linux/arch/s390/mm/fault.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 15:07:57 +01:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* S390 version
* Copyright IBM Corp. 1999
* Author(s): Hartmut Penner (hp@de.ibm.com)
* Ulrich Weigand (uweigand@de.ibm.com)
*
* Derived from "arch/i386/mm/fault.c"
* Copyright (C) 1995 Linus Torvalds
*/
#include <linux/kernel_stat.h>
#include <linux/mmu_context.h>
perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events! In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging, monitoring, analysis facility. Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem 'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and less appropriate. All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion) The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well. Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and suggested a rename. User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to keep the size down.) This patch has been generated via the following script: FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config') sed -i \ -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \ -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \ -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \ -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \ -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \ -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \ $FILES for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g') mv $N $M done FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*) sed -i \ -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \ -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \ -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \ -e 's/counter/event/g' \ -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \ $FILES ... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches is the smallest: the end of the merge window. Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch. ( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but in case there's something left where 'counter' would be better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. ) Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 12:02:48 +02:00
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/kdebug.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/console.h>
#include <linux/extable.h>
#include <linux/hardirq.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/kfence.h>
#include <asm/asm-extable.h>
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/diag.h>
#include <asm/gmap.h>
#include <asm/irq.h>
#include <asm/facility.h>
#include <asm/uv.h>
#include "../kernel/entry.h"
#define __FAIL_ADDR_MASK -4096L
/*
* Allocate private vm_fault_reason from top.
* Please make sure it won't collide with vm_fault_reason.
*/
#define VM_FAULT_BADCONTEXT ((__force vm_fault_t)0x80000000)
#define VM_FAULT_BADMAP ((__force vm_fault_t)0x40000000)
#define VM_FAULT_BADACCESS ((__force vm_fault_t)0x20000000)
#define VM_FAULT_SIGNAL ((__force vm_fault_t)0x10000000)
#define VM_FAULT_PFAULT ((__force vm_fault_t)0x8000000)
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 12:08:22 +02:00
enum fault_type {
KERNEL_FAULT,
USER_FAULT,
GMAP_FAULT,
};
static unsigned long store_indication __read_mostly;
static int __init fault_init(void)
{
if (test_facility(75))
store_indication = 0xc00;
return 0;
}
early_initcall(fault_init);
/*
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 12:08:22 +02:00
* Find out which address space caused the exception.
*/
static enum fault_type get_fault_type(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
s390/uaccess: rework uaccess code - fix locking issues The current uaccess code uses a page table walk in some circumstances, e.g. in case of the in atomic futex operations or if running on old hardware which doesn't support the mvcos instruction. However it turned out that the page table walk code does not correctly lock page tables when accessing page table entries. In other words: a different cpu may invalidate a page table entry while the current cpu inspects the pte. This may lead to random data corruption. Adding correct locking however isn't trivial for all uaccess operations. Especially copy_in_user() is problematic since that requires to hold at least two locks, but must be protected against ABBA deadlock when a different cpu also performs a copy_in_user() operation. So the solution is a different approach where we change address spaces: User space runs in primary address mode, or access register mode within vdso code, like it currently already does. The kernel usually also runs in home space mode, however when accessing user space the kernel switches to primary or secondary address mode if the mvcos instruction is not available or if a compare-and-swap (futex) instruction on a user space address is performed. KVM however is special, since that requires the kernel to run in home address space while implicitly accessing user space with the sie instruction. So we end up with: User space: - runs in primary or access register mode - cr1 contains the user asce - cr7 contains the user asce - cr13 contains the kernel asce Kernel space: - runs in home space mode - cr1 contains the user or kernel asce -> the kernel asce is loaded when a uaccess requires primary or secondary address mode - cr7 contains the user or kernel asce, (changed with set_fs()) - cr13 contains the kernel asce In case of uaccess the kernel changes to: - primary space mode in case of a uaccess (copy_to_user) and uses e.g. the mvcp instruction to access user space. However the kernel will stay in home space mode if the mvcos instruction is available - secondary space mode in case of futex atomic operations, so that the instructions come from primary address space and data from secondary space In case of kvm the kernel runs in home space mode, but cr1 gets switched to contain the gmap asce before the sie instruction gets executed. When the sie instruction is finished cr1 will be switched back to contain the user asce. A context switch between two processes will always load the kernel asce for the next process in cr1. So the first exit to user space is a bit more expensive (one extra load control register instruction) than before, however keeps the code rather simple. In sum this means there is no need to perform any error prone page table walks anymore when accessing user space. The patch seems to be rather large, however it mainly removes the the page table walk code and restores the previously deleted "standard" uaccess code, with a couple of changes. The uaccess without mvcos mode can be enforced with the "uaccess_primary" kernel parameter. Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2014-03-21 10:42:25 +01:00
unsigned long trans_exc_code;
trans_exc_code = regs->int_parm_long & 3;
/* Primary address space */
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 12:08:22 +02:00
if (likely(trans_exc_code == 0)) {
s390/mm: remove set_fs / rework address space handling Remove set_fs support from s390. With doing this rework address space handling and simplify it. As a result address spaces are now setup like this: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | %cr13 ASCE ----------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------- user space | user | user | kernel kernel, normal execution | kernel | user | kernel kernel, kvm guest execution | gmap | user | kernel To achieve this the getcpu vdso syscall is removed in order to avoid secondary address mode and a separate vdso address space in for user space. The getcpu vdso syscall will be implemented differently with a subsequent patch. The kernel accesses user space always via secondary address space. This happens in different ways: - with mvcos in home space mode and directly read/write to secondary address space - with mvcs/mvcp in primary space mode and copy from primary space to secondary space or vice versa - with e.g. cs in secondary space mode and access secondary space Switching translation modes happens with sacf before and after instructions which access user space, like before. Lazy handling of control register reloading is removed in the hope to make everything simpler, but at the cost of making kernel entry and exit a bit slower. That is: on kernel entry the primary asce is always changed to contain the kernel asce, and on kernel exit the primary asce is changed again so it contains the user asce. In kernel mode there is only one exception to the primary asce: when kvm guests are executed the primary asce contains the gmap asce (which describes the guest address space). The primary asce is reset to kernel asce whenever kvm guest execution is interrupted, so that this doesn't has to be taken into account for any user space accesses. Reviewed-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
2020-11-16 08:06:40 +01:00
if (user_mode(regs))
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 12:08:22 +02:00
return USER_FAULT;
s390/mm: remove set_fs / rework address space handling Remove set_fs support from s390. With doing this rework address space handling and simplify it. As a result address spaces are now setup like this: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | %cr13 ASCE ----------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------- user space | user | user | kernel kernel, normal execution | kernel | user | kernel kernel, kvm guest execution | gmap | user | kernel To achieve this the getcpu vdso syscall is removed in order to avoid secondary address mode and a separate vdso address space in for user space. The getcpu vdso syscall will be implemented differently with a subsequent patch. The kernel accesses user space always via secondary address space. This happens in different ways: - with mvcos in home space mode and directly read/write to secondary address space - with mvcs/mvcp in primary space mode and copy from primary space to secondary space or vice versa - with e.g. cs in secondary space mode and access secondary space Switching translation modes happens with sacf before and after instructions which access user space, like before. Lazy handling of control register reloading is removed in the hope to make everything simpler, but at the cost of making kernel entry and exit a bit slower. That is: on kernel entry the primary asce is always changed to contain the kernel asce, and on kernel exit the primary asce is changed again so it contains the user asce. In kernel mode there is only one exception to the primary asce: when kvm guests are executed the primary asce contains the gmap asce (which describes the guest address space). The primary asce is reset to kernel asce whenever kvm guest execution is interrupted, so that this doesn't has to be taken into account for any user space accesses. Reviewed-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
2020-11-16 08:06:40 +01:00
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PGSTE))
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 12:08:22 +02:00
return KERNEL_FAULT;
s390/mm: remove set_fs / rework address space handling Remove set_fs support from s390. With doing this rework address space handling and simplify it. As a result address spaces are now setup like this: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | %cr13 ASCE ----------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------- user space | user | user | kernel kernel, normal execution | kernel | user | kernel kernel, kvm guest execution | gmap | user | kernel To achieve this the getcpu vdso syscall is removed in order to avoid secondary address mode and a separate vdso address space in for user space. The getcpu vdso syscall will be implemented differently with a subsequent patch. The kernel accesses user space always via secondary address space. This happens in different ways: - with mvcos in home space mode and directly read/write to secondary address space - with mvcs/mvcp in primary space mode and copy from primary space to secondary space or vice versa - with e.g. cs in secondary space mode and access secondary space Switching translation modes happens with sacf before and after instructions which access user space, like before. Lazy handling of control register reloading is removed in the hope to make everything simpler, but at the cost of making kernel entry and exit a bit slower. That is: on kernel entry the primary asce is always changed to contain the kernel asce, and on kernel exit the primary asce is changed again so it contains the user asce. In kernel mode there is only one exception to the primary asce: when kvm guests are executed the primary asce contains the gmap asce (which describes the guest address space). The primary asce is reset to kernel asce whenever kvm guest execution is interrupted, so that this doesn't has to be taken into account for any user space accesses. Reviewed-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
2020-11-16 08:06:40 +01:00
if (test_pt_regs_flag(regs, PIF_GUEST_FAULT))
return GMAP_FAULT;
return KERNEL_FAULT;
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 12:08:22 +02:00
}
s390/mm: remove set_fs / rework address space handling Remove set_fs support from s390. With doing this rework address space handling and simplify it. As a result address spaces are now setup like this: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | %cr13 ASCE ----------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------- user space | user | user | kernel kernel, normal execution | kernel | user | kernel kernel, kvm guest execution | gmap | user | kernel To achieve this the getcpu vdso syscall is removed in order to avoid secondary address mode and a separate vdso address space in for user space. The getcpu vdso syscall will be implemented differently with a subsequent patch. The kernel accesses user space always via secondary address space. This happens in different ways: - with mvcos in home space mode and directly read/write to secondary address space - with mvcs/mvcp in primary space mode and copy from primary space to secondary space or vice versa - with e.g. cs in secondary space mode and access secondary space Switching translation modes happens with sacf before and after instructions which access user space, like before. Lazy handling of control register reloading is removed in the hope to make everything simpler, but at the cost of making kernel entry and exit a bit slower. That is: on kernel entry the primary asce is always changed to contain the kernel asce, and on kernel exit the primary asce is changed again so it contains the user asce. In kernel mode there is only one exception to the primary asce: when kvm guests are executed the primary asce contains the gmap asce (which describes the guest address space). The primary asce is reset to kernel asce whenever kvm guest execution is interrupted, so that this doesn't has to be taken into account for any user space accesses. Reviewed-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
2020-11-16 08:06:40 +01:00
if (trans_exc_code == 2)
return USER_FAULT;
/* Access register mode, not used in the kernel */
if (trans_exc_code == 1)
return USER_FAULT;
/* Home space -> access via kernel ASCE */
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 12:08:22 +02:00
return KERNEL_FAULT;
}
static unsigned long get_fault_address(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long trans_exc_code = regs->int_parm_long;
return trans_exc_code & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK;
}
static bool fault_is_write(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long trans_exc_code = regs->int_parm_long;
return (trans_exc_code & store_indication) == 0x400;
}
static int bad_address(void *p)
{
unsigned long dummy;
return get_kernel_nofault(dummy, (unsigned long *)p);
}
static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long asce, unsigned long address)
{
unsigned long *table = __va(asce & _ASCE_ORIGIN);
pr_alert("AS:%016lx ", asce);
switch (asce & _ASCE_TYPE_MASK) {
case _ASCE_TYPE_REGION1:
table += (address & _REGION1_INDEX) >> _REGION1_SHIFT;
if (bad_address(table))
goto bad;
pr_cont("R1:%016lx ", *table);
if (*table & _REGION_ENTRY_INVALID)
goto out;
table = __va(*table & _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN);
fallthrough;
case _ASCE_TYPE_REGION2:
table += (address & _REGION2_INDEX) >> _REGION2_SHIFT;
if (bad_address(table))
goto bad;
pr_cont("R2:%016lx ", *table);
if (*table & _REGION_ENTRY_INVALID)
goto out;
table = __va(*table & _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN);
fallthrough;
case _ASCE_TYPE_REGION3:
table += (address & _REGION3_INDEX) >> _REGION3_SHIFT;
if (bad_address(table))
goto bad;
pr_cont("R3:%016lx ", *table);
if (*table & (_REGION_ENTRY_INVALID | _REGION3_ENTRY_LARGE))
goto out;
table = __va(*table & _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN);
fallthrough;
case _ASCE_TYPE_SEGMENT:
table += (address & _SEGMENT_INDEX) >> _SEGMENT_SHIFT;
if (bad_address(table))
goto bad;
pr_cont("S:%016lx ", *table);
if (*table & (_SEGMENT_ENTRY_INVALID | _SEGMENT_ENTRY_LARGE))
goto out;
table = __va(*table & _SEGMENT_ENTRY_ORIGIN);
}
table += (address & _PAGE_INDEX) >> _PAGE_SHIFT;
if (bad_address(table))
goto bad;
pr_cont("P:%016lx ", *table);
out:
pr_cont("\n");
return;
bad:
pr_cont("BAD\n");
}
static void dump_fault_info(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long asce;
pr_alert("Failing address: %016lx TEID: %016lx\n",
regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK, regs->int_parm_long);
pr_alert("Fault in ");
switch (regs->int_parm_long & 3) {
case 3:
pr_cont("home space ");
break;
case 2:
pr_cont("secondary space ");
break;
case 1:
pr_cont("access register ");
break;
case 0:
pr_cont("primary space ");
break;
}
pr_cont("mode while using ");
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 12:08:22 +02:00
switch (get_fault_type(regs)) {
case USER_FAULT:
asce = S390_lowcore.user_asce.val;
pr_cont("user ");
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 12:08:22 +02:00
break;
case GMAP_FAULT:
asce = ((struct gmap *)S390_lowcore.gmap)->asce;
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 12:08:22 +02:00
pr_cont("gmap ");
break;
case KERNEL_FAULT:
asce = S390_lowcore.kernel_asce.val;
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 12:08:22 +02:00
pr_cont("kernel ");
break;
default:
unreachable();
}
pr_cont("ASCE.\n");
dump_pagetable(asce, regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK);
}
int show_unhandled_signals = 1;
void report_user_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long signr, int is_mm_fault)
{
static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(rs, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
if ((task_pid_nr(current) > 1) && !show_unhandled_signals)
return;
if (!unhandled_signal(current, signr))
return;
if (!__ratelimit(&rs))
return;
pr_alert("User process fault: interruption code %04x ilc:%d ",
regs->int_code & 0xffff, regs->int_code >> 17);
print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT "in ", regs->psw.addr);
pr_cont("\n");
if (is_mm_fault)
dump_fault_info(regs);
show_regs(regs);
}
static noinline void do_sigsegv(struct pt_regs *regs, int si_code)
{
report_user_fault(regs, SIGSEGV, 1);
force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, si_code,
(void __user *)(regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK));
}
static noinline void do_no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, vm_fault_t fault)
{
enum fault_type fault_type;
unsigned long address;
bool is_write;
if (fixup_exception(regs))
return;
fault_type = get_fault_type(regs);
if ((fault_type == KERNEL_FAULT) && (fault == VM_FAULT_BADCONTEXT)) {
address = get_fault_address(regs);
is_write = fault_is_write(regs);
if (kfence_handle_page_fault(address, is_write, regs))
return;
}
if (fault_type == KERNEL_FAULT)
pr_alert("Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space\n");
else
pr_alert("Unable to handle kernel paging request in virtual user address space\n");
dump_fault_info(regs);
die(regs, "Oops");
}
static noinline void do_low_address(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/*
* Low-address protection hit in kernel mode means
* NULL pointer write access in kernel mode.
*/
if (regs->psw.mask & PSW_MASK_PSTATE) {
/* Low-address protection hit in user mode: 'cannot happen' */
die(regs, "Low-address protection");
}
do_no_context(regs, VM_FAULT_BADACCESS);
}
static noinline void do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR,
(void __user *)(regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK));
}
static noinline void do_fault_error(struct pt_regs *regs, vm_fault_t fault)
{
int si_code;
switch (fault) {
case VM_FAULT_BADACCESS:
case VM_FAULT_BADMAP:
/* Bad memory access. Check if it is kernel or user space. */
if (user_mode(regs)) {
/* User mode accesses just cause a SIGSEGV */
si_code = (fault == VM_FAULT_BADMAP) ?
SEGV_MAPERR : SEGV_ACCERR;
do_sigsegv(regs, si_code);
break;
}
fallthrough;
case VM_FAULT_BADCONTEXT:
case VM_FAULT_PFAULT:
do_no_context(regs, fault);
break;
case VM_FAULT_SIGNAL:
if (!user_mode(regs))
do_no_context(regs, fault);
break;
default: /* fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR */
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM) {
if (!user_mode(regs))
do_no_context(regs, fault);
else
pagefault_out_of_memory();
vm: add VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV handling support The core VM already knows about VM_FAULT_SIGBUS, but cannot return a "you should SIGSEGV" error, because the SIGSEGV case was generally handled by the caller - usually the architecture fault handler. That results in lots of duplication - all the architecture fault handlers end up doing very similar "look up vma, check permissions, do retries etc" - but it generally works. However, there are cases where the VM actually wants to SIGSEGV, and applications _expect_ SIGSEGV. In particular, when accessing the stack guard page, libsigsegv expects a SIGSEGV. And it usually got one, because the stack growth is handled by that duplicated architecture fault handler. However, when the generic VM layer started propagating the error return from the stack expansion in commit fee7e49d4514 ("mm: propagate error from stack expansion even for guard page"), that now exposed the existing VM_FAULT_SIGBUS result to user space. And user space really expected SIGSEGV, not SIGBUS. To fix that case, we need to add a VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV, and teach all those duplicate architecture fault handlers about it. They all already have the code to handle SIGSEGV, so it's about just tying that new return value to the existing code, but it's all a bit annoying. This is the mindless minimal patch to do this. A more extensive patch would be to try to gather up the mostly shared fault handling logic into one generic helper routine, and long-term we really should do that cleanup. Just from this patch, you can generally see that most architectures just copied (directly or indirectly) the old x86 way of doing things, but in the meantime that original x86 model has been improved to hold the VM semaphore for shorter times etc and to handle VM_FAULT_RETRY and other "newer" things, so it would be a good idea to bring all those improvements to the generic case and teach other architectures about them too. Reported-and-tested-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Tested-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@inai.de> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> # "s390 still compiles and boots" Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-01-29 10:51:32 -08:00
} else if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV) {
/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die */
if (!user_mode(regs))
do_no_context(regs, fault);
vm: add VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV handling support The core VM already knows about VM_FAULT_SIGBUS, but cannot return a "you should SIGSEGV" error, because the SIGSEGV case was generally handled by the caller - usually the architecture fault handler. That results in lots of duplication - all the architecture fault handlers end up doing very similar "look up vma, check permissions, do retries etc" - but it generally works. However, there are cases where the VM actually wants to SIGSEGV, and applications _expect_ SIGSEGV. In particular, when accessing the stack guard page, libsigsegv expects a SIGSEGV. And it usually got one, because the stack growth is handled by that duplicated architecture fault handler. However, when the generic VM layer started propagating the error return from the stack expansion in commit fee7e49d4514 ("mm: propagate error from stack expansion even for guard page"), that now exposed the existing VM_FAULT_SIGBUS result to user space. And user space really expected SIGSEGV, not SIGBUS. To fix that case, we need to add a VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV, and teach all those duplicate architecture fault handlers about it. They all already have the code to handle SIGSEGV, so it's about just tying that new return value to the existing code, but it's all a bit annoying. This is the mindless minimal patch to do this. A more extensive patch would be to try to gather up the mostly shared fault handling logic into one generic helper routine, and long-term we really should do that cleanup. Just from this patch, you can generally see that most architectures just copied (directly or indirectly) the old x86 way of doing things, but in the meantime that original x86 model has been improved to hold the VM semaphore for shorter times etc and to handle VM_FAULT_RETRY and other "newer" things, so it would be a good idea to bring all those improvements to the generic case and teach other architectures about them too. Reported-and-tested-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Tested-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@inai.de> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> # "s390 still compiles and boots" Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-01-29 10:51:32 -08:00
else
do_sigsegv(regs, SEGV_MAPERR);
} else if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS) {
/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die */
if (!user_mode(regs))
do_no_context(regs, fault);
else
do_sigbus(regs);
} else {
BUG();
}
break;
}
}
/*
* This routine handles page faults. It determines the address,
* and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate
* routines.
*
* interruption code (int_code):
* 04 Protection -> Write-Protection (suppression)
* 10 Segment translation -> Not present (nullification)
* 11 Page translation -> Not present (nullification)
* 3b Region third trans. -> Not present (nullification)
*/
mm: convert return type of handle_mm_fault() caller to vm_fault_t Use new return type vm_fault_t for fault handler. For now, this is just documenting that the function returns a VM_FAULT value rather than an errno. Once all instances are converted, vm_fault_t will become a distinct type. Ref-> commit 1c8f422059ae ("mm: change return type to vm_fault_t") In this patch all the caller of handle_mm_fault() are changed to return vm_fault_t type. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180617084810.GA6730@jordon-HP-15-Notebook-PC Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)" <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-08-17 15:44:47 -07:00
static inline vm_fault_t do_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int access)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct task_struct *tsk;
unsigned long address;
struct mm_struct *mm;
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 12:08:22 +02:00
enum fault_type type;
unsigned int flags;
struct gmap *gmap;
mm: convert return type of handle_mm_fault() caller to vm_fault_t Use new return type vm_fault_t for fault handler. For now, this is just documenting that the function returns a VM_FAULT value rather than an errno. Once all instances are converted, vm_fault_t will become a distinct type. Ref-> commit 1c8f422059ae ("mm: change return type to vm_fault_t") In this patch all the caller of handle_mm_fault() are changed to return vm_fault_t type. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180617084810.GA6730@jordon-HP-15-Notebook-PC Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)" <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-08-17 15:44:47 -07:00
vm_fault_t fault;
bool is_write;
tsk = current;
/*
* The instruction that caused the program check has
* been nullified. Don't signal single step via SIGTRAP.
*/
s390: convert to generic entry This patch converts s390 to use the generic entry infrastructure from kernel/entry/*. There are a few special things on s390: - PIF_PER_TRAP is moved to TIF_PER_TRAP as the generic code doesn't know about our PIF flags in exit_to_user_mode_loop(). - The old code had several ways to restart syscalls: a) PIF_SYSCALL_RESTART, which was only set during execve to force a restart after upgrading a process (usually qemu-kvm) to pgste page table extensions. b) PIF_SYSCALL, which is set by do_signal() to indicate that the current syscall should be restarted. This is changed so that do_signal() now also uses PIF_SYSCALL_RESTART. Continuing to use PIF_SYSCALL doesn't work with the generic code, and changing it to PIF_SYSCALL_RESTART makes PIF_SYSCALL and PIF_SYSCALL_RESTART more unique. - On s390 calling sys_sigreturn or sys_rt_sigreturn is implemented by executing a svc instruction on the process stack which causes a fault. While handling that fault the fault code sets PIF_SYSCALL to hand over processing to the syscall code on exit to usermode. The patch introduces PIF_SYSCALL_RET_SET, which is set if ptrace sets a return value for a syscall. The s390x ptrace ABI uses r2 both for the syscall number and return value, so ptrace cannot set the syscall number + return value at the same time. The flag makes handling that a bit easier. do_syscall() will just skip executing the syscall if PIF_SYSCALL_RET_SET is set. CONFIG_DEBUG_ASCE was removd in favour of the generic CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY. CR1/7/13 will be checked both on kernel entry and exit to contain the correct asces. Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2020-11-21 11:14:56 +01:00
clear_thread_flag(TIF_PER_TRAP);
mm, kprobes: generalize and rename notify_page_fault() as kprobe_page_fault() Architectures which support kprobes have very similar boilerplate around calling kprobe_fault_handler(). Use a helper function in kprobes.h to unify them, based on the x86 code. This changes the behaviour for other architectures when preemption is enabled. Previously, they would have disabled preemption while calling the kprobe handler. However, preemption would be disabled if this fault was due to a kprobe, so we know the fault was not due to a kprobe handler and can simply return failure. This behaviour was introduced in commit a980c0ef9f6d ("x86/kprobes: Refactor kprobes_fault() like kprobe_exceptions_notify()") [anshuman.khandual@arm.com: export kprobe_fault_handler()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561133358-8876-1-git-send-email-anshuman.khandual@arm.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560420444-25737-1-git-send-email-anshuman.khandual@arm.com Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-16 16:28:00 -07:00
if (kprobe_page_fault(regs, 14))
return 0;
mm = tsk->mm;
address = get_fault_address(regs);
is_write = fault_is_write(regs);
fault = VM_FAULT_BADCONTEXT;
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 12:08:22 +02:00
type = get_fault_type(regs);
switch (type) {
case KERNEL_FAULT:
goto out;
case USER_FAULT:
case GMAP_FAULT:
if (faulthandler_disabled() || !mm)
goto out;
break;
}
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address);
mm: introduce FAULT_FLAG_DEFAULT Although there're tons of arch-specific page fault handlers, most of them are still sharing the same initial value of the page fault flags. Say, merely all of the page fault handlers would allow the fault to be retried, and they also allow the fault to respond to SIGKILL. Let's define a default value for the fault flags to replace those initial page fault flags that were copied over. With this, it'll be far easier to introduce new fault flag that can be used by all the architectures instead of touching all the archs. Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Bobby Powers <bobbypowers@gmail.com> Cc: Denis Plotnikov <dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Martin Cracauer <cracauer@cons.org> Cc: Marty McFadden <mcfadden8@llnl.gov> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Maya Gokhale <gokhale2@llnl.gov> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200220160238.9694-1-peterx@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-01 21:08:37 -07:00
flags = FAULT_FLAG_DEFAULT;
if (user_mode(regs))
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER;
if (is_write)
access = VM_WRITE;
if (access == VM_WRITE)
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
if (!(flags & FAULT_FLAG_USER))
goto lock_mmap;
vma = lock_vma_under_rcu(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto lock_mmap;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & access)) {
vma_end_read(vma);
goto lock_mmap;
}
fault = handle_mm_fault(vma, address, flags | FAULT_FLAG_VMA_LOCK, regs);
mm: drop per-VMA lock when returning VM_FAULT_RETRY or VM_FAULT_COMPLETED handle_mm_fault returning VM_FAULT_RETRY or VM_FAULT_COMPLETED means mmap_lock has been released. However with per-VMA locks behavior is different and the caller should still release it. To make the rules consistent for the caller, drop the per-VMA lock when returning VM_FAULT_RETRY or VM_FAULT_COMPLETED. Currently the only path returning VM_FAULT_RETRY under per-VMA locks is do_swap_page and no path returns VM_FAULT_COMPLETED for now. [willy@infradead.org: fix riscv] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAJuCfpE6GWEx1rPBmNpUfoD5o-gNFz9-UFywzCE2PbEGBiVz7g@mail.gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230630211957.1341547-4-surenb@google.com Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Tested-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com> Cc: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <michel@lespinasse.org> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@google.com> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Cc: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@bytedance.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-06-30 14:19:54 -07:00
if (!(fault & (VM_FAULT_RETRY | VM_FAULT_COMPLETED)))
vma_end_read(vma);
if (!(fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY)) {
count_vm_vma_lock_event(VMA_LOCK_SUCCESS);
if (likely(!(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR)))
fault = 0;
goto out;
}
count_vm_vma_lock_event(VMA_LOCK_RETRY);
/* Quick path to respond to signals */
if (fault_signal_pending(fault, regs)) {
fault = VM_FAULT_SIGNAL;
goto out;
}
lock_mmap:
mmap locking API: use coccinelle to convert mmap_sem rwsem call sites This change converts the existing mmap_sem rwsem calls to use the new mmap locking API instead. The change is generated using coccinelle with the following rule: // spatch --sp-file mmap_lock_api.cocci --in-place --include-headers --dir . @@ expression mm; @@ ( -init_rwsem +mmap_init_lock | -down_write +mmap_write_lock | -down_write_killable +mmap_write_lock_killable | -down_write_trylock +mmap_write_trylock | -up_write +mmap_write_unlock | -downgrade_write +mmap_write_downgrade | -down_read +mmap_read_lock | -down_read_killable +mmap_read_lock_killable | -down_read_trylock +mmap_read_trylock | -up_read +mmap_read_unlock ) -(&mm->mmap_sem) +(mm) Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Liam Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-5-walken@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-08 21:33:25 -07:00
mmap_read_lock(mm);
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 12:08:22 +02:00
gmap = NULL;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PGSTE) && type == GMAP_FAULT) {
gmap = (struct gmap *)S390_lowcore.gmap;
current->thread.gmap_addr = address;
s390/mm: add shadow gmap support For a nested KVM guest the outer KVM host needs to create shadow page tables for the nested guest. This patch adds the basic support to the guest address space (gmap) code. For each guest address space the inner KVM host creates, the first outer KVM host needs to create shadow page tables. The address space is identified by the ASCE loaded into the control register 1 at the time the inner SIE instruction for the second nested KVM guest is executed. The outer KVM host creates the shadow tables starting with the table identified by the ASCE on a on-demand basis. The outer KVM host will get repeated faults for all the shadow tables needed to run the second KVM guest. While a shadow page table for the second KVM guest is active the access to the origin region, segment and page tables needs to be restricted for the first KVM guest. For region and segment and page tables the first KVM guest may read the memory, but write attempt has to lead to an unshadow. This is done using the page invalid and read-only bits in the page table of the first KVM guest. If the first guest re-accesses one of the origin pages of a shadow, it gets a fault and the affected parts of the shadow page table hierarchy needs to be removed again. PGSTE tables don't have to be shadowed, as all interpretation assist can't deal with the invalid bits in the shadow pte being set differently than the original ones provided by the first KVM guest. Many bug fixes and improvements by David Hildenbrand. Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
2016-03-08 12:12:18 +01:00
current->thread.gmap_write_flag = !!(flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE);
current->thread.gmap_int_code = regs->int_code & 0xffff;
address = __gmap_translate(gmap, address);
if (address == -EFAULT) {
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
goto out_up;
}
if (gmap->pfault_enabled)
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT;
}
retry:
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto out_up;
if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > address)) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto out_up;
vma = expand_stack(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto out;
}
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & access)))
goto out_up;
fault = handle_mm_fault(vma, address, flags, regs);
mm: introduce fault_signal_pending() For most architectures, we've got a quick path to detect fatal signal after a handle_mm_fault(). Introduce a helper for that quick path. It cleans the current codes a bit so we don't need to duplicate the same check across archs. More importantly, this will be an unified place that we handle the signal immediately right after an interrupted page fault, so it'll be much easier for us if we want to change the behavior of handling signals later on for all the archs. Note that currently only part of the archs are using this new helper, because some archs have their own way to handle signals. In the follow up patches, we'll try to apply this helper to all the rest of archs. Another note is that the "regs" parameter in the new helper is not used yet. It'll be used very soon. Now we kept it in this patch only to avoid touching all the archs again in the follow up patches. [peterx@redhat.com: fix sparse warnings] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200311145921.GD479302@xz-x1 Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Bobby Powers <bobbypowers@gmail.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Denis Plotnikov <dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Martin Cracauer <cracauer@cons.org> Cc: Marty McFadden <mcfadden8@llnl.gov> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Maya Gokhale <gokhale2@llnl.gov> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200220155353.8676-4-peterx@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-01 21:08:06 -07:00
if (fault_signal_pending(fault, regs)) {
fault = VM_FAULT_SIGNAL;
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT)
goto out_up;
goto out;
}
mm: avoid unnecessary page fault retires on shared memory types I observed that for each of the shared file-backed page faults, we're very likely to retry one more time for the 1st write fault upon no page. It's because we'll need to release the mmap lock for dirty rate limit purpose with balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited() (in fault_dirty_shared_page()). Then after that throttling we return VM_FAULT_RETRY. We did that probably because VM_FAULT_RETRY is the only way we can return to the fault handler at that time telling it we've released the mmap lock. However that's not ideal because it's very likely the fault does not need to be retried at all since the pgtable was well installed before the throttling, so the next continuous fault (including taking mmap read lock, walk the pgtable, etc.) could be in most cases unnecessary. It's not only slowing down page faults for shared file-backed, but also add more mmap lock contention which is in most cases not needed at all. To observe this, one could try to write to some shmem page and look at "pgfault" value in /proc/vmstat, then we should expect 2 counts for each shmem write simply because we retried, and vm event "pgfault" will capture that. To make it more efficient, add a new VM_FAULT_COMPLETED return code just to show that we've completed the whole fault and released the lock. It's also a hint that we should very possibly not need another fault immediately on this page because we've just completed it. This patch provides a ~12% perf boost on my aarch64 test VM with a simple program sequentially dirtying 400MB shmem file being mmap()ed and these are the time it needs: Before: 650.980 ms (+-1.94%) After: 569.396 ms (+-1.38%) I believe it could help more than that. We need some special care on GUP and the s390 pgfault handler (for gmap code before returning from pgfault), the rest changes in the page fault handlers should be relatively straightforward. Another thing to mention is that mm_account_fault() does take this new fault as a generic fault to be accounted, unlike VM_FAULT_RETRY. I explicitly didn't touch hmm_vma_fault() and break_ksm() because they do not handle VM_FAULT_RETRY even with existing code, so I'm literally keeping them as-is. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220530183450.42886-1-peterx@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org> Acked-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> [arm part] Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@quicinc.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.osdn.me> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-05-30 14:34:50 -04:00
/* The fault is fully completed (including releasing mmap lock) */
if (fault & VM_FAULT_COMPLETED) {
if (gmap) {
mmap_read_lock(mm);
goto out_gmap;
}
fault = 0;
goto out;
}
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR))
goto out_up;
if (fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PGSTE) && gmap &&
(flags & FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT)) {
/*
* FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT has been set,
* mmap_lock has not been released
*/
current->thread.gmap_pfault = 1;
fault = VM_FAULT_PFAULT;
goto out_up;
}
flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT;
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_TRIED;
mmap_read_lock(mm);
goto retry;
}
mm: avoid unnecessary page fault retires on shared memory types I observed that for each of the shared file-backed page faults, we're very likely to retry one more time for the 1st write fault upon no page. It's because we'll need to release the mmap lock for dirty rate limit purpose with balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited() (in fault_dirty_shared_page()). Then after that throttling we return VM_FAULT_RETRY. We did that probably because VM_FAULT_RETRY is the only way we can return to the fault handler at that time telling it we've released the mmap lock. However that's not ideal because it's very likely the fault does not need to be retried at all since the pgtable was well installed before the throttling, so the next continuous fault (including taking mmap read lock, walk the pgtable, etc.) could be in most cases unnecessary. It's not only slowing down page faults for shared file-backed, but also add more mmap lock contention which is in most cases not needed at all. To observe this, one could try to write to some shmem page and look at "pgfault" value in /proc/vmstat, then we should expect 2 counts for each shmem write simply because we retried, and vm event "pgfault" will capture that. To make it more efficient, add a new VM_FAULT_COMPLETED return code just to show that we've completed the whole fault and released the lock. It's also a hint that we should very possibly not need another fault immediately on this page because we've just completed it. This patch provides a ~12% perf boost on my aarch64 test VM with a simple program sequentially dirtying 400MB shmem file being mmap()ed and these are the time it needs: Before: 650.980 ms (+-1.94%) After: 569.396 ms (+-1.38%) I believe it could help more than that. We need some special care on GUP and the s390 pgfault handler (for gmap code before returning from pgfault), the rest changes in the page fault handlers should be relatively straightforward. Another thing to mention is that mm_account_fault() does take this new fault as a generic fault to be accounted, unlike VM_FAULT_RETRY. I explicitly didn't touch hmm_vma_fault() and break_ksm() because they do not handle VM_FAULT_RETRY even with existing code, so I'm literally keeping them as-is. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220530183450.42886-1-peterx@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org> Acked-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> [arm part] Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Brian Cain <bcain@quicinc.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.osdn.me> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-05-30 14:34:50 -04:00
out_gmap:
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 12:08:22 +02:00
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PGSTE) && gmap) {
address = __gmap_link(gmap, current->thread.gmap_addr,
address);
if (address == -EFAULT) {
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
goto out_up;
}
if (address == -ENOMEM) {
fault = VM_FAULT_OOM;
goto out_up;
}
}
fault = 0;
out_up:
mmap locking API: use coccinelle to convert mmap_sem rwsem call sites This change converts the existing mmap_sem rwsem calls to use the new mmap locking API instead. The change is generated using coccinelle with the following rule: // spatch --sp-file mmap_lock_api.cocci --in-place --include-headers --dir . @@ expression mm; @@ ( -init_rwsem +mmap_init_lock | -down_write +mmap_write_lock | -down_write_killable +mmap_write_lock_killable | -down_write_trylock +mmap_write_trylock | -up_write +mmap_write_unlock | -downgrade_write +mmap_write_downgrade | -down_read +mmap_read_lock | -down_read_killable +mmap_read_lock_killable | -down_read_trylock +mmap_read_trylock | -up_read +mmap_read_unlock ) -(&mm->mmap_sem) +(mm) Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Liam Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-5-walken@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-08 21:33:25 -07:00
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
out:
return fault;
}
void do_protection_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long trans_exc_code;
mm: convert return type of handle_mm_fault() caller to vm_fault_t Use new return type vm_fault_t for fault handler. For now, this is just documenting that the function returns a VM_FAULT value rather than an errno. Once all instances are converted, vm_fault_t will become a distinct type. Ref-> commit 1c8f422059ae ("mm: change return type to vm_fault_t") In this patch all the caller of handle_mm_fault() are changed to return vm_fault_t type. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180617084810.GA6730@jordon-HP-15-Notebook-PC Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)" <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-08-17 15:44:47 -07:00
vm_fault_t fault;
int access;
trans_exc_code = regs->int_parm_long;
/*
* Protection exceptions are suppressing, decrement psw address.
* The exception to this rule are aborted transactions, for these
* the PSW already points to the correct location.
*/
if (!(regs->int_code & 0x200))
regs->psw.addr = __rewind_psw(regs->psw, regs->int_code >> 16);
/*
* Check for low-address protection. This needs to be treated
* as a special case because the translation exception code
* field is not guaranteed to contain valid data in this case.
*/
if (unlikely(!(trans_exc_code & 4))) {
do_low_address(regs);
return;
}
if (unlikely(MACHINE_HAS_NX && (trans_exc_code & 0x80))) {
regs->int_parm_long = (trans_exc_code & ~PAGE_MASK) |
(regs->psw.addr & PAGE_MASK);
access = VM_EXEC;
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
} else {
access = VM_WRITE;
fault = do_exception(regs, access);
}
if (unlikely(fault))
do_fault_error(regs, fault);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_protection_exception);
void do_dat_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
mm: convert return type of handle_mm_fault() caller to vm_fault_t Use new return type vm_fault_t for fault handler. For now, this is just documenting that the function returns a VM_FAULT value rather than an errno. Once all instances are converted, vm_fault_t will become a distinct type. Ref-> commit 1c8f422059ae ("mm: change return type to vm_fault_t") In this patch all the caller of handle_mm_fault() are changed to return vm_fault_t type. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180617084810.GA6730@jordon-HP-15-Notebook-PC Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)" <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-08-17 15:44:47 -07:00
vm_fault_t fault;
int access;
access = VM_ACCESS_FLAGS;
fault = do_exception(regs, access);
if (unlikely(fault))
do_fault_error(regs, fault);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_dat_exception);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PGSTE)
void do_secure_storage_access(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long addr = regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct page *page;
struct gmap *gmap;
int rc;
/*
* Bit 61 indicates if the address is valid, if it is not the
* kernel should be stopped or SIGSEGV should be sent to the
* process. Bit 61 is not reliable without the misc UV feature,
* therefore this needs to be checked too.
*/
if (uv_has_feature(BIT_UV_FEAT_MISC) &&
!test_bit_inv(61, &regs->int_parm_long)) {
/*
* When this happens, userspace did something that it
* was not supposed to do, e.g. branching into secure
* memory. Trigger a segmentation fault.
*/
if (user_mode(regs)) {
send_sig(SIGSEGV, current, 0);
return;
}
/*
* The kernel should never run into this case and
* there is no way out of this situation.
*/
panic("Unexpected PGM 0x3d with TEID bit 61=0");
}
switch (get_fault_type(regs)) {
case GMAP_FAULT:
mm = current->mm;
gmap = (struct gmap *)S390_lowcore.gmap;
mmap_read_lock(mm);
addr = __gmap_translate(gmap, addr);
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) {
do_fault_error(regs, VM_FAULT_BADMAP);
break;
}
fallthrough;
case USER_FAULT:
mm = current->mm;
mmap locking API: use coccinelle to convert mmap_sem rwsem call sites This change converts the existing mmap_sem rwsem calls to use the new mmap locking API instead. The change is generated using coccinelle with the following rule: // spatch --sp-file mmap_lock_api.cocci --in-place --include-headers --dir . @@ expression mm; @@ ( -init_rwsem +mmap_init_lock | -down_write +mmap_write_lock | -down_write_killable +mmap_write_lock_killable | -down_write_trylock +mmap_write_trylock | -up_write +mmap_write_unlock | -downgrade_write +mmap_write_downgrade | -down_read +mmap_read_lock | -down_read_killable +mmap_read_lock_killable | -down_read_trylock +mmap_read_trylock | -up_read +mmap_read_unlock ) -(&mm->mmap_sem) +(mm) Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Liam Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-5-walken@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-08 21:33:25 -07:00
mmap_read_lock(mm);
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (!vma) {
mmap locking API: use coccinelle to convert mmap_sem rwsem call sites This change converts the existing mmap_sem rwsem calls to use the new mmap locking API instead. The change is generated using coccinelle with the following rule: // spatch --sp-file mmap_lock_api.cocci --in-place --include-headers --dir . @@ expression mm; @@ ( -init_rwsem +mmap_init_lock | -down_write +mmap_write_lock | -down_write_killable +mmap_write_lock_killable | -down_write_trylock +mmap_write_trylock | -up_write +mmap_write_unlock | -downgrade_write +mmap_write_downgrade | -down_read +mmap_read_lock | -down_read_killable +mmap_read_lock_killable | -down_read_trylock +mmap_read_trylock | -up_read +mmap_read_unlock ) -(&mm->mmap_sem) +(mm) Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Liam Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-5-walken@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-08 21:33:25 -07:00
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
do_fault_error(regs, VM_FAULT_BADMAP);
break;
}
page = follow_page(vma, addr, FOLL_WRITE | FOLL_GET);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(page)) {
mmap locking API: use coccinelle to convert mmap_sem rwsem call sites This change converts the existing mmap_sem rwsem calls to use the new mmap locking API instead. The change is generated using coccinelle with the following rule: // spatch --sp-file mmap_lock_api.cocci --in-place --include-headers --dir . @@ expression mm; @@ ( -init_rwsem +mmap_init_lock | -down_write +mmap_write_lock | -down_write_killable +mmap_write_lock_killable | -down_write_trylock +mmap_write_trylock | -up_write +mmap_write_unlock | -downgrade_write +mmap_write_downgrade | -down_read +mmap_read_lock | -down_read_killable +mmap_read_lock_killable | -down_read_trylock +mmap_read_trylock | -up_read +mmap_read_unlock ) -(&mm->mmap_sem) +(mm) Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Liam Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-5-walken@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-08 21:33:25 -07:00
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
break;
}
if (arch_make_page_accessible(page))
send_sig(SIGSEGV, current, 0);
put_page(page);
mmap locking API: use coccinelle to convert mmap_sem rwsem call sites This change converts the existing mmap_sem rwsem calls to use the new mmap locking API instead. The change is generated using coccinelle with the following rule: // spatch --sp-file mmap_lock_api.cocci --in-place --include-headers --dir . @@ expression mm; @@ ( -init_rwsem +mmap_init_lock | -down_write +mmap_write_lock | -down_write_killable +mmap_write_lock_killable | -down_write_trylock +mmap_write_trylock | -up_write +mmap_write_unlock | -downgrade_write +mmap_write_downgrade | -down_read +mmap_read_lock | -down_read_killable +mmap_read_lock_killable | -down_read_trylock +mmap_read_trylock | -up_read +mmap_read_unlock ) -(&mm->mmap_sem) +(mm) Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Liam Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-5-walken@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-08 21:33:25 -07:00
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
break;
case KERNEL_FAULT:
page = phys_to_page(addr);
Revert "mm/gup: remove try_get_page(), call try_get_compound_head() directly" This reverts commit 9857a17f206ff374aea78bccfb687f145368be2e. That commit was completely broken, and I should have caught on to it earlier. But happily, the kernel test robot noticed the breakage fairly quickly. The breakage is because "try_get_page()" is about avoiding the page reference count overflow case, but is otherwise the exact same as a plain "get_page()". In contrast, "try_get_compound_head()" is an entirely different beast, and uses __page_cache_add_speculative() because it's not just about the page reference count, but also about possibly racing with the underlying page going away. So all the commentary about how "try_get_page() has fallen a little behind in terms of maintenance, try_get_compound_head() handles speculative page references more thoroughly" was just completely wrong: yes, try_get_compound_head() handles speculative page references, but the point is that try_get_page() does not, and must not. So there's no lack of maintainance - there are fundamentally different semantics. A speculative page reference would be entirely wrong in "get_page()", and it's entirely wrong in "try_get_page()". It's not about speculation, it's purely about "uhhuh, you can't get this page because you've tried to increment the reference count too much already". The reason the kernel test robot noticed this bug was that it hit the VM_BUG_ON() in __page_cache_add_speculative(), which is all about verifying that the context of any speculative page access is correct. But since that isn't what try_get_page() is all about, the VM_BUG_ON() tests things that are not correct to test for try_get_page(). Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-07 11:03:45 -07:00
if (unlikely(!try_get_page(page)))
break;
rc = arch_make_page_accessible(page);
put_page(page);
if (rc)
BUG();
break;
default:
do_fault_error(regs, VM_FAULT_BADMAP);
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
}
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_secure_storage_access);
void do_non_secure_storage_access(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long gaddr = regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK;
struct gmap *gmap = (struct gmap *)S390_lowcore.gmap;
if (get_fault_type(regs) != GMAP_FAULT) {
do_fault_error(regs, VM_FAULT_BADMAP);
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return;
}
if (gmap_convert_to_secure(gmap, gaddr) == -EINVAL)
send_sig(SIGSEGV, current, 0);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_non_secure_storage_access);
void do_secure_storage_violation(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage violations for protected guests A secure storage violation is triggered when a protected guest tries to access secure memory that has been mapped erroneously, or that belongs to a different protected guest or to the ultravisor. With upcoming patches, protected guests will be able to trigger secure storage violations in normal operation. This happens for example if a protected guest is rebooted with deferred destroy enabled and the new guest is also protected. When the new protected guest touches pages that have not yet been destroyed, and thus are accounted to the previous protected guest, a secure storage violation is raised. This patch adds handling of secure storage violations for protected guests. This exception is handled by first trying to destroy the page, because it is expected to belong to a defunct protected guest where a destroy should be possible. Note that a secure page can only be destroyed if its protected VM does not have any CPUs, which only happens when the protected VM is being terminated. If that fails, a normal export of the page is attempted. This means that pages that trigger the exception will be made non-secure (in one way or another) before attempting to use them again for a different secure guest. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628135619.32410-3-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220628135619.32410-3-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
2022-06-28 15:56:03 +02:00
unsigned long gaddr = regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK;
struct gmap *gmap = (struct gmap *)S390_lowcore.gmap;
/*
* If the VM has been rebooted, its address space might still contain
* secure pages from the previous boot.
* Clear the page so it can be reused.
*/
if (!gmap_destroy_page(gmap, gaddr))
return;
/*
* Either KVM messed up the secure guest mapping or the same
* page is mapped into multiple secure guests.
*
* This exception is only triggered when a guest 2 is running
* and can therefore never occur in kernel context.
*/
pr_warn_ratelimited("Secure storage violation in task: %s, pid %d\n",
current->comm, current->pid);
send_sig(SIGSEGV, current, 0);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PGSTE */