linux/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 15:07:57 +01:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* x86_64 specific EFI support functions
* Based on Extensible Firmware Interface Specification version 1.0
*
* Copyright (C) 2005-2008 Intel Co.
* Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
* Bibo Mao <bibo.mao@intel.com>
* Chandramouli Narayanan <mouli@linux.intel.com>
* Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
*
* Code to convert EFI to E820 map has been implemented in elilo bootloader
* based on a EFI patch by Edgar Hucek. Based on the E820 map, the page table
* is setup appropriately for EFI runtime code.
* - mouli 06/14/2007.
*
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "efi: " fmt
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
mm: remove include/linux/bootmem.h Move remaining definitions and declarations from include/linux/bootmem.h into include/linux/memblock.h and remove the redundant header. The includes were replaced with the semantic patch below and then semi-automated removal of duplicated '#include <linux/memblock.h> @@ @@ - #include <linux/bootmem.h> + #include <linux/memblock.h> [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: dma-direct: fix up for the removal of linux/bootmem.h] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002185342.133d1680@canb.auug.org.au [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: powerpc: fix up for removal of linux/bootmem.h] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181005161406.73ef8727@canb.auug.org.au [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: x86/kaslr, ACPI/NUMA: fix for linux/bootmem.h removal] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181008190341.5e396491@canb.auug.org.au Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536927045-23536-30-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-30 15:09:49 -07:00
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/ioport.h>
#include <linux/mc146818rtc.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/ucs2_string.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/proto.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
#include <asm/realmode.h>
#include <asm/time.h>
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <asm/sev-es.h>
/*
* We allocate runtime services regions top-down, starting from -4G, i.e.
* 0xffff_ffff_0000_0000 and limit EFI VA mapping space to 64G.
*/
static u64 efi_va = EFI_VA_START;
x86/efi: Hoist page table switching code into efi_call_virt() This change is a prerequisite for pending patches that switch to a dedicated EFI page table, instead of using 'trampoline_pgd' which shares PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. The pending patches make it impossible to dereference the runtime service function pointer without first switching %cr3. It's true that we now have duplicated switching code in efi_call_virt() and efi_call_phys_{prolog,epilog}() but we are sacrificing code duplication for a little more clarity and the ease of writing the page table switching code in C instead of asm. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-5-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:33 +00:00
struct efi_scratch efi_scratch;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efi_mm);
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
/*
* We need our own copy of the higher levels of the page tables
* because we want to avoid inserting EFI region mappings (EFI_VA_END
* to EFI_VA_START) into the standard kernel page tables. Everything
* else can be shared, see efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings().
*
* We don't want the pgd on the pgd_list and cannot use pgd_alloc() for the
* allocation.
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
*/
int __init efi_alloc_page_tables(void)
{
pgd_t *pgd, *efi_pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
pud_t *pud;
gfp_t gfp_mask;
gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO;
efi_pgd = (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(gfp_mask, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER);
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
if (!efi_pgd)
goto fail;
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
pgd = efi_pgd + pgd_index(EFI_VA_END);
p4d = p4d_alloc(&init_mm, pgd, EFI_VA_END);
if (!p4d)
goto free_pgd;
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
pud = pud_alloc(&init_mm, p4d, EFI_VA_END);
if (!pud)
goto free_p4d;
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
efi_mm.pgd = efi_pgd;
mm_init_cpumask(&efi_mm);
init_new_context(NULL, &efi_mm);
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
return 0;
free_p4d:
if (pgtable_l5_enabled())
free_page((unsigned long)pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd));
free_pgd:
free_pages((unsigned long)efi_pgd, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER);
fail:
return -ENOMEM;
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
}
/*
* Add low kernel mappings for passing arguments to EFI functions.
*/
void efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(void)
{
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
unsigned num_entries;
pgd_t *pgd_k, *pgd_efi;
p4d_t *p4d_k, *p4d_efi;
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
pud_t *pud_k, *pud_efi;
pgd_t *efi_pgd = efi_mm.pgd;
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
/*
* We can share all PGD entries apart from the one entry that
* covers the EFI runtime mapping space.
*
* Make sure the EFI runtime region mappings are guaranteed to
* only span a single PGD entry and that the entry also maps
* other important kernel regions.
*/
MAYBE_BUILD_BUG_ON(pgd_index(EFI_VA_END) != pgd_index(MODULES_END));
MAYBE_BUILD_BUG_ON((EFI_VA_START & PGDIR_MASK) !=
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
(EFI_VA_END & PGDIR_MASK));
pgd_efi = efi_pgd + pgd_index(PAGE_OFFSET);
pgd_k = pgd_offset_k(PAGE_OFFSET);
num_entries = pgd_index(EFI_VA_END) - pgd_index(PAGE_OFFSET);
memcpy(pgd_efi, pgd_k, sizeof(pgd_t) * num_entries);
/*
* As with PGDs, we share all P4D entries apart from the one entry
* that covers the EFI runtime mapping space.
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(p4d_index(EFI_VA_END) != p4d_index(MODULES_END));
BUILD_BUG_ON((EFI_VA_START & P4D_MASK) != (EFI_VA_END & P4D_MASK));
pgd_efi = efi_pgd + pgd_index(EFI_VA_END);
pgd_k = pgd_offset_k(EFI_VA_END);
p4d_efi = p4d_offset(pgd_efi, 0);
p4d_k = p4d_offset(pgd_k, 0);
num_entries = p4d_index(EFI_VA_END);
memcpy(p4d_efi, p4d_k, sizeof(p4d_t) * num_entries);
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
/*
* We share all the PUD entries apart from those that map the
* EFI regions. Copy around them.
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON((EFI_VA_START & ~PUD_MASK) != 0);
BUILD_BUG_ON((EFI_VA_END & ~PUD_MASK) != 0);
p4d_efi = p4d_offset(pgd_efi, EFI_VA_END);
p4d_k = p4d_offset(pgd_k, EFI_VA_END);
pud_efi = pud_offset(p4d_efi, 0);
pud_k = pud_offset(p4d_k, 0);
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
num_entries = pud_index(EFI_VA_END);
memcpy(pud_efi, pud_k, sizeof(pud_t) * num_entries);
pud_efi = pud_offset(p4d_efi, EFI_VA_START);
pud_k = pud_offset(p4d_k, EFI_VA_START);
x86/efi: Build our own page table structures With commit e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings") all users booting on 64-bit UEFI machines see the following warning, ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:225 note_page+0x5dc/0x780() x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address ffff88000005f000/0xffff88000005f000 ... x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, 165660 W+X pages found. ... This is caused by mapping EFI regions with RWX permissions. There isn't much we can do to restrict the permissions for these regions due to the way the firmware toolchains mix code and data, but we can at least isolate these mappings so that they do not appear in the regular kernel page tables. In commit d2f7cbe7b26a ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping") we started using 'trampoline_pgd' to map the EFI regions because there was an existing identity mapping there which we use during the SetVirtualAddressMap() call and for broken firmware that accesses those addresses. But 'trampoline_pgd' shares some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir' and does not provide the isolation we require. Notably the virtual address for __START_KERNEL_map and MODULES_START are mapped by the same PGD entry so we need to be more careful when copying changes over in efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(). This patch doesn't go the full mile, we still want to share some PGD entries with 'swapper_pg_dir'. Having completely separate page tables brings its own issues such as synchronising new mappings after memory hotplug and module loading. Sharing also keeps memory usage down. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448658575-17029-6-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-11-27 21:09:34 +00:00
num_entries = PTRS_PER_PUD - pud_index(EFI_VA_START);
memcpy(pud_efi, pud_k, sizeof(pud_t) * num_entries);
}
/*
* Wrapper for slow_virt_to_phys() that handles NULL addresses.
*/
static inline phys_addr_t
virt_to_phys_or_null_size(void *va, unsigned long size)
{
efi/x86: Handle by-ref arguments covering multiple pages in mixed mode The mixed mode runtime wrappers are fragile when it comes to how the memory referred to by its pointer arguments are laid out in memory, due to the fact that it translates these addresses to physical addresses that the runtime services can dereference when running in 1:1 mode. Since vmalloc'ed pages (including the vmap'ed stack) are not contiguous in the physical address space, this scheme only works if the referenced memory objects do not cross page boundaries. Currently, the mixed mode runtime service wrappers require that all by-ref arguments that live in the vmalloc space have a size that is a power of 2, and are aligned to that same value. While this is a sensible way to construct an object that is guaranteed not to cross a page boundary, it is overly strict when it comes to checking whether a given object violates this requirement, as we can simply take the physical address of the first and the last byte, and verify that they point into the same physical page. When this check fails, we emit a WARN(), but then simply proceed with the call, which could cause data corruption if the next physical page belongs to a mapping that is entirely unrelated. Given that with vmap'ed stacks, this condition is much more likely to trigger, let's relax the condition a bit, but fail the runtime service call if it does trigger. Fixes: f6697df36bdf0bf7 ("x86/efi: Prevent mixed mode boot corruption with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221084849.26878-4-ardb@kernel.org
2020-02-21 09:48:48 +01:00
phys_addr_t pa;
if (!va)
return 0;
if (virt_addr_valid(va))
return virt_to_phys(va);
efi/x86: Handle by-ref arguments covering multiple pages in mixed mode The mixed mode runtime wrappers are fragile when it comes to how the memory referred to by its pointer arguments are laid out in memory, due to the fact that it translates these addresses to physical addresses that the runtime services can dereference when running in 1:1 mode. Since vmalloc'ed pages (including the vmap'ed stack) are not contiguous in the physical address space, this scheme only works if the referenced memory objects do not cross page boundaries. Currently, the mixed mode runtime service wrappers require that all by-ref arguments that live in the vmalloc space have a size that is a power of 2, and are aligned to that same value. While this is a sensible way to construct an object that is guaranteed not to cross a page boundary, it is overly strict when it comes to checking whether a given object violates this requirement, as we can simply take the physical address of the first and the last byte, and verify that they point into the same physical page. When this check fails, we emit a WARN(), but then simply proceed with the call, which could cause data corruption if the next physical page belongs to a mapping that is entirely unrelated. Given that with vmap'ed stacks, this condition is much more likely to trigger, let's relax the condition a bit, but fail the runtime service call if it does trigger. Fixes: f6697df36bdf0bf7 ("x86/efi: Prevent mixed mode boot corruption with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221084849.26878-4-ardb@kernel.org
2020-02-21 09:48:48 +01:00
pa = slow_virt_to_phys(va);
efi/x86: Handle by-ref arguments covering multiple pages in mixed mode The mixed mode runtime wrappers are fragile when it comes to how the memory referred to by its pointer arguments are laid out in memory, due to the fact that it translates these addresses to physical addresses that the runtime services can dereference when running in 1:1 mode. Since vmalloc'ed pages (including the vmap'ed stack) are not contiguous in the physical address space, this scheme only works if the referenced memory objects do not cross page boundaries. Currently, the mixed mode runtime service wrappers require that all by-ref arguments that live in the vmalloc space have a size that is a power of 2, and are aligned to that same value. While this is a sensible way to construct an object that is guaranteed not to cross a page boundary, it is overly strict when it comes to checking whether a given object violates this requirement, as we can simply take the physical address of the first and the last byte, and verify that they point into the same physical page. When this check fails, we emit a WARN(), but then simply proceed with the call, which could cause data corruption if the next physical page belongs to a mapping that is entirely unrelated. Given that with vmap'ed stacks, this condition is much more likely to trigger, let's relax the condition a bit, but fail the runtime service call if it does trigger. Fixes: f6697df36bdf0bf7 ("x86/efi: Prevent mixed mode boot corruption with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221084849.26878-4-ardb@kernel.org
2020-02-21 09:48:48 +01:00
/* check if the object crosses a page boundary */
if (WARN_ON((pa ^ (pa + size - 1)) & PAGE_MASK))
return 0;
efi/x86: Handle by-ref arguments covering multiple pages in mixed mode The mixed mode runtime wrappers are fragile when it comes to how the memory referred to by its pointer arguments are laid out in memory, due to the fact that it translates these addresses to physical addresses that the runtime services can dereference when running in 1:1 mode. Since vmalloc'ed pages (including the vmap'ed stack) are not contiguous in the physical address space, this scheme only works if the referenced memory objects do not cross page boundaries. Currently, the mixed mode runtime service wrappers require that all by-ref arguments that live in the vmalloc space have a size that is a power of 2, and are aligned to that same value. While this is a sensible way to construct an object that is guaranteed not to cross a page boundary, it is overly strict when it comes to checking whether a given object violates this requirement, as we can simply take the physical address of the first and the last byte, and verify that they point into the same physical page. When this check fails, we emit a WARN(), but then simply proceed with the call, which could cause data corruption if the next physical page belongs to a mapping that is entirely unrelated. Given that with vmap'ed stacks, this condition is much more likely to trigger, let's relax the condition a bit, but fail the runtime service call if it does trigger. Fixes: f6697df36bdf0bf7 ("x86/efi: Prevent mixed mode boot corruption with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221084849.26878-4-ardb@kernel.org
2020-02-21 09:48:48 +01:00
return pa;
}
#define virt_to_phys_or_null(addr) \
virt_to_phys_or_null_size((addr), sizeof(*(addr)))
int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
{
efi/x86: Don't remap text<->rodata gap read-only for mixed mode Commit d9e3d2c4f10320 ("efi/x86: Don't map the entire kernel text RW for mixed mode") updated the code that creates the 1:1 memory mapping to use read-only attributes for the 1:1 alias of the kernel's text and rodata sections, to protect it from inadvertent modification. However, it failed to take into account that the unused gap between text and rodata is given to the page allocator for general use. If the vmap'ed stack happens to be allocated from this region, any by-ref output arguments passed to EFI runtime services that are allocated on the stack (such as the 'datasize' argument taken by GetVariable() when invoked from efivar_entry_size()) will be referenced via a read-only mapping, resulting in a page fault if the EFI code tries to write to it: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000386aae88 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation PGD fd61063 P4D fd61063 PUD fd62063 PMD 386000e1 Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 255 Comm: systemd-sysv-ge Not tainted 5.6.0-rc4-default+ #22 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0008:0x3eaeed95 Code: ... <89> 03 be 05 00 00 80 a1 74 63 b1 3e 83 c0 48 e8 44 d2 ff ff eb 05 RSP: 0018:000000000fd73fa0 EFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 00000000386aae88 RCX: 000000003e9f1120 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000000000fd73fd8 R08: 00000000386aae88 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffc0f040220000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f21160ac940(0000) GS:ffff9cf23d500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0008 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000386aae88 CR3: 000000000fd6c004 CR4: 00000000003606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: Modules linked in: CR2: 00000000386aae88 ---[ end trace a8bfbd202e712834 ]--- Let's fix this by remapping text and rodata individually, and leave the gaps mapped read-write. Fixes: d9e3d2c4f10320 ("efi/x86: Don't map the entire kernel text RW for mixed mode") Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200409130434.6736-10-ardb@kernel.org
2020-04-09 15:04:34 +02:00
unsigned long pfn, text, pf, rodata;
struct page *page;
unsigned npages;
pgd_t *pgd = efi_mm.pgd;
/*
* It can happen that the physical address of new_memmap lands in memory
* which is not mapped in the EFI page table. Therefore we need to go
* and ident-map those pages containing the map before calling
* phys_efi_set_virtual_address_map().
*/
2015-11-27 21:09:31 +00:00
pfn = pa_memmap >> PAGE_SHIFT;
x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME When SME is active, pagetable entries created for EFI need to have the encryption mask set as necessary. When the new pagetable pages are allocated they are mapped encrypted. So, update the efi_pgt value that will be used in CR3 to include the encryption mask so that the PGD table can be read successfully. The pagetable mapping as well as the kernel are also added to the pagetable mapping as encrypted. All other EFI mappings are mapped decrypted (tables, etc.). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9a8f4c502db4a84b09e2f0a1555bb75aa8b69785.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-17 16:10:15 -05:00
pf = _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ENC;
if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, pa_memmap, num_pages, pf)) {
pr_err("Error ident-mapping new memmap (0x%lx)!\n", pa_memmap);
return 1;
}
x86/efi: Always map the first physical page into the EFI pagetables Commit: 129766708 ("x86/efi: Only map RAM into EFI page tables if in mixed-mode") stopped creating 1:1 mappings for all RAM, when running in native 64-bit mode. It turns out though that there are 64-bit EFI implementations in the wild (this particular problem has been reported on a Lenovo Yoga 710-11IKB), which still make use of the first physical page for their own private use, even though they explicitly mark it EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY in the memory map. In case there is no mapping for this particular frame in the EFI pagetables, as soon as firmware tries to make use of it, a triple fault occurs and the system reboots (in case of the Yoga 710-11IKB this is very early during bootup). Fix that by always mapping the first page of physical memory into the EFI pagetables. We're free to hand this page to the BIOS, as trim_bios_range() will reserve the first page and isolate it away from memory allocators anyway. Note that just reverting 129766708 alone is not enough on v4.9-rc1+ to fix the regression on affected hardware, as this commit: ab72a27da ("x86/efi: Consolidate region mapping logic") later made the first physical frame not to be mapped anyway. Reported-by: Hanka Pavlikova <hanka@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@ucw.cz> Cc: Waiman Long <waiman.long@hpe.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@kernel.org # v4.8+ Fixes: 129766708 ("x86/efi: Only map RAM into EFI page tables if in mixed-mode") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170127222552.22336-1-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk [ Tidied up the changelog and the comment. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-27 22:25:52 +00:00
/*
* Certain firmware versions are way too sentimential and still believe
* they are exclusive and unquestionable owners of the first physical page,
* even though they explicitly mark it as EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY
* (but then write-access it later during SetVirtualAddressMap()).
*
* Create a 1:1 mapping for this page, to avoid triple faults during early
* boot with such firmware. We are free to hand this page to the BIOS,
* as trim_bios_range() will reserve the first page and isolate it away
* from memory allocators anyway.
*/
if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, pf)) {
x86/efi: Always map the first physical page into the EFI pagetables Commit: 129766708 ("x86/efi: Only map RAM into EFI page tables if in mixed-mode") stopped creating 1:1 mappings for all RAM, when running in native 64-bit mode. It turns out though that there are 64-bit EFI implementations in the wild (this particular problem has been reported on a Lenovo Yoga 710-11IKB), which still make use of the first physical page for their own private use, even though they explicitly mark it EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY in the memory map. In case there is no mapping for this particular frame in the EFI pagetables, as soon as firmware tries to make use of it, a triple fault occurs and the system reboots (in case of the Yoga 710-11IKB this is very early during bootup). Fix that by always mapping the first page of physical memory into the EFI pagetables. We're free to hand this page to the BIOS, as trim_bios_range() will reserve the first page and isolate it away from memory allocators anyway. Note that just reverting 129766708 alone is not enough on v4.9-rc1+ to fix the regression on affected hardware, as this commit: ab72a27da ("x86/efi: Consolidate region mapping logic") later made the first physical frame not to be mapped anyway. Reported-by: Hanka Pavlikova <hanka@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@ucw.cz> Cc: Waiman Long <waiman.long@hpe.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@kernel.org # v4.8+ Fixes: 129766708 ("x86/efi: Only map RAM into EFI page tables if in mixed-mode") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170127222552.22336-1-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk [ Tidied up the changelog and the comment. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-27 22:25:52 +00:00
pr_err("Failed to create 1:1 mapping for the first page!\n");
return 1;
}
/*
* When SEV-ES is active, the GHCB as set by the kernel will be used
* by firmware. Create a 1:1 unencrypted mapping for each GHCB.
*/
if (sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd)) {
pr_err("Failed to create 1:1 mapping for the GHCBs!\n");
return 1;
}
/*
* When making calls to the firmware everything needs to be 1:1
* mapped and addressable with 32-bit pointers. Map the kernel
* text and allocate a new stack because we can't rely on the
* stack pointer being < 4GB.
*/
if (!efi_is_mixed())
return 0;
page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_DMA32);
if (!page) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate EFI runtime stack < 4GB\n");
return 1;
}
efi_scratch.phys_stack = page_to_phys(page + 1); /* stack grows down */
efi/x86: Don't remap text<->rodata gap read-only for mixed mode Commit d9e3d2c4f10320 ("efi/x86: Don't map the entire kernel text RW for mixed mode") updated the code that creates the 1:1 memory mapping to use read-only attributes for the 1:1 alias of the kernel's text and rodata sections, to protect it from inadvertent modification. However, it failed to take into account that the unused gap between text and rodata is given to the page allocator for general use. If the vmap'ed stack happens to be allocated from this region, any by-ref output arguments passed to EFI runtime services that are allocated on the stack (such as the 'datasize' argument taken by GetVariable() when invoked from efivar_entry_size()) will be referenced via a read-only mapping, resulting in a page fault if the EFI code tries to write to it: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000386aae88 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation PGD fd61063 P4D fd61063 PUD fd62063 PMD 386000e1 Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 255 Comm: systemd-sysv-ge Not tainted 5.6.0-rc4-default+ #22 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0008:0x3eaeed95 Code: ... <89> 03 be 05 00 00 80 a1 74 63 b1 3e 83 c0 48 e8 44 d2 ff ff eb 05 RSP: 0018:000000000fd73fa0 EFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 00000000386aae88 RCX: 000000003e9f1120 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000000000fd73fd8 R08: 00000000386aae88 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffc0f040220000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f21160ac940(0000) GS:ffff9cf23d500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0008 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000386aae88 CR3: 000000000fd6c004 CR4: 00000000003606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: Modules linked in: CR2: 00000000386aae88 ---[ end trace a8bfbd202e712834 ]--- Let's fix this by remapping text and rodata individually, and leave the gaps mapped read-write. Fixes: d9e3d2c4f10320 ("efi/x86: Don't map the entire kernel text RW for mixed mode") Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200409130434.6736-10-ardb@kernel.org
2020-04-09 15:04:34 +02:00
npages = (_etext - _text) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
text = __pa(_text);
2015-11-27 21:09:31 +00:00
pfn = text >> PAGE_SHIFT;
pf = _PAGE_ENC;
x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME When SME is active, pagetable entries created for EFI need to have the encryption mask set as necessary. When the new pagetable pages are allocated they are mapped encrypted. So, update the efi_pgt value that will be used in CR3 to include the encryption mask so that the PGD table can be read successfully. The pagetable mapping as well as the kernel are also added to the pagetable mapping as encrypted. All other EFI mappings are mapped decrypted (tables, etc.). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9a8f4c502db4a84b09e2f0a1555bb75aa8b69785.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-17 16:10:15 -05:00
if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, text, npages, pf)) {
pr_err("Failed to map kernel text 1:1\n");
return 1;
}
efi/x86: Don't remap text<->rodata gap read-only for mixed mode Commit d9e3d2c4f10320 ("efi/x86: Don't map the entire kernel text RW for mixed mode") updated the code that creates the 1:1 memory mapping to use read-only attributes for the 1:1 alias of the kernel's text and rodata sections, to protect it from inadvertent modification. However, it failed to take into account that the unused gap between text and rodata is given to the page allocator for general use. If the vmap'ed stack happens to be allocated from this region, any by-ref output arguments passed to EFI runtime services that are allocated on the stack (such as the 'datasize' argument taken by GetVariable() when invoked from efivar_entry_size()) will be referenced via a read-only mapping, resulting in a page fault if the EFI code tries to write to it: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000386aae88 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation PGD fd61063 P4D fd61063 PUD fd62063 PMD 386000e1 Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 255 Comm: systemd-sysv-ge Not tainted 5.6.0-rc4-default+ #22 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0008:0x3eaeed95 Code: ... <89> 03 be 05 00 00 80 a1 74 63 b1 3e 83 c0 48 e8 44 d2 ff ff eb 05 RSP: 0018:000000000fd73fa0 EFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 00000000386aae88 RCX: 000000003e9f1120 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000000000fd73fd8 R08: 00000000386aae88 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffc0f040220000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f21160ac940(0000) GS:ffff9cf23d500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0008 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000386aae88 CR3: 000000000fd6c004 CR4: 00000000003606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: Modules linked in: CR2: 00000000386aae88 ---[ end trace a8bfbd202e712834 ]--- Let's fix this by remapping text and rodata individually, and leave the gaps mapped read-write. Fixes: d9e3d2c4f10320 ("efi/x86: Don't map the entire kernel text RW for mixed mode") Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200409130434.6736-10-ardb@kernel.org
2020-04-09 15:04:34 +02:00
npages = (__end_rodata - __start_rodata) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
rodata = __pa(__start_rodata);
pfn = rodata >> PAGE_SHIFT;
pf = _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_ENC;
efi/x86: Don't remap text<->rodata gap read-only for mixed mode Commit d9e3d2c4f10320 ("efi/x86: Don't map the entire kernel text RW for mixed mode") updated the code that creates the 1:1 memory mapping to use read-only attributes for the 1:1 alias of the kernel's text and rodata sections, to protect it from inadvertent modification. However, it failed to take into account that the unused gap between text and rodata is given to the page allocator for general use. If the vmap'ed stack happens to be allocated from this region, any by-ref output arguments passed to EFI runtime services that are allocated on the stack (such as the 'datasize' argument taken by GetVariable() when invoked from efivar_entry_size()) will be referenced via a read-only mapping, resulting in a page fault if the EFI code tries to write to it: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000386aae88 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation PGD fd61063 P4D fd61063 PUD fd62063 PMD 386000e1 Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 255 Comm: systemd-sysv-ge Not tainted 5.6.0-rc4-default+ #22 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0008:0x3eaeed95 Code: ... <89> 03 be 05 00 00 80 a1 74 63 b1 3e 83 c0 48 e8 44 d2 ff ff eb 05 RSP: 0018:000000000fd73fa0 EFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 00000000386aae88 RCX: 000000003e9f1120 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000000000fd73fd8 R08: 00000000386aae88 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffc0f040220000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f21160ac940(0000) GS:ffff9cf23d500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0008 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000386aae88 CR3: 000000000fd6c004 CR4: 00000000003606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: Modules linked in: CR2: 00000000386aae88 ---[ end trace a8bfbd202e712834 ]--- Let's fix this by remapping text and rodata individually, and leave the gaps mapped read-write. Fixes: d9e3d2c4f10320 ("efi/x86: Don't map the entire kernel text RW for mixed mode") Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200409130434.6736-10-ardb@kernel.org
2020-04-09 15:04:34 +02:00
if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, rodata, npages, pf)) {
pr_err("Failed to map kernel rodata 1:1\n");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
{
unsigned long flags = _PAGE_RW;
2015-11-27 21:09:31 +00:00
unsigned long pfn;
pgd_t *pgd = efi_mm.pgd;
/*
* EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE regions typically cover PE/COFF
* executable images in memory that consist of both R-X and
* RW- sections, so we cannot apply read-only or non-exec
* permissions just yet. However, modern EFI systems provide
* a memory attributes table that describes those sections
* with the appropriate restricted permissions, which are
* applied in efi_runtime_update_mappings() below. All other
* regions can be mapped non-executable at this point, with
* the exception of boot services code regions, but those will
* be unmapped again entirely in efi_free_boot_services().
*/
if (md->type != EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE &&
md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)
flags |= _PAGE_NX;
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
2015-11-27 21:09:31 +00:00
flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
if (sev_active() && md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
2015-11-27 21:09:31 +00:00
pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, va, md->num_pages, flags))
pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
md->phys_addr, va);
}
void __init efi_map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
{
unsigned long size = md->num_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
u64 pa = md->phys_addr;
/*
* Make sure the 1:1 mappings are present as a catch-all for b0rked
* firmware which doesn't update all internal pointers after switching
* to virtual mode and would otherwise crap on us.
*/
__map_region(md, md->phys_addr);
/*
* Enforce the 1:1 mapping as the default virtual address when
* booting in EFI mixed mode, because even though we may be
* running a 64-bit kernel, the firmware may only be 32-bit.
*/
if (efi_is_mixed()) {
md->virt_addr = md->phys_addr;
return;
}
efi_va -= size;
/* Is PA 2M-aligned? */
if (!(pa & (PMD_SIZE - 1))) {
efi_va &= PMD_MASK;
} else {
u64 pa_offset = pa & (PMD_SIZE - 1);
u64 prev_va = efi_va;
/* get us the same offset within this 2M page */
efi_va = (efi_va & PMD_MASK) + pa_offset;
if (efi_va > prev_va)
efi_va -= PMD_SIZE;
}
if (efi_va < EFI_VA_END) {
pr_warn(FW_WARN "VA address range overflow!\n");
return;
}
/* Do the VA map */
__map_region(md, efi_va);
md->virt_addr = efi_va;
}
/*
* kexec kernel will use efi_map_region_fixed to map efi runtime memory ranges.
* md->virt_addr is the original virtual address which had been mapped in kexec
* 1st kernel.
*/
void __init efi_map_region_fixed(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
{
__map_region(md, md->phys_addr);
__map_region(md, md->virt_addr);
}
void __init parse_efi_setup(u64 phys_addr, u32 data_len)
{
efi_setup = phys_addr + sizeof(struct setup_data);
}
x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE UEFI v2.6 introduces EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE which describes memory protections that may be applied to the EFI Runtime code and data regions by the kernel. This enables the kernel to map these regions more strictly thereby increasing security. Presently, the only valid bits for the attribute field of a memory descriptor are EFI_MEMORY_RO and EFI_MEMORY_XP, hence use these bits to update the mappings in efi_pgd. The UEFI specification recommends to use this feature instead of EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE and hence while updating EFI mappings we first check for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE and if it's present we update the mappings according to this table and hence disregarding EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE even if it's published by the firmware. We consider EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE only when EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is absent. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485868902-20401-6-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-31 13:21:37 +00:00
static int __init efi_update_mappings(efi_memory_desc_t *md, unsigned long pf)
{
x86/efi: Map EFI_MEMORY_{XP,RO} memory region bits to EFI page tables Now that we have EFI memory region bits that indicate which regions do not need execute permission or read/write permission in the page tables, let's use them. We also check for EFI_NX_PE_DATA and only enforce the restrictive mappings if it's present (to allow us to ignore buggy firmware that sets bits it didn't mean to and to preserve backwards compatibility). Instead of assuming that firmware would set appropriate attributes in memory descriptor like EFI_MEMORY_RO for code and EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, we can expect some firmware out there which might only set *type* in memory descriptor to be EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE or EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA leaving away attribute. This will lead to improper mappings of EFI runtime regions. In order to avoid it, we check attribute and type of memory descriptor to update mappings and moreover Windows works this way. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455712566-16727-13-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-17 12:36:05 +00:00
unsigned long pfn;
pgd_t *pgd = efi_mm.pgd;
x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE UEFI v2.6 introduces EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE which describes memory protections that may be applied to the EFI Runtime code and data regions by the kernel. This enables the kernel to map these regions more strictly thereby increasing security. Presently, the only valid bits for the attribute field of a memory descriptor are EFI_MEMORY_RO and EFI_MEMORY_XP, hence use these bits to update the mappings in efi_pgd. The UEFI specification recommends to use this feature instead of EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE and hence while updating EFI mappings we first check for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE and if it's present we update the mappings according to this table and hence disregarding EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE even if it's published by the firmware. We consider EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE only when EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is absent. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485868902-20401-6-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-31 13:21:37 +00:00
int err1, err2;
/* Update the 1:1 mapping */
pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
err1 = kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->phys_addr, md->num_pages, pf);
if (err1) {
pr_err("Error while updating 1:1 mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr);
}
err2 = kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->virt_addr, md->num_pages, pf);
if (err2) {
pr_err("Error while updating VA mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr);
}
return err1 || err2;
}
static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
{
unsigned long pf = 0;
if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_XP)
pf |= _PAGE_NX;
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
if (sev_active())
pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE UEFI v2.6 introduces EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE which describes memory protections that may be applied to the EFI Runtime code and data regions by the kernel. This enables the kernel to map these regions more strictly thereby increasing security. Presently, the only valid bits for the attribute field of a memory descriptor are EFI_MEMORY_RO and EFI_MEMORY_XP, hence use these bits to update the mappings in efi_pgd. The UEFI specification recommends to use this feature instead of EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE and hence while updating EFI mappings we first check for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE and if it's present we update the mappings according to this table and hence disregarding EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE even if it's published by the firmware. We consider EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE only when EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is absent. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485868902-20401-6-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-31 13:21:37 +00:00
return efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
}
void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
{
x86/efi: Map EFI_MEMORY_{XP,RO} memory region bits to EFI page tables Now that we have EFI memory region bits that indicate which regions do not need execute permission or read/write permission in the page tables, let's use them. We also check for EFI_NX_PE_DATA and only enforce the restrictive mappings if it's present (to allow us to ignore buggy firmware that sets bits it didn't mean to and to preserve backwards compatibility). Instead of assuming that firmware would set appropriate attributes in memory descriptor like EFI_MEMORY_RO for code and EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, we can expect some firmware out there which might only set *type* in memory descriptor to be EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE or EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA leaving away attribute. This will lead to improper mappings of EFI runtime regions. In order to avoid it, we check attribute and type of memory descriptor to update mappings and moreover Windows works this way. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455712566-16727-13-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-17 12:36:05 +00:00
efi_memory_desc_t *md;
x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE UEFI v2.6 introduces EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE which describes memory protections that may be applied to the EFI Runtime code and data regions by the kernel. This enables the kernel to map these regions more strictly thereby increasing security. Presently, the only valid bits for the attribute field of a memory descriptor are EFI_MEMORY_RO and EFI_MEMORY_XP, hence use these bits to update the mappings in efi_pgd. The UEFI specification recommends to use this feature instead of EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE and hence while updating EFI mappings we first check for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE and if it's present we update the mappings according to this table and hence disregarding EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE even if it's published by the firmware. We consider EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE only when EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is absent. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485868902-20401-6-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-31 13:21:37 +00:00
/*
* Use the EFI Memory Attribute Table for mapping permissions if it
* exists, since it is intended to supersede EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE.
*/
if (efi_enabled(EFI_MEM_ATTR)) {
efi_memattr_apply_permissions(NULL, efi_update_mem_attr);
return;
}
/*
* EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is intended to replace
* EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE. So, use EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE to update
* permissions only if EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is not
* published by the firmware. Even if we find a buggy implementation of
* EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE, don't fall back to
* EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE, because of the same reason.
*/
x86/efi: Map EFI_MEMORY_{XP,RO} memory region bits to EFI page tables Now that we have EFI memory region bits that indicate which regions do not need execute permission or read/write permission in the page tables, let's use them. We also check for EFI_NX_PE_DATA and only enforce the restrictive mappings if it's present (to allow us to ignore buggy firmware that sets bits it didn't mean to and to preserve backwards compatibility). Instead of assuming that firmware would set appropriate attributes in memory descriptor like EFI_MEMORY_RO for code and EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, we can expect some firmware out there which might only set *type* in memory descriptor to be EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE or EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA leaving away attribute. This will lead to improper mappings of EFI runtime regions. In order to avoid it, we check attribute and type of memory descriptor to update mappings and moreover Windows works this way. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455712566-16727-13-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-17 12:36:05 +00:00
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_NX_PE_DATA))
return;
for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) {
x86/efi: Map EFI_MEMORY_{XP,RO} memory region bits to EFI page tables Now that we have EFI memory region bits that indicate which regions do not need execute permission or read/write permission in the page tables, let's use them. We also check for EFI_NX_PE_DATA and only enforce the restrictive mappings if it's present (to allow us to ignore buggy firmware that sets bits it didn't mean to and to preserve backwards compatibility). Instead of assuming that firmware would set appropriate attributes in memory descriptor like EFI_MEMORY_RO for code and EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, we can expect some firmware out there which might only set *type* in memory descriptor to be EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE or EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA leaving away attribute. This will lead to improper mappings of EFI runtime regions. In order to avoid it, we check attribute and type of memory descriptor to update mappings and moreover Windows works this way. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455712566-16727-13-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-17 12:36:05 +00:00
unsigned long pf = 0;
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME))
continue;
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
pf |= _PAGE_PCD;
if ((md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_XP) ||
(md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA))
pf |= _PAGE_NX;
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO) &&
(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
if (sev_active())
pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE UEFI v2.6 introduces EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE which describes memory protections that may be applied to the EFI Runtime code and data regions by the kernel. This enables the kernel to map these regions more strictly thereby increasing security. Presently, the only valid bits for the attribute field of a memory descriptor are EFI_MEMORY_RO and EFI_MEMORY_XP, hence use these bits to update the mappings in efi_pgd. The UEFI specification recommends to use this feature instead of EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE and hence while updating EFI mappings we first check for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE and if it's present we update the mappings according to this table and hence disregarding EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE even if it's published by the firmware. We consider EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE only when EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is absent. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485868902-20401-6-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-31 13:21:37 +00:00
efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
x86/efi: Map EFI_MEMORY_{XP,RO} memory region bits to EFI page tables Now that we have EFI memory region bits that indicate which regions do not need execute permission or read/write permission in the page tables, let's use them. We also check for EFI_NX_PE_DATA and only enforce the restrictive mappings if it's present (to allow us to ignore buggy firmware that sets bits it didn't mean to and to preserve backwards compatibility). Instead of assuming that firmware would set appropriate attributes in memory descriptor like EFI_MEMORY_RO for code and EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, we can expect some firmware out there which might only set *type* in memory descriptor to be EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE or EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA leaving away attribute. This will lead to improper mappings of EFI runtime regions. In order to avoid it, we check attribute and type of memory descriptor to update mappings and moreover Windows works this way. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455712566-16727-13-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-17 12:36:05 +00:00
}
}
void __init efi_dump_pagetable(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_PGT_DUMP
ptdump_walk_pgd_level(NULL, &efi_mm);
#endif
}
/*
* Makes the calling thread switch to/from efi_mm context. Can be used
* in a kernel thread and user context. Preemption needs to remain disabled
* while the EFI-mm is borrowed. mmgrab()/mmdrop() is not used because the mm
* can not change under us.
* It should be ensured that there are no concurent calls to this function.
*/
void efi_switch_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
efi_scratch.prev_mm = current->active_mm;
current->active_mm = mm;
switch_mm(efi_scratch.prev_mm, mm, NULL);
}
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(efi_runtime_lock);
/*
* DS and ES contain user values. We need to save them.
* The 32-bit EFI code needs a valid DS, ES, and SS. There's no
* need to save the old SS: __KERNEL_DS is always acceptable.
*/
#define __efi_thunk(func, ...) \
({ \
unsigned short __ds, __es; \
efi_status_t ____s; \
\
savesegment(ds, __ds); \
savesegment(es, __es); \
\
loadsegment(ss, __KERNEL_DS); \
loadsegment(ds, __KERNEL_DS); \
loadsegment(es, __KERNEL_DS); \
\
____s = efi64_thunk(efi.runtime->mixed_mode.func, __VA_ARGS__); \
\
loadsegment(ds, __ds); \
loadsegment(es, __es); \
\
____s ^= (____s & BIT(31)) | (____s & BIT_ULL(31)) << 32; \
____s; \
})
/*
* Switch to the EFI page tables early so that we can access the 1:1
* runtime services mappings which are not mapped in any other page
* tables.
*
* Also, disable interrupts because the IDT points to 64-bit handlers,
* which aren't going to function correctly when we switch to 32-bit.
*/
#define efi_thunk(func...) \
({ \
efi_status_t __s; \
\
arch_efi_call_virt_setup(); \
\
__s = __efi_thunk(func); \
\
arch_efi_call_virt_teardown(); \
\
__s; \
})
efi/x86: avoid KASAN false positives when accessing the 1: 1 mapping When installing the EFI virtual address map during early boot, we access the EFI system table to retrieve the 1:1 mapped address of the SetVirtualAddressMap() EFI runtime service. This memory is not known to KASAN, so on KASAN enabled builds, this may result in a splat like ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x141/0x354 Read of size 4 at addr 000000003fbeef38 by task swapper/0/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5+ #758 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8b/0xbb ? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x141/0x354 ? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x141/0x354 __kasan_report+0x176/0x192 ? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x141/0x354 kasan_report+0xe/0x20 efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x141/0x354 ? efi_thunk_runtime_setup+0x148/0x148 ? __inc_numa_state+0x19/0x90 ? memcpy+0x34/0x50 efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x5fd/0x67d start_kernel+0x5cd/0x682 ? mem_encrypt_init+0x6/0x6 ? x86_family+0x5/0x20 ? load_ucode_bsp+0x46/0x154 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 ================================================================== Since this code runs only a single time during early boot, let's annotate it as __no_sanitize_address so KASAN disregards it entirely. Fixes: 698294704573 ("efi/x86: Split SetVirtualAddresMap() wrappers into ...") Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-01-18 17:57:03 +01:00
static efi_status_t __init __no_sanitize_address
efi_thunk_set_virtual_address_map(unsigned long memory_map_size,
unsigned long descriptor_size,
u32 descriptor_version,
efi_memory_desc_t *virtual_map)
{
efi_status_t status;
unsigned long flags;
efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings();
local_irq_save(flags);
efi_switch_mm(&efi_mm);
status = __efi_thunk(set_virtual_address_map, memory_map_size,
descriptor_size, descriptor_version, virtual_map);
efi_switch_mm(efi_scratch.prev_mm);
local_irq_restore(flags);
return status;
}
static efi_status_t efi_thunk_get_time(efi_time_t *tm, efi_time_cap_t *tc)
{
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
static efi_status_t efi_thunk_set_time(efi_time_t *tm)
{
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_get_wakeup_time(efi_bool_t *enabled, efi_bool_t *pending,
efi_time_t *tm)
{
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_set_wakeup_time(efi_bool_t enabled, efi_time_t *tm)
{
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
static unsigned long efi_name_size(efi_char16_t *name)
{
return ucs2_strsize(name, EFI_VAR_NAME_LEN) + 1;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_get_variable(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *vendor,
u32 *attr, unsigned long *data_size, void *data)
{
u8 buf[24] __aligned(8);
efi_guid_t *vnd = PTR_ALIGN((efi_guid_t *)buf, sizeof(*vnd));
efi_status_t status;
u32 phys_name, phys_vendor, phys_attr;
u32 phys_data_size, phys_data;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&efi_runtime_lock, flags);
*vnd = *vendor;
phys_data_size = virt_to_phys_or_null(data_size);
phys_vendor = virt_to_phys_or_null(vnd);
phys_name = virt_to_phys_or_null_size(name, efi_name_size(name));
phys_attr = virt_to_phys_or_null(attr);
phys_data = virt_to_phys_or_null_size(data, *data_size);
efi/x86: Handle by-ref arguments covering multiple pages in mixed mode The mixed mode runtime wrappers are fragile when it comes to how the memory referred to by its pointer arguments are laid out in memory, due to the fact that it translates these addresses to physical addresses that the runtime services can dereference when running in 1:1 mode. Since vmalloc'ed pages (including the vmap'ed stack) are not contiguous in the physical address space, this scheme only works if the referenced memory objects do not cross page boundaries. Currently, the mixed mode runtime service wrappers require that all by-ref arguments that live in the vmalloc space have a size that is a power of 2, and are aligned to that same value. While this is a sensible way to construct an object that is guaranteed not to cross a page boundary, it is overly strict when it comes to checking whether a given object violates this requirement, as we can simply take the physical address of the first and the last byte, and verify that they point into the same physical page. When this check fails, we emit a WARN(), but then simply proceed with the call, which could cause data corruption if the next physical page belongs to a mapping that is entirely unrelated. Given that with vmap'ed stacks, this condition is much more likely to trigger, let's relax the condition a bit, but fail the runtime service call if it does trigger. Fixes: f6697df36bdf0bf7 ("x86/efi: Prevent mixed mode boot corruption with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221084849.26878-4-ardb@kernel.org
2020-02-21 09:48:48 +01:00
if (!phys_name || (data && !phys_data))
status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
else
status = efi_thunk(get_variable, phys_name, phys_vendor,
phys_attr, phys_data_size, phys_data);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&efi_runtime_lock, flags);
return status;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_set_variable(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *vendor,
u32 attr, unsigned long data_size, void *data)
{
u8 buf[24] __aligned(8);
efi_guid_t *vnd = PTR_ALIGN((efi_guid_t *)buf, sizeof(*vnd));
u32 phys_name, phys_vendor, phys_data;
efi_status_t status;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&efi_runtime_lock, flags);
*vnd = *vendor;
phys_name = virt_to_phys_or_null_size(name, efi_name_size(name));
phys_vendor = virt_to_phys_or_null(vnd);
phys_data = virt_to_phys_or_null_size(data, data_size);
if (!phys_name || (data && !phys_data))
efi/x86: Handle by-ref arguments covering multiple pages in mixed mode The mixed mode runtime wrappers are fragile when it comes to how the memory referred to by its pointer arguments are laid out in memory, due to the fact that it translates these addresses to physical addresses that the runtime services can dereference when running in 1:1 mode. Since vmalloc'ed pages (including the vmap'ed stack) are not contiguous in the physical address space, this scheme only works if the referenced memory objects do not cross page boundaries. Currently, the mixed mode runtime service wrappers require that all by-ref arguments that live in the vmalloc space have a size that is a power of 2, and are aligned to that same value. While this is a sensible way to construct an object that is guaranteed not to cross a page boundary, it is overly strict when it comes to checking whether a given object violates this requirement, as we can simply take the physical address of the first and the last byte, and verify that they point into the same physical page. When this check fails, we emit a WARN(), but then simply proceed with the call, which could cause data corruption if the next physical page belongs to a mapping that is entirely unrelated. Given that with vmap'ed stacks, this condition is much more likely to trigger, let's relax the condition a bit, but fail the runtime service call if it does trigger. Fixes: f6697df36bdf0bf7 ("x86/efi: Prevent mixed mode boot corruption with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221084849.26878-4-ardb@kernel.org
2020-02-21 09:48:48 +01:00
status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
else
status = efi_thunk(set_variable, phys_name, phys_vendor,
attr, data_size, phys_data);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&efi_runtime_lock, flags);
return status;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_set_variable_nonblocking(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *vendor,
u32 attr, unsigned long data_size,
void *data)
{
u8 buf[24] __aligned(8);
efi_guid_t *vnd = PTR_ALIGN((efi_guid_t *)buf, sizeof(*vnd));
u32 phys_name, phys_vendor, phys_data;
efi_status_t status;
unsigned long flags;
if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&efi_runtime_lock, flags))
return EFI_NOT_READY;
*vnd = *vendor;
phys_name = virt_to_phys_or_null_size(name, efi_name_size(name));
phys_vendor = virt_to_phys_or_null(vnd);
phys_data = virt_to_phys_or_null_size(data, data_size);
if (!phys_name || (data && !phys_data))
efi/x86: Handle by-ref arguments covering multiple pages in mixed mode The mixed mode runtime wrappers are fragile when it comes to how the memory referred to by its pointer arguments are laid out in memory, due to the fact that it translates these addresses to physical addresses that the runtime services can dereference when running in 1:1 mode. Since vmalloc'ed pages (including the vmap'ed stack) are not contiguous in the physical address space, this scheme only works if the referenced memory objects do not cross page boundaries. Currently, the mixed mode runtime service wrappers require that all by-ref arguments that live in the vmalloc space have a size that is a power of 2, and are aligned to that same value. While this is a sensible way to construct an object that is guaranteed not to cross a page boundary, it is overly strict when it comes to checking whether a given object violates this requirement, as we can simply take the physical address of the first and the last byte, and verify that they point into the same physical page. When this check fails, we emit a WARN(), but then simply proceed with the call, which could cause data corruption if the next physical page belongs to a mapping that is entirely unrelated. Given that with vmap'ed stacks, this condition is much more likely to trigger, let's relax the condition a bit, but fail the runtime service call if it does trigger. Fixes: f6697df36bdf0bf7 ("x86/efi: Prevent mixed mode boot corruption with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221084849.26878-4-ardb@kernel.org
2020-02-21 09:48:48 +01:00
status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
else
status = efi_thunk(set_variable, phys_name, phys_vendor,
attr, data_size, phys_data);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&efi_runtime_lock, flags);
return status;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_get_next_variable(unsigned long *name_size,
efi_char16_t *name,
efi_guid_t *vendor)
{
u8 buf[24] __aligned(8);
efi_guid_t *vnd = PTR_ALIGN((efi_guid_t *)buf, sizeof(*vnd));
efi_status_t status;
u32 phys_name_size, phys_name, phys_vendor;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&efi_runtime_lock, flags);
*vnd = *vendor;
phys_name_size = virt_to_phys_or_null(name_size);
phys_vendor = virt_to_phys_or_null(vnd);
phys_name = virt_to_phys_or_null_size(name, *name_size);
efi/x86: Handle by-ref arguments covering multiple pages in mixed mode The mixed mode runtime wrappers are fragile when it comes to how the memory referred to by its pointer arguments are laid out in memory, due to the fact that it translates these addresses to physical addresses that the runtime services can dereference when running in 1:1 mode. Since vmalloc'ed pages (including the vmap'ed stack) are not contiguous in the physical address space, this scheme only works if the referenced memory objects do not cross page boundaries. Currently, the mixed mode runtime service wrappers require that all by-ref arguments that live in the vmalloc space have a size that is a power of 2, and are aligned to that same value. While this is a sensible way to construct an object that is guaranteed not to cross a page boundary, it is overly strict when it comes to checking whether a given object violates this requirement, as we can simply take the physical address of the first and the last byte, and verify that they point into the same physical page. When this check fails, we emit a WARN(), but then simply proceed with the call, which could cause data corruption if the next physical page belongs to a mapping that is entirely unrelated. Given that with vmap'ed stacks, this condition is much more likely to trigger, let's relax the condition a bit, but fail the runtime service call if it does trigger. Fixes: f6697df36bdf0bf7 ("x86/efi: Prevent mixed mode boot corruption with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221084849.26878-4-ardb@kernel.org
2020-02-21 09:48:48 +01:00
if (!phys_name)
status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
else
status = efi_thunk(get_next_variable, phys_name_size,
phys_name, phys_vendor);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&efi_runtime_lock, flags);
*vendor = *vnd;
return status;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_get_next_high_mono_count(u32 *count)
{
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
static void
efi_thunk_reset_system(int reset_type, efi_status_t status,
unsigned long data_size, efi_char16_t *data)
{
u32 phys_data;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&efi_runtime_lock, flags);
phys_data = virt_to_phys_or_null_size(data, data_size);
efi_thunk(reset_system, reset_type, status, data_size, phys_data);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&efi_runtime_lock, flags);
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_update_capsule(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
unsigned long count, unsigned long sg_list)
{
/*
* To properly support this function we would need to repackage
* 'capsules' because the firmware doesn't understand 64-bit
* pointers.
*/
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_query_variable_info(u32 attr, u64 *storage_space,
u64 *remaining_space,
u64 *max_variable_size)
{
efi_status_t status;
u32 phys_storage, phys_remaining, phys_max;
unsigned long flags;
if (efi.runtime_version < EFI_2_00_SYSTEM_TABLE_REVISION)
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
spin_lock_irqsave(&efi_runtime_lock, flags);
phys_storage = virt_to_phys_or_null(storage_space);
phys_remaining = virt_to_phys_or_null(remaining_space);
phys_max = virt_to_phys_or_null(max_variable_size);
status = efi_thunk(query_variable_info, attr, phys_storage,
phys_remaining, phys_max);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&efi_runtime_lock, flags);
return status;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_query_variable_info_nonblocking(u32 attr, u64 *storage_space,
u64 *remaining_space,
u64 *max_variable_size)
{
efi_status_t status;
u32 phys_storage, phys_remaining, phys_max;
unsigned long flags;
if (efi.runtime_version < EFI_2_00_SYSTEM_TABLE_REVISION)
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&efi_runtime_lock, flags))
return EFI_NOT_READY;
phys_storage = virt_to_phys_or_null(storage_space);
phys_remaining = virt_to_phys_or_null(remaining_space);
phys_max = virt_to_phys_or_null(max_variable_size);
status = efi_thunk(query_variable_info, attr, phys_storage,
phys_remaining, phys_max);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&efi_runtime_lock, flags);
return status;
}
static efi_status_t
efi_thunk_query_capsule_caps(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
unsigned long count, u64 *max_size,
int *reset_type)
{
/*
* To properly support this function we would need to repackage
* 'capsules' because the firmware doesn't understand 64-bit
* pointers.
*/
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
void __init efi_thunk_runtime_setup(void)
{
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED))
return;
efi.get_time = efi_thunk_get_time;
efi.set_time = efi_thunk_set_time;
efi.get_wakeup_time = efi_thunk_get_wakeup_time;
efi.set_wakeup_time = efi_thunk_set_wakeup_time;
efi.get_variable = efi_thunk_get_variable;
efi.get_next_variable = efi_thunk_get_next_variable;
efi.set_variable = efi_thunk_set_variable;
efi.set_variable_nonblocking = efi_thunk_set_variable_nonblocking;
efi.get_next_high_mono_count = efi_thunk_get_next_high_mono_count;
efi.reset_system = efi_thunk_reset_system;
efi.query_variable_info = efi_thunk_query_variable_info;
efi.query_variable_info_nonblocking = efi_thunk_query_variable_info_nonblocking;
efi.update_capsule = efi_thunk_update_capsule;
efi.query_capsule_caps = efi_thunk_query_capsule_caps;
}
efi/x86: avoid KASAN false positives when accessing the 1: 1 mapping When installing the EFI virtual address map during early boot, we access the EFI system table to retrieve the 1:1 mapped address of the SetVirtualAddressMap() EFI runtime service. This memory is not known to KASAN, so on KASAN enabled builds, this may result in a splat like ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x141/0x354 Read of size 4 at addr 000000003fbeef38 by task swapper/0/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5+ #758 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8b/0xbb ? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x141/0x354 ? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x141/0x354 __kasan_report+0x176/0x192 ? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x141/0x354 kasan_report+0xe/0x20 efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x141/0x354 ? efi_thunk_runtime_setup+0x148/0x148 ? __inc_numa_state+0x19/0x90 ? memcpy+0x34/0x50 efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x5fd/0x67d start_kernel+0x5cd/0x682 ? mem_encrypt_init+0x6/0x6 ? x86_family+0x5/0x20 ? load_ucode_bsp+0x46/0x154 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 ================================================================== Since this code runs only a single time during early boot, let's annotate it as __no_sanitize_address so KASAN disregards it entirely. Fixes: 698294704573 ("efi/x86: Split SetVirtualAddresMap() wrappers into ...") Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-01-18 17:57:03 +01:00
efi_status_t __init __no_sanitize_address
efi_set_virtual_address_map(unsigned long memory_map_size,
unsigned long descriptor_size,
u32 descriptor_version,
efi_memory_desc_t *virtual_map,
unsigned long systab_phys)
{
const efi_system_table_t *systab = (efi_system_table_t *)systab_phys;
efi_status_t status;
unsigned long flags;
if (efi_is_mixed())
return efi_thunk_set_virtual_address_map(memory_map_size,
descriptor_size,
descriptor_version,
virtual_map);
efi_switch_mm(&efi_mm);
kernel_fpu_begin();
/* Disable interrupts around EFI calls: */
local_irq_save(flags);
status = efi_call(efi.runtime->set_virtual_address_map,
memory_map_size, descriptor_size,
descriptor_version, virtual_map);
local_irq_restore(flags);
kernel_fpu_end();
/* grab the virtually remapped EFI runtime services table pointer */
efi.runtime = READ_ONCE(systab->runtime);
efi_switch_mm(efi_scratch.prev_mm);
return status;
}