2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
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#
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# Linux system call numbers and entry vectors
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#
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# The format is:
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# <num> <abi> <name> [<entry point> [<oabi compat entry point>]]
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#
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# Where abi is:
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# common - for system calls shared between oabi and eabi (may have compat)
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# oabi - for oabi-only system calls (may have compat)
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# eabi - for eabi-only system calls
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#
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# For each syscall number, "common" is mutually exclusive with oabi and eabi
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#
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0 common restart_syscall sys_restart_syscall
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1 common exit sys_exit
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2 common fork sys_fork
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3 common read sys_read
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4 common write sys_write
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5 common open sys_open
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6 common close sys_close
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# 7 was sys_waitpid
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8 common creat sys_creat
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9 common link sys_link
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10 common unlink sys_unlink
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11 common execve sys_execve
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12 common chdir sys_chdir
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y2038: rename old time and utime syscalls
The time, stime, utime, utimes, and futimesat system calls are only
used on older architectures, and we do not provide y2038 safe variants
of them, as they are replaced by clock_gettime64, clock_settime64,
and utimensat_time64.
However, for consistency it seems better to have the 32-bit architectures
that still use them call the "time32" entry points (leaving the
traditional handlers for the 64-bit architectures), like we do for system
calls that now require two versions.
Note: We used to always define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME and only set __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME32 for compat mode on 64-bit kernels. Now this is
reversed: only 64-bit architectures set __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME/UTIME, while
we need __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME32/UTIME32 for 32-bit architectures and compat
mode. The resulting asm/unistd.h changes look a bit counterintuitive.
This is only a cleanup patch and it should not change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2019-01-06 23:45:29 +01:00
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13 oabi time sys_time32
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2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
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14 common mknod sys_mknod
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15 common chmod sys_chmod
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16 common lchown sys_lchown16
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# 17 was sys_break
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# 18 was sys_stat
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19 common lseek sys_lseek
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20 common getpid sys_getpid
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21 common mount sys_mount
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22 oabi umount sys_oldumount
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23 common setuid sys_setuid16
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24 common getuid sys_getuid16
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y2038: rename old time and utime syscalls
The time, stime, utime, utimes, and futimesat system calls are only
used on older architectures, and we do not provide y2038 safe variants
of them, as they are replaced by clock_gettime64, clock_settime64,
and utimensat_time64.
However, for consistency it seems better to have the 32-bit architectures
that still use them call the "time32" entry points (leaving the
traditional handlers for the 64-bit architectures), like we do for system
calls that now require two versions.
Note: We used to always define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME and only set __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME32 for compat mode on 64-bit kernels. Now this is
reversed: only 64-bit architectures set __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME/UTIME, while
we need __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME32/UTIME32 for 32-bit architectures and compat
mode. The resulting asm/unistd.h changes look a bit counterintuitive.
This is only a cleanup patch and it should not change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2019-01-06 23:45:29 +01:00
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25 oabi stime sys_stime32
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2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
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26 common ptrace sys_ptrace
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27 oabi alarm sys_alarm
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# 28 was sys_fstat
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29 common pause sys_pause
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y2038: rename old time and utime syscalls
The time, stime, utime, utimes, and futimesat system calls are only
used on older architectures, and we do not provide y2038 safe variants
of them, as they are replaced by clock_gettime64, clock_settime64,
and utimensat_time64.
However, for consistency it seems better to have the 32-bit architectures
that still use them call the "time32" entry points (leaving the
traditional handlers for the 64-bit architectures), like we do for system
calls that now require two versions.
Note: We used to always define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME and only set __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME32 for compat mode on 64-bit kernels. Now this is
reversed: only 64-bit architectures set __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME/UTIME, while
we need __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME32/UTIME32 for 32-bit architectures and compat
mode. The resulting asm/unistd.h changes look a bit counterintuitive.
This is only a cleanup patch and it should not change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2019-01-06 23:45:29 +01:00
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30 oabi utime sys_utime32
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2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
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# 31 was sys_stty
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# 32 was sys_gtty
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33 common access sys_access
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34 common nice sys_nice
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# 35 was sys_ftime
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36 common sync sys_sync
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37 common kill sys_kill
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38 common rename sys_rename
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39 common mkdir sys_mkdir
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40 common rmdir sys_rmdir
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41 common dup sys_dup
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42 common pipe sys_pipe
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43 common times sys_times
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# 44 was sys_prof
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45 common brk sys_brk
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46 common setgid sys_setgid16
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47 common getgid sys_getgid16
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# 48 was sys_signal
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49 common geteuid sys_geteuid16
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50 common getegid sys_getegid16
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51 common acct sys_acct
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52 common umount2 sys_umount
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# 53 was sys_lock
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54 common ioctl sys_ioctl
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55 common fcntl sys_fcntl
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# 56 was sys_mpx
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57 common setpgid sys_setpgid
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# 58 was sys_ulimit
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# 59 was sys_olduname
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60 common umask sys_umask
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61 common chroot sys_chroot
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62 common ustat sys_ustat
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63 common dup2 sys_dup2
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64 common getppid sys_getppid
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65 common getpgrp sys_getpgrp
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66 common setsid sys_setsid
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67 common sigaction sys_sigaction
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# 68 was sys_sgetmask
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# 69 was sys_ssetmask
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70 common setreuid sys_setreuid16
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71 common setregid sys_setregid16
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72 common sigsuspend sys_sigsuspend
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73 common sigpending sys_sigpending
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74 common sethostname sys_sethostname
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75 common setrlimit sys_setrlimit
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# Back compat 2GB limited rlimit
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76 oabi getrlimit sys_old_getrlimit
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77 common getrusage sys_getrusage
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78 common gettimeofday sys_gettimeofday
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79 common settimeofday sys_settimeofday
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80 common getgroups sys_getgroups16
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81 common setgroups sys_setgroups16
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82 oabi select sys_old_select
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83 common symlink sys_symlink
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# 84 was sys_lstat
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85 common readlink sys_readlink
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86 common uselib sys_uselib
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87 common swapon sys_swapon
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88 common reboot sys_reboot
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89 oabi readdir sys_old_readdir
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90 oabi mmap sys_old_mmap
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91 common munmap sys_munmap
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92 common truncate sys_truncate
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93 common ftruncate sys_ftruncate
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94 common fchmod sys_fchmod
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95 common fchown sys_fchown16
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96 common getpriority sys_getpriority
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97 common setpriority sys_setpriority
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# 98 was sys_profil
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99 common statfs sys_statfs
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100 common fstatfs sys_fstatfs
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# 101 was sys_ioperm
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102 oabi socketcall sys_socketcall sys_oabi_socketcall
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103 common syslog sys_syslog
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104 common setitimer sys_setitimer
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105 common getitimer sys_getitimer
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106 common stat sys_newstat
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107 common lstat sys_newlstat
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108 common fstat sys_newfstat
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# 109 was sys_uname
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# 110 was sys_iopl
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111 common vhangup sys_vhangup
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# 112 was sys_idle
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# syscall to call a syscall!
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113 oabi syscall sys_syscall
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114 common wait4 sys_wait4
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115 common swapoff sys_swapoff
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116 common sysinfo sys_sysinfo
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117 oabi ipc sys_ipc sys_oabi_ipc
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118 common fsync sys_fsync
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119 common sigreturn sys_sigreturn_wrapper
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120 common clone sys_clone
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121 common setdomainname sys_setdomainname
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122 common uname sys_newuname
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# 123 was sys_modify_ldt
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2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
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124 common adjtimex sys_adjtimex_time32
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2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
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125 common mprotect sys_mprotect
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126 common sigprocmask sys_sigprocmask
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# 127 was sys_create_module
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128 common init_module sys_init_module
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129 common delete_module sys_delete_module
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# 130 was sys_get_kernel_syms
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131 common quotactl sys_quotactl
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132 common getpgid sys_getpgid
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133 common fchdir sys_fchdir
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2021-06-29 15:11:44 -05:00
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134 common bdflush sys_ni_syscall
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2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
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135 common sysfs sys_sysfs
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136 common personality sys_personality
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# 137 was sys_afs_syscall
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138 common setfsuid sys_setfsuid16
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139 common setfsgid sys_setfsgid16
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140 common _llseek sys_llseek
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141 common getdents sys_getdents
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142 common _newselect sys_select
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143 common flock sys_flock
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144 common msync sys_msync
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145 common readv sys_readv
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146 common writev sys_writev
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147 common getsid sys_getsid
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148 common fdatasync sys_fdatasync
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2020-08-14 17:31:07 -07:00
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149 common _sysctl sys_ni_syscall
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2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
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150 common mlock sys_mlock
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151 common munlock sys_munlock
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152 common mlockall sys_mlockall
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153 common munlockall sys_munlockall
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154 common sched_setparam sys_sched_setparam
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155 common sched_getparam sys_sched_getparam
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156 common sched_setscheduler sys_sched_setscheduler
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157 common sched_getscheduler sys_sched_getscheduler
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158 common sched_yield sys_sched_yield
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159 common sched_get_priority_max sys_sched_get_priority_max
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160 common sched_get_priority_min sys_sched_get_priority_min
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2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
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161 common sched_rr_get_interval sys_sched_rr_get_interval_time32
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162 common nanosleep sys_nanosleep_time32
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2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
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163 common mremap sys_mremap
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164 common setresuid sys_setresuid16
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165 common getresuid sys_getresuid16
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# 166 was sys_vm86
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# 167 was sys_query_module
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168 common poll sys_poll
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169 common nfsservctl
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170 common setresgid sys_setresgid16
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171 common getresgid sys_getresgid16
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172 common prctl sys_prctl
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173 common rt_sigreturn sys_rt_sigreturn_wrapper
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174 common rt_sigaction sys_rt_sigaction
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175 common rt_sigprocmask sys_rt_sigprocmask
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176 common rt_sigpending sys_rt_sigpending
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2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
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177 common rt_sigtimedwait sys_rt_sigtimedwait_time32
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2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
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178 common rt_sigqueueinfo sys_rt_sigqueueinfo
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179 common rt_sigsuspend sys_rt_sigsuspend
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180 common pread64 sys_pread64 sys_oabi_pread64
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181 common pwrite64 sys_pwrite64 sys_oabi_pwrite64
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182 common chown sys_chown16
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183 common getcwd sys_getcwd
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184 common capget sys_capget
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185 common capset sys_capset
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186 common sigaltstack sys_sigaltstack
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187 common sendfile sys_sendfile
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# 188 reserved
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# 189 reserved
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190 common vfork sys_vfork
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# SuS compliant getrlimit
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191 common ugetrlimit sys_getrlimit
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192 common mmap2 sys_mmap2
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193 common truncate64 sys_truncate64 sys_oabi_truncate64
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194 common ftruncate64 sys_ftruncate64 sys_oabi_ftruncate64
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195 common stat64 sys_stat64 sys_oabi_stat64
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196 common lstat64 sys_lstat64 sys_oabi_lstat64
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197 common fstat64 sys_fstat64 sys_oabi_fstat64
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198 common lchown32 sys_lchown
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199 common getuid32 sys_getuid
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200 common getgid32 sys_getgid
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201 common geteuid32 sys_geteuid
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202 common getegid32 sys_getegid
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203 common setreuid32 sys_setreuid
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204 common setregid32 sys_setregid
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205 common getgroups32 sys_getgroups
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206 common setgroups32 sys_setgroups
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207 common fchown32 sys_fchown
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208 common setresuid32 sys_setresuid
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209 common getresuid32 sys_getresuid
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210 common setresgid32 sys_setresgid
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211 common getresgid32 sys_getresgid
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212 common chown32 sys_chown
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213 common setuid32 sys_setuid
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214 common setgid32 sys_setgid
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215 common setfsuid32 sys_setfsuid
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216 common setfsgid32 sys_setfsgid
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217 common getdents64 sys_getdents64
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218 common pivot_root sys_pivot_root
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219 common mincore sys_mincore
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220 common madvise sys_madvise
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221 common fcntl64 sys_fcntl64 sys_oabi_fcntl64
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# 222 for tux
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# 223 is unused
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224 common gettid sys_gettid
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225 common readahead sys_readahead sys_oabi_readahead
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226 common setxattr sys_setxattr
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227 common lsetxattr sys_lsetxattr
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228 common fsetxattr sys_fsetxattr
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229 common getxattr sys_getxattr
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230 common lgetxattr sys_lgetxattr
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231 common fgetxattr sys_fgetxattr
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232 common listxattr sys_listxattr
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233 common llistxattr sys_llistxattr
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234 common flistxattr sys_flistxattr
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235 common removexattr sys_removexattr
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236 common lremovexattr sys_lremovexattr
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237 common fremovexattr sys_fremovexattr
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238 common tkill sys_tkill
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239 common sendfile64 sys_sendfile64
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2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
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240 common futex sys_futex_time32
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
|
241 common sched_setaffinity sys_sched_setaffinity
|
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|
242 common sched_getaffinity sys_sched_getaffinity
|
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|
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243 common io_setup sys_io_setup
|
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|
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|
244 common io_destroy sys_io_destroy
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
245 common io_getevents sys_io_getevents_time32
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
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246 common io_submit sys_io_submit
|
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247 common io_cancel sys_io_cancel
|
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248 common exit_group sys_exit_group
|
2023-07-10 18:51:24 +00:00
|
|
|
249 common lookup_dcookie sys_ni_syscall
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
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|
250 common epoll_create sys_epoll_create
|
|
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|
251 common epoll_ctl sys_epoll_ctl sys_oabi_epoll_ctl
|
2021-08-11 08:30:22 +01:00
|
|
|
252 common epoll_wait sys_epoll_wait
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
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253 common remap_file_pages sys_remap_file_pages
|
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|
# 254 for set_thread_area
|
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|
# 255 for get_thread_area
|
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256 common set_tid_address sys_set_tid_address
|
|
|
|
|
257 common timer_create sys_timer_create
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
258 common timer_settime sys_timer_settime32
|
|
|
|
|
259 common timer_gettime sys_timer_gettime32
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
|
260 common timer_getoverrun sys_timer_getoverrun
|
|
|
|
|
261 common timer_delete sys_timer_delete
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
262 common clock_settime sys_clock_settime32
|
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|
|
263 common clock_gettime sys_clock_gettime32
|
|
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|
|
264 common clock_getres sys_clock_getres_time32
|
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|
|
|
265 common clock_nanosleep sys_clock_nanosleep_time32
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
|
266 common statfs64 sys_statfs64_wrapper
|
|
|
|
|
267 common fstatfs64 sys_fstatfs64_wrapper
|
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|
|
268 common tgkill sys_tgkill
|
y2038: rename old time and utime syscalls
The time, stime, utime, utimes, and futimesat system calls are only
used on older architectures, and we do not provide y2038 safe variants
of them, as they are replaced by clock_gettime64, clock_settime64,
and utimensat_time64.
However, for consistency it seems better to have the 32-bit architectures
that still use them call the "time32" entry points (leaving the
traditional handlers for the 64-bit architectures), like we do for system
calls that now require two versions.
Note: We used to always define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME and only set __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME32 for compat mode on 64-bit kernels. Now this is
reversed: only 64-bit architectures set __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME/UTIME, while
we need __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME32/UTIME32 for 32-bit architectures and compat
mode. The resulting asm/unistd.h changes look a bit counterintuitive.
This is only a cleanup patch and it should not change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2019-01-06 23:45:29 +01:00
|
|
|
269 common utimes sys_utimes_time32
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
|
270 common arm_fadvise64_64 sys_arm_fadvise64_64
|
|
|
|
|
271 common pciconfig_iobase sys_pciconfig_iobase
|
|
|
|
|
272 common pciconfig_read sys_pciconfig_read
|
|
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|
|
273 common pciconfig_write sys_pciconfig_write
|
|
|
|
|
274 common mq_open sys_mq_open
|
|
|
|
|
275 common mq_unlink sys_mq_unlink
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
276 common mq_timedsend sys_mq_timedsend_time32
|
|
|
|
|
277 common mq_timedreceive sys_mq_timedreceive_time32
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
|
278 common mq_notify sys_mq_notify
|
|
|
|
|
279 common mq_getsetattr sys_mq_getsetattr
|
|
|
|
|
280 common waitid sys_waitid
|
|
|
|
|
281 common socket sys_socket
|
|
|
|
|
282 common bind sys_bind sys_oabi_bind
|
|
|
|
|
283 common connect sys_connect sys_oabi_connect
|
|
|
|
|
284 common listen sys_listen
|
|
|
|
|
285 common accept sys_accept
|
|
|
|
|
286 common getsockname sys_getsockname
|
|
|
|
|
287 common getpeername sys_getpeername
|
|
|
|
|
288 common socketpair sys_socketpair
|
|
|
|
|
289 common send sys_send
|
|
|
|
|
290 common sendto sys_sendto sys_oabi_sendto
|
|
|
|
|
291 common recv sys_recv
|
|
|
|
|
292 common recvfrom sys_recvfrom
|
|
|
|
|
293 common shutdown sys_shutdown
|
|
|
|
|
294 common setsockopt sys_setsockopt
|
|
|
|
|
295 common getsockopt sys_getsockopt
|
|
|
|
|
296 common sendmsg sys_sendmsg sys_oabi_sendmsg
|
|
|
|
|
297 common recvmsg sys_recvmsg
|
|
|
|
|
298 common semop sys_semop sys_oabi_semop
|
|
|
|
|
299 common semget sys_semget
|
ipc: rename old-style shmctl/semctl/msgctl syscalls
The behavior of these system calls is slightly different between
architectures, as determined by the CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
symbol. Most architectures that implement the split IPC syscalls don't set
that symbol and only get the modern version, but alpha, arm, microblaze,
mips-n32, mips-n64 and xtensa expect the caller to pass the IPC_64 flag.
For the architectures that so far only implement sys_ipc(), i.e. m68k,
mips-o32, powerpc, s390, sh, sparc, and x86-32, we want the new behavior
when adding the split syscalls, so we need to distinguish between the
two groups of architectures.
The method I picked for this distinction is to have a separate system call
entry point: sys_old_*ctl() now uses ipc_parse_version, while sys_*ctl()
does not. The system call tables of the five architectures are changed
accordingly.
As an additional benefit, we no longer need the configuration specific
definition for ipc_parse_version(), it always does the same thing now,
but simply won't get called on architectures with the modern interface.
A small downside is that on architectures that do set
ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION, we now have an extra set of entry points
that are never called. They only add a few bytes of bloat, so it seems
better to keep them compared to adding yet another Kconfig symbol.
I considered adding new syscall numbers for the IPC_64 variants for
consistency, but decided against that for now.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2018-12-31 22:22:40 +01:00
|
|
|
300 common semctl sys_old_semctl
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
|
301 common msgsnd sys_msgsnd
|
|
|
|
|
302 common msgrcv sys_msgrcv
|
|
|
|
|
303 common msgget sys_msgget
|
ipc: rename old-style shmctl/semctl/msgctl syscalls
The behavior of these system calls is slightly different between
architectures, as determined by the CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
symbol. Most architectures that implement the split IPC syscalls don't set
that symbol and only get the modern version, but alpha, arm, microblaze,
mips-n32, mips-n64 and xtensa expect the caller to pass the IPC_64 flag.
For the architectures that so far only implement sys_ipc(), i.e. m68k,
mips-o32, powerpc, s390, sh, sparc, and x86-32, we want the new behavior
when adding the split syscalls, so we need to distinguish between the
two groups of architectures.
The method I picked for this distinction is to have a separate system call
entry point: sys_old_*ctl() now uses ipc_parse_version, while sys_*ctl()
does not. The system call tables of the five architectures are changed
accordingly.
As an additional benefit, we no longer need the configuration specific
definition for ipc_parse_version(), it always does the same thing now,
but simply won't get called on architectures with the modern interface.
A small downside is that on architectures that do set
ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION, we now have an extra set of entry points
that are never called. They only add a few bytes of bloat, so it seems
better to keep them compared to adding yet another Kconfig symbol.
I considered adding new syscall numbers for the IPC_64 variants for
consistency, but decided against that for now.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2018-12-31 22:22:40 +01:00
|
|
|
304 common msgctl sys_old_msgctl
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
|
305 common shmat sys_shmat
|
|
|
|
|
306 common shmdt sys_shmdt
|
|
|
|
|
307 common shmget sys_shmget
|
ipc: rename old-style shmctl/semctl/msgctl syscalls
The behavior of these system calls is slightly different between
architectures, as determined by the CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
symbol. Most architectures that implement the split IPC syscalls don't set
that symbol and only get the modern version, but alpha, arm, microblaze,
mips-n32, mips-n64 and xtensa expect the caller to pass the IPC_64 flag.
For the architectures that so far only implement sys_ipc(), i.e. m68k,
mips-o32, powerpc, s390, sh, sparc, and x86-32, we want the new behavior
when adding the split syscalls, so we need to distinguish between the
two groups of architectures.
The method I picked for this distinction is to have a separate system call
entry point: sys_old_*ctl() now uses ipc_parse_version, while sys_*ctl()
does not. The system call tables of the five architectures are changed
accordingly.
As an additional benefit, we no longer need the configuration specific
definition for ipc_parse_version(), it always does the same thing now,
but simply won't get called on architectures with the modern interface.
A small downside is that on architectures that do set
ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION, we now have an extra set of entry points
that are never called. They only add a few bytes of bloat, so it seems
better to keep them compared to adding yet another Kconfig symbol.
I considered adding new syscall numbers for the IPC_64 variants for
consistency, but decided against that for now.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2018-12-31 22:22:40 +01:00
|
|
|
308 common shmctl sys_old_shmctl
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
|
309 common add_key sys_add_key
|
|
|
|
|
310 common request_key sys_request_key
|
|
|
|
|
311 common keyctl sys_keyctl
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
312 common semtimedop sys_semtimedop_time32 sys_oabi_semtimedop
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
|
313 common vserver
|
|
|
|
|
314 common ioprio_set sys_ioprio_set
|
|
|
|
|
315 common ioprio_get sys_ioprio_get
|
|
|
|
|
316 common inotify_init sys_inotify_init
|
|
|
|
|
317 common inotify_add_watch sys_inotify_add_watch
|
|
|
|
|
318 common inotify_rm_watch sys_inotify_rm_watch
|
|
|
|
|
319 common mbind sys_mbind
|
|
|
|
|
320 common get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy
|
|
|
|
|
321 common set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy
|
|
|
|
|
322 common openat sys_openat
|
|
|
|
|
323 common mkdirat sys_mkdirat
|
|
|
|
|
324 common mknodat sys_mknodat
|
|
|
|
|
325 common fchownat sys_fchownat
|
y2038: rename old time and utime syscalls
The time, stime, utime, utimes, and futimesat system calls are only
used on older architectures, and we do not provide y2038 safe variants
of them, as they are replaced by clock_gettime64, clock_settime64,
and utimensat_time64.
However, for consistency it seems better to have the 32-bit architectures
that still use them call the "time32" entry points (leaving the
traditional handlers for the 64-bit architectures), like we do for system
calls that now require two versions.
Note: We used to always define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME and only set __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME32 for compat mode on 64-bit kernels. Now this is
reversed: only 64-bit architectures set __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME/UTIME, while
we need __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME32/UTIME32 for 32-bit architectures and compat
mode. The resulting asm/unistd.h changes look a bit counterintuitive.
This is only a cleanup patch and it should not change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2019-01-06 23:45:29 +01:00
|
|
|
326 common futimesat sys_futimesat_time32
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
|
327 common fstatat64 sys_fstatat64 sys_oabi_fstatat64
|
|
|
|
|
328 common unlinkat sys_unlinkat
|
|
|
|
|
329 common renameat sys_renameat
|
|
|
|
|
330 common linkat sys_linkat
|
|
|
|
|
331 common symlinkat sys_symlinkat
|
|
|
|
|
332 common readlinkat sys_readlinkat
|
|
|
|
|
333 common fchmodat sys_fchmodat
|
|
|
|
|
334 common faccessat sys_faccessat
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
335 common pselect6 sys_pselect6_time32
|
|
|
|
|
336 common ppoll sys_ppoll_time32
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
|
337 common unshare sys_unshare
|
|
|
|
|
338 common set_robust_list sys_set_robust_list
|
|
|
|
|
339 common get_robust_list sys_get_robust_list
|
|
|
|
|
340 common splice sys_splice
|
|
|
|
|
341 common arm_sync_file_range sys_sync_file_range2
|
|
|
|
|
342 common tee sys_tee
|
|
|
|
|
343 common vmsplice sys_vmsplice
|
|
|
|
|
344 common move_pages sys_move_pages
|
|
|
|
|
345 common getcpu sys_getcpu
|
|
|
|
|
346 common epoll_pwait sys_epoll_pwait
|
|
|
|
|
347 common kexec_load sys_kexec_load
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
348 common utimensat sys_utimensat_time32
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
|
349 common signalfd sys_signalfd
|
|
|
|
|
350 common timerfd_create sys_timerfd_create
|
|
|
|
|
351 common eventfd sys_eventfd
|
|
|
|
|
352 common fallocate sys_fallocate
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
353 common timerfd_settime sys_timerfd_settime32
|
|
|
|
|
354 common timerfd_gettime sys_timerfd_gettime32
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
|
355 common signalfd4 sys_signalfd4
|
|
|
|
|
356 common eventfd2 sys_eventfd2
|
|
|
|
|
357 common epoll_create1 sys_epoll_create1
|
|
|
|
|
358 common dup3 sys_dup3
|
|
|
|
|
359 common pipe2 sys_pipe2
|
|
|
|
|
360 common inotify_init1 sys_inotify_init1
|
|
|
|
|
361 common preadv sys_preadv
|
|
|
|
|
362 common pwritev sys_pwritev
|
|
|
|
|
363 common rt_tgsigqueueinfo sys_rt_tgsigqueueinfo
|
|
|
|
|
364 common perf_event_open sys_perf_event_open
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
365 common recvmmsg sys_recvmmsg_time32
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
|
366 common accept4 sys_accept4
|
|
|
|
|
367 common fanotify_init sys_fanotify_init
|
|
|
|
|
368 common fanotify_mark sys_fanotify_mark
|
|
|
|
|
369 common prlimit64 sys_prlimit64
|
|
|
|
|
370 common name_to_handle_at sys_name_to_handle_at
|
|
|
|
|
371 common open_by_handle_at sys_open_by_handle_at
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
372 common clock_adjtime sys_clock_adjtime32
|
2016-10-18 19:57:01 +01:00
|
|
|
373 common syncfs sys_syncfs
|
|
|
|
|
374 common sendmmsg sys_sendmmsg
|
|
|
|
|
375 common setns sys_setns
|
|
|
|
|
376 common process_vm_readv sys_process_vm_readv
|
|
|
|
|
377 common process_vm_writev sys_process_vm_writev
|
|
|
|
|
378 common kcmp sys_kcmp
|
|
|
|
|
379 common finit_module sys_finit_module
|
|
|
|
|
380 common sched_setattr sys_sched_setattr
|
|
|
|
|
381 common sched_getattr sys_sched_getattr
|
|
|
|
|
382 common renameat2 sys_renameat2
|
|
|
|
|
383 common seccomp sys_seccomp
|
|
|
|
|
384 common getrandom sys_getrandom
|
|
|
|
|
385 common memfd_create sys_memfd_create
|
|
|
|
|
386 common bpf sys_bpf
|
|
|
|
|
387 common execveat sys_execveat
|
|
|
|
|
388 common userfaultfd sys_userfaultfd
|
|
|
|
|
389 common membarrier sys_membarrier
|
|
|
|
|
390 common mlock2 sys_mlock2
|
|
|
|
|
391 common copy_file_range sys_copy_file_range
|
|
|
|
|
392 common preadv2 sys_preadv2
|
|
|
|
|
393 common pwritev2 sys_pwritev2
|
2016-10-18 20:26:10 +01:00
|
|
|
394 common pkey_mprotect sys_pkey_mprotect
|
|
|
|
|
395 common pkey_alloc sys_pkey_alloc
|
|
|
|
|
396 common pkey_free sys_pkey_free
|
2017-03-09 17:14:32 +00:00
|
|
|
397 common statx sys_statx
|
2018-06-02 08:43:57 -04:00
|
|
|
398 common rseq sys_rseq
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
399 common io_pgetevents sys_io_pgetevents_time32
|
2018-12-30 21:43:07 +01:00
|
|
|
400 common migrate_pages sys_migrate_pages
|
2018-12-30 22:01:52 +01:00
|
|
|
401 common kexec_file_load sys_kexec_file_load
|
2019-01-10 12:45:11 +01:00
|
|
|
# 402 is unused
|
|
|
|
|
403 common clock_gettime64 sys_clock_gettime
|
|
|
|
|
404 common clock_settime64 sys_clock_settime
|
|
|
|
|
405 common clock_adjtime64 sys_clock_adjtime
|
|
|
|
|
406 common clock_getres_time64 sys_clock_getres
|
|
|
|
|
407 common clock_nanosleep_time64 sys_clock_nanosleep
|
|
|
|
|
408 common timer_gettime64 sys_timer_gettime
|
|
|
|
|
409 common timer_settime64 sys_timer_settime
|
|
|
|
|
410 common timerfd_gettime64 sys_timerfd_gettime
|
|
|
|
|
411 common timerfd_settime64 sys_timerfd_settime
|
|
|
|
|
412 common utimensat_time64 sys_utimensat
|
|
|
|
|
413 common pselect6_time64 sys_pselect6
|
|
|
|
|
414 common ppoll_time64 sys_ppoll
|
|
|
|
|
416 common io_pgetevents_time64 sys_io_pgetevents
|
|
|
|
|
417 common recvmmsg_time64 sys_recvmmsg
|
|
|
|
|
418 common mq_timedsend_time64 sys_mq_timedsend
|
|
|
|
|
419 common mq_timedreceive_time64 sys_mq_timedreceive
|
|
|
|
|
420 common semtimedop_time64 sys_semtimedop
|
|
|
|
|
421 common rt_sigtimedwait_time64 sys_rt_sigtimedwait
|
|
|
|
|
422 common futex_time64 sys_futex
|
|
|
|
|
423 common sched_rr_get_interval_time64 sys_sched_rr_get_interval
|
2019-02-28 13:59:19 +01:00
|
|
|
424 common pidfd_send_signal sys_pidfd_send_signal
|
|
|
|
|
425 common io_uring_setup sys_io_uring_setup
|
|
|
|
|
426 common io_uring_enter sys_io_uring_enter
|
|
|
|
|
427 common io_uring_register sys_io_uring_register
|
2019-05-16 12:52:34 +01:00
|
|
|
428 common open_tree sys_open_tree
|
|
|
|
|
429 common move_mount sys_move_mount
|
|
|
|
|
430 common fsopen sys_fsopen
|
|
|
|
|
431 common fsconfig sys_fsconfig
|
|
|
|
|
432 common fsmount sys_fsmount
|
|
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433 common fspick sys_fspick
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2019-05-24 12:44:59 +02:00
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434 common pidfd_open sys_pidfd_open
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2019-07-11 10:09:44 -07:00
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435 common clone3 sys_clone3
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2019-05-24 11:31:44 +02:00
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436 common close_range sys_close_range
|
open: introduce openat2(2) syscall
/* Background. */
For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags
are present[1].
This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to
being added to openat(2).
Userspace also has a hard time figuring out whether a particular flag is
supported on a particular kernel. While it is now possible with
contemporary kernels (thanks to [3]), older kernels will expose unknown
flag bits through fcntl(F_GETFL). Giving a clear -EINVAL during
openat(2) time matches modern syscall designs and is far more
fool-proof.
In addition, the newly-added path resolution restriction LOOKUP flags
(which we would like to expose to user-space) don't feel related to the
pre-existing O_* flag set -- they affect all components of path lookup.
We'd therefore like to add a new flag argument.
Adding a new syscall allows us to finally fix the flag-ignoring problem,
and we can make it extensible enough so that we will hopefully never
need an openat3(2).
/* Syscall Prototype. */
/*
* open_how is an extensible structure (similar in interface to
* clone3(2) or sched_setattr(2)). The size parameter must be set to
* sizeof(struct open_how), to allow for future extensions. All future
* extensions will be appended to open_how, with their zero value
* acting as a no-op default.
*/
struct open_how { /* ... */ };
int openat2(int dfd, const char *pathname,
struct open_how *how, size_t size);
/* Description. */
The initial version of 'struct open_how' contains the following fields:
flags
Used to specify openat(2)-style flags. However, any unknown flag
bits or otherwise incorrect flag combinations (like O_PATH|O_RDWR)
will result in -EINVAL. In addition, this field is 64-bits wide to
allow for more O_ flags than currently permitted with openat(2).
mode
The file mode for O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.
Must be set to zero if flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.
resolve
Restrict path resolution (in contrast to O_* flags they affect all
path components). The current set of flags are as follows (at the
moment, all of the RESOLVE_ flags are implemented as just passing
the corresponding LOOKUP_ flag).
RESOLVE_NO_XDEV => LOOKUP_NO_XDEV
RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS
RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS
RESOLVE_BENEATH => LOOKUP_BENEATH
RESOLVE_IN_ROOT => LOOKUP_IN_ROOT
open_how does not contain an embedded size field, because it is of
little benefit (userspace can figure out the kernel open_how size at
runtime fairly easily without it). It also only contains u64s (even
though ->mode arguably should be a u16) to avoid having padding fields
which are never used in the future.
Note that as a result of the new how->flags handling, O_PATH|O_TMPFILE
is no longer permitted for openat(2). As far as I can tell, this has
always been a bug and appears to not be used by userspace (and I've not
seen any problems on my machines by disallowing it). If it turns out
this breaks something, we can special-case it and only permit it for
openat(2) but not openat2(2).
After input from Florian Weimer, the new open_how and flag definitions
are inside a separate header from uapi/linux/fcntl.h, to avoid problems
that glibc has with importing that header.
/* Testing. */
In a follow-up patch there are over 200 selftests which ensure that this
syscall has the correct semantics and will correctly handle several
attack scenarios.
In addition, I've written a userspace library[4] which provides
convenient wrappers around openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) (this is necessary
because no other syscalls support RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, and thus lots of care
must be taken when using RESOLVE_IN_ROOT'd file descriptors with other
syscalls). During the development of this patch, I've run numerous
verification tests using libpathrs (showing that the API is reasonably
usable by userspace).
/* Future Work. */
Additional RESOLVE_ flags have been suggested during the review period.
These can be easily implemented separately (such as blocking auto-mount
during resolution).
Furthermore, there are some other proposed changes to the openat(2)
interface (the most obvious example is magic-link hardening[5]) which
would be a good opportunity to add a way for userspace to restrict how
O_PATH file descriptors can be re-opened.
Another possible avenue of future work would be some kind of
CHECK_FIELDS[6] flag which causes the kernel to indicate to userspace
which openat2(2) flags and fields are supported by the current kernel
(to avoid userspace having to go through several guesses to figure it
out).
[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/588444/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyyxJL1LyXZeBsf2ypriraj5ut1XkNDsunRBqgVjZU_6Q@mail.gmail.com
[3]: commit 629e014bb834 ("fs: completely ignore unknown open flags")
[4]: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17523
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190930183316.10190-2-cyphar@cyphar.com/
[6]: https://youtu.be/ggD-eb3yPVs
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-01-18 23:07:59 +11:00
|
|
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437 common openat2 sys_openat2
|
2020-01-07 09:59:26 -08:00
|
|
|
438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd
|
2020-05-14 16:44:25 +02:00
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|
|
439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2
|
mm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory hinting API
There is usecase that System Management Software(SMS) want to give a
memory hint like MADV_[COLD|PAGEEOUT] to other processes and in the
case of Android, it is the ActivityManagerService.
The information required to make the reclaim decision is not known to the
app. Instead, it is known to the centralized userspace
daemon(ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate
reclaim on its own without any app involvement.
To solve the issue, this patch introduces a new syscall
process_madvise(2). It uses pidfd of an external process to give the
hint. It also supports vector address range because Android app has
thousands of vmas due to zygote so it's totally waste of CPU and power if
we should call the syscall one by one for each vma.(With testing 2000-vma
syscall vs 1-vector syscall, it showed 15% performance improvement. I
think it would be bigger in real practice because the testing ran very
cache friendly environment).
Another potential use case for the vector range is to amortize the cost
ofTLB shootdowns for multiple ranges when using MADV_DONTNEED; this could
benefit users like TCP receive zerocopy and malloc implementations. In
future, we could find more usecases for other advises so let's make it
happens as API since we introduce a new syscall at this moment. With
that, existing madvise(2) user could replace it with process_madvise(2)
with their own pid if they want to have batch address ranges support
feature.
ince it could affect other process's address range, only privileged
process(PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) or something else(e.g., being the same
UID) gives it the right to ptrace the process could use it successfully.
The flag argument is reserved for future use if we need to extend the API.
I think supporting all hints madvise has/will supported/support to
process_madvise is rather risky. Because we are not sure all hints make
sense from external process and implementation for the hint may rely on
the caller being in the current context so it could be error-prone. Thus,
I just limited hints as MADV_[COLD|PAGEOUT] in this patch.
If someone want to add other hints, we could hear the usecase and review
it for each hint. It's safer for maintenance rather than introducing a
buggy syscall but hard to fix it later.
So finally, the API is as follows,
ssize_t process_madvise(int pidfd, const struct iovec *iovec,
unsigned long vlen, int advice, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
The process_madvise() system call is used to give advice or directions
to the kernel about the address ranges from external process as well as
local process. It provides the advice to address ranges of process
described by iovec and vlen. The goal of such advice is to improve
system or application performance.
The pidfd selects the process referred to by the PID file descriptor
specified in pidfd. (See pidofd_open(2) for further information)
The pointer iovec points to an array of iovec structures, defined in
<sys/uio.h> as:
struct iovec {
void *iov_base; /* starting address */
size_t iov_len; /* number of bytes to be advised */
};
The iovec describes address ranges beginning at address(iov_base)
and with size length of bytes(iov_len).
The vlen represents the number of elements in iovec.
The advice is indicated in the advice argument, which is one of the
following at this moment if the target process specified by pidfd is
external.
MADV_COLD
MADV_PAGEOUT
Permission to provide a hint to external process is governed by a
ptrace access mode PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS check; see ptrace(2).
The process_madvise supports every advice madvise(2) has if target
process is in same thread group with calling process so user could
use process_madvise(2) to extend existing madvise(2) to support
vector address ranges.
RETURN VALUE
On success, process_madvise() returns the number of bytes advised.
This return value may be less than the total number of requested
bytes, if an error occurred. The caller should check return value
to determine whether a partial advice occurred.
FAQ:
Q.1 - Why does any external entity have better knowledge?
Quote from Sandeep
"For Android, every application (including the special SystemServer)
are forked from Zygote. The reason of course is to share as many
libraries and classes between the two as possible to benefit from the
preloading during boot.
After applications start, (almost) all of the APIs end up calling into
this SystemServer process over IPC (binder) and back to the
application.
In a fully running system, the SystemServer monitors every single
process periodically to calculate their PSS / RSS and also decides
which process is "important" to the user for interactivity.
So, because of how these processes start _and_ the fact that the
SystemServer is looping to monitor each process, it does tend to *know*
which address range of the application is not used / useful.
Besides, we can never rely on applications to clean things up
themselves. We've had the "hey app1, the system is low on memory,
please trim your memory usage down" notifications for a long time[1].
They rely on applications honoring the broadcasts and very few do.
So, if we want to avoid the inevitable killing of the application and
restarting it, some way to be able to tell the OS about unimportant
memory in these applications will be useful.
- ssp
Q.2 - How to guarantee the race(i.e., object validation) between when
giving a hint from an external process and get the hint from the target
process?
process_madvise operates on the target process's address space as it
exists at the instant that process_madvise is called. If the space
target process can run between the time the process_madvise process
inspects the target process address space and the time that
process_madvise is actually called, process_madvise may operate on
memory regions that the calling process does not expect. It's the
responsibility of the process calling process_madvise to close this
race condition. For example, the calling process can suspend the
target process with ptrace, SIGSTOP, or the freezer cgroup so that it
doesn't have an opportunity to change its own address space before
process_madvise is called. Another option is to operate on memory
regions that the caller knows a priori will be unchanged in the target
process. Yet another option is to accept the race for certain
process_madvise calls after reasoning that mistargeting will do no
harm. The suggested API itself does not provide synchronization. It
also apply other APIs like move_pages, process_vm_write.
The race isn't really a problem though. Why is it so wrong to require
that callers do their own synchronization in some manner? Nobody
objects to write(2) merely because it's possible for two processes to
open the same file and clobber each other's writes --- instead, we tell
people to use flock or something. Think about mmap. It never
guarantees newly allocated address space is still valid when the user
tries to access it because other threads could unmap the memory right
before. That's where we need synchronization by using other API or
design from userside. It shouldn't be part of API itself. If someone
needs more fine-grained synchronization rather than process level,
there were two ideas suggested - cookie[2] and anon-fd[3]. Both are
applicable via using last reserved argument of the API but I don't
think it's necessary right now since we have already ways to prevent
the race so don't want to add additional complexity with more
fine-grained optimization model.
To make the API extend, it reserved an unsigned long as last argument
so we could support it in future if someone really needs it.
Q.3 - Why doesn't ptrace work?
Injecting an madvise in the target process using ptrace would not work
for us because such injected madvise would have to be executed by the
target process, which means that process would have to be runnable and
that creates the risk of the abovementioned race and hinting a wrong
VMA. Furthermore, we want to act the hint in caller's context, not the
callee's, because the callee is usually limited in cpuset/cgroups or
even freezed state so they can't act by themselves quick enough, which
causes more thrashing/kill. It doesn't work if the target process are
ptraced(e.g., strace, debugger, minidump) because a process can have at
most one ptracer.
[1] https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory"
[2] process_getinfo for getting the cookie which is updated whenever
vma of process address layout are changed - Daniel Colascione -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190520035254.57579-1-minchan@kernel.org/T/#m7694416fd179b2066a2c62b5b139b14e3894e224
[3] anonymous fd which is used for the object(i.e., address range)
validation - Michal Hocko -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200120112722.GY18451@dhcp22.suse.cz/
[minchan@kernel.org: fix process_madvise build break for arm64]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303145756.GA219683@google.com
[minchan@kernel.org: fix build error for mips of process_madvise]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508052517.GA197378@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix patch ordering issue]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arm64 whoops]
[minchan@kernel.org: make process_madvise() vlen arg have type size_t, per Florian]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 build]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix syscall numbering]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200905142639.49fc3f1a@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: madvise.c needs compat.h]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908204547.285646b4@canb.auug.org.au
[minchan@kernel.org: fix mips build]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200909173655.GC2435453@google.com
[yuehaibing@huawei.com: remove duplicate header which is included twice]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915121550.30584-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
[minchan@kernel.org: do not use helper functions for process_madvise]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200921175539.GB387368@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: pidfd_get_pid() gained an argument]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix up for "iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec"]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200928212542.468e1fef@canb.auug.org.au
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-3-minchan@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508183320.GA125527@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-4-minchan@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-4-minchan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-17 16:14:59 -07:00
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|
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440 common process_madvise sys_process_madvise
|
2020-12-18 14:05:41 -08:00
|
|
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441 common epoll_pwait2 sys_epoll_pwait2
|
fs: add mount_setattr()
This implements the missing mount_setattr() syscall. While the new mount
api allows to change the properties of a superblock there is currently
no way to change the properties of a mount or a mount tree using file
descriptors which the new mount api is based on. In addition the old
mount api has the restriction that mount options cannot be applied
recursively. This hasn't changed since changing mount options on a
per-mount basis was implemented in [1] and has been a frequent request
not just for convenience but also for security reasons. The legacy
mount syscall is unable to accommodate this behavior without introducing
a whole new set of flags because MS_REC | MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND |
MS_RDONLY | MS_NOEXEC | [...] only apply the mount option to the topmost
mount. Changing MS_REC to apply to the whole mount tree would mean
introducing a significant uapi change and would likely cause significant
regressions.
The new mount_setattr() syscall allows to recursively clear and set
mount options in one shot. Multiple calls to change mount options
requesting the same changes are idempotent:
int mount_setattr(int dfd, const char *path, unsigned flags,
struct mount_attr *uattr, size_t usize);
Flags to modify path resolution behavior are specified in the @flags
argument. Currently, AT_EMPTY_PATH, AT_RECURSIVE, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW,
and AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT are supported. If useful, additional lookup flags to
restrict path resolution as introduced with openat2() might be supported
in the future.
The mount_setattr() syscall can be expected to grow over time and is
designed with extensibility in mind. It follows the extensible syscall
pattern we have used with other syscalls such as openat2(), clone3(),
sched_{set,get}attr(), and others.
The set of mount options is passed in the uapi struct mount_attr which
currently has the following layout:
struct mount_attr {
__u64 attr_set;
__u64 attr_clr;
__u64 propagation;
__u64 userns_fd;
};
The @attr_set and @attr_clr members are used to clear and set mount
options. This way a user can e.g. request that a set of flags is to be
raised such as turning mounts readonly by raising MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY in
@attr_set while at the same time requesting that another set of flags is
to be lowered such as removing noexec from a mount tree by specifying
MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC in @attr_clr.
Note, since the MOUNT_ATTR_<atime> values are an enum starting from 0,
not a bitmap, users wanting to transition to a different atime setting
cannot simply specify the atime setting in @attr_set, but must also
specify MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME in the @attr_clr field. So we ensure that
MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME can't be partially set in @attr_clr and that @attr_set
can't have any atime bits set if MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME isn't set in
@attr_clr.
The @propagation field lets callers specify the propagation type of a
mount tree. Propagation is a single property that has four different
settings and as such is not really a flag argument but an enum.
Specifically, it would be unclear what setting and clearing propagation
settings in combination would amount to. The legacy mount() syscall thus
forbids the combination of multiple propagation settings too. The goal
is to keep the semantics of mount propagation somewhat simple as they
are overly complex as it is.
The @userns_fd field lets user specify a user namespace whose idmapping
becomes the idmapping of the mount. This is implemented and explained in
detail in the next patch.
[1]: commit 2e4b7fcd9260 ("[PATCH] r/o bind mounts: honor mount writer counts at remount")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-35-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 14:19:53 +01:00
|
|
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442 common mount_setattr sys_mount_setattr
|
2021-05-31 18:42:58 +02:00
|
|
|
443 common quotactl_fd sys_quotactl_fd
|
2021-04-22 17:41:19 +02:00
|
|
|
444 common landlock_create_ruleset sys_landlock_create_ruleset
|
|
|
|
|
445 common landlock_add_rule sys_landlock_add_rule
|
|
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446 common landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self
|
2021-09-02 15:00:33 -07:00
|
|
|
# 447 reserved for memfd_secret
|
|
|
|
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448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
|
2021-09-23 14:11:07 -03:00
|
|
|
449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv
|
2022-01-14 14:08:21 -08:00
|
|
|
450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
|
2023-05-10 12:58:06 -07:00
|
|
|
451 common cachestat sys_cachestat
|
2023-07-11 18:16:05 +02:00
|
|
|
452 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
|
2023-09-14 18:58:03 +00:00
|
|
|
453 common map_shadow_stack sys_map_shadow_stack
|
2023-09-21 12:45:10 +02:00
|
|
|
454 common futex_wake sys_futex_wake
|
2023-09-21 12:45:12 +02:00
|
|
|
455 common futex_wait sys_futex_wait
|
2023-09-21 12:45:15 +02:00
|
|
|
456 common futex_requeue sys_futex_requeue
|
2023-10-25 16:02:04 +02:00
|
|
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457 common statmount sys_statmount
|
|
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458 common listmount sys_listmount
|
lsm/stable-6.8 PR 20240105
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull security module updates from Paul Moore:
- Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and
lsm_set_self_attr().
The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and
third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these
syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under
/proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple,
simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current
/proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM
was allowed to be active at a given time.
We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the
existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and
even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel
API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had
established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls.
Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly
unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he
is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more
difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM
community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to
continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as
pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g.
syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain.
My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing
out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to
support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step
forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our
reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic
for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api
folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of
their concerns.
- Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit
ioctls on 64-bit systems problem.
This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which
provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually
cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while
Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this
patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes.
- Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled
at boot.
While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something
users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and
then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via
NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense.
Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take
this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like
the best fit.
- Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about
our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc.
I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated
MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been
working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if
they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role;
hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to
look after it.
- Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits)
lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook
lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx
calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass()
selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test
MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM
MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry
mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts
mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses
lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static
lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user()
lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx()
lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()
lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr()
lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr()
lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation
lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA
LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls
SELinux: Add selfattr hooks
AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks
Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks
...
2024-01-09 12:57:46 -08:00
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459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
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460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
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461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
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mseal: wire up mseal syscall
Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10.
This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel.
In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range
against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits.
Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and
no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel
version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves
the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot
simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory
must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur.
Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data
structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the
VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type.
Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example,
such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees
since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable
or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be
applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and
applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A
similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall
[4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and
this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case.
Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal().
The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature:
int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
addr/len: memory range.
flags: reserved.
mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range.
1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can
be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
via mremap().
3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific
risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is
unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA.
5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous
memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those
behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a
memset(0) for anonymous memory.
The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in
V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this
API.
Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing,
which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the
case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute
(RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from
becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime
of the process.
Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed
by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively
but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM
permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not
tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is
sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory.
For example, with madvise(DONTNEED).
However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security
risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the
second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros
and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard
operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case,
the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write
permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow
integrity.
Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome
browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions
that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a
complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases.
The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and
sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to
glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all
non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all
applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new
protections.
In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable
contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in
shaping this patch:
Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the
destructive madvise operations.
Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization.
Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope.
Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from
implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD.
MM perf benchmarks
==================
This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to
check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made,
when any segment within the given memory range is sealed.
To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed.
[8]
The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call,
by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using
PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have
similar results.
The tests have roughly below sequence:
for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++)
create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA)
start the sampling
for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++)
mprotect one mapping
stop and save the sample
delete 1000 mappings
calculates all samples.
Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz,
4G memory, Chromebook.
Based on the latest upstream code:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104%
munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107%
munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106%
munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107%
munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104%
munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105%
mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106%
mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105%
mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104%
mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103%
mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103%
mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104%
madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109%
madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121%
madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121%
madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119%
madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115%
madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106%
munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108%
munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106%
munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106%
munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108%
munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107%
mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107%
mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106%
mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107%
mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105%
mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105%
mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105%
madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115%
madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120%
madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115%
madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116%
madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113%
madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111%
Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds
20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA.
In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109%
munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105%
munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103%
munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112%
munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114%
munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99%
mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97%
mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94%
mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103%
mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100%
mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101%
mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103%
madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109%
madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108%
madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105%
madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107%
madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108%
madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105%
munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104%
munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104%
munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102%
munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99%
munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103%
mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112%
mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107%
mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103%
mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103%
mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99%
mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103%
madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108%
madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109%
madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107%
madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109%
madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108%
madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114%
For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30
CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases.
It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254%
munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316%
munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398%
munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396%
munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352%
munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287%
mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187%
mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335%
mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506%
mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471%
mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465%
mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433%
madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125%
madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122%
madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138%
madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147%
madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145%
madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262%
munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327%
munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419%
munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413%
munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341%
munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303%
mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228%
mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409%
mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504%
mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423%
mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412%
mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415%
madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123%
madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133%
madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151%
madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151%
madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140%
madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142%
From 5.10 to 6.8
munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma.
mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma.
madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma.
In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the
increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times
greater for munmap and mprotect.
When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked
on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance
benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may
not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database
service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data
from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best to
take this data with a grain of salt.
This patch (of 5):
Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-2-jeffxu@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> [Bug #2]
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-04-15 16:35:20 +00:00
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462 common mseal sys_mseal
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