License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 15:07:57 +01:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
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/*
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* FPU register's regset abstraction, for ptrace, core dumps, etc.
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*/
|
2021-06-23 14:01:36 +02:00
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#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
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#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
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2021-10-15 03:16:39 +02:00
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#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
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#include <asm/fpu/signal.h>
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#include <asm/fpu/regset.h>
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x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack
Some applications (like GDB) would like to tweak shadow stack state via
ptrace. This allows for existing functionality to continue to work for
seized shadow stack applications. Provide a regset interface for
manipulating the shadow stack pointer (SSP).
There is already ptrace functionality for accessing xstate, but this
does not include supervisor xfeatures. So there is not a completely
clear place for where to put the shadow stack state. Adding it to the
user xfeatures regset would complicate that code, as it currently shares
logic with signals which should not have supervisor features.
Don't add a general supervisor xfeature regset like the user one,
because it is better to maintain flexibility for other supervisor
xfeatures to define their own interface. For example, an xfeature may
decide not to expose all of it's state to userspace, as is actually the
case for shadow stack ptrace functionality. A lot of enum values remain
to be used, so just put it in dedicated shadow stack regset.
The only downside to not having a generic supervisor xfeature regset,
is that apps need to be enlightened of any new supervisor xfeature
exposed this way (i.e. they can't try to have generic save/restore
logic). But maybe that is a good thing, because they have to think
through each new xfeature instead of encountering issues when a new
supervisor xfeature was added.
By adding a shadow stack regset, it also has the effect of including the
shadow stack state in a core dump, which could be useful for debugging.
The shadow stack specific xstate includes the SSP, and the shadow stack
and WRSS enablement status. Enabling shadow stack or WRSS in the kernel
involves more than just flipping the bit. The kernel is made aware that
it has to do extra things when cloning or handling signals. That logic
is triggered off of separate feature enablement state kept in the task
struct. So the flipping on HW shadow stack enforcement without notifying
the kernel to change its behavior would severely limit what an application
could do without crashing, and the results would depend on kernel
internal implementation details. There is also no known use for controlling
this state via ptrace today. So only expose the SSP, which is something
that userspace already has indirect control over.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-41-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
2023-06-12 17:11:06 -07:00
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#include <asm/prctl.h>
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2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
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2021-10-15 03:16:30 +02:00
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#include "context.h"
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2021-10-15 03:16:21 +02:00
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#include "internal.h"
|
2021-10-15 03:16:31 +02:00
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#include "legacy.h"
|
2021-10-13 16:55:55 +02:00
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#include "xstate.h"
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2021-10-15 03:16:21 +02:00
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|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
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/*
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* The xstateregs_active() routine is the same as the regset_fpregs_active() routine,
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* as the "regset->n" for the xstate regset will be updated based on the feature
|
2016-02-23 15:34:30 -08:00
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* capabilities supported by the xsave.
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
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|
*/
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|
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int regset_fpregs_active(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset)
|
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|
|
{
|
2019-04-03 18:41:36 +02:00
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return regset->n;
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
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}
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|
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int regset_xregset_fpregs_active(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset)
|
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|
|
{
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2019-04-03 18:41:36 +02:00
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if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FXSR))
|
2016-04-04 22:25:01 +02:00
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return regset->n;
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else
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return 0;
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2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
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}
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2021-06-23 14:01:46 +02:00
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/*
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* The regset get() functions are invoked from:
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*
|
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* - coredump to dump the current task's fpstate. If the current task
|
|
|
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* owns the FPU then the memory state has to be synchronized and the
|
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* FPU register state preserved. Otherwise fpstate is already in sync.
|
|
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*
|
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* - ptrace to dump fpstate of a stopped task, in which case the registers
|
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* have already been saved to fpstate on context switch.
|
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*/
|
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static void sync_fpstate(struct fpu *fpu)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (fpu == ¤t->thread.fpu)
|
2021-06-23 14:02:06 +02:00
|
|
|
fpu_sync_fpstate(fpu);
|
2021-06-23 14:01:46 +02:00
|
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}
|
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|
2021-06-23 14:01:47 +02:00
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/*
|
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|
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* Invalidate cached FPU registers before modifying the stopped target
|
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* task's fpstate.
|
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*
|
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* This forces the target task on resume to restore the FPU registers from
|
|
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* modified fpstate. Otherwise the task might skip the restore and operate
|
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* with the cached FPU registers which discards the modifications.
|
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*/
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static void fpu_force_restore(struct fpu *fpu)
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{
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/*
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* Only stopped child tasks can be used to modify the FPU
|
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* state in the fpstate buffer:
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*/
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WARN_ON_FPU(fpu == ¤t->thread.fpu);
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__fpu_invalidate_fpregs_state(fpu);
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}
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|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
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int xfpregs_get(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
|
2020-02-18 12:14:34 -05:00
|
|
|
struct membuf to)
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
{
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struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
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|
2021-06-23 14:01:43 +02:00
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if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FXSR))
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
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return -ENODEV;
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|
2021-06-23 14:01:46 +02:00
|
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sync_fpstate(fpu);
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
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|
2021-06-23 14:01:43 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!use_xsave()) {
|
2021-10-13 16:55:36 +02:00
|
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|
return membuf_write(&to, &fpu->fpstate->regs.fxsave,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(fpu->fpstate->regs.fxsave));
|
2021-06-23 14:01:43 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
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|
|
2021-06-23 14:02:19 +02:00
|
|
|
copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf(to, target, XSTATE_COPY_FX);
|
2021-06-23 14:01:43 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int xfpregs_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
|
|
|
|
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
|
2022-02-14 13:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
struct fxregs_state newstate;
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:39 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FXSR))
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
return -ENODEV;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:39 +02:00
|
|
|
/* No funny business with partial or oversized writes is permitted. */
|
|
|
|
if (pos != 0 || count != sizeof(newstate))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, &newstate, 0, -1);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
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|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:40 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Do not allow an invalid MXCSR value. */
|
|
|
|
if (newstate.mxcsr & ~mxcsr_feature_mask)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2021-06-23 14:01:39 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:47 +02:00
|
|
|
fpu_force_restore(fpu);
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:39 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Copy the state */
|
2021-10-13 16:55:36 +02:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&fpu->fpstate->regs.fxsave, &newstate, sizeof(newstate));
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-02-14 13:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Clear xmm8..15 for 32-bit callers */
|
2021-10-13 16:55:36 +02:00
|
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(fpu->__fpstate.regs.fxsave.xmm_space) != 16 * 16);
|
2022-02-14 13:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (in_ia32_syscall())
|
|
|
|
memset(&fpu->fpstate->regs.fxsave.xmm_space[8*4], 0, 8 * 16);
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:39 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Mark FP and SSE as in use when XSAVE is enabled */
|
|
|
|
if (use_xsave())
|
2021-10-13 16:55:36 +02:00
|
|
|
fpu->fpstate->regs.xsave.header.xfeatures |= XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE;
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:39 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int xstateregs_get(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
|
2020-02-18 12:14:34 -05:00
|
|
|
struct membuf to)
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2021-06-23 14:01:38 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
return -ENODEV;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:02:19 +02:00
|
|
|
sync_fpstate(&target->thread.fpu);
|
2016-06-17 13:07:17 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:02:19 +02:00
|
|
|
copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf(to, target, XSTATE_COPY_XSAVE);
|
2021-06-23 14:01:38 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int xstateregs_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
|
|
|
|
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
|
2021-06-23 14:01:36 +02:00
|
|
|
struct xregs_state *tmpbuf = NULL;
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:36 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
return -ENODEV;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-17 13:07:17 -07:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* A whole standard-format XSAVE buffer is needed:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-10-15 01:09:34 +02:00
|
|
|
if (pos != 0 || count != fpu_user_cfg.max_size)
|
2016-06-17 13:07:17 -07:00
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:36 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!kbuf) {
|
|
|
|
tmpbuf = vmalloc(count);
|
|
|
|
if (!tmpbuf)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
2016-06-17 13:07:17 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:36 +02:00
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(tmpbuf, ubuf, count)) {
|
|
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-09-23 14:59:54 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-17 13:07:17 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:47 +02:00
|
|
|
fpu_force_restore(fpu);
|
2022-11-15 15:09:28 -08:00
|
|
|
ret = copy_uabi_from_kernel_to_xstate(fpu->fpstate, kbuf ?: tmpbuf, &target->thread.pkru);
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:36 +02:00
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
vfree(tmpbuf);
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack
Some applications (like GDB) would like to tweak shadow stack state via
ptrace. This allows for existing functionality to continue to work for
seized shadow stack applications. Provide a regset interface for
manipulating the shadow stack pointer (SSP).
There is already ptrace functionality for accessing xstate, but this
does not include supervisor xfeatures. So there is not a completely
clear place for where to put the shadow stack state. Adding it to the
user xfeatures regset would complicate that code, as it currently shares
logic with signals which should not have supervisor features.
Don't add a general supervisor xfeature regset like the user one,
because it is better to maintain flexibility for other supervisor
xfeatures to define their own interface. For example, an xfeature may
decide not to expose all of it's state to userspace, as is actually the
case for shadow stack ptrace functionality. A lot of enum values remain
to be used, so just put it in dedicated shadow stack regset.
The only downside to not having a generic supervisor xfeature regset,
is that apps need to be enlightened of any new supervisor xfeature
exposed this way (i.e. they can't try to have generic save/restore
logic). But maybe that is a good thing, because they have to think
through each new xfeature instead of encountering issues when a new
supervisor xfeature was added.
By adding a shadow stack regset, it also has the effect of including the
shadow stack state in a core dump, which could be useful for debugging.
The shadow stack specific xstate includes the SSP, and the shadow stack
and WRSS enablement status. Enabling shadow stack or WRSS in the kernel
involves more than just flipping the bit. The kernel is made aware that
it has to do extra things when cloning or handling signals. That logic
is triggered off of separate feature enablement state kept in the task
struct. So the flipping on HW shadow stack enforcement without notifying
the kernel to change its behavior would severely limit what an application
could do without crashing, and the results would depend on kernel
internal implementation details. There is also no known use for controlling
this state via ptrace today. So only expose the SSP, which is something
that userspace already has indirect control over.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-41-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
2023-06-12 17:11:06 -07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
|
|
|
|
int ssp_active(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (target->thread.features & ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK)
|
|
|
|
return regset->n;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int ssp_get(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
|
|
|
|
struct membuf to)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
|
|
|
|
struct cet_user_state *cetregs;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
|
|
|
|
return -ENODEV;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sync_fpstate(fpu);
|
|
|
|
cetregs = get_xsave_addr(&fpu->fpstate->regs.xsave, XFEATURE_CET_USER);
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(!cetregs)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This shouldn't ever be NULL because shadow stack was
|
|
|
|
* verified to be enabled above. This means
|
|
|
|
* MSR_IA32_U_CET.CET_SHSTK_EN should be 1 and so
|
|
|
|
* XFEATURE_CET_USER should not be in the init state.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return -ENODEV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return membuf_write(&to, (unsigned long *)&cetregs->user_ssp,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(cetregs->user_ssp));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int ssp_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
|
|
|
|
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
|
|
|
|
struct xregs_state *xsave = &fpu->fpstate->regs.xsave;
|
|
|
|
struct cet_user_state *cetregs;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long user_ssp;
|
|
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) ||
|
|
|
|
!ssp_active(target, regset))
|
|
|
|
return -ENODEV;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pos != 0 || count != sizeof(user_ssp))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, &user_ssp, 0, -1);
|
|
|
|
if (r)
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Some kernel instructions (IRET, etc) can cause exceptions in the case
|
|
|
|
* of disallowed CET register values. Just prevent invalid values.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (user_ssp >= TASK_SIZE_MAX || !IS_ALIGNED(user_ssp, 8))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fpu_force_restore(fpu);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cetregs = get_xsave_addr(xsave, XFEATURE_CET_USER);
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(!cetregs)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This shouldn't ever be NULL because shadow stack was
|
|
|
|
* verified to be enabled above. This means
|
|
|
|
* MSR_IA32_U_CET.CET_SHSTK_EN should be 1 and so
|
|
|
|
* XFEATURE_CET_USER should not be in the init state.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return -ENODEV;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cetregs->user_ssp = user_ssp;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
#if defined CONFIG_X86_32 || defined CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* FPU tag word conversions.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline unsigned short twd_i387_to_fxsr(unsigned short twd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int tmp; /* to avoid 16 bit prefixes in the code */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Transform each pair of bits into 01 (valid) or 00 (empty) */
|
|
|
|
tmp = ~twd;
|
|
|
|
tmp = (tmp | (tmp>>1)) & 0x5555; /* 0V0V0V0V0V0V0V0V */
|
|
|
|
/* and move the valid bits to the lower byte. */
|
|
|
|
tmp = (tmp | (tmp >> 1)) & 0x3333; /* 00VV00VV00VV00VV */
|
|
|
|
tmp = (tmp | (tmp >> 2)) & 0x0f0f; /* 0000VVVV0000VVVV */
|
|
|
|
tmp = (tmp | (tmp >> 4)) & 0x00ff; /* 00000000VVVVVVVV */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return tmp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define FPREG_ADDR(f, n) ((void *)&(f)->st_space + (n) * 16)
|
|
|
|
#define FP_EXP_TAG_VALID 0
|
|
|
|
#define FP_EXP_TAG_ZERO 1
|
|
|
|
#define FP_EXP_TAG_SPECIAL 2
|
|
|
|
#define FP_EXP_TAG_EMPTY 3
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-30 17:15:32 +02:00
|
|
|
static inline u32 twd_fxsr_to_i387(struct fxregs_state *fxsave)
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct _fpxreg *st;
|
|
|
|
u32 tos = (fxsave->swd >> 11) & 7;
|
|
|
|
u32 twd = (unsigned long) fxsave->twd;
|
|
|
|
u32 tag;
|
|
|
|
u32 ret = 0xffff0000u;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++, twd >>= 1) {
|
|
|
|
if (twd & 0x1) {
|
|
|
|
st = FPREG_ADDR(fxsave, (i - tos) & 7);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (st->exponent & 0x7fff) {
|
|
|
|
case 0x7fff:
|
|
|
|
tag = FP_EXP_TAG_SPECIAL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x0000:
|
|
|
|
if (!st->significand[0] &&
|
|
|
|
!st->significand[1] &&
|
|
|
|
!st->significand[2] &&
|
|
|
|
!st->significand[3])
|
|
|
|
tag = FP_EXP_TAG_ZERO;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
tag = FP_EXP_TAG_SPECIAL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
if (st->significand[3] & 0x8000)
|
|
|
|
tag = FP_EXP_TAG_VALID;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
tag = FP_EXP_TAG_SPECIAL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
tag = FP_EXP_TAG_EMPTY;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret |= tag << (2 * i);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* FXSR floating point environment conversions.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:44 +02:00
|
|
|
static void __convert_from_fxsr(struct user_i387_ia32_struct *env,
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *tsk,
|
|
|
|
struct fxregs_state *fxsave)
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct _fpreg *to = (struct _fpreg *) &env->st_space[0];
|
|
|
|
struct _fpxreg *from = (struct _fpxreg *) &fxsave->st_space[0];
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
env->cwd = fxsave->cwd | 0xffff0000u;
|
|
|
|
env->swd = fxsave->swd | 0xffff0000u;
|
|
|
|
env->twd = twd_fxsr_to_i387(fxsave);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
|
|
|
|
env->fip = fxsave->rip;
|
|
|
|
env->foo = fxsave->rdp;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* should be actually ds/cs at fpu exception time, but
|
|
|
|
* that information is not available in 64bit mode.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
env->fcs = task_pt_regs(tsk)->cs;
|
|
|
|
if (tsk == current) {
|
|
|
|
savesegment(ds, env->fos);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
env->fos = tsk->thread.ds;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
env->fos |= 0xffff0000;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
env->fip = fxsave->fip;
|
|
|
|
env->fcs = (u16) fxsave->fcs | ((u32) fxsave->fop << 16);
|
|
|
|
env->foo = fxsave->foo;
|
|
|
|
env->fos = fxsave->fos;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&to[i], &from[i], sizeof(to[0]));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:44 +02:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
convert_from_fxsr(struct user_i387_ia32_struct *env, struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2021-10-13 16:55:36 +02:00
|
|
|
__convert_from_fxsr(env, tsk, &tsk->thread.fpu.fpstate->regs.fxsave);
|
2021-06-23 14:01:44 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-04-03 18:41:30 +02:00
|
|
|
void convert_to_fxsr(struct fxregs_state *fxsave,
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
const struct user_i387_ia32_struct *env)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct _fpreg *from = (struct _fpreg *) &env->st_space[0];
|
|
|
|
struct _fpxreg *to = (struct _fpxreg *) &fxsave->st_space[0];
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fxsave->cwd = env->cwd;
|
|
|
|
fxsave->swd = env->swd;
|
|
|
|
fxsave->twd = twd_i387_to_fxsr(env->twd);
|
|
|
|
fxsave->fop = (u16) ((u32) env->fcs >> 16);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
|
|
|
|
fxsave->rip = env->fip;
|
|
|
|
fxsave->rdp = env->foo;
|
|
|
|
/* cs and ds ignored */
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
fxsave->fip = env->fip;
|
|
|
|
fxsave->fcs = (env->fcs & 0xffff);
|
|
|
|
fxsave->foo = env->foo;
|
|
|
|
fxsave->fos = env->fos;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&to[i], &from[i], sizeof(from[0]));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int fpregs_get(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
|
2020-02-18 12:14:34 -05:00
|
|
|
struct membuf to)
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
|
|
|
|
struct user_i387_ia32_struct env;
|
2021-06-23 14:01:44 +02:00
|
|
|
struct fxregs_state fxsave, *fx;
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:46 +02:00
|
|
|
sync_fpstate(fpu);
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:44 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FPU))
|
2020-02-18 12:14:34 -05:00
|
|
|
return fpregs_soft_get(target, regset, to);
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:44 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FXSR)) {
|
2021-10-13 16:55:36 +02:00
|
|
|
return membuf_write(&to, &fpu->fpstate->regs.fsave,
|
2020-02-18 12:14:34 -05:00
|
|
|
sizeof(struct fregs_state));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:44 +02:00
|
|
|
if (use_xsave()) {
|
|
|
|
struct membuf mb = { .p = &fxsave, .left = sizeof(fxsave) };
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:44 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Handle init state optimized xstate correctly */
|
2021-06-23 14:02:19 +02:00
|
|
|
copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf(mb, target, XSTATE_COPY_FP);
|
2021-06-23 14:01:44 +02:00
|
|
|
fx = &fxsave;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2021-10-13 16:55:36 +02:00
|
|
|
fx = &fpu->fpstate->regs.fxsave;
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:44 +02:00
|
|
|
__convert_from_fxsr(&env, target, fx);
|
2020-02-18 12:14:34 -05:00
|
|
|
return membuf_write(&to, &env, sizeof(env));
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int fpregs_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
|
|
|
|
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
|
|
|
|
struct user_i387_ia32_struct env;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:41 +02:00
|
|
|
/* No funny business with partial or oversized writes is permitted. */
|
|
|
|
if (pos != 0 || count != sizeof(struct user_i387_ia32_struct))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:41 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FPU))
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
return fpregs_soft_set(target, regset, pos, count, kbuf, ubuf);
|
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:41 +02:00
|
|
|
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, &env, 0, -1);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:47 +02:00
|
|
|
fpu_force_restore(fpu);
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-06-23 14:01:41 +02:00
|
|
|
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FXSR))
|
2021-10-13 16:55:36 +02:00
|
|
|
convert_to_fxsr(&fpu->fpstate->regs.fxsave, &env);
|
2021-06-23 14:01:41 +02:00
|
|
|
else
|
2021-10-13 16:55:36 +02:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&fpu->fpstate->regs.fsave, &env, sizeof(env));
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2021-06-23 14:01:41 +02:00
|
|
|
* Update the header bit in the xsave header, indicating the
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
* presence of FP.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-06-23 14:01:41 +02:00
|
|
|
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
|
2021-10-13 16:55:36 +02:00
|
|
|
fpu->fpstate->regs.xsave.header.xfeatures |= XFEATURE_MASK_FP;
|
2021-06-23 14:01:41 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-04-30 12:59:30 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 || CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */
|