linux/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
*
* Procedures for interfacing to the RTAS on CHRP machines.
*
* Peter Bergner, IBM March 2001.
* Copyright (C) 2001 IBM.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "rtas: " fmt
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
#include <linux/bsearch.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
#include <linux/kconfig.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/lockdep.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
powerpc/rtas: Facilitate high-level call sequences On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations. However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the level of RTAS entry and exit. Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.) Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and ibm,get-vpd. But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially disrupting a sequence in progress. So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences, they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas() users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow. Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas(). * Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function. * Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the .lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with justifying commentary. * In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking rtas_lock and entering RTAS. * Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do: int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE); int fwrc; mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); do { fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL); } while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc)); mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:53 -06:00
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/of.h>
#include <linux/of_fdt.h>
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/stdarg.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
#include <linux/xarray.h>
#include <asm/delay.h>
#include <asm/firmware.h>
#include <asm/interrupt.h>
#include <asm/machdep.h>
#include <asm/mmu.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
powerpc/pseries: add RTAS work area allocator Various pseries-specific RTAS functions take a temporary "work area" parameter - a buffer in memory accessible to RTAS. Typically such functions are passed the statically allocated rtas_data_buf buffer as the argument. This buffer is protected by a global spinlock. So users of rtas_data_buf cannot perform sleeping operations while accessing the buffer. Most RTAS functions that have a work area parameter can return a status (-2/990x) that indicates that the caller should retry. Before retrying, the caller may need to reschedule or sleep (see rtas_busy_delay() for details). This combination of factors leads to uncomfortable constructions like this: do { spin_lock(&rtas_data_buf_lock); rc = rtas_call(token, __pa(rtas_data_buf, ...); if (rc == 0) { /* parse or copy out rtas_data_buf contents */ } spin_unlock(&rtas_data_buf_lock); } while (rtas_busy_delay(rc)); Another unfortunately common way of handling this is for callers to blithely ignore the possibility of a -2/990x status and hope for the best. If users were allowed to perform blocking operations while owning a work area, the programming model would become less tedious and error-prone. Users could schedule away, sleep, or perform other blocking operations without having to release and re-acquire resources. We could continue to use a single work area buffer, and convert rtas_data_buf_lock to a mutex. But that would impose an unnecessarily coarse serialization on all users. As awkward as the current design is, it prevents longer running operations that need to repeatedly use rtas_data_buf from blocking the progress of others. There are more considerations. One is that while 4KB is fine for all current in-kernel uses, some RTAS calls can take much smaller buffers, and some (VPD, platform dumps) would likely benefit from larger ones. Another is that at least one RTAS function (ibm,get-vpd) has *two* work area parameters. And finally, we should expect the number of work area users in the kernel to increase over time as we introduce lockdown-compatible ABIs to replace less safe use cases based on sys_rtas/librtas. So a special-purpose allocator for RTAS work area buffers seems worth trying. Properties: * The backing memory for the allocator is reserved early in boot in order to satisfy RTAS addressing requirements, and then managed with genalloc. * Allocations can block, but they never fail (mempool-like). * Prioritizes first-come, first-serve fairness over throughput. * Early boot allocations before the allocator has been initialized are served via an internal static buffer. Intended to replace rtas_data_buf. New code that needs RTAS work area buffers should prefer this API. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-12-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:42:00 -06:00
#include <asm/rtas-work-area.h>
#include <asm/rtas.h>
#include <asm/time.h>
#include <asm/trace.h>
#include <asm/udbg.h>
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
struct rtas_filter {
/* Indexes into the args buffer, -1 if not used */
const int buf_idx1;
const int size_idx1;
const int buf_idx2;
const int size_idx2;
/*
* Assumed buffer size per the spec if the function does not
* have a size parameter, e.g. ibm,errinjct. 0 if unused.
*/
const int fixed_size;
};
/**
* struct rtas_function - Descriptor for RTAS functions.
*
* @token: Value of @name if it exists under the /rtas node.
* @name: Function name.
* @filter: If non-NULL, invoking this function via the rtas syscall is
* generally allowed, and @filter describes constraints on the
* arguments. See also @banned_for_syscall_on_le.
* @banned_for_syscall_on_le: Set when call via sys_rtas is generally allowed
* but specifically restricted on ppc64le. Such
* functions are believed to have no users on
* ppc64le, and we want to keep it that way. It does
* not make sense for this to be set when @filter
* is NULL.
powerpc/rtas: Facilitate high-level call sequences On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations. However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the level of RTAS entry and exit. Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.) Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and ibm,get-vpd. But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially disrupting a sequence in progress. So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences, they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas() users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow. Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas(). * Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function. * Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the .lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with justifying commentary. * In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking rtas_lock and entering RTAS. * Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do: int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE); int fwrc; mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); do { fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL); } while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc)); mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:53 -06:00
* @lock: Pointer to an optional dedicated per-function mutex. This
* should be set for functions that require multiple calls in
* sequence to complete a single operation, and such sequences
* will disrupt each other if allowed to interleave. Users of
* this function are required to hold the associated lock for
* the duration of the call sequence. Add an explanatory
* comment to the function table entry if setting this member.
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
*/
struct rtas_function {
s32 token;
const bool banned_for_syscall_on_le:1;
const char * const name;
const struct rtas_filter *filter;
powerpc/rtas: Facilitate high-level call sequences On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations. However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the level of RTAS entry and exit. Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.) Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and ibm,get-vpd. But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially disrupting a sequence in progress. So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences, they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas() users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow. Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas(). * Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function. * Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the .lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with justifying commentary. * In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking rtas_lock and entering RTAS. * Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do: int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE); int fwrc; mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); do { fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL); } while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc)); mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:53 -06:00
struct mutex *lock;
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
};
powerpc/rtas: Facilitate high-level call sequences On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations. However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the level of RTAS entry and exit. Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.) Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and ibm,get-vpd. But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially disrupting a sequence in progress. So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences, they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas() users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow. Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas(). * Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function. * Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the .lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with justifying commentary. * In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking rtas_lock and entering RTAS. * Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do: int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE); int fwrc; mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); do { fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL); } while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc)); mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:53 -06:00
/*
* Per-function locks for sequence-based RTAS functions.
*/
static DEFINE_MUTEX(rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(rtas_ibm_get_dynamic_sensor_state_lock);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(rtas_ibm_get_indices_lock);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(rtas_ibm_lpar_perftools_lock);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(rtas_ibm_physical_attestation_lock);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(rtas_ibm_set_dynamic_indicator_lock);
DEFINE_MUTEX(rtas_ibm_get_vpd_lock);
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
static struct rtas_function rtas_function_table[] __ro_after_init = {
[RTAS_FNIDX__CHECK_EXCEPTION] = {
.name = "check-exception",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__DISPLAY_CHARACTER] = {
.name = "display-character",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = -1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__EVENT_SCAN] = {
.name = "event-scan",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__FREEZE_TIME_BASE] = {
.name = "freeze-time-base",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__GET_POWER_LEVEL] = {
.name = "get-power-level",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = -1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__GET_SENSOR_STATE] = {
.name = "get-sensor-state",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = -1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__GET_TERM_CHAR] = {
.name = "get-term-char",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__GET_TIME_OF_DAY] = {
.name = "get-time-of-day",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = -1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE] = {
.name = "ibm,activate-firmware",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = -1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
powerpc/rtas: Facilitate high-level call sequences On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations. However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the level of RTAS entry and exit. Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.) Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and ibm,get-vpd. But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially disrupting a sequence in progress. So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences, they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas() users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow. Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas(). * Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function. * Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the .lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with justifying commentary. * In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking rtas_lock and entering RTAS. * Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do: int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE); int fwrc; mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); do { fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL); } while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc)); mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:53 -06:00
/*
* PAPR+ as of v2.13 doesn't explicitly impose any
* restriction, but this typically requires multiple
* calls before success, and there's no reason to
* allow sequences to interleave.
*/
.lock = &rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock,
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_CBE_START_PTCAL] = {
.name = "ibm,cbe-start-ptcal",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_CBE_STOP_PTCAL] = {
.name = "ibm,cbe-stop-ptcal",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_CHANGE_MSI] = {
.name = "ibm,change-msi",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_CLOSE_ERRINJCT] = {
.name = "ibm,close-errinjct",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = -1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_CONFIGURE_BRIDGE] = {
.name = "ibm,configure-bridge",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_CONFIGURE_CONNECTOR] = {
.name = "ibm,configure-connector",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = 0, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = 1, .size_idx2 = -1,
.fixed_size = 4096,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_CONFIGURE_KERNEL_DUMP] = {
.name = "ibm,configure-kernel-dump",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_CONFIGURE_PE] = {
.name = "ibm,configure-pe",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_CREATE_PE_DMA_WINDOW] = {
.name = "ibm,create-pe-dma-window",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_DISPLAY_MESSAGE] = {
.name = "ibm,display-message",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = 0, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_ERRINJCT] = {
.name = "ibm,errinjct",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = 2, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
.fixed_size = 1024,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_EXTI2C] = {
.name = "ibm,exti2c",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_GET_CONFIG_ADDR_INFO] = {
.name = "ibm,get-config-addr-info",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_GET_CONFIG_ADDR_INFO2] = {
.name = "ibm,get-config-addr-info2",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = -1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_GET_DYNAMIC_SENSOR_STATE] = {
.name = "ibm,get-dynamic-sensor-state",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = 1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
powerpc/rtas: Facilitate high-level call sequences On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations. However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the level of RTAS entry and exit. Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.) Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and ibm,get-vpd. But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially disrupting a sequence in progress. So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences, they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas() users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow. Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas(). * Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function. * Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the .lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with justifying commentary. * In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking rtas_lock and entering RTAS. * Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do: int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE); int fwrc; mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); do { fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL); } while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc)); mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:53 -06:00
/*
* PAPR+ v2.13 R17.3.193 is explicit that the OS
* must not call ibm,get-dynamic-sensor-state with
* different inputs until a non-retry status has been
* returned.
*/
.lock = &rtas_ibm_get_dynamic_sensor_state_lock,
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_GET_INDICES] = {
.name = "ibm,get-indices",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = 2, .size_idx1 = 3,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
powerpc/rtas: Facilitate high-level call sequences On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations. However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the level of RTAS entry and exit. Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.) Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and ibm,get-vpd. But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially disrupting a sequence in progress. So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences, they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas() users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow. Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas(). * Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function. * Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the .lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with justifying commentary. * In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking rtas_lock and entering RTAS. * Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do: int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE); int fwrc; mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); do { fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL); } while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc)); mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:53 -06:00
/*
* PAPR+ v2.13 R17.3.172 says that the OS must not
* interleave ibm,get-indices call sequences with
* different inputs.
*/
.lock = &rtas_ibm_get_indices_lock,
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_GET_RIO_TOPOLOGY] = {
.name = "ibm,get-rio-topology",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_GET_SYSTEM_PARAMETER] = {
.name = "ibm,get-system-parameter",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = 1, .size_idx1 = 2,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_GET_VPD] = {
.name = "ibm,get-vpd",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = 0, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = 1, .size_idx2 = 2,
},
powerpc/rtas: Facilitate high-level call sequences On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations. However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the level of RTAS entry and exit. Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.) Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and ibm,get-vpd. But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially disrupting a sequence in progress. So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences, they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas() users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow. Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas(). * Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function. * Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the .lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with justifying commentary. * In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking rtas_lock and entering RTAS. * Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do: int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE); int fwrc; mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); do { fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL); } while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc)); mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:53 -06:00
/*
* PAPR+ v2.13 R17.3.204 indicates that sequences
* should not be allowed to interleave.
*/
.lock = &rtas_ibm_get_vpd_lock,
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_GET_XIVE] = {
.name = "ibm,get-xive",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_INT_OFF] = {
.name = "ibm,int-off",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_INT_ON] = {
.name = "ibm,int-on",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_IO_QUIESCE_ACK] = {
.name = "ibm,io-quiesce-ack",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_LPAR_PERFTOOLS] = {
.name = "ibm,lpar-perftools",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = 2, .size_idx1 = 3,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
powerpc/rtas: Facilitate high-level call sequences On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations. However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the level of RTAS entry and exit. Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.) Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and ibm,get-vpd. But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially disrupting a sequence in progress. So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences, they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas() users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow. Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas(). * Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function. * Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the .lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with justifying commentary. * In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking rtas_lock and entering RTAS. * Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do: int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE); int fwrc; mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); do { fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL); } while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc)); mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:53 -06:00
/*
* PAPR+ v2.13 R17.3.266 says the OS should allow
* only one call sequence in progress at a time.
*/
.lock = &rtas_ibm_lpar_perftools_lock,
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_MANAGE_FLASH_IMAGE] = {
.name = "ibm,manage-flash-image",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_MANAGE_STORAGE_PRESERVATION] = {
.name = "ibm,manage-storage-preservation",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_NMI_INTERLOCK] = {
.name = "ibm,nmi-interlock",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_NMI_REGISTER] = {
.name = "ibm,nmi-register",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_OPEN_ERRINJCT] = {
.name = "ibm,open-errinjct",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = -1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_OPEN_SRIOV_ALLOW_UNFREEZE] = {
.name = "ibm,open-sriov-allow-unfreeze",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_OPEN_SRIOV_MAP_PE_NUMBER] = {
.name = "ibm,open-sriov-map-pe-number",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_OS_TERM] = {
.name = "ibm,os-term",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_PARTNER_CONTROL] = {
.name = "ibm,partner-control",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_PHYSICAL_ATTESTATION] = {
.name = "ibm,physical-attestation",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = 0, .size_idx1 = 1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
powerpc/rtas: Facilitate high-level call sequences On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations. However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the level of RTAS entry and exit. Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.) Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and ibm,get-vpd. But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially disrupting a sequence in progress. So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences, they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas() users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow. Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas(). * Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function. * Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the .lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with justifying commentary. * In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking rtas_lock and entering RTAS. * Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do: int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE); int fwrc; mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); do { fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL); } while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc)); mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:53 -06:00
/*
* This follows a sequence-based pattern similar to
* ibm,get-vpd et al. Since PAPR+ restricts
* interleaving call sequences for other functions of
* this style, assume the restriction applies here,
* even though it's not explicit in the spec.
*/
.lock = &rtas_ibm_physical_attestation_lock,
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_PLATFORM_DUMP] = {
.name = "ibm,platform-dump",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = 4, .size_idx1 = 5,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
powerpc/rtas: Facilitate high-level call sequences On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations. However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the level of RTAS entry and exit. Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.) Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and ibm,get-vpd. But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially disrupting a sequence in progress. So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences, they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas() users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow. Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas(). * Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function. * Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the .lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with justifying commentary. * In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking rtas_lock and entering RTAS. * Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do: int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE); int fwrc; mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); do { fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL); } while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc)); mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:53 -06:00
/*
* PAPR+ v2.13 7.3.3.4.1 indicates that concurrent
* sequences of ibm,platform-dump are allowed if they
* are operating on different dump tags. So leave the
* lock pointer unset for now. This may need
* reconsideration if kernel-internal users appear.
*/
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_POWER_OFF_UPS] = {
.name = "ibm,power-off-ups",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_QUERY_INTERRUPT_SOURCE_NUMBER] = {
.name = "ibm,query-interrupt-source-number",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_QUERY_PE_DMA_WINDOW] = {
.name = "ibm,query-pe-dma-window",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_READ_PCI_CONFIG] = {
.name = "ibm,read-pci-config",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_READ_SLOT_RESET_STATE] = {
.name = "ibm,read-slot-reset-state",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = -1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_READ_SLOT_RESET_STATE2] = {
.name = "ibm,read-slot-reset-state2",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_REMOVE_PE_DMA_WINDOW] = {
.name = "ibm,remove-pe-dma-window",
},
powerpc/rtas: use correct function name for resetting TCE tables The PAPR spec spells the function name as "ibm,reset-pe-dma-windows" but in practice firmware uses the singular form: "ibm,reset-pe-dma-window" in the device tree. Since we have the wrong spelling in the RTAS function table, reverse lookups (token -> name) fail and warn: unexpected failed lookup for token 86 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 545 at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:659 __do_enter_rtas_trace+0x2a4/0x2b4 CPU: 1 PID: 545 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4 #30 Hardware name: IBM,9105-22A POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NL1060_028) hv:phyp pSeries NIP [c0000000000417f0] __do_enter_rtas_trace+0x2a4/0x2b4 LR [c0000000000417ec] __do_enter_rtas_trace+0x2a0/0x2b4 Call Trace: __do_enter_rtas_trace+0x2a0/0x2b4 (unreliable) rtas_call+0x1f8/0x3e0 enable_ddw.constprop.0+0x4d0/0xc84 dma_iommu_dma_supported+0xe8/0x24c dma_set_mask+0x5c/0xd8 mlx5_pci_init.constprop.0+0xf0/0x46c [mlx5_core] probe_one+0xfc/0x32c [mlx5_core] local_pci_probe+0x68/0x12c pci_call_probe+0x68/0x1ec pci_device_probe+0xbc/0x1a8 really_probe+0x104/0x570 __driver_probe_device+0xb8/0x224 driver_probe_device+0x54/0x130 __driver_attach+0x158/0x2b0 bus_for_each_dev+0xa8/0x120 driver_attach+0x34/0x48 bus_add_driver+0x174/0x304 driver_register+0x8c/0x1c4 __pci_register_driver+0x68/0x7c mlx5_init+0xb8/0x118 [mlx5_core] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x388 do_init_module+0x7c/0x2a4 init_module_from_file+0xb4/0x108 idempotent_init_module+0x184/0x34c sys_finit_module+0x90/0x114 And oopses are possible when lockdep is enabled or the RTAS tracepoints are active, since those paths dereference the result of the lookup. Use the correct spelling to match firmware's behavior, adjusting the related constants to match. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: 8252b88294d2 ("powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups") Reported-by: Gaurav Batra <gbatra@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240222-rtas-fix-ibm-reset-pe-dma-window-v1-1-7aaf235ac63c@linux.ibm.com
2024-02-22 16:19:14 -06:00
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_RESET_PE_DMA_WINDOW] = {
/*
* Note: PAPR+ v2.13 7.3.31.4.1 spells this as
* "ibm,reset-pe-dma-windows" (plural), but RTAS
* implementations use the singular form in practice.
*/
.name = "ibm,reset-pe-dma-window",
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SCAN_LOG_DUMP] = {
.name = "ibm,scan-log-dump",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = 0, .size_idx1 = 1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SET_DYNAMIC_INDICATOR] = {
.name = "ibm,set-dynamic-indicator",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = 2, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
powerpc/rtas: Facilitate high-level call sequences On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations. However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the level of RTAS entry and exit. Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.) Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and ibm,get-vpd. But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially disrupting a sequence in progress. So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences, they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas() users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow. Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas(). * Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function. * Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the .lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with justifying commentary. * In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking rtas_lock and entering RTAS. * Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do: int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE); int fwrc; mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); do { fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL); } while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc)); mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:53 -06:00
/*
* PAPR+ v2.13 R17.3.183 says the OS must not call
* this function with different inputs until a
* non-retry status has been returned.
*/
.lock = &rtas_ibm_set_dynamic_indicator_lock,
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SET_EEH_OPTION] = {
.name = "ibm,set-eeh-option",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = -1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SET_SLOT_RESET] = {
.name = "ibm,set-slot-reset",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SET_SYSTEM_PARAMETER] = {
.name = "ibm,set-system-parameter",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = 1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SET_XIVE] = {
.name = "ibm,set-xive",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SLOT_ERROR_DETAIL] = {
.name = "ibm,slot-error-detail",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_SUSPEND_ME] = {
.name = "ibm,suspend-me",
.banned_for_syscall_on_le = true,
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = -1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_TUNE_DMA_PARMS] = {
.name = "ibm,tune-dma-parms",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_UPDATE_FLASH_64_AND_REBOOT] = {
.name = "ibm,update-flash-64-and-reboot",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_UPDATE_NODES] = {
.name = "ibm,update-nodes",
.banned_for_syscall_on_le = true,
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = 0, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
.fixed_size = 4096,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_UPDATE_PROPERTIES] = {
.name = "ibm,update-properties",
.banned_for_syscall_on_le = true,
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = 0, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
.fixed_size = 4096,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_VALIDATE_FLASH_IMAGE] = {
.name = "ibm,validate-flash-image",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_WRITE_PCI_CONFIG] = {
.name = "ibm,write-pci-config",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__NVRAM_FETCH] = {
.name = "nvram-fetch",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__NVRAM_STORE] = {
.name = "nvram-store",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__POWER_OFF] = {
.name = "power-off",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__PUT_TERM_CHAR] = {
.name = "put-term-char",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__QUERY_CPU_STOPPED_STATE] = {
.name = "query-cpu-stopped-state",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__READ_PCI_CONFIG] = {
.name = "read-pci-config",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__RTAS_LAST_ERROR] = {
.name = "rtas-last-error",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__SET_INDICATOR] = {
.name = "set-indicator",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = -1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__SET_POWER_LEVEL] = {
.name = "set-power-level",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = -1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__SET_TIME_FOR_POWER_ON] = {
.name = "set-time-for-power-on",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = -1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__SET_TIME_OF_DAY] = {
.name = "set-time-of-day",
.filter = &(const struct rtas_filter) {
.buf_idx1 = -1, .size_idx1 = -1,
.buf_idx2 = -1, .size_idx2 = -1,
},
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__START_CPU] = {
.name = "start-cpu",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__STOP_SELF] = {
.name = "stop-self",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__SYSTEM_REBOOT] = {
.name = "system-reboot",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__THAW_TIME_BASE] = {
.name = "thaw-time-base",
},
[RTAS_FNIDX__WRITE_PCI_CONFIG] = {
.name = "write-pci-config",
},
};
#define for_each_rtas_function(funcp) \
for (funcp = &rtas_function_table[0]; \
funcp < &rtas_function_table[ARRAY_SIZE(rtas_function_table)]; \
++funcp)
/*
* Nearly all RTAS calls need to be serialized. All uses of the
* default rtas_args block must hold rtas_lock.
*
* Exceptions to the RTAS serialization requirement (e.g. stop-self)
* must use a separate rtas_args structure.
*/
static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(rtas_lock);
static struct rtas_args rtas_args;
/**
* rtas_function_token() - RTAS function token lookup.
* @handle: Function handle, e.g. RTAS_FN_EVENT_SCAN.
*
* Context: Any context.
* Return: the token value for the function if implemented by this platform,
* otherwise RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE.
*/
s32 rtas_function_token(const rtas_fn_handle_t handle)
{
const size_t index = handle.index;
const bool out_of_bounds = index >= ARRAY_SIZE(rtas_function_table);
if (WARN_ONCE(out_of_bounds, "invalid function index %zu", index))
return RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE;
/*
* Various drivers attempt token lookups on non-RTAS
* platforms.
*/
if (!rtas.dev)
return RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE;
return rtas_function_table[index].token;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtas_function_token);
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
static int rtas_function_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const struct rtas_function *f1 = a;
const struct rtas_function *f2 = b;
return strcmp(f1->name, f2->name);
}
/*
* Boot-time initialization of the function table needs the lookup to
* return a non-const-qualified object. Use rtas_name_to_function()
* in all other contexts.
*/
static struct rtas_function *__rtas_name_to_function(const char *name)
{
const struct rtas_function key = {
.name = name,
};
struct rtas_function *found;
found = bsearch(&key, rtas_function_table, ARRAY_SIZE(rtas_function_table),
sizeof(rtas_function_table[0]), rtas_function_cmp);
return found;
}
static const struct rtas_function *rtas_name_to_function(const char *name)
{
return __rtas_name_to_function(name);
}
static DEFINE_XARRAY(rtas_token_to_function_xarray);
static int __init rtas_token_to_function_xarray_init(void)
{
const struct rtas_function *func;
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
int err = 0;
for_each_rtas_function(func) {
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
const s32 token = func->token;
if (token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
continue;
err = xa_err(xa_store(&rtas_token_to_function_xarray,
token, (void *)func, GFP_KERNEL));
if (err)
break;
}
return err;
}
arch_initcall(rtas_token_to_function_xarray_init);
powerpc/rtas: Avoid warning on invalid token argument to sys_rtas() rtas_token_to_function() WARNs when passed an invalid token; it's meant to catch bugs in kernel-based users of RTAS functions. However, user space controls the token value passed to rtas_token_to_function() by block_rtas_call(), so user space with sufficient privilege to use sys_rtas() can trigger the warnings at will: unexpected failed lookup for token 2048 WARNING: CPU: 20 PID: 2247 at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:556 rtas_token_to_function+0xfc/0x110 ... NIP rtas_token_to_function+0xfc/0x110 LR rtas_token_to_function+0xf8/0x110 Call Trace: rtas_token_to_function+0xf8/0x110 (unreliable) sys_rtas+0x188/0x880 system_call_exception+0x268/0x530 system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 It's desirable to continue warning on bogus tokens in rtas_token_to_function(). Currently it is used to look up RTAS function descriptors when tracing, where we know there has to have been a successful descriptor lookup by different means already, and it would be a serious inconsistency for the reverse lookup to fail. So instead of weakening rtas_token_to_function()'s contract by removing the warnings, introduce rtas_token_to_function_untrusted(), which has no opinion on failed lookups. Convert block_rtas_call() and rtas_token_to_function() to use it. Fixes: 8252b88294d2 ("powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups") Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-1-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:48 -06:00
/*
* For use by sys_rtas(), where the token value is provided by user
* space and we don't want to warn on failed lookups.
*/
static const struct rtas_function *rtas_token_to_function_untrusted(s32 token)
{
return xa_load(&rtas_token_to_function_xarray, token);
}
/*
* Reverse lookup for deriving the function descriptor from a
* known-good token value in contexts where the former is not already
* available. @token must be valid, e.g. derived from the result of a
* prior lookup against the function table.
*/
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
static const struct rtas_function *rtas_token_to_function(s32 token)
{
const struct rtas_function *func;
if (WARN_ONCE(token < 0, "invalid token %d", token))
return NULL;
powerpc/rtas: Avoid warning on invalid token argument to sys_rtas() rtas_token_to_function() WARNs when passed an invalid token; it's meant to catch bugs in kernel-based users of RTAS functions. However, user space controls the token value passed to rtas_token_to_function() by block_rtas_call(), so user space with sufficient privilege to use sys_rtas() can trigger the warnings at will: unexpected failed lookup for token 2048 WARNING: CPU: 20 PID: 2247 at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:556 rtas_token_to_function+0xfc/0x110 ... NIP rtas_token_to_function+0xfc/0x110 LR rtas_token_to_function+0xf8/0x110 Call Trace: rtas_token_to_function+0xf8/0x110 (unreliable) sys_rtas+0x188/0x880 system_call_exception+0x268/0x530 system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 It's desirable to continue warning on bogus tokens in rtas_token_to_function(). Currently it is used to look up RTAS function descriptors when tracing, where we know there has to have been a successful descriptor lookup by different means already, and it would be a serious inconsistency for the reverse lookup to fail. So instead of weakening rtas_token_to_function()'s contract by removing the warnings, introduce rtas_token_to_function_untrusted(), which has no opinion on failed lookups. Convert block_rtas_call() and rtas_token_to_function() to use it. Fixes: 8252b88294d2 ("powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups") Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-1-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:48 -06:00
func = rtas_token_to_function_untrusted(token);
if (func)
return func;
/*
* Fall back to linear scan in case the reverse mapping hasn't
* been initialized yet.
*/
if (xa_empty(&rtas_token_to_function_xarray)) {
for_each_rtas_function(func) {
if (func->token == token)
return func;
}
}
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
WARN_ONCE(true, "unexpected failed lookup for token %d", token);
return NULL;
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
}
/* This is here deliberately so it's only used in this file */
void enter_rtas(unsigned long);
static void __do_enter_rtas(struct rtas_args *args)
{
enter_rtas(__pa(args));
srr_regs_clobbered(); /* rtas uses SRRs, invalidate */
}
powerpc/rtas: Keep MSR[RI] set when calling RTAS RTAS runs in real mode (MSR[DR] and MSR[IR] unset) and in 32-bit big endian mode (MSR[SF,LE] unset). The change in MSR is done in enter_rtas() in a relatively complex way, since the MSR value could be hardcoded. Furthermore, a panic has been reported when hitting the watchdog interrupt while running in RTAS, this leads to the following stack trace: watchdog: CPU 24 Hard LOCKUP watchdog: CPU 24 TB:997512652051031, last heartbeat TB:997504470175378 (15980ms ago) ... Supported: No, Unreleased kernel CPU: 24 PID: 87504 Comm: drmgr Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E X 5.14.21-150400.71.1.bz196362_2-default #1 SLE15-SP4 (unreleased) 0d821077ef4faa8dfaf370efb5fdca1fa35f4e2c NIP: 000000001fb41050 LR: 000000001fb4104c CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000000fc33d60 TRAP: 0100 Tainted: G E X (5.14.21-150400.71.1.bz196362_2-default) MSR: 8000000002981000 <SF,VEC,VSX,ME> CR: 48800002 XER: 20040020 CFAR: 000000000000011c IRQMASK: 1 GPR00: 0000000000000003 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000001 00000000000050dc GPR04: 000000001ffb6100 0000000000000020 0000000000000001 000000001fb09010 GPR08: 0000000020000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR12: 80040000072a40a8 c00000000ff8b680 0000000000000007 0000000000000034 GPR16: 000000001fbf6e94 000000001fbf6d84 000000001fbd1db0 000000001fb3f008 GPR20: 000000001fb41018 ffffffffffffffff 000000000000017f fffffffffffff68f GPR24: 000000001fb18fe8 000000001fb3e000 000000001fb1adc0 000000001fb1cf40 GPR28: 000000001fb26000 000000001fb460f0 000000001fb17f18 000000001fb17000 NIP [000000001fb41050] 0x1fb41050 LR [000000001fb4104c] 0x1fb4104c Call Trace: Instruction dump: XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX Oops: Unrecoverable System Reset, sig: 6 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries ... Supported: No, Unreleased kernel CPU: 24 PID: 87504 Comm: drmgr Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E X 5.14.21-150400.71.1.bz196362_2-default #1 SLE15-SP4 (unreleased) 0d821077ef4faa8dfaf370efb5fdca1fa35f4e2c NIP: 000000001fb41050 LR: 000000001fb4104c CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000000fc33d60 TRAP: 0100 Tainted: G E X (5.14.21-150400.71.1.bz196362_2-default) MSR: 8000000002981000 <SF,VEC,VSX,ME> CR: 48800002 XER: 20040020 CFAR: 000000000000011c IRQMASK: 1 GPR00: 0000000000000003 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000001 00000000000050dc GPR04: 000000001ffb6100 0000000000000020 0000000000000001 000000001fb09010 GPR08: 0000000020000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR12: 80040000072a40a8 c00000000ff8b680 0000000000000007 0000000000000034 GPR16: 000000001fbf6e94 000000001fbf6d84 000000001fbd1db0 000000001fb3f008 GPR20: 000000001fb41018 ffffffffffffffff 000000000000017f fffffffffffff68f GPR24: 000000001fb18fe8 000000001fb3e000 000000001fb1adc0 000000001fb1cf40 GPR28: 000000001fb26000 000000001fb460f0 000000001fb17f18 000000001fb17000 NIP [000000001fb41050] 0x1fb41050 LR [000000001fb4104c] 0x1fb4104c Call Trace: Instruction dump: XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX ---[ end trace 3ddec07f638c34a2 ]--- This happens because MSR[RI] is unset when entering RTAS but there is no valid reason to not set it here. RTAS is expected to be called with MSR[RI] as specified in PAPR+ section "7.2.1 Machine State": R1–7.2.1–9. If called with MSR[RI] equal to 1, then RTAS must protect its own critical regions from recursion by setting the MSR[RI] bit to 0 when in the critical regions. Fixing this by reviewing the way MSR is compute before calling RTAS. Now a hardcoded value meaning real mode, 32 bits big endian mode and Recoverable Interrupt is loaded. In the case MSR[S] is set, it will remain set while entering RTAS as only urfid can unset it (thanks Fabiano). In addition a check is added in do_enter_rtas() to detect calls made with MSR[RI] unset, as we are forcing it on later. This patch has been tested on the following machines: Power KVM Guest P8 S822L (host Ubuntu kernel 5.11.0-49-generic) PowerVM LPAR P8 9119-MME (FW860.A1) p9 9008-22L (FW950.00) P10 9080-HEX (FW1010.00) Suggested-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220504101244.12107-1-ldufour@linux.ibm.com
2022-05-04 12:12:44 +02:00
static void __do_enter_rtas_trace(struct rtas_args *args)
{
const struct rtas_function *func = rtas_token_to_function(be32_to_cpu(args->token));
/*
* If there is a per-function lock, it must be held by the
* caller.
*/
if (func->lock)
lockdep_assert_held(func->lock);
if (args == &rtas_args)
lockdep_assert_held(&rtas_lock);
trace_rtas_input(args, func->name);
trace_rtas_ll_entry(args);
__do_enter_rtas(args);
trace_rtas_ll_exit(args);
trace_rtas_output(args, func->name);
}
static void do_enter_rtas(struct rtas_args *args)
{
const unsigned long msr = mfmsr();
/*
* Situations where we want to skip any active tracepoints for
* safety reasons:
*
* 1. The last code executed on an offline CPU as it stops,
* i.e. we're about to call stop-self. The tracepoints'
* function name lookup uses xarray, which uses RCU, which
* isn't valid to call on an offline CPU. Any events
* emitted on an offline CPU will be discarded anyway.
*
* 2. In real mode, as when invoking ibm,nmi-interlock from
* the pseries MCE handler. We cannot count on trace
* buffers or the entries in rtas_token_to_function_xarray
* to be contained in the RMO.
*/
const unsigned long mask = MSR_IR | MSR_DR;
const bool can_trace = likely(cpu_online(raw_smp_processor_id()) &&
(msr & mask) == mask);
powerpc/rtas: Keep MSR[RI] set when calling RTAS RTAS runs in real mode (MSR[DR] and MSR[IR] unset) and in 32-bit big endian mode (MSR[SF,LE] unset). The change in MSR is done in enter_rtas() in a relatively complex way, since the MSR value could be hardcoded. Furthermore, a panic has been reported when hitting the watchdog interrupt while running in RTAS, this leads to the following stack trace: watchdog: CPU 24 Hard LOCKUP watchdog: CPU 24 TB:997512652051031, last heartbeat TB:997504470175378 (15980ms ago) ... Supported: No, Unreleased kernel CPU: 24 PID: 87504 Comm: drmgr Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E X 5.14.21-150400.71.1.bz196362_2-default #1 SLE15-SP4 (unreleased) 0d821077ef4faa8dfaf370efb5fdca1fa35f4e2c NIP: 000000001fb41050 LR: 000000001fb4104c CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000000fc33d60 TRAP: 0100 Tainted: G E X (5.14.21-150400.71.1.bz196362_2-default) MSR: 8000000002981000 <SF,VEC,VSX,ME> CR: 48800002 XER: 20040020 CFAR: 000000000000011c IRQMASK: 1 GPR00: 0000000000000003 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000001 00000000000050dc GPR04: 000000001ffb6100 0000000000000020 0000000000000001 000000001fb09010 GPR08: 0000000020000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR12: 80040000072a40a8 c00000000ff8b680 0000000000000007 0000000000000034 GPR16: 000000001fbf6e94 000000001fbf6d84 000000001fbd1db0 000000001fb3f008 GPR20: 000000001fb41018 ffffffffffffffff 000000000000017f fffffffffffff68f GPR24: 000000001fb18fe8 000000001fb3e000 000000001fb1adc0 000000001fb1cf40 GPR28: 000000001fb26000 000000001fb460f0 000000001fb17f18 000000001fb17000 NIP [000000001fb41050] 0x1fb41050 LR [000000001fb4104c] 0x1fb4104c Call Trace: Instruction dump: XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX Oops: Unrecoverable System Reset, sig: 6 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries ... Supported: No, Unreleased kernel CPU: 24 PID: 87504 Comm: drmgr Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E X 5.14.21-150400.71.1.bz196362_2-default #1 SLE15-SP4 (unreleased) 0d821077ef4faa8dfaf370efb5fdca1fa35f4e2c NIP: 000000001fb41050 LR: 000000001fb4104c CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000000fc33d60 TRAP: 0100 Tainted: G E X (5.14.21-150400.71.1.bz196362_2-default) MSR: 8000000002981000 <SF,VEC,VSX,ME> CR: 48800002 XER: 20040020 CFAR: 000000000000011c IRQMASK: 1 GPR00: 0000000000000003 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000001 00000000000050dc GPR04: 000000001ffb6100 0000000000000020 0000000000000001 000000001fb09010 GPR08: 0000000020000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR12: 80040000072a40a8 c00000000ff8b680 0000000000000007 0000000000000034 GPR16: 000000001fbf6e94 000000001fbf6d84 000000001fbd1db0 000000001fb3f008 GPR20: 000000001fb41018 ffffffffffffffff 000000000000017f fffffffffffff68f GPR24: 000000001fb18fe8 000000001fb3e000 000000001fb1adc0 000000001fb1cf40 GPR28: 000000001fb26000 000000001fb460f0 000000001fb17f18 000000001fb17000 NIP [000000001fb41050] 0x1fb41050 LR [000000001fb4104c] 0x1fb4104c Call Trace: Instruction dump: XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX ---[ end trace 3ddec07f638c34a2 ]--- This happens because MSR[RI] is unset when entering RTAS but there is no valid reason to not set it here. RTAS is expected to be called with MSR[RI] as specified in PAPR+ section "7.2.1 Machine State": R1–7.2.1–9. If called with MSR[RI] equal to 1, then RTAS must protect its own critical regions from recursion by setting the MSR[RI] bit to 0 when in the critical regions. Fixing this by reviewing the way MSR is compute before calling RTAS. Now a hardcoded value meaning real mode, 32 bits big endian mode and Recoverable Interrupt is loaded. In the case MSR[S] is set, it will remain set while entering RTAS as only urfid can unset it (thanks Fabiano). In addition a check is added in do_enter_rtas() to detect calls made with MSR[RI] unset, as we are forcing it on later. This patch has been tested on the following machines: Power KVM Guest P8 S822L (host Ubuntu kernel 5.11.0-49-generic) PowerVM LPAR P8 9119-MME (FW860.A1) p9 9008-22L (FW950.00) P10 9080-HEX (FW1010.00) Suggested-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220504101244.12107-1-ldufour@linux.ibm.com
2022-05-04 12:12:44 +02:00
/*
* Make sure MSR[RI] is currently enabled as it will be forced later
* in enter_rtas.
*/
BUG_ON(!(msr & MSR_RI));
BUG_ON(!irqs_disabled());
hard_irq_disable(); /* Ensure MSR[EE] is disabled on PPC64 */
if (can_trace)
__do_enter_rtas_trace(args);
else
__do_enter_rtas(args);
}
struct rtas_t rtas;
DEFINE_SPINLOCK(rtas_data_buf_lock);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtas_data_buf_lock);
char rtas_data_buf[RTAS_DATA_BUF_SIZE] __aligned(SZ_4K);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtas_data_buf);
unsigned long rtas_rmo_buf;
/*
* If non-NULL, this gets called when the kernel terminates.
* This is done like this so rtas_flash can be a module.
*/
void (*rtas_flash_term_hook)(int);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtas_flash_term_hook);
/*
* call_rtas_display_status and call_rtas_display_status_delay
* are designed only for very early low-level debugging, which
* is why the token is hard-coded to 10.
*/
static void call_rtas_display_status(unsigned char c)
{
unsigned long flags;
if (!rtas.base)
return;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&rtas_lock, flags);
rtas_call_unlocked(&rtas_args, 10, 1, 1, NULL, c);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rtas_lock, flags);
}
static void call_rtas_display_status_delay(char c)
{
static int pending_newline = 0; /* did last write end with unprinted newline? */
static int width = 16;
if (c == '\n') {
while (width-- > 0)
call_rtas_display_status(' ');
width = 16;
mdelay(500);
pending_newline = 1;
} else {
if (pending_newline) {
call_rtas_display_status('\r');
call_rtas_display_status('\n');
}
pending_newline = 0;
if (width--) {
call_rtas_display_status(c);
udelay(10000);
}
}
}
void __init udbg_init_rtas_panel(void)
{
udbg_putc = call_rtas_display_status_delay;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_UDBG_RTAS_CONSOLE
/* If you think you're dying before early_init_dt_scan_rtas() does its
* work, you can hard code the token values for your firmware here and
* hardcode rtas.base/entry etc.
*/
static unsigned int rtas_putchar_token = RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE;
static unsigned int rtas_getchar_token = RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE;
static void udbg_rtascon_putc(char c)
{
int tries;
if (!rtas.base)
return;
/* Add CRs before LFs */
if (c == '\n')
udbg_rtascon_putc('\r');
/* if there is more than one character to be displayed, wait a bit */
for (tries = 0; tries < 16; tries++) {
if (rtas_call(rtas_putchar_token, 1, 1, NULL, c) == 0)
break;
udelay(1000);
}
}
static int udbg_rtascon_getc_poll(void)
{
int c;
if (!rtas.base)
return -1;
if (rtas_call(rtas_getchar_token, 0, 2, &c))
return -1;
return c;
}
static int udbg_rtascon_getc(void)
{
int c;
while ((c = udbg_rtascon_getc_poll()) == -1)
;
return c;
}
void __init udbg_init_rtas_console(void)
{
udbg_putc = udbg_rtascon_putc;
udbg_getc = udbg_rtascon_getc;
udbg_getc_poll = udbg_rtascon_getc_poll;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_UDBG_RTAS_CONSOLE */
void rtas_progress(char *s, unsigned short hex)
{
struct device_node *root;
int width;
const __be32 *p;
char *os;
static int display_character, set_indicator;
static int display_width, display_lines, form_feed;
static const int *row_width;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(progress_lock);
static int current_line;
static int pending_newline = 0; /* did last write end with unprinted newline? */
if (!rtas.base)
return;
if (display_width == 0) {
display_width = 0x10;
if ((root = of_find_node_by_path("/rtas"))) {
if ((p = of_get_property(root,
"ibm,display-line-length", NULL)))
display_width = be32_to_cpu(*p);
if ((p = of_get_property(root,
"ibm,form-feed", NULL)))
form_feed = be32_to_cpu(*p);
if ((p = of_get_property(root,
"ibm,display-number-of-lines", NULL)))
display_lines = be32_to_cpu(*p);
row_width = of_get_property(root,
"ibm,display-truncation-length", NULL);
of_node_put(root);
}
display_character = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_DISPLAY_CHARACTER);
set_indicator = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_SET_INDICATOR);
}
if (display_character == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
/* use hex display if available */
if (set_indicator != RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
rtas_call(set_indicator, 3, 1, NULL, 6, 0, hex);
return;
}
spin_lock(&progress_lock);
/*
* Last write ended with newline, but we didn't print it since
* it would just clear the bottom line of output. Print it now
* instead.
*
* If no newline is pending and form feed is supported, clear the
* display with a form feed; otherwise, print a CR to start output
* at the beginning of the line.
*/
if (pending_newline) {
rtas_call(display_character, 1, 1, NULL, '\r');
rtas_call(display_character, 1, 1, NULL, '\n');
pending_newline = 0;
} else {
current_line = 0;
if (form_feed)
rtas_call(display_character, 1, 1, NULL,
(char)form_feed);
else
rtas_call(display_character, 1, 1, NULL, '\r');
}
if (row_width)
width = row_width[current_line];
else
width = display_width;
os = s;
while (*os) {
if (*os == '\n' || *os == '\r') {
/* If newline is the last character, save it
* until next call to avoid bumping up the
* display output.
*/
if (*os == '\n' && !os[1]) {
pending_newline = 1;
current_line++;
if (current_line > display_lines-1)
current_line = display_lines-1;
spin_unlock(&progress_lock);
return;
}
/* RTAS wants CR-LF, not just LF */
if (*os == '\n') {
rtas_call(display_character, 1, 1, NULL, '\r');
rtas_call(display_character, 1, 1, NULL, '\n');
} else {
/* CR might be used to re-draw a line, so we'll
* leave it alone and not add LF.
*/
rtas_call(display_character, 1, 1, NULL, *os);
}
if (row_width)
width = row_width[current_line];
else
width = display_width;
} else {
width--;
rtas_call(display_character, 1, 1, NULL, *os);
}
os++;
/* if we overwrite the screen length */
if (width <= 0)
while ((*os != 0) && (*os != '\n') && (*os != '\r'))
os++;
}
spin_unlock(&progress_lock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtas_progress); /* needed by rtas_flash module */
int rtas_token(const char *service)
{
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
const struct rtas_function *func;
const __be32 *tokp;
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
if (rtas.dev == NULL)
return RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE;
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
func = rtas_name_to_function(service);
if (func)
return func->token;
/*
* The caller is looking up a name that is not known to be an
* RTAS function. Either it's a function that needs to be
* added to the table, or they're misusing rtas_token() to
* access non-function properties of the /rtas node. Warn and
* fall back to the legacy behavior.
*/
WARN_ONCE(1, "unknown function `%s`, should it be added to rtas_function_table?\n",
service);
tokp = of_get_property(rtas.dev, service, NULL);
return tokp ? be32_to_cpu(*tokp) : RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtas_token);
#ifdef CONFIG_RTAS_ERROR_LOGGING
static u32 rtas_error_log_max __ro_after_init = RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX;
/*
* Return the firmware-specified size of the error log buffer
* for all rtas calls that require an error buffer argument.
* This includes 'check-exception' and 'rtas-last-error'.
*/
int rtas_get_error_log_max(void)
{
return rtas_error_log_max;
}
static void __init init_error_log_max(void)
{
static const char propname[] __initconst = "rtas-error-log-max";
u32 max;
if (of_property_read_u32(rtas.dev, propname, &max)) {
pr_warn("%s not found, using default of %u\n",
propname, RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX);
max = RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX;
}
if (max > RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX) {
pr_warn("%s = %u, clamping max error log size to %u\n",
propname, max, RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX);
max = RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX;
}
rtas_error_log_max = max;
}
static char rtas_err_buf[RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX];
/** Return a copy of the detailed error text associated with the
* most recent failed call to rtas. Because the error text
* might go stale if there are any other intervening rtas calls,
* this routine must be called atomically with whatever produced
* the error (i.e. with rtas_lock still held from the previous call).
*/
static char *__fetch_rtas_last_error(char *altbuf)
{
const s32 token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_RTAS_LAST_ERROR);
struct rtas_args err_args, save_args;
u32 bufsz;
char *buf = NULL;
lockdep_assert_held(&rtas_lock);
if (token == -1)
return NULL;
bufsz = rtas_get_error_log_max();
err_args.token = cpu_to_be32(token);
err_args.nargs = cpu_to_be32(2);
err_args.nret = cpu_to_be32(1);
err_args.args[0] = cpu_to_be32(__pa(rtas_err_buf));
err_args.args[1] = cpu_to_be32(bufsz);
err_args.args[2] = 0;
save_args = rtas_args;
rtas_args = err_args;
do_enter_rtas(&rtas_args);
err_args = rtas_args;
rtas_args = save_args;
/* Log the error in the unlikely case that there was one. */
if (unlikely(err_args.args[2] == 0)) {
if (altbuf) {
buf = altbuf;
} else {
buf = rtas_err_buf;
if (slab_is_available())
buf = kmalloc(RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
if (buf)
memmove(buf, rtas_err_buf, RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX);
}
return buf;
}
#define get_errorlog_buffer() kmalloc(RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX, GFP_KERNEL)
#else /* CONFIG_RTAS_ERROR_LOGGING */
#define __fetch_rtas_last_error(x) NULL
#define get_errorlog_buffer() NULL
static void __init init_error_log_max(void) {}
#endif
static void
va_rtas_call_unlocked(struct rtas_args *args, int token, int nargs, int nret,
va_list list)
{
int i;
args->token = cpu_to_be32(token);
args->nargs = cpu_to_be32(nargs);
args->nret = cpu_to_be32(nret);
args->rets = &(args->args[nargs]);
for (i = 0; i < nargs; ++i)
args->args[i] = cpu_to_be32(va_arg(list, __u32));
for (i = 0; i < nret; ++i)
args->rets[i] = 0;
do_enter_rtas(args);
}
/**
* rtas_call_unlocked() - Invoke an RTAS firmware function without synchronization.
* @args: RTAS parameter block to be used for the call, must obey RTAS addressing
* constraints.
* @token: Identifies the function being invoked.
* @nargs: Number of input parameters. Does not include token.
* @nret: Number of output parameters, including the call status.
* @....: List of @nargs input parameters.
*
* Invokes the RTAS function indicated by @token, which the caller
* should obtain via rtas_function_token().
*
* This function is similar to rtas_call(), but must be used with a
* limited set of RTAS calls specifically exempted from the general
* requirement that only one RTAS call may be in progress at any
* time. Examples include stop-self and ibm,nmi-interlock.
*/
void rtas_call_unlocked(struct rtas_args *args, int token, int nargs, int nret, ...)
{
va_list list;
va_start(list, nret);
va_rtas_call_unlocked(args, token, nargs, nret, list);
va_end(list);
}
static bool token_is_restricted_errinjct(s32 token)
{
return token == rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_OPEN_ERRINJCT) ||
token == rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ERRINJCT);
}
/**
* rtas_call() - Invoke an RTAS firmware function.
* @token: Identifies the function being invoked.
* @nargs: Number of input parameters. Does not include token.
* @nret: Number of output parameters, including the call status.
* @outputs: Array of @nret output words.
* @....: List of @nargs input parameters.
*
* Invokes the RTAS function indicated by @token, which the caller
* should obtain via rtas_function_token().
*
* The @nargs and @nret arguments must match the number of input and
* output parameters specified for the RTAS function.
*
* rtas_call() returns RTAS status codes, not conventional Linux errno
* values. Callers must translate any failure to an appropriate errno
* in syscall context. Most callers of RTAS functions that can return
* -2 or 990x should use rtas_busy_delay() to correctly handle those
* statuses before calling again.
*
* The return value descriptions are adapted from 7.2.8 [RTAS] Return
* Codes of the PAPR and CHRP specifications.
*
* Context: Process context preferably, interrupt context if
* necessary. Acquires an internal spinlock and may perform
* GFP_ATOMIC slab allocation in error path. Unsafe for NMI
* context.
* Return:
* * 0 - RTAS function call succeeded.
* * -1 - RTAS function encountered a hardware or
* platform error, or the token is invalid,
* or the function is restricted by kernel policy.
* * -2 - Specs say "A necessary hardware device was busy,
* and the requested function could not be
* performed. The operation should be retried at
* a later time." This is misleading, at least with
* respect to current RTAS implementations. What it
* usually means in practice is that the function
* could not be completed while meeting RTAS's
* deadline for returning control to the OS (250us
* for PAPR/PowerVM, typically), but the call may be
* immediately reattempted to resume work on it.
* * -3 - Parameter error.
* * -7 - Unexpected state change.
* * 9000...9899 - Vendor-specific success codes.
* * 9900...9905 - Advisory extended delay. Caller should try
* again after ~10^x ms has elapsed, where x is
* the last digit of the status [0-5]. Again going
* beyond the PAPR text, 990x on PowerVM indicates
* contention for RTAS-internal resources. Other
* RTAS call sequences in progress should be
* allowed to complete before reattempting the
* call.
* * -9000 - Multi-level isolation error.
* * -9999...-9004 - Vendor-specific error codes.
* * Additional negative values - Function-specific error.
* * Additional positive values - Function-specific success.
*/
int rtas_call(int token, int nargs, int nret, int *outputs, ...)
{
struct pin_cookie cookie;
va_list list;
int i;
unsigned long flags;
struct rtas_args *args;
char *buff_copy = NULL;
int ret;
if (!rtas.entry || token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
return -1;
if (token_is_restricted_errinjct(token)) {
/*
* It would be nicer to not discard the error value
* from security_locked_down(), but callers expect an
* RTAS status, not an errno.
*/
if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION))
return -1;
}
if ((mfmsr() & (MSR_IR|MSR_DR)) != (MSR_IR|MSR_DR)) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return -1;
}
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&rtas_lock, flags);
cookie = lockdep_pin_lock(&rtas_lock);
/* We use the global rtas args buffer */
args = &rtas_args;
va_start(list, outputs);
va_rtas_call_unlocked(args, token, nargs, nret, list);
va_end(list);
/* A -1 return code indicates that the last command couldn't
be completed due to a hardware error. */
if (be32_to_cpu(args->rets[0]) == -1)
buff_copy = __fetch_rtas_last_error(NULL);
if (nret > 1 && outputs != NULL)
for (i = 0; i < nret-1; ++i)
outputs[i] = be32_to_cpu(args->rets[i + 1]);
ret = (nret > 0) ? be32_to_cpu(args->rets[0]) : 0;
lockdep_unpin_lock(&rtas_lock, cookie);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rtas_lock, flags);
if (buff_copy) {
log_error(buff_copy, ERR_TYPE_RTAS_LOG, 0);
if (slab_is_available())
kfree(buff_copy);
}
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtas_call);
/**
* rtas_busy_delay_time() - From an RTAS status value, calculate the
* suggested delay time in milliseconds.
*
* @status: a value returned from rtas_call() or similar APIs which return
* the status of a RTAS function call.
*
* Context: Any context.
*
* Return:
* * 100000 - If @status is 9905.
* * 10000 - If @status is 9904.
* * 1000 - If @status is 9903.
* * 100 - If @status is 9902.
* * 10 - If @status is 9901.
* * 1 - If @status is either 9900 or -2. This is "wrong" for -2, but
* some callers depend on this behavior, and the worst outcome
* is that they will delay for longer than necessary.
* * 0 - If @status is not a busy or extended delay value.
*/
unsigned int rtas_busy_delay_time(int status)
{
int order;
unsigned int ms = 0;
if (status == RTAS_BUSY) {
ms = 1;
} else if (status >= RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MIN &&
status <= RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MAX) {
order = status - RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MIN;
for (ms = 1; order > 0; order--)
ms *= 10;
}
return ms;
}
powerpc/rtas: handle extended delays safely in early boot Some code that runs early in boot calls RTAS functions that can return -2 or 990x statuses, which mean the caller should retry. An example is pSeries_cmo_feature_init(), which invokes ibm,get-system-parameter but treats these benign statuses as errors instead of retrying. pSeries_cmo_feature_init() and similar code should be made to retry until they succeed or receive a real error, using the usual pattern: do { rc = rtas_call(token, etc...); } while (rtas_busy_delay(rc)); But rtas_busy_delay() will perform a timed sleep on any 990x status. This isn't safe so early in boot, before the CPU scheduler and timer subsystem have initialized. The -2 RTAS status is much more likely to occur during single-threaded boot than 990x in practice, at least on PowerVM. This is because -2 usually means that RTAS made progress but exhausted its self-imposed timeslice, while 990x is associated with concurrent requests from the OS causing internal contention. Regardless, according to the language in PAPR, the OS should be prepared to handle either type of status at any time. Add a fallback path to rtas_busy_delay() to handle this as safely as possible, performing a small delay on 990x. Include a counter to detect retry loops that aren't making progress and bail out. Add __ref to rtas_busy_delay() since it now conditionally calls an __init function. This was found by inspection and I'm not aware of any real failures. However, the implementation of rtas_busy_delay() before commit 38f7b7067dae ("powerpc/rtas: rtas_busy_delay() improvements") was not susceptible to this problem, so let's treat this as a regression. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: 38f7b7067dae ("powerpc/rtas: rtas_busy_delay() improvements") Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-1-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:49 -06:00
/*
* Early boot fallback for rtas_busy_delay().
*/
static bool __init rtas_busy_delay_early(int status)
{
static size_t successive_ext_delays __initdata;
bool retry;
switch (status) {
case RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MIN...RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MAX:
/*
* In the unlikely case that we receive an extended
* delay status in early boot, the OS is probably not
* the cause, and there's nothing we can do to clear
* the condition. Best we can do is delay for a bit
* and hope it's transient. Lie to the caller if it
* seems like we're stuck in a retry loop.
*/
mdelay(1);
retry = true;
successive_ext_delays += 1;
if (successive_ext_delays > 1000) {
pr_err("too many extended delays, giving up\n");
dump_stack();
retry = false;
successive_ext_delays = 0;
}
break;
case RTAS_BUSY:
retry = true;
successive_ext_delays = 0;
break;
default:
retry = false;
successive_ext_delays = 0;
break;
}
return retry;
}
powerpc/rtas: rtas_busy_delay() improvements Generally RTAS cannot block, and in PAPR it is required to return control to the OS within a few tens of microseconds. In order to support operations which may take longer to complete, many RTAS primitives can return intermediate -2 ("busy") or 990x ("extended delay") values, which indicate that the OS should reattempt the same call with the same arguments at some point in the future. Current versions of PAPR are less than clear about this, but the intended meanings of these values in more detail are: RTAS_BUSY (-2): RTAS has suspended a potentially long-running operation in order to meet its latency obligation and give the OS the opportunity to perform other work. RTAS can resume making progress as soon as the OS reattempts the call. RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_{MIN...MAX} (9900-9905): RTAS must wait for an external event to occur or for internal contention to resolve before it can complete the requested operation. The value encodes a non-binding hint as to roughly how long the OS should wait before calling again, but the OS is allowed to reattempt the call sooner or even immediately. Linux of course must take its own CPU scheduling obligations into account when handling these statuses; e.g. a task which receives an RTAS_BUSY status should check whether to reschedule before it attempts the RTAS call again to avoid starving other tasks. rtas_busy_delay() is a helper function that "consumes" a busy or extended delay status. Common usage: int rc; do { rc = rtas_call(rtas_token("some-function"), ...); } while (rtas_busy_delay(rc)); /* convert rc to Linux error value, etc */ If rc is a busy or extended delay status, the caller can rely on rtas_busy_delay() to perform an appropriate sleep or reschedule and return nonzero. Other statuses are handled normally by the caller. The current implementation of rtas_busy_delay() both oversleeps and overuses the CPU: * It performs msleep() for all 990x and even when no delay is suggested (-2), but this is understood to actually sleep for two jiffies minimum in practice (20ms with HZ=100). 9900 (1ms) and 9901 (10ms) appear to be the most common extended delay statuses, and the oversleeping measurably lengthens DLPAR operations, which perform many RTAS calls. * It does not sleep on 990x unless need_resched() is true, causing code like the loop above to needlessly retry, wasting CPU time. Alter the logic to align better with the intended meanings: * When passed RTAS_BUSY, perform cond_resched() and return without sleeping. The caller should reattempt immediately * Always sleep when passed an extended delay status, using usleep_range() for precise shorter sleeps. Limit the sleep time to one second even though there are higher architected values. Change rtas_busy_delay()'s return type to bool to better reflect its usage, and add kernel-doc. rtas_busy_delay_time() is unchanged, even though it "incorrectly" returns 1 for RTAS_BUSY. There are users of that API with open-coded delay loops in sensitive contexts that will have to be taken on an individual basis. Brief results for addition and removal of 5GB memory on a small P9 PowerVM partition follow. Load was generated with stress-ng --cpu N. For add, elapsed time is greatly reduced without significant change in the number of RTAS calls or time spent on CPU. For remove, elapsed time is modestly reduced, with significant reductions in RTAS calls and time spent on CPU. With no competing workload (- before, + after): Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory add count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 1,935 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.22% ) - 609.99 msec task-clock # 0.183 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.19% ) + 1,956 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.17% ) + 618.56 msec task-clock # 0.278 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.11% ) - 3.3322 +- 0.0670 seconds time elapsed ( +- 2.01% ) + 2.2222 +- 0.0416 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.87% ) Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory remove count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 6,224 probe:rtas_call # 0.008 M/sec ( +- 2.57% ) - 750.36 msec task-clock # 0.190 CPUs utilized ( +- 2.01% ) + 843 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.12% ) + 250.66 msec task-clock # 0.068 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.17% ) - 3.9394 +- 0.0890 seconds time elapsed ( +- 2.26% ) + 3.678 +- 0.113 seconds time elapsed ( +- 3.07% ) With all CPUs 100% busy (- before, + after): Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory add count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 2,979 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.12% ) - 1,096.62 msec task-clock # 0.105 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.10% ) + 2,981 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.22% ) + 1,095.26 msec task-clock # 0.154 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.21% ) - 10.476 +- 0.104 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.00% ) + 7.1124 +- 0.0865 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.22% ) Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory remove count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 2,702 probe:rtas_call # 0.004 M/sec ( +- 4.00% ) - 722.71 msec task-clock # 0.067 CPUs utilized ( +- 2.41% ) + 1,246 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.25% ) + 487.73 msec task-clock # 0.049 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.20% ) - 10.829 +- 0.163 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.51% ) + 9.9887 +- 0.0866 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.87% ) Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211117060259.957178-2-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
2021-11-17 00:02:58 -06:00
/**
* rtas_busy_delay() - helper for RTAS busy and extended delay statuses
*
* @status: a value returned from rtas_call() or similar APIs which return
* the status of a RTAS function call.
*
* Context: Process context. May sleep or schedule.
*
* Return:
* * true - @status is RTAS_BUSY or an extended delay hint. The
* caller may assume that the CPU has been yielded if necessary,
* and that an appropriate delay for @status has elapsed.
* Generally the caller should reattempt the RTAS call which
* yielded @status.
*
* * false - @status is not @RTAS_BUSY nor an extended delay hint. The
* caller is responsible for handling @status.
*/
powerpc/rtas: handle extended delays safely in early boot Some code that runs early in boot calls RTAS functions that can return -2 or 990x statuses, which mean the caller should retry. An example is pSeries_cmo_feature_init(), which invokes ibm,get-system-parameter but treats these benign statuses as errors instead of retrying. pSeries_cmo_feature_init() and similar code should be made to retry until they succeed or receive a real error, using the usual pattern: do { rc = rtas_call(token, etc...); } while (rtas_busy_delay(rc)); But rtas_busy_delay() will perform a timed sleep on any 990x status. This isn't safe so early in boot, before the CPU scheduler and timer subsystem have initialized. The -2 RTAS status is much more likely to occur during single-threaded boot than 990x in practice, at least on PowerVM. This is because -2 usually means that RTAS made progress but exhausted its self-imposed timeslice, while 990x is associated with concurrent requests from the OS causing internal contention. Regardless, according to the language in PAPR, the OS should be prepared to handle either type of status at any time. Add a fallback path to rtas_busy_delay() to handle this as safely as possible, performing a small delay on 990x. Include a counter to detect retry loops that aren't making progress and bail out. Add __ref to rtas_busy_delay() since it now conditionally calls an __init function. This was found by inspection and I'm not aware of any real failures. However, the implementation of rtas_busy_delay() before commit 38f7b7067dae ("powerpc/rtas: rtas_busy_delay() improvements") was not susceptible to this problem, so let's treat this as a regression. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: 38f7b7067dae ("powerpc/rtas: rtas_busy_delay() improvements") Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-1-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:49 -06:00
bool __ref rtas_busy_delay(int status)
{
unsigned int ms;
powerpc/rtas: rtas_busy_delay() improvements Generally RTAS cannot block, and in PAPR it is required to return control to the OS within a few tens of microseconds. In order to support operations which may take longer to complete, many RTAS primitives can return intermediate -2 ("busy") or 990x ("extended delay") values, which indicate that the OS should reattempt the same call with the same arguments at some point in the future. Current versions of PAPR are less than clear about this, but the intended meanings of these values in more detail are: RTAS_BUSY (-2): RTAS has suspended a potentially long-running operation in order to meet its latency obligation and give the OS the opportunity to perform other work. RTAS can resume making progress as soon as the OS reattempts the call. RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_{MIN...MAX} (9900-9905): RTAS must wait for an external event to occur or for internal contention to resolve before it can complete the requested operation. The value encodes a non-binding hint as to roughly how long the OS should wait before calling again, but the OS is allowed to reattempt the call sooner or even immediately. Linux of course must take its own CPU scheduling obligations into account when handling these statuses; e.g. a task which receives an RTAS_BUSY status should check whether to reschedule before it attempts the RTAS call again to avoid starving other tasks. rtas_busy_delay() is a helper function that "consumes" a busy or extended delay status. Common usage: int rc; do { rc = rtas_call(rtas_token("some-function"), ...); } while (rtas_busy_delay(rc)); /* convert rc to Linux error value, etc */ If rc is a busy or extended delay status, the caller can rely on rtas_busy_delay() to perform an appropriate sleep or reschedule and return nonzero. Other statuses are handled normally by the caller. The current implementation of rtas_busy_delay() both oversleeps and overuses the CPU: * It performs msleep() for all 990x and even when no delay is suggested (-2), but this is understood to actually sleep for two jiffies minimum in practice (20ms with HZ=100). 9900 (1ms) and 9901 (10ms) appear to be the most common extended delay statuses, and the oversleeping measurably lengthens DLPAR operations, which perform many RTAS calls. * It does not sleep on 990x unless need_resched() is true, causing code like the loop above to needlessly retry, wasting CPU time. Alter the logic to align better with the intended meanings: * When passed RTAS_BUSY, perform cond_resched() and return without sleeping. The caller should reattempt immediately * Always sleep when passed an extended delay status, using usleep_range() for precise shorter sleeps. Limit the sleep time to one second even though there are higher architected values. Change rtas_busy_delay()'s return type to bool to better reflect its usage, and add kernel-doc. rtas_busy_delay_time() is unchanged, even though it "incorrectly" returns 1 for RTAS_BUSY. There are users of that API with open-coded delay loops in sensitive contexts that will have to be taken on an individual basis. Brief results for addition and removal of 5GB memory on a small P9 PowerVM partition follow. Load was generated with stress-ng --cpu N. For add, elapsed time is greatly reduced without significant change in the number of RTAS calls or time spent on CPU. For remove, elapsed time is modestly reduced, with significant reductions in RTAS calls and time spent on CPU. With no competing workload (- before, + after): Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory add count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 1,935 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.22% ) - 609.99 msec task-clock # 0.183 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.19% ) + 1,956 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.17% ) + 618.56 msec task-clock # 0.278 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.11% ) - 3.3322 +- 0.0670 seconds time elapsed ( +- 2.01% ) + 2.2222 +- 0.0416 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.87% ) Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory remove count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 6,224 probe:rtas_call # 0.008 M/sec ( +- 2.57% ) - 750.36 msec task-clock # 0.190 CPUs utilized ( +- 2.01% ) + 843 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.12% ) + 250.66 msec task-clock # 0.068 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.17% ) - 3.9394 +- 0.0890 seconds time elapsed ( +- 2.26% ) + 3.678 +- 0.113 seconds time elapsed ( +- 3.07% ) With all CPUs 100% busy (- before, + after): Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory add count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 2,979 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.12% ) - 1,096.62 msec task-clock # 0.105 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.10% ) + 2,981 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.22% ) + 1,095.26 msec task-clock # 0.154 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.21% ) - 10.476 +- 0.104 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.00% ) + 7.1124 +- 0.0865 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.22% ) Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory remove count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 2,702 probe:rtas_call # 0.004 M/sec ( +- 4.00% ) - 722.71 msec task-clock # 0.067 CPUs utilized ( +- 2.41% ) + 1,246 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.25% ) + 487.73 msec task-clock # 0.049 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.20% ) - 10.829 +- 0.163 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.51% ) + 9.9887 +- 0.0866 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.87% ) Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211117060259.957178-2-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
2021-11-17 00:02:58 -06:00
bool ret;
powerpc/rtas: handle extended delays safely in early boot Some code that runs early in boot calls RTAS functions that can return -2 or 990x statuses, which mean the caller should retry. An example is pSeries_cmo_feature_init(), which invokes ibm,get-system-parameter but treats these benign statuses as errors instead of retrying. pSeries_cmo_feature_init() and similar code should be made to retry until they succeed or receive a real error, using the usual pattern: do { rc = rtas_call(token, etc...); } while (rtas_busy_delay(rc)); But rtas_busy_delay() will perform a timed sleep on any 990x status. This isn't safe so early in boot, before the CPU scheduler and timer subsystem have initialized. The -2 RTAS status is much more likely to occur during single-threaded boot than 990x in practice, at least on PowerVM. This is because -2 usually means that RTAS made progress but exhausted its self-imposed timeslice, while 990x is associated with concurrent requests from the OS causing internal contention. Regardless, according to the language in PAPR, the OS should be prepared to handle either type of status at any time. Add a fallback path to rtas_busy_delay() to handle this as safely as possible, performing a small delay on 990x. Include a counter to detect retry loops that aren't making progress and bail out. Add __ref to rtas_busy_delay() since it now conditionally calls an __init function. This was found by inspection and I'm not aware of any real failures. However, the implementation of rtas_busy_delay() before commit 38f7b7067dae ("powerpc/rtas: rtas_busy_delay() improvements") was not susceptible to this problem, so let's treat this as a regression. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: 38f7b7067dae ("powerpc/rtas: rtas_busy_delay() improvements") Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-1-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:49 -06:00
/*
* Can't do timed sleeps before timekeeping is up.
*/
if (system_state < SYSTEM_SCHEDULING)
return rtas_busy_delay_early(status);
powerpc/rtas: rtas_busy_delay() improvements Generally RTAS cannot block, and in PAPR it is required to return control to the OS within a few tens of microseconds. In order to support operations which may take longer to complete, many RTAS primitives can return intermediate -2 ("busy") or 990x ("extended delay") values, which indicate that the OS should reattempt the same call with the same arguments at some point in the future. Current versions of PAPR are less than clear about this, but the intended meanings of these values in more detail are: RTAS_BUSY (-2): RTAS has suspended a potentially long-running operation in order to meet its latency obligation and give the OS the opportunity to perform other work. RTAS can resume making progress as soon as the OS reattempts the call. RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_{MIN...MAX} (9900-9905): RTAS must wait for an external event to occur or for internal contention to resolve before it can complete the requested operation. The value encodes a non-binding hint as to roughly how long the OS should wait before calling again, but the OS is allowed to reattempt the call sooner or even immediately. Linux of course must take its own CPU scheduling obligations into account when handling these statuses; e.g. a task which receives an RTAS_BUSY status should check whether to reschedule before it attempts the RTAS call again to avoid starving other tasks. rtas_busy_delay() is a helper function that "consumes" a busy or extended delay status. Common usage: int rc; do { rc = rtas_call(rtas_token("some-function"), ...); } while (rtas_busy_delay(rc)); /* convert rc to Linux error value, etc */ If rc is a busy or extended delay status, the caller can rely on rtas_busy_delay() to perform an appropriate sleep or reschedule and return nonzero. Other statuses are handled normally by the caller. The current implementation of rtas_busy_delay() both oversleeps and overuses the CPU: * It performs msleep() for all 990x and even when no delay is suggested (-2), but this is understood to actually sleep for two jiffies minimum in practice (20ms with HZ=100). 9900 (1ms) and 9901 (10ms) appear to be the most common extended delay statuses, and the oversleeping measurably lengthens DLPAR operations, which perform many RTAS calls. * It does not sleep on 990x unless need_resched() is true, causing code like the loop above to needlessly retry, wasting CPU time. Alter the logic to align better with the intended meanings: * When passed RTAS_BUSY, perform cond_resched() and return without sleeping. The caller should reattempt immediately * Always sleep when passed an extended delay status, using usleep_range() for precise shorter sleeps. Limit the sleep time to one second even though there are higher architected values. Change rtas_busy_delay()'s return type to bool to better reflect its usage, and add kernel-doc. rtas_busy_delay_time() is unchanged, even though it "incorrectly" returns 1 for RTAS_BUSY. There are users of that API with open-coded delay loops in sensitive contexts that will have to be taken on an individual basis. Brief results for addition and removal of 5GB memory on a small P9 PowerVM partition follow. Load was generated with stress-ng --cpu N. For add, elapsed time is greatly reduced without significant change in the number of RTAS calls or time spent on CPU. For remove, elapsed time is modestly reduced, with significant reductions in RTAS calls and time spent on CPU. With no competing workload (- before, + after): Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory add count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 1,935 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.22% ) - 609.99 msec task-clock # 0.183 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.19% ) + 1,956 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.17% ) + 618.56 msec task-clock # 0.278 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.11% ) - 3.3322 +- 0.0670 seconds time elapsed ( +- 2.01% ) + 2.2222 +- 0.0416 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.87% ) Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory remove count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 6,224 probe:rtas_call # 0.008 M/sec ( +- 2.57% ) - 750.36 msec task-clock # 0.190 CPUs utilized ( +- 2.01% ) + 843 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.12% ) + 250.66 msec task-clock # 0.068 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.17% ) - 3.9394 +- 0.0890 seconds time elapsed ( +- 2.26% ) + 3.678 +- 0.113 seconds time elapsed ( +- 3.07% ) With all CPUs 100% busy (- before, + after): Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory add count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 2,979 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.12% ) - 1,096.62 msec task-clock # 0.105 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.10% ) + 2,981 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.22% ) + 1,095.26 msec task-clock # 0.154 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.21% ) - 10.476 +- 0.104 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.00% ) + 7.1124 +- 0.0865 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.22% ) Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory remove count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 2,702 probe:rtas_call # 0.004 M/sec ( +- 4.00% ) - 722.71 msec task-clock # 0.067 CPUs utilized ( +- 2.41% ) + 1,246 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.25% ) + 487.73 msec task-clock # 0.049 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.20% ) - 10.829 +- 0.163 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.51% ) + 9.9887 +- 0.0866 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.87% ) Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211117060259.957178-2-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
2021-11-17 00:02:58 -06:00
switch (status) {
case RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MIN...RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MAX:
ret = true;
ms = rtas_busy_delay_time(status);
/*
* The extended delay hint can be as high as 100 seconds.
* Surely any function returning such a status is either
* buggy or isn't going to be significantly slowed by us
* polling at 1HZ. Clamp the sleep time to one second.
*/
ms = clamp(ms, 1U, 1000U);
/*
* The delay hint is an order-of-magnitude suggestion, not
* a minimum. It is fine, possibly even advantageous, for
* us to pause for less time than hinted. For small values,
* use usleep_range() to ensure we don't sleep much longer
* than actually needed.
*
* See Documentation/timers/timers-howto.rst for
* explanation of the threshold used here. In effect we use
* usleep_range() for 9900 and 9901, msleep() for
* 9902-9905.
*/
if (ms <= 20)
usleep_range(ms * 100, ms * 1000);
else
msleep(ms);
break;
case RTAS_BUSY:
ret = true;
/*
* We should call again immediately if there's no other
* work to do.
*/
cond_resched();
break;
default:
ret = false;
/*
* Not a busy or extended delay status; the caller should
* handle @status itself. Ensure we warn on misuses in
* atomic context regardless.
*/
might_sleep();
break;
}
powerpc/rtas: rtas_busy_delay() improvements Generally RTAS cannot block, and in PAPR it is required to return control to the OS within a few tens of microseconds. In order to support operations which may take longer to complete, many RTAS primitives can return intermediate -2 ("busy") or 990x ("extended delay") values, which indicate that the OS should reattempt the same call with the same arguments at some point in the future. Current versions of PAPR are less than clear about this, but the intended meanings of these values in more detail are: RTAS_BUSY (-2): RTAS has suspended a potentially long-running operation in order to meet its latency obligation and give the OS the opportunity to perform other work. RTAS can resume making progress as soon as the OS reattempts the call. RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_{MIN...MAX} (9900-9905): RTAS must wait for an external event to occur or for internal contention to resolve before it can complete the requested operation. The value encodes a non-binding hint as to roughly how long the OS should wait before calling again, but the OS is allowed to reattempt the call sooner or even immediately. Linux of course must take its own CPU scheduling obligations into account when handling these statuses; e.g. a task which receives an RTAS_BUSY status should check whether to reschedule before it attempts the RTAS call again to avoid starving other tasks. rtas_busy_delay() is a helper function that "consumes" a busy or extended delay status. Common usage: int rc; do { rc = rtas_call(rtas_token("some-function"), ...); } while (rtas_busy_delay(rc)); /* convert rc to Linux error value, etc */ If rc is a busy or extended delay status, the caller can rely on rtas_busy_delay() to perform an appropriate sleep or reschedule and return nonzero. Other statuses are handled normally by the caller. The current implementation of rtas_busy_delay() both oversleeps and overuses the CPU: * It performs msleep() for all 990x and even when no delay is suggested (-2), but this is understood to actually sleep for two jiffies minimum in practice (20ms with HZ=100). 9900 (1ms) and 9901 (10ms) appear to be the most common extended delay statuses, and the oversleeping measurably lengthens DLPAR operations, which perform many RTAS calls. * It does not sleep on 990x unless need_resched() is true, causing code like the loop above to needlessly retry, wasting CPU time. Alter the logic to align better with the intended meanings: * When passed RTAS_BUSY, perform cond_resched() and return without sleeping. The caller should reattempt immediately * Always sleep when passed an extended delay status, using usleep_range() for precise shorter sleeps. Limit the sleep time to one second even though there are higher architected values. Change rtas_busy_delay()'s return type to bool to better reflect its usage, and add kernel-doc. rtas_busy_delay_time() is unchanged, even though it "incorrectly" returns 1 for RTAS_BUSY. There are users of that API with open-coded delay loops in sensitive contexts that will have to be taken on an individual basis. Brief results for addition and removal of 5GB memory on a small P9 PowerVM partition follow. Load was generated with stress-ng --cpu N. For add, elapsed time is greatly reduced without significant change in the number of RTAS calls or time spent on CPU. For remove, elapsed time is modestly reduced, with significant reductions in RTAS calls and time spent on CPU. With no competing workload (- before, + after): Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory add count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 1,935 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.22% ) - 609.99 msec task-clock # 0.183 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.19% ) + 1,956 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.17% ) + 618.56 msec task-clock # 0.278 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.11% ) - 3.3322 +- 0.0670 seconds time elapsed ( +- 2.01% ) + 2.2222 +- 0.0416 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.87% ) Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory remove count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 6,224 probe:rtas_call # 0.008 M/sec ( +- 2.57% ) - 750.36 msec task-clock # 0.190 CPUs utilized ( +- 2.01% ) + 843 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.12% ) + 250.66 msec task-clock # 0.068 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.17% ) - 3.9394 +- 0.0890 seconds time elapsed ( +- 2.26% ) + 3.678 +- 0.113 seconds time elapsed ( +- 3.07% ) With all CPUs 100% busy (- before, + after): Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory add count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 2,979 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.12% ) - 1,096.62 msec task-clock # 0.105 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.10% ) + 2,981 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.22% ) + 1,095.26 msec task-clock # 0.154 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.21% ) - 10.476 +- 0.104 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.00% ) + 7.1124 +- 0.0865 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.22% ) Performance counter stats for 'bash -c echo "memory remove count 20" > /sys/kernel/dlpar' (10 runs): - 2,702 probe:rtas_call # 0.004 M/sec ( +- 4.00% ) - 722.71 msec task-clock # 0.067 CPUs utilized ( +- 2.41% ) + 1,246 probe:rtas_call # 0.003 M/sec ( +- 0.25% ) + 487.73 msec task-clock # 0.049 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.20% ) - 10.829 +- 0.163 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.51% ) + 9.9887 +- 0.0866 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.87% ) Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211117060259.957178-2-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
2021-11-17 00:02:58 -06:00
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtas_busy_delay);
int rtas_error_rc(int rtas_rc)
{
int rc;
switch (rtas_rc) {
case RTAS_HARDWARE_ERROR: /* Hardware Error */
rc = -EIO;
break;
case RTAS_INVALID_PARAMETER: /* Bad indicator/domain/etc */
rc = -EINVAL;
break;
case -9000: /* Isolation error */
rc = -EFAULT;
break;
case -9001: /* Outstanding TCE/PTE */
rc = -EEXIST;
break;
case -9002: /* No usable slot */
rc = -ENODEV;
break;
default:
pr_err("%s: unexpected error %d\n", __func__, rtas_rc);
rc = -ERANGE;
break;
}
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtas_error_rc);
int rtas_get_power_level(int powerdomain, int *level)
{
int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_GET_POWER_LEVEL);
int rc;
if (token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
return -ENOENT;
while ((rc = rtas_call(token, 1, 2, level, powerdomain)) == RTAS_BUSY)
udelay(1);
if (rc < 0)
return rtas_error_rc(rc);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtas_get_power_level);
int rtas_set_power_level(int powerdomain, int level, int *setlevel)
{
int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_SET_POWER_LEVEL);
int rc;
if (token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
return -ENOENT;
do {
rc = rtas_call(token, 2, 2, setlevel, powerdomain, level);
} while (rtas_busy_delay(rc));
if (rc < 0)
return rtas_error_rc(rc);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtas_set_power_level);
int rtas_get_sensor(int sensor, int index, int *state)
{
int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_GET_SENSOR_STATE);
int rc;
if (token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
return -ENOENT;
do {
rc = rtas_call(token, 2, 2, state, sensor, index);
} while (rtas_busy_delay(rc));
if (rc < 0)
return rtas_error_rc(rc);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtas_get_sensor);
powerpc/rtas: Introduce rtas_get_sensor_fast() for IRQ handlers The EPOW interrupt handler uses rtas_get_sensor(), which in turn uses rtas_busy_delay() to wait for RTAS becoming ready in case it is necessary. But rtas_busy_delay() is annotated with might_sleep() and thus may not be used by interrupts handlers like the EPOW handler! This leads to the following BUG when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP is enabled: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:496 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, pid: 0, name: swapper/1 CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.2.0-rc2-thuth #6 Call Trace: [c00000007ffe7b90] [c000000000807670] dump_stack+0xa0/0xdc (unreliable) [c00000007ffe7bc0] [c0000000000e1f14] ___might_sleep+0x134/0x180 [c00000007ffe7c20] [c00000000002aec0] rtas_busy_delay+0x30/0xd0 [c00000007ffe7c50] [c00000000002bde4] rtas_get_sensor+0x74/0xe0 [c00000007ffe7ce0] [c000000000083264] ras_epow_interrupt+0x44/0x450 [c00000007ffe7d90] [c000000000120260] handle_irq_event_percpu+0xa0/0x300 [c00000007ffe7e70] [c000000000120524] handle_irq_event+0x64/0xc0 [c00000007ffe7eb0] [c000000000124dbc] handle_fasteoi_irq+0xec/0x260 [c00000007ffe7ef0] [c00000000011f4f0] generic_handle_irq+0x50/0x80 [c00000007ffe7f20] [c000000000010f3c] __do_irq+0x8c/0x200 [c00000007ffe7f90] [c0000000000236cc] call_do_irq+0x14/0x24 [c00000007e6f39e0] [c000000000011144] do_IRQ+0x94/0x110 [c00000007e6f3a30] [c000000000002594] hardware_interrupt_common+0x114/0x180 Fix this issue by introducing a new rtas_get_sensor_fast() function that does not use rtas_busy_delay() - and thus can only be used for sensors that do not cause a BUSY condition - known as "fast" sensors. The EPOW sensor is defined to be "fast" in sPAPR - mpe. Fixes: 587f83e8dd50 ("powerpc/pseries: Use rtas_get_sensor in RAS code") Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Fontenot <nfont@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2015-07-17 12:46:58 +02:00
int rtas_get_sensor_fast(int sensor, int index, int *state)
{
int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_GET_SENSOR_STATE);
powerpc/rtas: Introduce rtas_get_sensor_fast() for IRQ handlers The EPOW interrupt handler uses rtas_get_sensor(), which in turn uses rtas_busy_delay() to wait for RTAS becoming ready in case it is necessary. But rtas_busy_delay() is annotated with might_sleep() and thus may not be used by interrupts handlers like the EPOW handler! This leads to the following BUG when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP is enabled: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:496 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, pid: 0, name: swapper/1 CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.2.0-rc2-thuth #6 Call Trace: [c00000007ffe7b90] [c000000000807670] dump_stack+0xa0/0xdc (unreliable) [c00000007ffe7bc0] [c0000000000e1f14] ___might_sleep+0x134/0x180 [c00000007ffe7c20] [c00000000002aec0] rtas_busy_delay+0x30/0xd0 [c00000007ffe7c50] [c00000000002bde4] rtas_get_sensor+0x74/0xe0 [c00000007ffe7ce0] [c000000000083264] ras_epow_interrupt+0x44/0x450 [c00000007ffe7d90] [c000000000120260] handle_irq_event_percpu+0xa0/0x300 [c00000007ffe7e70] [c000000000120524] handle_irq_event+0x64/0xc0 [c00000007ffe7eb0] [c000000000124dbc] handle_fasteoi_irq+0xec/0x260 [c00000007ffe7ef0] [c00000000011f4f0] generic_handle_irq+0x50/0x80 [c00000007ffe7f20] [c000000000010f3c] __do_irq+0x8c/0x200 [c00000007ffe7f90] [c0000000000236cc] call_do_irq+0x14/0x24 [c00000007e6f39e0] [c000000000011144] do_IRQ+0x94/0x110 [c00000007e6f3a30] [c000000000002594] hardware_interrupt_common+0x114/0x180 Fix this issue by introducing a new rtas_get_sensor_fast() function that does not use rtas_busy_delay() - and thus can only be used for sensors that do not cause a BUSY condition - known as "fast" sensors. The EPOW sensor is defined to be "fast" in sPAPR - mpe. Fixes: 587f83e8dd50 ("powerpc/pseries: Use rtas_get_sensor in RAS code") Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Fontenot <nfont@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2015-07-17 12:46:58 +02:00
int rc;
if (token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
return -ENOENT;
rc = rtas_call(token, 2, 2, state, sensor, index);
WARN_ON(rc == RTAS_BUSY || (rc >= RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MIN &&
rc <= RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MAX));
if (rc < 0)
return rtas_error_rc(rc);
return rc;
}
bool rtas_indicator_present(int token, int *maxindex)
{
int proplen, count, i;
const struct indicator_elem {
__be32 token;
__be32 maxindex;
} *indicators;
indicators = of_get_property(rtas.dev, "rtas-indicators", &proplen);
if (!indicators)
return false;
count = proplen / sizeof(struct indicator_elem);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (__be32_to_cpu(indicators[i].token) != token)
continue;
if (maxindex)
*maxindex = __be32_to_cpu(indicators[i].maxindex);
return true;
}
return false;
}
int rtas_set_indicator(int indicator, int index, int new_value)
{
int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_SET_INDICATOR);
int rc;
if (token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
return -ENOENT;
do {
rc = rtas_call(token, 3, 1, NULL, indicator, index, new_value);
} while (rtas_busy_delay(rc));
if (rc < 0)
return rtas_error_rc(rc);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtas_set_indicator);
[POWERPC] Fix might-sleep warning on removing cpus Noticing the following might_sleep warning (dump_stack()) during kdump testing when CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK_SLEEP is enabled. All secondary CPUs will be calling rtas_set_indicator with interrupts disabled to remove them from global interrupt queue. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:463 in_atomic():1, irqs_disabled():1 Call Trace: [C00000000FFFB970] [C000000000010234] .show_stack+0x68/0x1b0 (unreliable) [C00000000FFFBA10] [C000000000059354] .__might_sleep+0xd8/0xf4 [C00000000FFFBA90] [C00000000001D1BC] .rtas_busy_delay+0x20/0x5c [C00000000FFFBB20] [C00000000001D8A8] .rtas_set_indicator+0x6c/0xcc [C00000000FFFBBC0] [C000000000048BF4] .xics_teardown_cpu+0x118/0x134 [C00000000FFFBC40] [C00000000004539C] .pseries_kexec_cpu_down_xics+0x74/0x8c [C00000000FFFBCC0] [C00000000002DF08] .crash_ipi_callback+0x15c/0x188 [C00000000FFFBD50] [C0000000000296EC] .smp_message_recv+0x84/0xdc [C00000000FFFBDC0] [C000000000048E08] .xics_ipi_dispatch+0xf0/0x130 [C00000000FFFBE50] [C00000000009EF10] .handle_IRQ_event+0x7c/0xf8 [C00000000FFFBF00] [C0000000000A0A14] .handle_percpu_irq+0x90/0x10c [C00000000FFFBF90] [C00000000002659C] .call_handle_irq+0x1c/0x2c [C00000000058B9C0] [C00000000000CA10] .do_IRQ+0xf4/0x1a4 [C00000000058BA50] [C0000000000044EC] hardware_interrupt_entry+0xc/0x10 --- Exception: 501 at .plpar_hcall_norets+0x14/0x1c LR = .pseries_dedicated_idle_sleep+0x190/0x1d4 [C00000000058BD40] [C00000000058BDE0] 0xc00000000058bde0 (unreliable) [C00000000058BDF0] [C00000000001270C] .cpu_idle+0x10c/0x1e0 [C00000000058BE70] [C000000000009274] .rest_init+0x44/0x5c To fix this issue, rtas_set_indicator_fast() is added so that will not wait for RTAS 'busy' delay and this new function is used for kdump (in xics_teardown_cpu()) and for CPU hotplug ( xics_migrate_irqs_away() and xics_setup_cpu()). Note that the platform architecture spec says that set-indicator on the indicator we're using here is not permitted to return the busy or extended busy status codes. Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
2006-07-27 14:29:00 -07:00
/*
* Ignoring RTAS extended delay
*/
int rtas_set_indicator_fast(int indicator, int index, int new_value)
{
int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_SET_INDICATOR);
[POWERPC] Fix might-sleep warning on removing cpus Noticing the following might_sleep warning (dump_stack()) during kdump testing when CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK_SLEEP is enabled. All secondary CPUs will be calling rtas_set_indicator with interrupts disabled to remove them from global interrupt queue. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:463 in_atomic():1, irqs_disabled():1 Call Trace: [C00000000FFFB970] [C000000000010234] .show_stack+0x68/0x1b0 (unreliable) [C00000000FFFBA10] [C000000000059354] .__might_sleep+0xd8/0xf4 [C00000000FFFBA90] [C00000000001D1BC] .rtas_busy_delay+0x20/0x5c [C00000000FFFBB20] [C00000000001D8A8] .rtas_set_indicator+0x6c/0xcc [C00000000FFFBBC0] [C000000000048BF4] .xics_teardown_cpu+0x118/0x134 [C00000000FFFBC40] [C00000000004539C] .pseries_kexec_cpu_down_xics+0x74/0x8c [C00000000FFFBCC0] [C00000000002DF08] .crash_ipi_callback+0x15c/0x188 [C00000000FFFBD50] [C0000000000296EC] .smp_message_recv+0x84/0xdc [C00000000FFFBDC0] [C000000000048E08] .xics_ipi_dispatch+0xf0/0x130 [C00000000FFFBE50] [C00000000009EF10] .handle_IRQ_event+0x7c/0xf8 [C00000000FFFBF00] [C0000000000A0A14] .handle_percpu_irq+0x90/0x10c [C00000000FFFBF90] [C00000000002659C] .call_handle_irq+0x1c/0x2c [C00000000058B9C0] [C00000000000CA10] .do_IRQ+0xf4/0x1a4 [C00000000058BA50] [C0000000000044EC] hardware_interrupt_entry+0xc/0x10 --- Exception: 501 at .plpar_hcall_norets+0x14/0x1c LR = .pseries_dedicated_idle_sleep+0x190/0x1d4 [C00000000058BD40] [C00000000058BDE0] 0xc00000000058bde0 (unreliable) [C00000000058BDF0] [C00000000001270C] .cpu_idle+0x10c/0x1e0 [C00000000058BE70] [C000000000009274] .rest_init+0x44/0x5c To fix this issue, rtas_set_indicator_fast() is added so that will not wait for RTAS 'busy' delay and this new function is used for kdump (in xics_teardown_cpu()) and for CPU hotplug ( xics_migrate_irqs_away() and xics_setup_cpu()). Note that the platform architecture spec says that set-indicator on the indicator we're using here is not permitted to return the busy or extended busy status codes. Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
2006-07-27 14:29:00 -07:00
int rc;
if (token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
return -ENOENT;
rc = rtas_call(token, 3, 1, NULL, indicator, index, new_value);
WARN_ON(rc == RTAS_BUSY || (rc >= RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MIN &&
rc <= RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MAX));
[POWERPC] Fix might-sleep warning on removing cpus Noticing the following might_sleep warning (dump_stack()) during kdump testing when CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK_SLEEP is enabled. All secondary CPUs will be calling rtas_set_indicator with interrupts disabled to remove them from global interrupt queue. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:463 in_atomic():1, irqs_disabled():1 Call Trace: [C00000000FFFB970] [C000000000010234] .show_stack+0x68/0x1b0 (unreliable) [C00000000FFFBA10] [C000000000059354] .__might_sleep+0xd8/0xf4 [C00000000FFFBA90] [C00000000001D1BC] .rtas_busy_delay+0x20/0x5c [C00000000FFFBB20] [C00000000001D8A8] .rtas_set_indicator+0x6c/0xcc [C00000000FFFBBC0] [C000000000048BF4] .xics_teardown_cpu+0x118/0x134 [C00000000FFFBC40] [C00000000004539C] .pseries_kexec_cpu_down_xics+0x74/0x8c [C00000000FFFBCC0] [C00000000002DF08] .crash_ipi_callback+0x15c/0x188 [C00000000FFFBD50] [C0000000000296EC] .smp_message_recv+0x84/0xdc [C00000000FFFBDC0] [C000000000048E08] .xics_ipi_dispatch+0xf0/0x130 [C00000000FFFBE50] [C00000000009EF10] .handle_IRQ_event+0x7c/0xf8 [C00000000FFFBF00] [C0000000000A0A14] .handle_percpu_irq+0x90/0x10c [C00000000FFFBF90] [C00000000002659C] .call_handle_irq+0x1c/0x2c [C00000000058B9C0] [C00000000000CA10] .do_IRQ+0xf4/0x1a4 [C00000000058BA50] [C0000000000044EC] hardware_interrupt_entry+0xc/0x10 --- Exception: 501 at .plpar_hcall_norets+0x14/0x1c LR = .pseries_dedicated_idle_sleep+0x190/0x1d4 [C00000000058BD40] [C00000000058BDE0] 0xc00000000058bde0 (unreliable) [C00000000058BDF0] [C00000000001270C] .cpu_idle+0x10c/0x1e0 [C00000000058BE70] [C000000000009274] .rest_init+0x44/0x5c To fix this issue, rtas_set_indicator_fast() is added so that will not wait for RTAS 'busy' delay and this new function is used for kdump (in xics_teardown_cpu()) and for CPU hotplug ( xics_migrate_irqs_away() and xics_setup_cpu()). Note that the platform architecture spec says that set-indicator on the indicator we're using here is not permitted to return the busy or extended busy status codes. Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
2006-07-27 14:29:00 -07:00
if (rc < 0)
return rtas_error_rc(rc);
return rc;
}
/**
* rtas_ibm_suspend_me() - Call ibm,suspend-me to suspend the LPAR.
*
* @fw_status: RTAS call status will be placed here if not NULL.
*
* rtas_ibm_suspend_me() should be called only on a CPU which has
* received H_CONTINUE from the H_JOIN hcall. All other active CPUs
* should be waiting to return from H_JOIN.
*
* rtas_ibm_suspend_me() may suspend execution of the OS
* indefinitely. Callers should take appropriate measures upon return, such as
* resetting watchdog facilities.
*
* Callers may choose to retry this call if @fw_status is
* %RTAS_THREADS_ACTIVE.
*
* Return:
* 0 - The partition has resumed from suspend, possibly after
* migration to a different host.
* -ECANCELED - The operation was aborted.
* -EAGAIN - There were other CPUs not in H_JOIN at the time of the call.
* -EBUSY - Some other condition prevented the suspend from succeeding.
* -EIO - Hardware/platform error.
*/
int rtas_ibm_suspend_me(int *fw_status)
{
int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_SUSPEND_ME);
int fwrc;
int ret;
fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL);
switch (fwrc) {
case 0:
ret = 0;
break;
case RTAS_SUSPEND_ABORTED:
ret = -ECANCELED;
break;
case RTAS_THREADS_ACTIVE:
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
case RTAS_NOT_SUSPENDABLE:
case RTAS_OUTSTANDING_COPROC:
ret = -EBUSY;
break;
case -1:
default:
ret = -EIO;
break;
}
if (fw_status)
*fw_status = fwrc;
return ret;
}
void __noreturn rtas_restart(char *cmd)
{
if (rtas_flash_term_hook)
rtas_flash_term_hook(SYS_RESTART);
pr_emerg("system-reboot returned %d\n",
rtas_call(rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_SYSTEM_REBOOT), 0, 1, NULL));
for (;;);
}
void rtas_power_off(void)
{
if (rtas_flash_term_hook)
rtas_flash_term_hook(SYS_POWER_OFF);
/* allow power on only with power button press */
pr_emerg("power-off returned %d\n",
rtas_call(rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_POWER_OFF), 2, 1, NULL, -1, -1));
for (;;);
}
void __noreturn rtas_halt(void)
{
if (rtas_flash_term_hook)
rtas_flash_term_hook(SYS_HALT);
/* allow power on only with power button press */
pr_emerg("power-off returned %d\n",
rtas_call(rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_POWER_OFF), 2, 1, NULL, -1, -1));
for (;;);
}
/* Must be in the RMO region, so we place it here */
static char rtas_os_term_buf[2048];
static bool ibm_extended_os_term;
void rtas_os_term(char *str)
{
s32 token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_OS_TERM);
static struct rtas_args args;
int status;
/*
* Firmware with the ibm,extended-os-term property is guaranteed
* to always return from an ibm,os-term call. Earlier versions without
* this property may terminate the partition which we want to avoid
* since it interferes with panic_timeout.
*/
if (token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE || !ibm_extended_os_term)
return;
snprintf(rtas_os_term_buf, 2048, "OS panic: %s", str);
powerpc/rtas: avoid scheduling in rtas_os_term() It's unsafe to use rtas_busy_delay() to handle a busy status from the ibm,os-term RTAS function in rtas_os_term(): Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:618 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0 preempt_count: 2, expected: 0 CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G D 6.0.0-rc5-02182-gf8553a572277-dirty #9 Call Trace: [c000000007b8f000] [c000000001337110] dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0x110 (unreliable) [c000000007b8f040] [c0000000002440e4] __might_resched+0x394/0x3c0 [c000000007b8f0e0] [c00000000004f680] rtas_busy_delay+0x120/0x1b0 [c000000007b8f100] [c000000000052d04] rtas_os_term+0xb8/0xf4 [c000000007b8f180] [c0000000001150fc] pseries_panic+0x50/0x68 [c000000007b8f1f0] [c000000000036354] ppc_panic_platform_handler+0x34/0x50 [c000000007b8f210] [c0000000002303c4] notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x1c0 [c000000007b8f2b0] [c0000000002306cc] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xac/0x1c0 [c000000007b8f2f0] [c0000000001d62b8] panic+0x228/0x4d0 [c000000007b8f390] [c0000000001e573c] do_exit+0x140c/0x1420 [c000000007b8f480] [c0000000001e586c] make_task_dead+0xdc/0x200 Use rtas_busy_delay_time() instead, which signals without side effects whether to attempt the ibm,os-term RTAS call again. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118150751.469393-5-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
2022-11-18 09:07:42 -06:00
/*
* Keep calling as long as RTAS returns a "try again" status,
* but don't use rtas_busy_delay(), which potentially
* schedules.
*/
do {
rtas_call_unlocked(&args, token, 1, 1, NULL, __pa(rtas_os_term_buf));
status = be32_to_cpu(args.rets[0]);
powerpc/rtas: avoid scheduling in rtas_os_term() It's unsafe to use rtas_busy_delay() to handle a busy status from the ibm,os-term RTAS function in rtas_os_term(): Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:618 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0 preempt_count: 2, expected: 0 CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G D 6.0.0-rc5-02182-gf8553a572277-dirty #9 Call Trace: [c000000007b8f000] [c000000001337110] dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0x110 (unreliable) [c000000007b8f040] [c0000000002440e4] __might_resched+0x394/0x3c0 [c000000007b8f0e0] [c00000000004f680] rtas_busy_delay+0x120/0x1b0 [c000000007b8f100] [c000000000052d04] rtas_os_term+0xb8/0xf4 [c000000007b8f180] [c0000000001150fc] pseries_panic+0x50/0x68 [c000000007b8f1f0] [c000000000036354] ppc_panic_platform_handler+0x34/0x50 [c000000007b8f210] [c0000000002303c4] notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x1c0 [c000000007b8f2b0] [c0000000002306cc] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xac/0x1c0 [c000000007b8f2f0] [c0000000001d62b8] panic+0x228/0x4d0 [c000000007b8f390] [c0000000001e573c] do_exit+0x140c/0x1420 [c000000007b8f480] [c0000000001e586c] make_task_dead+0xdc/0x200 Use rtas_busy_delay_time() instead, which signals without side effects whether to attempt the ibm,os-term RTAS call again. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118150751.469393-5-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
2022-11-18 09:07:42 -06:00
} while (rtas_busy_delay_time(status));
if (status != 0)
pr_emerg("ibm,os-term call failed %d\n", status);
}
/**
* rtas_activate_firmware() - Activate a new version of firmware.
*
* Context: This function may sleep.
*
* Activate a new version of partition firmware. The OS must call this
* after resuming from a partition hibernation or migration in order
* to maintain the ability to perform live firmware updates. It's not
* catastrophic for this method to be absent or to fail; just log the
* condition in that case.
*/
void rtas_activate_firmware(void)
{
int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE);
int fwrc;
if (token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
pr_notice("ibm,activate-firmware method unavailable\n");
return;
}
mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock);
do {
fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL);
} while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc));
mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock);
if (fwrc)
pr_err("ibm,activate-firmware failed (%i)\n", fwrc);
}
/**
* get_pseries_errorlog() - Find a specific pseries error log in an RTAS
* extended event log.
* @log: RTAS error/event log
* @section_id: two character section identifier
*
* Return: A pointer to the specified errorlog or NULL if not found.
*/
noinstr struct pseries_errorlog *get_pseries_errorlog(struct rtas_error_log *log,
uint16_t section_id)
{
struct rtas_ext_event_log_v6 *ext_log =
(struct rtas_ext_event_log_v6 *)log->buffer;
struct pseries_errorlog *sect;
unsigned char *p, *log_end;
uint32_t ext_log_length = rtas_error_extended_log_length(log);
uint8_t log_format = rtas_ext_event_log_format(ext_log);
uint32_t company_id = rtas_ext_event_company_id(ext_log);
/* Check that we understand the format */
if (ext_log_length < sizeof(struct rtas_ext_event_log_v6) ||
log_format != RTAS_V6EXT_LOG_FORMAT_EVENT_LOG ||
company_id != RTAS_V6EXT_COMPANY_ID_IBM)
return NULL;
log_end = log->buffer + ext_log_length;
p = ext_log->vendor_log;
while (p < log_end) {
sect = (struct pseries_errorlog *)p;
if (pseries_errorlog_id(sect) == section_id)
return sect;
p += pseries_errorlog_length(sect);
}
return NULL;
}
powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve information and update various things. The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall, which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they want with arbitrary arguments. Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in /proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address, poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to the RTAS call. However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem access). Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases. In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure Boot and lockdown we need to care about this. We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO buffer. The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2020-08-20 14:45:12 +10:00
/*
* The sys_rtas syscall, as originally designed, allows root to pass
* arbitrary physical addresses to RTAS calls. A number of RTAS calls
* can be abused to write to arbitrary memory and do other things that
* are potentially harmful to system integrity, and thus should only
* be used inside the kernel and not exposed to userspace.
*
* All known legitimate users of the sys_rtas syscall will only ever
* pass addresses that fall within the RMO buffer, and use a known
* subset of RTAS calls.
*
* Accordingly, we filter RTAS requests to check that the call is
* permitted, and that provided pointers fall within the RMO buffer.
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
* If a function is allowed to be invoked via the syscall, then its
* entry in the rtas_functions table points to a rtas_filter that
* describes its constraints, with the indexes of the parameters which
* are expected to contain addresses and sizes of buffers allocated
* inside the RMO buffer.
powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve information and update various things. The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall, which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they want with arbitrary arguments. Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in /proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address, poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to the RTAS call. However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem access). Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases. In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure Boot and lockdown we need to care about this. We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO buffer. The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2020-08-20 14:45:12 +10:00
*/
static bool in_rmo_buf(u32 base, u32 end)
{
return base >= rtas_rmo_buf &&
base < (rtas_rmo_buf + RTAS_USER_REGION_SIZE) &&
powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve information and update various things. The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall, which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they want with arbitrary arguments. Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in /proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address, poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to the RTAS call. However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem access). Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases. In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure Boot and lockdown we need to care about this. We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO buffer. The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2020-08-20 14:45:12 +10:00
base <= end &&
end >= rtas_rmo_buf &&
end < (rtas_rmo_buf + RTAS_USER_REGION_SIZE);
powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve information and update various things. The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall, which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they want with arbitrary arguments. Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in /proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address, poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to the RTAS call. However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem access). Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases. In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure Boot and lockdown we need to care about this. We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO buffer. The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2020-08-20 14:45:12 +10:00
}
2023-12-12 11:01:52 -06:00
static bool block_rtas_call(const struct rtas_function *func, int nargs,
powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve information and update various things. The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall, which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they want with arbitrary arguments. Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in /proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address, poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to the RTAS call. However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem access). Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases. In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure Boot and lockdown we need to care about this. We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO buffer. The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2020-08-20 14:45:12 +10:00
struct rtas_args *args)
{
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
const struct rtas_filter *f;
2023-12-12 11:01:52 -06:00
const bool is_platform_dump =
func == &rtas_function_table[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_PLATFORM_DUMP];
const bool is_config_conn =
func == &rtas_function_table[RTAS_FNIDX__IBM_CONFIGURE_CONNECTOR];
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
u32 base, size, end;
powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve information and update various things. The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall, which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they want with arbitrary arguments. Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in /proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address, poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to the RTAS call. However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem access). Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases. In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure Boot and lockdown we need to care about this. We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO buffer. The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2020-08-20 14:45:12 +10:00
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
/*
2023-12-12 11:01:52 -06:00
* Only functions with filters attached are allowed.
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
*/
f = func->filter;
if (!f)
goto err;
/*
* And some functions aren't allowed on LE.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN) && func->banned_for_syscall_on_le)
goto err;
if (f->buf_idx1 != -1) {
base = be32_to_cpu(args->args[f->buf_idx1]);
if (f->size_idx1 != -1)
size = be32_to_cpu(args->args[f->size_idx1]);
else if (f->fixed_size)
size = f->fixed_size;
else
size = 1;
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
end = base + size - 1;
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
/*
* Special case for ibm,platform-dump - NULL buffer
* address is used to indicate end of dump processing
*/
if (is_platform_dump && base == 0)
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
return false;
powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve information and update various things. The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall, which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they want with arbitrary arguments. Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in /proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address, poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to the RTAS call. However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem access). Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases. In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure Boot and lockdown we need to care about this. We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO buffer. The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2020-08-20 14:45:12 +10:00
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
if (!in_rmo_buf(base, end))
goto err;
}
powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve information and update various things. The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall, which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they want with arbitrary arguments. Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in /proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address, poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to the RTAS call. However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem access). Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases. In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure Boot and lockdown we need to care about this. We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO buffer. The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2020-08-20 14:45:12 +10:00
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
if (f->buf_idx2 != -1) {
base = be32_to_cpu(args->args[f->buf_idx2]);
if (f->size_idx2 != -1)
size = be32_to_cpu(args->args[f->size_idx2]);
else if (f->fixed_size)
size = f->fixed_size;
else
size = 1;
end = base + size - 1;
powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve information and update various things. The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall, which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they want with arbitrary arguments. Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in /proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address, poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to the RTAS call. However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem access). Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases. In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure Boot and lockdown we need to care about this. We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO buffer. The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2020-08-20 14:45:12 +10:00
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
/*
* Special case for ibm,configure-connector where the
* address can be 0
*/
if (is_config_conn && base == 0)
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
return false;
powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve information and update various things. The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall, which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they want with arbitrary arguments. Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in /proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address, poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to the RTAS call. However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem access). Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases. In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure Boot and lockdown we need to care about this. We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO buffer. The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2020-08-20 14:45:12 +10:00
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
if (!in_rmo_buf(base, end))
goto err;
powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve information and update various things. The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall, which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they want with arbitrary arguments. Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in /proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address, poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to the RTAS call. However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem access). Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases. In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure Boot and lockdown we need to care about this. We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO buffer. The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2020-08-20 14:45:12 +10:00
}
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
return false;
powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve information and update various things. The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall, which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they want with arbitrary arguments. Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in /proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address, poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to the RTAS call. However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem access). Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases. In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure Boot and lockdown we need to care about this. We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO buffer. The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2020-08-20 14:45:12 +10:00
err:
pr_err_ratelimited("sys_rtas: RTAS call blocked - exploit attempt?\n");
2023-12-12 11:01:52 -06:00
pr_err_ratelimited("sys_rtas: %s nargs=%d (called by %s)\n",
func->name, nargs, current->comm);
powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve information and update various things. The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall, which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they want with arbitrary arguments. Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in /proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address, poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to the RTAS call. However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem access). Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases. In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure Boot and lockdown we need to care about this. We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO buffer. The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2020-08-20 14:45:12 +10:00
return true;
}
/* We assume to be passed big endian arguments */
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(rtas, struct rtas_args __user *, uargs)
{
2023-12-12 11:01:52 -06:00
const struct rtas_function *func;
struct pin_cookie cookie;
struct rtas_args args;
unsigned long flags;
char *buff_copy, *errbuf = NULL;
int nargs, nret, token;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!rtas.entry)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&args, uargs, 3 * sizeof(u32)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
nargs = be32_to_cpu(args.nargs);
nret = be32_to_cpu(args.nret);
token = be32_to_cpu(args.token);
if (nargs >= ARRAY_SIZE(args.args)
|| nret > ARRAY_SIZE(args.args)
|| nargs + nret > ARRAY_SIZE(args.args))
return -EINVAL;
/* Copy in args. */
if (copy_from_user(args.args, uargs->args,
nargs * sizeof(rtas_arg_t)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
2023-12-12 11:01:52 -06:00
/*
* If this token doesn't correspond to a function the kernel
* understands, you're not allowed to call it.
*/
func = rtas_token_to_function_untrusted(token);
if (!func)
return -EINVAL;
args.rets = &args.args[nargs];
memset(args.rets, 0, nret * sizeof(rtas_arg_t));
2023-12-12 11:01:52 -06:00
if (block_rtas_call(func, nargs, &args))
powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve information and update various things. The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall, which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they want with arbitrary arguments. Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in /proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address, poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to the RTAS call. However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem access). Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases. In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure Boot and lockdown we need to care about this. We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO buffer. The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
2020-08-20 14:45:12 +10:00
return -EINVAL;
if (token_is_restricted_errinjct(token)) {
int err;
err = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION);
if (err)
return err;
}
/* Need to handle ibm,suspend_me call specially */
if (token == rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_SUSPEND_ME)) {
powerpc/pseries: Fix endian problems with LE migration RTAS events require arguments be passed in big endian while hypercalls have their arguments passed in registers and the values should therefore be in CPU endian. The "ibm,suspend_me" 'RTAS' call makes a sequence of hypercalls to setup one true RTAS call. This means that "ibm,suspend_me" is handled specially in the ppc_rtas() syscall. The ppc_rtas() syscall has its arguments in big endian and can therefore pass these arguments directly to the RTAS call. "ibm,suspend_me" is handled specially from within ppc_rtas() (by calling rtas_ibm_suspend_me()) which has left an endian bug on little endian systems due to the requirement of hypercalls. The return value from rtas_ibm_suspend_me() gets returned in cpu endian, and is left unconverted, also a bug on little endian systems. rtas_ibm_suspend_me() does not actually make use of the rtas_args that it is passed. This patch removes the convoluted use of the rtas_args struct to pass params to rtas_ibm_suspend_me() in favour of passing what it needs as actual arguments. This patch also ensures the two callers of rtas_ibm_suspend_me() pass function parameters in cpu endian and in the case of ppc_rtas(), converts the return value. migrate_store() (the other caller of rtas_ibm_suspend_me()) is from a sysfs file which deals with everything in cpu endian so this function only underwent cleanup. This patch has been tested with KVM both LE and BE and on PowerVM both LE and BE. Under QEMU/KVM the migration happens without touching these code pathes. For PowerVM there is no obvious regression on BE and the LE code path now provides the correct parameters to the hypervisor. Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2015-01-21 13:32:00 +11:00
/*
* rtas_ibm_suspend_me assumes the streamid handle is in cpu
* endian, or at least the hcall within it requires it.
powerpc/pseries: Fix endian problems with LE migration RTAS events require arguments be passed in big endian while hypercalls have their arguments passed in registers and the values should therefore be in CPU endian. The "ibm,suspend_me" 'RTAS' call makes a sequence of hypercalls to setup one true RTAS call. This means that "ibm,suspend_me" is handled specially in the ppc_rtas() syscall. The ppc_rtas() syscall has its arguments in big endian and can therefore pass these arguments directly to the RTAS call. "ibm,suspend_me" is handled specially from within ppc_rtas() (by calling rtas_ibm_suspend_me()) which has left an endian bug on little endian systems due to the requirement of hypercalls. The return value from rtas_ibm_suspend_me() gets returned in cpu endian, and is left unconverted, also a bug on little endian systems. rtas_ibm_suspend_me() does not actually make use of the rtas_args that it is passed. This patch removes the convoluted use of the rtas_args struct to pass params to rtas_ibm_suspend_me() in favour of passing what it needs as actual arguments. This patch also ensures the two callers of rtas_ibm_suspend_me() pass function parameters in cpu endian and in the case of ppc_rtas(), converts the return value. migrate_store() (the other caller of rtas_ibm_suspend_me()) is from a sysfs file which deals with everything in cpu endian so this function only underwent cleanup. This patch has been tested with KVM both LE and BE and on PowerVM both LE and BE. Under QEMU/KVM the migration happens without touching these code pathes. For PowerVM there is no obvious regression on BE and the LE code path now provides the correct parameters to the hypervisor. Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2015-01-21 13:32:00 +11:00
*/
int rc = 0;
powerpc/pseries: Fix endian problems with LE migration RTAS events require arguments be passed in big endian while hypercalls have their arguments passed in registers and the values should therefore be in CPU endian. The "ibm,suspend_me" 'RTAS' call makes a sequence of hypercalls to setup one true RTAS call. This means that "ibm,suspend_me" is handled specially in the ppc_rtas() syscall. The ppc_rtas() syscall has its arguments in big endian and can therefore pass these arguments directly to the RTAS call. "ibm,suspend_me" is handled specially from within ppc_rtas() (by calling rtas_ibm_suspend_me()) which has left an endian bug on little endian systems due to the requirement of hypercalls. The return value from rtas_ibm_suspend_me() gets returned in cpu endian, and is left unconverted, also a bug on little endian systems. rtas_ibm_suspend_me() does not actually make use of the rtas_args that it is passed. This patch removes the convoluted use of the rtas_args struct to pass params to rtas_ibm_suspend_me() in favour of passing what it needs as actual arguments. This patch also ensures the two callers of rtas_ibm_suspend_me() pass function parameters in cpu endian and in the case of ppc_rtas(), converts the return value. migrate_store() (the other caller of rtas_ibm_suspend_me()) is from a sysfs file which deals with everything in cpu endian so this function only underwent cleanup. This patch has been tested with KVM both LE and BE and on PowerVM both LE and BE. Under QEMU/KVM the migration happens without touching these code pathes. For PowerVM there is no obvious regression on BE and the LE code path now provides the correct parameters to the hypervisor. Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2015-01-21 13:32:00 +11:00
u64 handle = ((u64)be32_to_cpu(args.args[0]) << 32)
| be32_to_cpu(args.args[1]);
rc = rtas_syscall_dispatch_ibm_suspend_me(handle);
if (rc == -EAGAIN)
args.rets[0] = cpu_to_be32(RTAS_NOT_SUSPENDABLE);
else if (rc == -EIO)
args.rets[0] = cpu_to_be32(-1);
else if (rc)
return rc;
goto copy_return;
}
buff_copy = get_errorlog_buffer();
powerpc/rtas: Facilitate high-level call sequences On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations. However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the level of RTAS entry and exit. Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.) Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and ibm,get-vpd. But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially disrupting a sequence in progress. So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences, they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas() users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow. Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas(). * Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function. * Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the .lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with justifying commentary. * In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking rtas_lock and entering RTAS. * Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do: int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE); int fwrc; mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); do { fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL); } while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc)); mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:53 -06:00
/*
* If this function has a mutex assigned to it, we must
* acquire it to avoid interleaving with any kernel-based uses
* of the same function. Kernel-based sequences acquire the
* appropriate mutex explicitly.
*/
if (func->lock)
mutex_lock(func->lock);
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&rtas_lock, flags);
cookie = lockdep_pin_lock(&rtas_lock);
rtas_args = args;
do_enter_rtas(&rtas_args);
args = rtas_args;
/* A -1 return code indicates that the last command couldn't
be completed due to a hardware error. */
if (be32_to_cpu(args.rets[0]) == -1)
errbuf = __fetch_rtas_last_error(buff_copy);
lockdep_unpin_lock(&rtas_lock, cookie);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rtas_lock, flags);
powerpc/rtas: Facilitate high-level call sequences On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations. However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the level of RTAS entry and exit. Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.) Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and ibm,get-vpd. But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially disrupting a sequence in progress. So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences, they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas() users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow. Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas(). * Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function. * Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the .lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with justifying commentary. * In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking rtas_lock and entering RTAS. * Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do: int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE); int fwrc; mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); do { fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL); } while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc)); mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock); There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
2023-12-12 11:01:53 -06:00
if (func->lock)
mutex_unlock(func->lock);
if (buff_copy) {
if (errbuf)
log_error(errbuf, ERR_TYPE_RTAS_LOG, 0);
kfree(buff_copy);
}
copy_return:
/* Copy out args. */
if (copy_to_user(uargs->args + nargs,
args.args + nargs,
nret * sizeof(rtas_arg_t)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
static void __init rtas_function_table_init(void)
{
struct property *prop;
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rtas_function_table); ++i) {
struct rtas_function *curr = &rtas_function_table[i];
struct rtas_function *prior;
int cmp;
curr->token = RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE;
if (i == 0)
continue;
/*
* Ensure table is sorted correctly for binary search
* on function names.
*/
prior = &rtas_function_table[i - 1];
cmp = strcmp(prior->name, curr->name);
if (cmp < 0)
continue;
if (cmp == 0) {
pr_err("'%s' has duplicate function table entries\n",
curr->name);
} else {
pr_err("function table unsorted: '%s' wrongly precedes '%s'\n",
prior->name, curr->name);
}
}
for_each_property_of_node(rtas.dev, prop) {
struct rtas_function *func;
if (prop->length != sizeof(u32))
continue;
func = __rtas_name_to_function(prop->name);
if (!func)
continue;
func->token = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)prop->value);
pr_debug("function %s has token %u\n", func->name, func->token);
}
}
/*
* Call early during boot, before mem init, to retrieve the RTAS
* information from the device-tree and allocate the RMO buffer for userland
* accesses.
*/
void __init rtas_initialize(void)
{
unsigned long rtas_region = RTAS_INSTANTIATE_MAX;
u32 base, size, entry;
int no_base, no_size, no_entry;
/* Get RTAS dev node and fill up our "rtas" structure with infos
* about it.
*/
rtas.dev = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "rtas");
if (!rtas.dev)
return;
no_base = of_property_read_u32(rtas.dev, "linux,rtas-base", &base);
no_size = of_property_read_u32(rtas.dev, "rtas-size", &size);
if (no_base || no_size) {
of_node_put(rtas.dev);
rtas.dev = NULL;
return;
}
rtas.base = base;
rtas.size = size;
no_entry = of_property_read_u32(rtas.dev, "linux,rtas-entry", &entry);
rtas.entry = no_entry ? rtas.base : entry;
init_error_log_max();
powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups The core RTAS support code and its clients perform two types of lookup for RTAS firmware function information. First, mapping a known function name to a token. The typical use case invokes rtas_token() to retrieve the token value to pass to rtas_call(). rtas_token() relies on of_get_property(), which performs a linear search of the /rtas node's property list under a lock with IRQs disabled. Second, and less common: given a token value, looking up some information about the function. The primary example is the sys_rtas filter path, which linearly scans a small table to match the token to a rtas_filter struct. Another use case to come is RTAS entry/exit tracepoints, which will require efficient lookup of function names from token values. Currently there is no general API for this. We need something much like the existing rtas_filters table, but more general and organized to facilitate efficient lookups. Introduce: * A new rtas_function type, aggregating function name, token, and filter. Other function characteristics could be added in the future. * An array of rtas_function, where each element corresponds to a known RTAS function. All information in the table is static save the token values, which are derived from the device tree at boot. The array is sorted by function name to allow binary search. * A named constant for each known RTAS function, used to index the function array. These also will be used in a client-facing API to be added later. * An xarray that maps valid tokens to rtas_function objects. Fold the existing rtas_filter table into the new rtas_function array, with the appropriate adjustments to block_rtas_call(). Remove now-redundant fields from struct rtas_filter. Preserve the function of the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN guard in the current filter table by introducing a per-function flag that is set for the function entries related to pseries LPAR migration. These have never had working users via sys_rtas on ppc64le; see commit de0f7349a0dd ("powerpc/rtas: prevent suspend-related sys_rtas use on LE"). Convert rtas_token() to use a lockless binary search on the function table. Fall back to the old behavior for lookups against names that are not known to be RTAS functions, but issue a warning. rtas_token() is for function names; it is not a general facility for accessing arbitrary properties of the /rtas node. All known misuses of rtas_token() have been converted to more appropriate of_ APIs in preceding changes. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-8-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:41:56 -06:00
/* Must be called before any function token lookups */
rtas_function_table_init();
/*
* Discover this now to avoid a device tree lookup in the
* panic path.
*/
ibm_extended_os_term = of_property_read_bool(rtas.dev, "ibm,extended-os-term");
/* If RTAS was found, allocate the RMO buffer for it and look for
* the stop-self token if any
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
if (firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_LPAR))
rtas_region = min(ppc64_rma_size, RTAS_INSTANTIATE_MAX);
#endif
rtas_rmo_buf = memblock_phys_alloc_range(RTAS_USER_REGION_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE,
memblock: drop memblock_alloc_base() The memblock_alloc_base() function tries to allocate a memory up to the limit specified by its max_addr parameter and panics if the allocation fails. Replace its usage with memblock_phys_alloc_range() and make the callers check the return value and panic in case of error. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548057848-15136-10-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [powerpc] Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Guo Ren <ren_guo@c-sky.com> [c-sky] Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> [Xen] Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-11 23:29:35 -07:00
0, rtas_region);
if (!rtas_rmo_buf)
panic("ERROR: RTAS: Failed to allocate %lx bytes below %pa\n",
PAGE_SIZE, &rtas_region);
powerpc/pseries: add RTAS work area allocator Various pseries-specific RTAS functions take a temporary "work area" parameter - a buffer in memory accessible to RTAS. Typically such functions are passed the statically allocated rtas_data_buf buffer as the argument. This buffer is protected by a global spinlock. So users of rtas_data_buf cannot perform sleeping operations while accessing the buffer. Most RTAS functions that have a work area parameter can return a status (-2/990x) that indicates that the caller should retry. Before retrying, the caller may need to reschedule or sleep (see rtas_busy_delay() for details). This combination of factors leads to uncomfortable constructions like this: do { spin_lock(&rtas_data_buf_lock); rc = rtas_call(token, __pa(rtas_data_buf, ...); if (rc == 0) { /* parse or copy out rtas_data_buf contents */ } spin_unlock(&rtas_data_buf_lock); } while (rtas_busy_delay(rc)); Another unfortunately common way of handling this is for callers to blithely ignore the possibility of a -2/990x status and hope for the best. If users were allowed to perform blocking operations while owning a work area, the programming model would become less tedious and error-prone. Users could schedule away, sleep, or perform other blocking operations without having to release and re-acquire resources. We could continue to use a single work area buffer, and convert rtas_data_buf_lock to a mutex. But that would impose an unnecessarily coarse serialization on all users. As awkward as the current design is, it prevents longer running operations that need to repeatedly use rtas_data_buf from blocking the progress of others. There are more considerations. One is that while 4KB is fine for all current in-kernel uses, some RTAS calls can take much smaller buffers, and some (VPD, platform dumps) would likely benefit from larger ones. Another is that at least one RTAS function (ibm,get-vpd) has *two* work area parameters. And finally, we should expect the number of work area users in the kernel to increase over time as we introduce lockdown-compatible ABIs to replace less safe use cases based on sys_rtas/librtas. So a special-purpose allocator for RTAS work area buffers seems worth trying. Properties: * The backing memory for the allocator is reserved early in boot in order to satisfy RTAS addressing requirements, and then managed with genalloc. * Allocations can block, but they never fail (mempool-like). * Prioritizes first-come, first-serve fairness over throughput. * Early boot allocations before the allocator has been initialized are served via an internal static buffer. Intended to replace rtas_data_buf. New code that needs RTAS work area buffers should prefer this API. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-12-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com
2023-02-10 12:42:00 -06:00
rtas_work_area_reserve_arena(rtas_region);
}
int __init early_init_dt_scan_rtas(unsigned long node,
const char *uname, int depth, void *data)
{
const u32 *basep, *entryp, *sizep;
if (depth != 1 || strcmp(uname, "rtas") != 0)
return 0;
basep = of_get_flat_dt_prop(node, "linux,rtas-base", NULL);
entryp = of_get_flat_dt_prop(node, "linux,rtas-entry", NULL);
sizep = of_get_flat_dt_prop(node, "rtas-size", NULL);
powerpc: Set crashkernel offset to mid of RMA region On large config LPARs (having 192 and more cores), Linux fails to boot due to insufficient memory in the first memblock. It is due to the memory reservation for the crash kernel which starts at 128MB offset of the first memblock. This memory reservation for the crash kernel doesn't leave enough space in the first memblock to accommodate other essential system resources. The crash kernel start address was set to 128MB offset by default to ensure that the crash kernel get some memory below the RMA region which is used to be of size 256MB. But given that the RMA region size can be 512MB or more, setting the crash kernel offset to mid of RMA size will leave enough space for the kernel to allocate memory for other system resources. Since the above crash kernel offset change is only applicable to the LPAR platform, the LPAR feature detection is pushed before the crash kernel reservation. The rest of LPAR specific initialization will still be done during pseries_probe_fw_features as usual. This patch is dependent on changes to paca allocation for boot CPU. It expect boot CPU to discover 1T segment support which is introduced by the patch posted here: https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/linuxppc-dev/2022-January/239175.html Reported-by: Abdul haleem <abdhalee@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220204085601.107257-1-sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com
2022-02-04 14:26:01 +05:30
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
/* need this feature to decide the crashkernel offset */
if (of_get_flat_dt_prop(node, "ibm,hypertas-functions", NULL))
powerpc_firmware_features |= FW_FEATURE_LPAR;
#endif
if (basep && entryp && sizep) {
rtas.base = *basep;
rtas.entry = *entryp;
rtas.size = *sizep;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_UDBG_RTAS_CONSOLE
basep = of_get_flat_dt_prop(node, "put-term-char", NULL);
if (basep)
rtas_putchar_token = *basep;
basep = of_get_flat_dt_prop(node, "get-term-char", NULL);
if (basep)
rtas_getchar_token = *basep;
if (rtas_putchar_token != RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE &&
rtas_getchar_token != RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
udbg_init_rtas_console();
#endif
/* break now */
return 1;
}
static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(timebase_lock);
static u64 timebase = 0;
void rtas_give_timebase(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&timebase_lock, flags);
hard_irq_disable();
rtas_call(rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_FREEZE_TIME_BASE), 0, 1, NULL);
timebase = get_tb();
raw_spin_unlock(&timebase_lock);
while (timebase)
barrier();
rtas_call(rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_THAW_TIME_BASE), 0, 1, NULL);
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
void rtas_take_timebase(void)
{
while (!timebase)
barrier();
raw_spin_lock(&timebase_lock);
set_tb(timebase >> 32, timebase & 0xffffffff);
timebase = 0;
raw_spin_unlock(&timebase_lock);
}