linux/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 15:07:57 +01:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#define __EXPORTED_HEADERS__
#include <errno.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <linux/falloc.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/memfd.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include "common.h"
#define MEMFD_STR "memfd:"
#define MEMFD_HUGE_STR "memfd-hugetlb:"
#define SHARED_FT_STR "(shared file-table)"
#define MFD_DEF_SIZE 8192
#define STACK_SIZE 65536
#define F_SEAL_EXEC 0x0020
#define F_WX_SEALS (F_SEAL_SHRINK | \
F_SEAL_GROW | \
F_SEAL_WRITE | \
F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE | \
F_SEAL_EXEC)
#define MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL 0x0008U
/*
* Default is not to test hugetlbfs
*/
static size_t mfd_def_size = MFD_DEF_SIZE;
static const char *memfd_str = MEMFD_STR;
static ssize_t fd2name(int fd, char *buf, size_t bufsize)
{
char buf1[PATH_MAX];
int size;
ssize_t nbytes;
size = snprintf(buf1, PATH_MAX, "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
if (size < 0) {
printf("snprintf(%d) failed on %m\n", fd);
abort();
}
/*
* reserver one byte for string termination.
*/
nbytes = readlink(buf1, buf, bufsize-1);
if (nbytes == -1) {
printf("readlink(%s) failed %m\n", buf1);
abort();
}
buf[nbytes] = '\0';
return nbytes;
}
static int mfd_assert_new(const char *name, loff_t sz, unsigned int flags)
{
int r, fd;
fd = sys_memfd_create(name, flags);
if (fd < 0) {
printf("memfd_create(\"%s\", %u) failed: %m\n",
name, flags);
abort();
}
r = ftruncate(fd, sz);
if (r < 0) {
printf("ftruncate(%llu) failed: %m\n", (unsigned long long)sz);
abort();
}
return fd;
}
static void sysctl_assert_write(const char *val)
{
int fd = open("/proc/sys/vm/memfd_noexec", O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0) {
printf("open sysctl failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
if (write(fd, val, strlen(val)) < 0) {
printf("write sysctl %s failed: %m\n", val);
abort();
}
}
static void sysctl_fail_write(const char *val)
{
int fd = open("/proc/sys/vm/memfd_noexec", O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0) {
printf("open sysctl failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
if (write(fd, val, strlen(val)) >= 0) {
printf("write sysctl %s succeeded, but failure expected\n",
val);
abort();
}
}
static void sysctl_assert_equal(const char *val)
{
char *p, buf[128] = {};
int fd = open("/proc/sys/vm/memfd_noexec", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0) {
printf("open sysctl failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
if (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
printf("read sysctl failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
/* Strip trailing whitespace. */
p = buf;
while (!isspace(*p))
p++;
*p = '\0';
if (strcmp(buf, val) != 0) {
printf("unexpected sysctl value: expected %s, got %s\n", val, buf);
abort();
}
}
static int mfd_assert_reopen_fd(int fd_in)
{
int fd;
char path[100];
sprintf(path, "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd_in);
fd = open(path, O_RDWR);
if (fd < 0) {
printf("re-open of existing fd %d failed\n", fd_in);
abort();
}
return fd;
}
static void mfd_fail_new(const char *name, unsigned int flags)
{
int r;
r = sys_memfd_create(name, flags);
if (r >= 0) {
printf("memfd_create(\"%s\", %u) succeeded, but failure expected\n",
name, flags);
close(r);
abort();
}
}
static unsigned int mfd_assert_get_seals(int fd)
{
int r;
r = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
if (r < 0) {
printf("GET_SEALS(%d) failed: %m\n", fd);
abort();
}
return (unsigned int)r;
}
static void mfd_assert_has_seals(int fd, unsigned int seals)
{
char buf[PATH_MAX];
unsigned int s;
fd2name(fd, buf, PATH_MAX);
s = mfd_assert_get_seals(fd);
if (s != seals) {
printf("%u != %u = GET_SEALS(%s)\n", seals, s, buf);
abort();
}
}
static void mfd_assert_add_seals(int fd, unsigned int seals)
{
int r;
unsigned int s;
s = mfd_assert_get_seals(fd);
r = fcntl(fd, F_ADD_SEALS, seals);
if (r < 0) {
printf("ADD_SEALS(%d, %u -> %u) failed: %m\n", fd, s, seals);
abort();
}
}
static void mfd_fail_add_seals(int fd, unsigned int seals)
{
int r;
unsigned int s;
r = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
if (r < 0)
s = 0;
else
s = (unsigned int)r;
r = fcntl(fd, F_ADD_SEALS, seals);
if (r >= 0) {
printf("ADD_SEALS(%d, %u -> %u) didn't fail as expected\n",
fd, s, seals);
abort();
}
}
static void mfd_assert_size(int fd, size_t size)
{
struct stat st;
int r;
r = fstat(fd, &st);
if (r < 0) {
printf("fstat(%d) failed: %m\n", fd);
abort();
} else if (st.st_size != size) {
printf("wrong file size %lld, but expected %lld\n",
(long long)st.st_size, (long long)size);
abort();
}
}
static int mfd_assert_dup(int fd)
{
int r;
r = dup(fd);
if (r < 0) {
printf("dup(%d) failed: %m\n", fd);
abort();
}
return r;
}
static void *mfd_assert_mmap_shared(int fd)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL,
mfd_def_size,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,
fd,
0);
if (p == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("mmap() failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
return p;
}
static void *mfd_assert_mmap_private(int fd)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL,
mfd_def_size,
PROT_READ,
MAP_PRIVATE,
fd,
0);
if (p == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("mmap() failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
return p;
}
static int mfd_assert_open(int fd, int flags, mode_t mode)
{
char buf[512];
int r;
sprintf(buf, "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
r = open(buf, flags, mode);
if (r < 0) {
printf("open(%s) failed: %m\n", buf);
abort();
}
return r;
}
static void mfd_fail_open(int fd, int flags, mode_t mode)
{
char buf[512];
int r;
sprintf(buf, "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
r = open(buf, flags, mode);
if (r >= 0) {
printf("open(%s) didn't fail as expected\n", buf);
abort();
}
}
static void mfd_assert_read(int fd)
{
char buf[16];
void *p;
ssize_t l;
l = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (l != sizeof(buf)) {
printf("read() failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
/* verify PROT_READ *is* allowed */
p = mmap(NULL,
mfd_def_size,
PROT_READ,
MAP_PRIVATE,
fd,
0);
if (p == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("mmap() failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
munmap(p, mfd_def_size);
/* verify MAP_PRIVATE is *always* allowed (even writable) */
p = mmap(NULL,
mfd_def_size,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE,
fd,
0);
if (p == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("mmap() failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
munmap(p, mfd_def_size);
}
/* Test that PROT_READ + MAP_SHARED mappings work. */
static void mfd_assert_read_shared(int fd)
{
void *p;
/* verify PROT_READ and MAP_SHARED *is* allowed */
p = mmap(NULL,
mfd_def_size,
PROT_READ,
MAP_SHARED,
fd,
0);
if (p == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("mmap() failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
munmap(p, mfd_def_size);
}
static void mfd_assert_fork_private_write(int fd)
{
int *p;
pid_t pid;
p = mmap(NULL,
mfd_def_size,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE,
fd,
0);
if (p == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("mmap() failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
p[0] = 22;
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
p[0] = 33;
exit(0);
} else {
waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
if (p[0] != 22) {
printf("MAP_PRIVATE copy-on-write failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
}
munmap(p, mfd_def_size);
}
static void mfd_assert_write(int fd)
{
ssize_t l;
void *p;
int r;
/*
* huegtlbfs does not support write, but we want to
* verify everything else here.
*/
if (!hugetlbfs_test) {
/* verify write() succeeds */
l = write(fd, "\0\0\0\0", 4);
if (l != 4) {
printf("write() failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
}
/* verify PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE is allowed */
p = mmap(NULL,
mfd_def_size,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,
fd,
0);
if (p == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("mmap() failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
*(char *)p = 0;
munmap(p, mfd_def_size);
/* verify PROT_WRITE is allowed */
p = mmap(NULL,
mfd_def_size,
PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,
fd,
0);
if (p == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("mmap() failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
*(char *)p = 0;
munmap(p, mfd_def_size);
/* verify PROT_READ with MAP_SHARED is allowed and a following
* mprotect(PROT_WRITE) allows writing */
p = mmap(NULL,
mfd_def_size,
PROT_READ,
MAP_SHARED,
fd,
0);
if (p == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("mmap() failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
r = mprotect(p, mfd_def_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
if (r < 0) {
printf("mprotect() failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
*(char *)p = 0;
munmap(p, mfd_def_size);
/* verify PUNCH_HOLE works */
r = fallocate(fd,
FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE | FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE,
0,
mfd_def_size);
if (r < 0) {
printf("fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE) failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
}
static void mfd_fail_write(int fd)
{
ssize_t l;
void *p;
int r;
/* verify write() fails */
l = write(fd, "data", 4);
if (l != -EPERM) {
printf("expected EPERM on write(), but got %d: %m\n", (int)l);
abort();
}
/* verify PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE is not allowed */
p = mmap(NULL,
mfd_def_size,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,
fd,
0);
if (p != MAP_FAILED) {
printf("mmap() didn't fail as expected\n");
abort();
}
/* verify PROT_WRITE is not allowed */
p = mmap(NULL,
mfd_def_size,
PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,
fd,
0);
if (p != MAP_FAILED) {
printf("mmap() didn't fail as expected\n");
abort();
}
/* Verify PROT_READ with MAP_SHARED with a following mprotect is not
* allowed. Note that for r/w the kernel already prevents the mmap. */
p = mmap(NULL,
mfd_def_size,
PROT_READ,
MAP_SHARED,
fd,
0);
if (p != MAP_FAILED) {
r = mprotect(p, mfd_def_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
if (r >= 0) {
printf("mmap()+mprotect() didn't fail as expected\n");
abort();
}
munmap(p, mfd_def_size);
}
/* verify PUNCH_HOLE fails */
r = fallocate(fd,
FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE | FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE,
0,
mfd_def_size);
if (r >= 0) {
printf("fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE) didn't fail as expected\n");
abort();
}
}
static void mfd_assert_shrink(int fd)
{
int r, fd2;
r = ftruncate(fd, mfd_def_size / 2);
if (r < 0) {
printf("ftruncate(SHRINK) failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
mfd_assert_size(fd, mfd_def_size / 2);
fd2 = mfd_assert_open(fd,
O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC,
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
close(fd2);
mfd_assert_size(fd, 0);
}
static void mfd_fail_shrink(int fd)
{
int r;
r = ftruncate(fd, mfd_def_size / 2);
if (r >= 0) {
printf("ftruncate(SHRINK) didn't fail as expected\n");
abort();
}
mfd_fail_open(fd,
O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC,
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
}
static void mfd_assert_grow(int fd)
{
int r;
r = ftruncate(fd, mfd_def_size * 2);
if (r < 0) {
printf("ftruncate(GROW) failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
mfd_assert_size(fd, mfd_def_size * 2);
r = fallocate(fd,
0,
0,
mfd_def_size * 4);
if (r < 0) {
printf("fallocate(ALLOC) failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
mfd_assert_size(fd, mfd_def_size * 4);
}
static void mfd_fail_grow(int fd)
{
int r;
r = ftruncate(fd, mfd_def_size * 2);
if (r >= 0) {
printf("ftruncate(GROW) didn't fail as expected\n");
abort();
}
r = fallocate(fd,
0,
0,
mfd_def_size * 4);
if (r >= 0) {
printf("fallocate(ALLOC) didn't fail as expected\n");
abort();
}
}
static void mfd_assert_grow_write(int fd)
{
static char *buf;
ssize_t l;
/* hugetlbfs does not support write */
if (hugetlbfs_test)
return;
buf = malloc(mfd_def_size * 8);
if (!buf) {
printf("malloc(%zu) failed: %m\n", mfd_def_size * 8);
abort();
}
l = pwrite(fd, buf, mfd_def_size * 8, 0);
if (l != (mfd_def_size * 8)) {
printf("pwrite() failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
mfd_assert_size(fd, mfd_def_size * 8);
}
static void mfd_fail_grow_write(int fd)
{
static char *buf;
ssize_t l;
/* hugetlbfs does not support write */
if (hugetlbfs_test)
return;
buf = malloc(mfd_def_size * 8);
if (!buf) {
printf("malloc(%zu) failed: %m\n", mfd_def_size * 8);
abort();
}
l = pwrite(fd, buf, mfd_def_size * 8, 0);
if (l == (mfd_def_size * 8)) {
printf("pwrite() didn't fail as expected\n");
abort();
}
}
static void mfd_assert_mode(int fd, int mode)
{
struct stat st;
char buf[PATH_MAX];
fd2name(fd, buf, PATH_MAX);
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
printf("fstat(%s) failed: %m\n", buf);
abort();
}
if ((st.st_mode & 07777) != mode) {
printf("fstat(%s) wrong file mode 0%04o, but expected 0%04o\n",
buf, (int)st.st_mode & 07777, mode);
abort();
}
}
static void mfd_assert_chmod(int fd, int mode)
{
char buf[PATH_MAX];
fd2name(fd, buf, PATH_MAX);
if (fchmod(fd, mode) < 0) {
printf("fchmod(%s, 0%04o) failed: %m\n", buf, mode);
abort();
}
mfd_assert_mode(fd, mode);
}
static void mfd_fail_chmod(int fd, int mode)
{
struct stat st;
char buf[PATH_MAX];
fd2name(fd, buf, PATH_MAX);
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
printf("fstat(%s) failed: %m\n", buf);
abort();
}
if (fchmod(fd, mode) == 0) {
printf("fchmod(%s, 0%04o) didn't fail as expected\n",
buf, mode);
abort();
}
/* verify that file mode bits did not change */
mfd_assert_mode(fd, st.st_mode & 07777);
}
static int idle_thread_fn(void *arg)
{
sigset_t set;
int sig;
/* dummy waiter; SIGTERM terminates us anyway */
sigemptyset(&set);
sigaddset(&set, SIGTERM);
sigwait(&set, &sig);
return 0;
}
static pid_t spawn_thread(unsigned int flags, int (*fn)(void *), void *arg)
{
uint8_t *stack;
pid_t pid;
stack = malloc(STACK_SIZE);
if (!stack) {
printf("malloc(STACK_SIZE) failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
pid = clone(fn, stack + STACK_SIZE, SIGCHLD | flags, arg);
if (pid < 0) {
printf("clone() failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
return pid;
}
static void join_thread(pid_t pid)
{
int wstatus;
if (waitpid(pid, &wstatus, 0) < 0) {
printf("newpid thread: waitpid() failed: %m\n");
abort();
}
if (WIFEXITED(wstatus) && WEXITSTATUS(wstatus) != 0) {
printf("newpid thread: exited with non-zero error code %d\n",
WEXITSTATUS(wstatus));
abort();
}
if (WIFSIGNALED(wstatus)) {
printf("newpid thread: killed by signal %d\n",
WTERMSIG(wstatus));
abort();
}
}
static pid_t spawn_idle_thread(unsigned int flags)
{
return spawn_thread(flags, idle_thread_fn, NULL);
}
static void join_idle_thread(pid_t pid)
{
kill(pid, SIGTERM);
waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
}
/*
* Test memfd_create() syscall
* Verify syscall-argument validation, including name checks, flag validation
* and more.
*/
static void test_create(void)
{
char buf[2048];
int fd;
printf("%s CREATE\n", memfd_str);
/* test NULL name */
mfd_fail_new(NULL, 0);
/* test over-long name (not zero-terminated) */
memset(buf, 0xff, sizeof(buf));
mfd_fail_new(buf, 0);
/* test over-long zero-terminated name */
memset(buf, 0xff, sizeof(buf));
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
mfd_fail_new(buf, 0);
/* verify "" is a valid name */
fd = mfd_assert_new("", 0, 0);
close(fd);
/* verify invalid O_* open flags */
mfd_fail_new("", 0x0100);
mfd_fail_new("", ~MFD_CLOEXEC);
mfd_fail_new("", ~MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
mfd_fail_new("", ~0);
mfd_fail_new("", 0x80000000U);
/* verify EXEC and NOEXEC_SEAL can't both be set */
mfd_fail_new("", MFD_EXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL);
/* verify MFD_CLOEXEC is allowed */
fd = mfd_assert_new("", 0, MFD_CLOEXEC);
close(fd);
/* verify MFD_ALLOW_SEALING is allowed */
fd = mfd_assert_new("", 0, MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
close(fd);
/* verify MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_CLOEXEC is allowed */
fd = mfd_assert_new("", 0, MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_CLOEXEC);
close(fd);
}
/*
* Test basic sealing
* A very basic sealing test to see whether setting/retrieving seals works.
*/
static void test_basic(void)
{
int fd;
printf("%s BASIC\n", memfd_str);
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_basic",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
/* add basic seals */
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SHRINK |
F_SEAL_WRITE);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SHRINK |
F_SEAL_WRITE);
/* add them again */
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SHRINK |
F_SEAL_WRITE);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SHRINK |
F_SEAL_WRITE);
/* add more seals and seal against sealing */
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_SEAL);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SHRINK |
F_SEAL_GROW |
F_SEAL_WRITE |
F_SEAL_SEAL);
/* verify that sealing no longer works */
mfd_fail_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_GROW);
mfd_fail_add_seals(fd, 0);
close(fd);
/* verify sealing does not work without MFD_ALLOW_SEALING */
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_basic",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SEAL);
mfd_fail_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SHRINK |
F_SEAL_GROW |
F_SEAL_WRITE);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SEAL);
close(fd);
}
/*
* Test SEAL_WRITE
* Test whether SEAL_WRITE actually prevents modifications.
*/
static void test_seal_write(void)
{
int fd;
printf("%s SEAL-WRITE\n", memfd_str);
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_seal_write",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE);
mfd_assert_read(fd);
mfd_fail_write(fd);
mfd_assert_shrink(fd);
mfd_assert_grow(fd);
mfd_fail_grow_write(fd);
close(fd);
}
/*
* Test SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE
* Test whether SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE actually prevents modifications.
*/
static void test_seal_future_write(void)
{
int fd, fd2;
void *p;
printf("%s SEAL-FUTURE-WRITE\n", memfd_str);
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_seal_future_write",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
p = mfd_assert_mmap_shared(fd);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE);
/* read should pass, writes should fail */
mfd_assert_read(fd);
mfd_assert_read_shared(fd);
mfd_fail_write(fd);
fd2 = mfd_assert_reopen_fd(fd);
/* read should pass, writes should still fail */
mfd_assert_read(fd2);
mfd_assert_read_shared(fd2);
mfd_fail_write(fd2);
mfd_assert_fork_private_write(fd);
munmap(p, mfd_def_size);
close(fd2);
close(fd);
}
/*
* Test SEAL_SHRINK
* Test whether SEAL_SHRINK actually prevents shrinking
*/
static void test_seal_shrink(void)
{
int fd;
printf("%s SEAL-SHRINK\n", memfd_str);
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_seal_shrink",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SHRINK);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SHRINK);
mfd_assert_read(fd);
mfd_assert_write(fd);
mfd_fail_shrink(fd);
mfd_assert_grow(fd);
mfd_assert_grow_write(fd);
close(fd);
}
/*
* Test SEAL_GROW
* Test whether SEAL_GROW actually prevents growing
*/
static void test_seal_grow(void)
{
int fd;
printf("%s SEAL-GROW\n", memfd_str);
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_seal_grow",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_GROW);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_GROW);
mfd_assert_read(fd);
mfd_assert_write(fd);
mfd_assert_shrink(fd);
mfd_fail_grow(fd);
mfd_fail_grow_write(fd);
close(fd);
}
/*
* Test SEAL_SHRINK | SEAL_GROW
* Test whether SEAL_SHRINK | SEAL_GROW actually prevents resizing
*/
static void test_seal_resize(void)
{
int fd;
printf("%s SEAL-RESIZE\n", memfd_str);
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_seal_resize",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW);
mfd_assert_read(fd);
mfd_assert_write(fd);
mfd_fail_shrink(fd);
mfd_fail_grow(fd);
mfd_fail_grow_write(fd);
close(fd);
}
/*
* Test SEAL_EXEC
* Test fd is created with exec and allow sealing.
* chmod() cannot change x bits after sealing.
*/
static void test_exec_seal(void)
{
int fd;
printf("%s SEAL-EXEC\n", memfd_str);
printf("%s Apply SEAL_EXEC\n", memfd_str);
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_seal_exec",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_EXEC);
mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0777);
mfd_assert_chmod(fd, 0644);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
mfd_assert_chmod(fd, 0600);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0670);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0605);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0700);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0100);
mfd_assert_chmod(fd, 0666);
mfd_assert_write(fd);
close(fd);
printf("%s Apply ALL_SEALS\n", memfd_str);
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_seal_exec",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_EXEC);
mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0777);
mfd_assert_chmod(fd, 0700);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_WX_SEALS);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0711);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0600);
mfd_fail_write(fd);
close(fd);
}
/*
* Test EXEC_NO_SEAL
* Test fd is created with exec and not allow sealing.
*/
static void test_exec_no_seal(void)
{
int fd;
printf("%s EXEC_NO_SEAL\n", memfd_str);
/* Create with EXEC but without ALLOW_SEALING */
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_exec_no_sealing",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_EXEC);
mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0777);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SEAL);
mfd_assert_chmod(fd, 0666);
close(fd);
}
/*
* Test memfd_create with MFD_NOEXEC flag
*/
static void test_noexec_seal(void)
{
int fd;
printf("%s NOEXEC_SEAL\n", memfd_str);
/* Create with NOEXEC and ALLOW_SEALING */
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_noexec",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL);
mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
close(fd);
/* Create with NOEXEC but without ALLOW_SEALING */
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_noexec",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL);
mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
close(fd);
}
static void test_sysctl_sysctl0(void)
{
int fd;
sysctl_assert_equal("0");
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_0_dfl",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0777);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
mfd_assert_chmod(fd, 0644);
close(fd);
}
static void test_sysctl_set_sysctl0(void)
{
sysctl_assert_write("0");
test_sysctl_sysctl0();
}
static void test_sysctl_sysctl1(void)
{
int fd;
sysctl_assert_equal("1");
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_1_dfl",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
close(fd);
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_1_exec",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_EXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0777);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
mfd_assert_chmod(fd, 0644);
close(fd);
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_1_noexec",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
close(fd);
}
static void test_sysctl_set_sysctl1(void)
{
sysctl_assert_write("1");
test_sysctl_sysctl1();
}
static void test_sysctl_sysctl2(void)
{
int fd;
sysctl_assert_equal("2");
memfd: do not -EACCES old memfd_create() users with vm.memfd_noexec=2 Given the difficulty of auditing all of userspace to figure out whether every memfd_create() user has switched to passing MFD_EXEC and MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL flags, it seems far less distruptive to make it possible for older programs that don't make use of executable memfds to run under vm.memfd_noexec=2. Otherwise, a small dependency change can result in spurious errors. For programs that don't use executable memfds, passing MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is functionally a no-op and thus having the same In addition, every failure under vm.memfd_noexec=2 needs to print to the kernel log so that userspace can figure out where the error came from. The concerns about pr_warn_ratelimited() spam that caused the switch to pr_warn_once()[1,2] do not apply to the vm.memfd_noexec=2 case. This is a user-visible API change, but as it allows programs to do something that would be blocked before, and the sysctl itself was broken and recently released, it seems unlikely this will cause any issues. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/Y5yS8wCnuYGLHMj4@x1n/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/202212161233.85C9783FB@keescook/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814-memfd-vm-noexec-uapi-fixes-v2-2-7ff9e3e10ba6@cyphar.com Fixes: 105ff5339f49 ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC") Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-08-14 18:40:58 +10:00
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_dfl",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
close(fd);
mfd_fail_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_exec",
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_EXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_noexec",
memfd: do not -EACCES old memfd_create() users with vm.memfd_noexec=2 Given the difficulty of auditing all of userspace to figure out whether every memfd_create() user has switched to passing MFD_EXEC and MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL flags, it seems far less distruptive to make it possible for older programs that don't make use of executable memfds to run under vm.memfd_noexec=2. Otherwise, a small dependency change can result in spurious errors. For programs that don't use executable memfds, passing MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is functionally a no-op and thus having the same In addition, every failure under vm.memfd_noexec=2 needs to print to the kernel log so that userspace can figure out where the error came from. The concerns about pr_warn_ratelimited() spam that caused the switch to pr_warn_once()[1,2] do not apply to the vm.memfd_noexec=2 case. This is a user-visible API change, but as it allows programs to do something that would be blocked before, and the sysctl itself was broken and recently released, it seems unlikely this will cause any issues. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/Y5yS8wCnuYGLHMj4@x1n/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/202212161233.85C9783FB@keescook/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814-memfd-vm-noexec-uapi-fixes-v2-2-7ff9e3e10ba6@cyphar.com Fixes: 105ff5339f49 ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC") Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-08-14 18:40:58 +10:00
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
memfd: do not -EACCES old memfd_create() users with vm.memfd_noexec=2 Given the difficulty of auditing all of userspace to figure out whether every memfd_create() user has switched to passing MFD_EXEC and MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL flags, it seems far less distruptive to make it possible for older programs that don't make use of executable memfds to run under vm.memfd_noexec=2. Otherwise, a small dependency change can result in spurious errors. For programs that don't use executable memfds, passing MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is functionally a no-op and thus having the same In addition, every failure under vm.memfd_noexec=2 needs to print to the kernel log so that userspace can figure out where the error came from. The concerns about pr_warn_ratelimited() spam that caused the switch to pr_warn_once()[1,2] do not apply to the vm.memfd_noexec=2 case. This is a user-visible API change, but as it allows programs to do something that would be blocked before, and the sysctl itself was broken and recently released, it seems unlikely this will cause any issues. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/Y5yS8wCnuYGLHMj4@x1n/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/202212161233.85C9783FB@keescook/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814-memfd-vm-noexec-uapi-fixes-v2-2-7ff9e3e10ba6@cyphar.com Fixes: 105ff5339f49 ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC") Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-08-14 18:40:58 +10:00
mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
close(fd);
}
static void test_sysctl_set_sysctl2(void)
{
sysctl_assert_write("2");
test_sysctl_sysctl2();
}
static int sysctl_simple_child(void *arg)
{
printf("%s sysctl 0\n", memfd_str);
test_sysctl_set_sysctl0();
printf("%s sysctl 1\n", memfd_str);
test_sysctl_set_sysctl1();
printf("%s sysctl 0\n", memfd_str);
test_sysctl_set_sysctl0();
printf("%s sysctl 2\n", memfd_str);
test_sysctl_set_sysctl2();
printf("%s sysctl 1\n", memfd_str);
test_sysctl_set_sysctl1();
printf("%s sysctl 0\n", memfd_str);
test_sysctl_set_sysctl0();
return 0;
}
/*
* Test sysctl
* A very basic test to make sure the core sysctl semantics work.
*/
static void test_sysctl_simple(void)
{
int pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_simple_child, NULL);
join_thread(pid);
}
static int sysctl_nested(void *arg)
{
void (*fn)(void) = arg;
fn();
return 0;
}
static int sysctl_nested_wait(void *arg)
{
/* Wait for a SIGCONT. */
kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
return sysctl_nested(arg);
}
static void test_sysctl_sysctl1_failset(void)
{
sysctl_fail_write("0");
test_sysctl_sysctl1();
}
static void test_sysctl_sysctl2_failset(void)
{
sysctl_fail_write("1");
test_sysctl_sysctl2();
sysctl_fail_write("0");
test_sysctl_sysctl2();
}
static int sysctl_nested_child(void *arg)
{
int pid;
selftests: memfd: error out test process when child test fails Patch series "memfd: cleanups for vm.memfd_noexec", v2. The most critical issue with vm.memfd_noexec=2 (the fact that passing MFD_EXEC would bypass it entirely[1]) has been fixed in Andrew's tree[2], but there are still some outstanding issues that need to be addressed: * vm.memfd_noexec=2 shouldn't reject old-style memfd_create(2) syscalls because it will make it far to difficult to ever migrate. Instead it should imply MFD_EXEC. * The dmesg warnings are pr_warn_once(), which on most systems means that they will be used up by systemd or some other boot process and userspace developers will never see it. - For the !(flags & (MFD_EXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL)) case, outputting a rate-limited message to the kernel log is necessary to tell userspace that they should add the new flags. Arguably the most ideal way to deal with the spam concern[3,4] while still prompting userspace to switch to the new flags would be to only log the warning once per task or something similar. However, adding something to task_struct for tracking this would be needless bloat for a single pr_warn_ratelimited(). So just switch to pr_info_ratelimited() to avoid spamming the log with something that isn't a real warning. There's lots of info-level stuff in dmesg, it seems really unlikely that this should be an actual problem. Most programs are already switching to the new flags anyway. - For the vm.memfd_noexec=2 case, we need to log a warning for every failure because otherwise userspace will have no idea why their previously working program started returning -EACCES (previously -EINVAL) from memfd_create(2). pr_warn_once() is simply wrong here. * The racheting mechanism for vm.memfd_noexec makes it incredibly unappealing for most users to enable the sysctl because enabling it on &init_pid_ns means you need a system reboot to unset it. Given the actual security threat being protected against, CAP_SYS_ADMIN users being restricted in this way makes little sense. The argument for this ratcheting by the original author was that it allows you to have a hierarchical setting that cannot be unset by child pidnses, but this is not accurate -- changing the parent pidns's vm.memfd_noexec setting to be more restrictive didn't affect children. Instead, switch the vm.memfd_noexec sysctl to be properly hierarchical and allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN users (in the pidns's owning userns) to lower the setting as long as it is not lower than the parent's effective setting. This change also makes it so that changing a parent pidns's vm.memfd_noexec will affect all descendants, providing a properly hierarchical setting. The performance impact of this is incredibly minimal since the maximum depth of pidns is 32 and it is only checked during memfd_create(2) and unshare(CLONE_NEWPID). * The memfd selftests would not exit with a non-zero error code when certain tests that ran in a forked process (specifically the ones related to MFD_EXEC and MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL) failed. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZJwcsU0vI-nzgOB_@codewreck.org/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230705063315.3680666-1-jeffxu@google.com/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/Y5yS8wCnuYGLHMj4@x1n/ [4]: https://lore.kernel.org/f185bb42-b29c-977e-312e-3349eea15383@linuxfoundation.org/ This patch (of 5): Before this change, a test runner using this self test would see a return code of 0 when the tests using a child process (namely the MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC tests) failed, masking test failures. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814-memfd-vm-noexec-uapi-fixes-v2-0-7ff9e3e10ba6@cyphar.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814-memfd-vm-noexec-uapi-fixes-v2-1-7ff9e3e10ba6@cyphar.com Fixes: 11f75a01448f ("selftests/memfd: add tests for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC") Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-08-14 18:40:57 +10:00
printf("%s nested sysctl 0\n", memfd_str);
sysctl_assert_write("0");
/* A further nested pidns works the same. */
pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_simple_child, NULL);
join_thread(pid);
selftests: memfd: error out test process when child test fails Patch series "memfd: cleanups for vm.memfd_noexec", v2. The most critical issue with vm.memfd_noexec=2 (the fact that passing MFD_EXEC would bypass it entirely[1]) has been fixed in Andrew's tree[2], but there are still some outstanding issues that need to be addressed: * vm.memfd_noexec=2 shouldn't reject old-style memfd_create(2) syscalls because it will make it far to difficult to ever migrate. Instead it should imply MFD_EXEC. * The dmesg warnings are pr_warn_once(), which on most systems means that they will be used up by systemd or some other boot process and userspace developers will never see it. - For the !(flags & (MFD_EXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL)) case, outputting a rate-limited message to the kernel log is necessary to tell userspace that they should add the new flags. Arguably the most ideal way to deal with the spam concern[3,4] while still prompting userspace to switch to the new flags would be to only log the warning once per task or something similar. However, adding something to task_struct for tracking this would be needless bloat for a single pr_warn_ratelimited(). So just switch to pr_info_ratelimited() to avoid spamming the log with something that isn't a real warning. There's lots of info-level stuff in dmesg, it seems really unlikely that this should be an actual problem. Most programs are already switching to the new flags anyway. - For the vm.memfd_noexec=2 case, we need to log a warning for every failure because otherwise userspace will have no idea why their previously working program started returning -EACCES (previously -EINVAL) from memfd_create(2). pr_warn_once() is simply wrong here. * The racheting mechanism for vm.memfd_noexec makes it incredibly unappealing for most users to enable the sysctl because enabling it on &init_pid_ns means you need a system reboot to unset it. Given the actual security threat being protected against, CAP_SYS_ADMIN users being restricted in this way makes little sense. The argument for this ratcheting by the original author was that it allows you to have a hierarchical setting that cannot be unset by child pidnses, but this is not accurate -- changing the parent pidns's vm.memfd_noexec setting to be more restrictive didn't affect children. Instead, switch the vm.memfd_noexec sysctl to be properly hierarchical and allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN users (in the pidns's owning userns) to lower the setting as long as it is not lower than the parent's effective setting. This change also makes it so that changing a parent pidns's vm.memfd_noexec will affect all descendants, providing a properly hierarchical setting. The performance impact of this is incredibly minimal since the maximum depth of pidns is 32 and it is only checked during memfd_create(2) and unshare(CLONE_NEWPID). * The memfd selftests would not exit with a non-zero error code when certain tests that ran in a forked process (specifically the ones related to MFD_EXEC and MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL) failed. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZJwcsU0vI-nzgOB_@codewreck.org/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230705063315.3680666-1-jeffxu@google.com/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/Y5yS8wCnuYGLHMj4@x1n/ [4]: https://lore.kernel.org/f185bb42-b29c-977e-312e-3349eea15383@linuxfoundation.org/ This patch (of 5): Before this change, a test runner using this self test would see a return code of 0 when the tests using a child process (namely the MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC tests) failed, masking test failures. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814-memfd-vm-noexec-uapi-fixes-v2-0-7ff9e3e10ba6@cyphar.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814-memfd-vm-noexec-uapi-fixes-v2-1-7ff9e3e10ba6@cyphar.com Fixes: 11f75a01448f ("selftests/memfd: add tests for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC") Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-08-14 18:40:57 +10:00
printf("%s nested sysctl 1\n", memfd_str);
sysctl_assert_write("1");
/* Child inherits our setting. */
pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested, test_sysctl_sysctl1);
join_thread(pid);
/* Child cannot raise the setting. */
pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested,
test_sysctl_sysctl1_failset);
join_thread(pid);
/* Child can lower the setting. */
pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested,
test_sysctl_set_sysctl2);
join_thread(pid);
/* Child lowering the setting has no effect on our setting. */
test_sysctl_sysctl1();
printf("%s nested sysctl 2\n", memfd_str);
sysctl_assert_write("2");
/* Child inherits our setting. */
pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested, test_sysctl_sysctl2);
join_thread(pid);
/* Child cannot raise the setting. */
pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested,
test_sysctl_sysctl2_failset);
join_thread(pid);
/* Verify that the rules are actually inherited after fork. */
printf("%s nested sysctl 0 -> 1 after fork\n", memfd_str);
sysctl_assert_write("0");
selftests: memfd: error out test process when child test fails Patch series "memfd: cleanups for vm.memfd_noexec", v2. The most critical issue with vm.memfd_noexec=2 (the fact that passing MFD_EXEC would bypass it entirely[1]) has been fixed in Andrew's tree[2], but there are still some outstanding issues that need to be addressed: * vm.memfd_noexec=2 shouldn't reject old-style memfd_create(2) syscalls because it will make it far to difficult to ever migrate. Instead it should imply MFD_EXEC. * The dmesg warnings are pr_warn_once(), which on most systems means that they will be used up by systemd or some other boot process and userspace developers will never see it. - For the !(flags & (MFD_EXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL)) case, outputting a rate-limited message to the kernel log is necessary to tell userspace that they should add the new flags. Arguably the most ideal way to deal with the spam concern[3,4] while still prompting userspace to switch to the new flags would be to only log the warning once per task or something similar. However, adding something to task_struct for tracking this would be needless bloat for a single pr_warn_ratelimited(). So just switch to pr_info_ratelimited() to avoid spamming the log with something that isn't a real warning. There's lots of info-level stuff in dmesg, it seems really unlikely that this should be an actual problem. Most programs are already switching to the new flags anyway. - For the vm.memfd_noexec=2 case, we need to log a warning for every failure because otherwise userspace will have no idea why their previously working program started returning -EACCES (previously -EINVAL) from memfd_create(2). pr_warn_once() is simply wrong here. * The racheting mechanism for vm.memfd_noexec makes it incredibly unappealing for most users to enable the sysctl because enabling it on &init_pid_ns means you need a system reboot to unset it. Given the actual security threat being protected against, CAP_SYS_ADMIN users being restricted in this way makes little sense. The argument for this ratcheting by the original author was that it allows you to have a hierarchical setting that cannot be unset by child pidnses, but this is not accurate -- changing the parent pidns's vm.memfd_noexec setting to be more restrictive didn't affect children. Instead, switch the vm.memfd_noexec sysctl to be properly hierarchical and allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN users (in the pidns's owning userns) to lower the setting as long as it is not lower than the parent's effective setting. This change also makes it so that changing a parent pidns's vm.memfd_noexec will affect all descendants, providing a properly hierarchical setting. The performance impact of this is incredibly minimal since the maximum depth of pidns is 32 and it is only checked during memfd_create(2) and unshare(CLONE_NEWPID). * The memfd selftests would not exit with a non-zero error code when certain tests that ran in a forked process (specifically the ones related to MFD_EXEC and MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL) failed. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZJwcsU0vI-nzgOB_@codewreck.org/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230705063315.3680666-1-jeffxu@google.com/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/Y5yS8wCnuYGLHMj4@x1n/ [4]: https://lore.kernel.org/f185bb42-b29c-977e-312e-3349eea15383@linuxfoundation.org/ This patch (of 5): Before this change, a test runner using this self test would see a return code of 0 when the tests using a child process (namely the MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC tests) failed, masking test failures. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814-memfd-vm-noexec-uapi-fixes-v2-0-7ff9e3e10ba6@cyphar.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814-memfd-vm-noexec-uapi-fixes-v2-1-7ff9e3e10ba6@cyphar.com Fixes: 11f75a01448f ("selftests/memfd: add tests for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC") Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-08-14 18:40:57 +10:00
pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested_wait,
test_sysctl_sysctl1_failset);
sysctl_assert_write("1");
kill(pid, SIGCONT);
join_thread(pid);
printf("%s nested sysctl 0 -> 2 after fork\n", memfd_str);
sysctl_assert_write("0");
pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested_wait,
test_sysctl_sysctl2_failset);
sysctl_assert_write("2");
kill(pid, SIGCONT);
join_thread(pid);
/*
* Verify that the current effective setting is saved on fork, meaning
* that the parent lowering the sysctl doesn't affect already-forked
* children.
*/
printf("%s nested sysctl 2 -> 1 after fork\n", memfd_str);
sysctl_assert_write("2");
pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested_wait,
test_sysctl_sysctl2);
sysctl_assert_write("1");
kill(pid, SIGCONT);
join_thread(pid);
printf("%s nested sysctl 2 -> 0 after fork\n", memfd_str);
sysctl_assert_write("2");
pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested_wait,
test_sysctl_sysctl2);
sysctl_assert_write("0");
kill(pid, SIGCONT);
join_thread(pid);
printf("%s nested sysctl 1 -> 0 after fork\n", memfd_str);
sysctl_assert_write("1");
pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested_wait,
test_sysctl_sysctl1);
sysctl_assert_write("0");
kill(pid, SIGCONT);
join_thread(pid);
return 0;
}
/*
* Test sysctl with nested pid namespaces
* Make sure that the sysctl nesting semantics work correctly.
*/
static void test_sysctl_nested(void)
{
int pid = spawn_thread(CLONE_NEWPID, sysctl_nested_child, NULL);
join_thread(pid);
}
/*
* Test sharing via dup()
* Test that seals are shared between dupped FDs and they're all equal.
*/
static void test_share_dup(char *banner, char *b_suffix)
{
int fd, fd2;
printf("%s %s %s\n", memfd_str, banner, b_suffix);
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_share_dup",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
fd2 = mfd_assert_dup(fd);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd2, 0);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd2, F_SEAL_WRITE);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd2, F_SEAL_SHRINK);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SHRINK);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd2, F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SHRINK);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SEAL);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_SEAL);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd2, F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_SEAL);
mfd_fail_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_GROW);
mfd_fail_add_seals(fd2, F_SEAL_GROW);
mfd_fail_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SEAL);
mfd_fail_add_seals(fd2, F_SEAL_SEAL);
close(fd2);
mfd_fail_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_GROW);
close(fd);
}
/*
* Test sealing with active mmap()s
* Modifying seals is only allowed if no other mmap() refs exist.
*/
static void test_share_mmap(char *banner, char *b_suffix)
{
int fd;
void *p;
printf("%s %s %s\n", memfd_str, banner, b_suffix);
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_share_mmap",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
/* shared/writable ref prevents sealing WRITE, but allows others */
p = mfd_assert_mmap_shared(fd);
mfd_fail_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SHRINK);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SHRINK);
munmap(p, mfd_def_size);
/* readable ref allows sealing */
p = mfd_assert_mmap_private(fd);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SHRINK);
munmap(p, mfd_def_size);
close(fd);
}
/*
* Test sealing with open(/proc/self/fd/%d)
* Via /proc we can get access to a separate file-context for the same memfd.
* This is *not* like dup(), but like a real separate open(). Make sure the
* semantics are as expected and we correctly check for RDONLY / WRONLY / RDWR.
*/
static void test_share_open(char *banner, char *b_suffix)
{
int fd, fd2;
printf("%s %s %s\n", memfd_str, banner, b_suffix);
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_share_open",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
fd2 = mfd_assert_open(fd, O_RDWR, 0);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd2, F_SEAL_WRITE);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd2, F_SEAL_SHRINK);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SHRINK);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd2, F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SHRINK);
close(fd);
fd = mfd_assert_open(fd2, O_RDONLY, 0);
mfd_fail_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SEAL);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SHRINK);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd2, F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SHRINK);
close(fd2);
fd2 = mfd_assert_open(fd, O_RDWR, 0);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd2, F_SEAL_SEAL);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_SEAL);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd2, F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_SEAL);
close(fd2);
close(fd);
}
/*
* Test sharing via fork()
* Test whether seal-modifications work as expected with forked children.
*/
static void test_share_fork(char *banner, char *b_suffix)
{
int fd;
pid_t pid;
printf("%s %s %s\n", memfd_str, banner, b_suffix);
fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_share_fork",
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
pid = spawn_idle_thread(0);
mfd_assert_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SEAL);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SEAL);
mfd_fail_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SEAL);
join_idle_thread(pid);
mfd_fail_add_seals(fd, F_SEAL_WRITE);
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SEAL);
close(fd);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
pid_t pid;
if (argc == 2) {
if (!strcmp(argv[1], "hugetlbfs")) {
unsigned long hpage_size = default_huge_page_size();
if (!hpage_size) {
printf("Unable to determine huge page size\n");
abort();
}
hugetlbfs_test = 1;
memfd_str = MEMFD_HUGE_STR;
mfd_def_size = hpage_size * 2;
} else {
printf("Unknown option: %s\n", argv[1]);
abort();
}
}
test_create();
test_basic();
test_exec_seal();
test_exec_no_seal();
test_noexec_seal();
test_seal_write();
test_seal_future_write();
test_seal_shrink();
test_seal_grow();
test_seal_resize();
test_sysctl_simple();
test_sysctl_nested();
test_share_dup("SHARE-DUP", "");
test_share_mmap("SHARE-MMAP", "");
test_share_open("SHARE-OPEN", "");
test_share_fork("SHARE-FORK", "");
/* Run test-suite in a multi-threaded environment with a shared
* file-table. */
pid = spawn_idle_thread(CLONE_FILES | CLONE_FS | CLONE_VM);
test_share_dup("SHARE-DUP", SHARED_FT_STR);
test_share_mmap("SHARE-MMAP", SHARED_FT_STR);
test_share_open("SHARE-OPEN", SHARED_FT_STR);
test_share_fork("SHARE-FORK", SHARED_FT_STR);
join_idle_thread(pid);
printf("memfd: DONE\n");
return 0;
}