desc_size, PAGE_SIZE);
x86/efi: Setup separate EFI page tables in kexec paths The switch to using a new dedicated page table for EFI runtime calls in commit commit 67a9108ed431 ("x86/efi: Build our own page table structures") failed to take into account changes required for the kexec code paths, which are unfortunately duplicated in the EFI code. Call the allocation and setup functions in kexec_enter_virtual_mode() just like we do for __efi_enter_virtual_mode() to avoid hitting NULL-pointer dereferences when making EFI runtime calls. At the very least, the call to efi_setup_page_tables() should have existed for kexec before the following commit: 67a9108ed431 ("x86/efi: Build our own page table structures") Things just magically worked because we were actually using the kernel's page tables that contained the required mappings. Reported-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1453385519-11477-1-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-01-21 14:11:59 +00:00
num_pages >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
if (efi_setup_page_tables(efi.memmap.phys_map, num_pages)) {
x86/efi: Setup separate EFI page tables in kexec paths The switch to using a new dedicated page table for EFI runtime calls in commit commit 67a9108ed431 ("x86/efi: Build our own page table structures") failed to take into account changes required for the kexec code paths, which are unfortunately duplicated in the EFI code. Call the allocation and setup functions in kexec_enter_virtual_mode() just like we do for __efi_enter_virtual_mode() to avoid hitting NULL-pointer dereferences when making EFI runtime calls. At the very least, the call to efi_setup_page_tables() should have existed for kexec before the following commit: 67a9108ed431 ("x86/efi: Build our own page table structures") Things just magically worked because we were actually using the kernel's page tables that contained the required mappings. Reported-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1453385519-11477-1-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-01-21 14:11:59 +00:00
clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags);
return;
}
efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings();
efi_native_runtime_setup();
#endif
}
/*
* This function will switch the EFI runtime services to virtual mode.
* Essentially, we look through the EFI memmap and map every region that
* has the runtime attribute bit set in its memory descriptor into the
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
* efi_pgd page table.
*
* The new method does a pagetable switch in a preemption-safe manner
* so that we're in a different address space when calling a runtime
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
* function. For function arguments passing we do copy the PUDs of the
* kernel page table into efi_pgd prior to each call.
*
* Specially for kexec boot, efi runtime maps in previous kernel should
* be passed in via setup_data. In that case runtime ranges will be mapped
* to the same virtual addresses as the first kernel, see
* kexec_enter_virtual_mode().
*/
static void __init __efi_enter_virtual_mode(void)
{
int count = 0, pg_shift = 0;
void *new_memmap = NULL;
efi_status_t status;
x86/efi: Fix EFI memmap pointer size warning Fix this when building on 32-bit: arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c: In function ‘__efi_enter_virtual_mode’: arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c:911:5: warning: cast to pointer from integer of different size [-Wint-to-pointer-cast] (efi_memory_desc_t *)pa); ^ arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c:918:5: warning: cast to pointer from integer of different size [-Wint-to-pointer-cast] (efi_memory_desc_t *)pa); ^ The @pa local variable is declared as phys_addr_t and that is a u64 when CONFIG_PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT=y. (The last is enabled on 32-bit on a PAE build.) However, its value comes from __pa() which is basically doing pointer arithmetic and checking, and returns unsigned long as it is the native pointer width. So let's use an unsigned long too. It should be fine to do so because the later users cast it to a pointer too. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161112210424.5157-2-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-11-12 21:04:23 +00:00
unsigned long pa;
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
if (efi_alloc_page_tables()) {
pr_err("Failed to allocate EFI page tables\n");
goto err;
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
}
efi_merge_regions();
new_memmap = efi_map_regions(&count, &pg_shift);
if (!new_memmap) {
pr_err("Error reallocating memory, EFI runtime non-functional!\n");
goto err;
}
pa = __pa(new_memmap);
/*
* Unregister the early EFI memmap from efi_init() and install
* the new EFI memory map that we are about to pass to the
* firmware via SetVirtualAddressMap().
*/
efi_memmap_unmap();
if (efi_memmap_init_late(pa, efi.memmap.desc_size * count)) {
pr_err("Failed to remap late EFI memory map\n");
goto err;
}
if (efi_enabled(EFI_DBG)) {
pr_info("EFI runtime memory map:\n");
efi_print_memmap();
}
if (efi_setup_page_tables(pa, 1 << pg_shift))
goto err;
efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings();
status = efi_set_virtual_address_map(efi.memmap.desc_size * count,
efi.memmap.desc_size,
efi.memmap.desc_version,
(efi_memory_desc_t *)pa,
efi_systab_phys);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
pr_err("Unable to switch EFI into virtual mode (status=%lx)!\n",
status);
goto err;
}
efi: Add embedded peripheral firmware support Just like with PCI options ROMs, which we save in the setup_efi_pci* functions from arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c, the EFI code / ROM itself sometimes may contain data which is useful/necessary for peripheral drivers to have access to. Specifically the EFI code may contain an embedded copy of firmware which needs to be (re)loaded into the peripheral. Normally such firmware would be part of linux-firmware, but in some cases this is not feasible, for 2 reasons: 1) The firmware is customized for a specific use-case of the chipset / use with a specific hardware model, so we cannot have a single firmware file for the chipset. E.g. touchscreen controller firmwares are compiled specifically for the hardware model they are used with, as they are calibrated for a specific model digitizer. 2) Despite repeated attempts we have failed to get permission to redistribute the firmware. This is especially a problem with customized firmwares, these get created by the chip vendor for a specific ODM and the copyright may partially belong with the ODM, so the chip vendor cannot give a blanket permission to distribute these. This commit adds support for finding peripheral firmware embedded in the EFI code and makes the found firmware available through the new efi_get_embedded_fw() function. Support for loading these firmwares through the standard firmware loading mechanism is added in a follow-up commit in this patch-series. Note we check the EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE for embedded firmware near the end of start_kernel(), just before calling rest_init(), this is on purpose because the typical EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE memory-segment is too large for early_memremap(), so the check must be done after mm_init(). This relies on EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE not being free-ed until efi_free_boot_services() is called, which means that this will only work on x86 for now. Reported-by: Dave Olsthoorn <dave@bewaar.me> Suggested-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200115163554.101315-3-hdegoede@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
2020-01-15 17:35:46 +01:00
efi_check_for_embedded_firmwares();
efi_free_boot_services();
if (!efi_is_mixed())
efi_native_runtime_setup();
else
efi_thunk_runtime_setup();
x86/efi: Map EFI_MEMORY_{XP,RO} memory region bits to EFI page tables Now that we have EFI memory region bits that indicate which regions do not need execute permission or read/write permission in the page tables, let's use them. We also check for EFI_NX_PE_DATA and only enforce the restrictive mappings if it's present (to allow us to ignore buggy firmware that sets bits it didn't mean to and to preserve backwards compatibility). Instead of assuming that firmware would set appropriate attributes in memory descriptor like EFI_MEMORY_RO for code and EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, we can expect some firmware out there which might only set *type* in memory descriptor to be EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE or EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA leaving away attribute. This will lead to improper mappings of EFI runtime regions. In order to avoid it, we check attribute and type of memory descriptor to update mappings and moreover Windows works this way. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455712566-16727-13-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-17 12:36:05 +00:00
/*
* Apply more restrictive page table mapping attributes now that
* SVAM() has been called and the firmware has performed all
* necessary relocation fixups for the new virtual addresses.
*/
efi_runtime_update_mappings();
Modify UEFI anti-bricking code This patch reworks the UEFI anti-bricking code, including an effective reversion of cc5a080c and 31ff2f20. It turns out that calling QueryVariableInfo() from boot services results in some firmware implementations jumping to physical addresses even after entering virtual mode, so until we have 1:1 mappings for UEFI runtime space this isn't going to work so well. Reverting these gets us back to the situation where we'd refuse to create variables on some systems because they classify deleted variables as "used" until the firmware triggers a garbage collection run, which they won't do until they reach a lower threshold. This results in it being impossible to install a bootloader, which is unhelpful. Feedback from Samsung indicates that the firmware doesn't need more than 5KB of storage space for its own purposes, so that seems like a reasonable threshold. However, there's still no guarantee that a platform will attempt garbage collection merely because it drops below this threshold. It seems that this is often only triggered if an attempt to write generates a genuine EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES error. We can force that by attempting to create a variable larger than the remaining space. This should fail, but if it somehow succeeds we can then immediately delete it. I've tested this on the UEFI machines I have available, but I don't have a Samsung and so can't verify that it avoids the bricking problem. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Y <jlee@suse.com> [ dummy variable cleanup ] Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
2013-06-01 16:06:20 -04:00
/* clean DUMMY object */
efi_delete_dummy_variable();
return;
err:
clear_bit(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES, &efi.flags);
}
void __init efi_enter_virtual_mode(void)
{
if (efi_enabled(EFI_PARAVIRT))
return;
efi.runtime = (efi_runtime_services_t *)efi_runtime;
if (efi_setup)
kexec_enter_virtual_mode();
else
__efi_enter_virtual_mode();
efi_dump_pagetable();
}
bool efi_is_table_address(unsigned long phys_addr)
{
unsigned int i;
if (phys_addr == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
return false;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(efi_tables); i++)
if (*(efi_tables[i]) == phys_addr)
return true;
return false;
}
char *efi_systab_show_arch(char *str)
{
if (uga_phys != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
str += sprintf(str, "UGA=0x%lx\n", uga_phys);
return str;
}
#define EFI_FIELD(var) efi_ ## var
#define EFI_ATTR_SHOW(name) \
static ssize_t name##_show(struct kobject *kobj, \
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf) \
{ \
return sprintf(buf, "0x%lx\n", EFI_FIELD(name)); \
}
EFI_ATTR_SHOW(fw_vendor);
EFI_ATTR_SHOW(runtime);
EFI_ATTR_SHOW(config_table);
struct kobj_attribute efi_attr_fw_vendor = __ATTR_RO(fw_vendor);
struct kobj_attribute efi_attr_runtime = __ATTR_RO(runtime);
struct kobj_attribute efi_attr_config_table = __ATTR_RO(config_table);
umode_t efi_attr_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr, int n)
{
if (attr == &efi_attr_fw_vendor.attr) {
if (efi_enabled(EFI_PARAVIRT) ||
efi_fw_vendor == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
return 0;
} else if (attr == &efi_attr_runtime.attr) {
if (efi_runtime == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
return 0;
} else if (attr == &efi_attr_config_table.attr) {
if (efi_config_table == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
return 0;
}
return attr->mode;
}