2019-11-23 09:58:40 +02:00
|
|
|
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause-Clear */
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2018-2019 The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved.
|
2022-03-23 11:14:17 +02:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved.
|
2019-11-23 09:58:40 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef ATH11K_PEER_H
|
|
|
|
|
#define ATH11K_PEER_H
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct ath11k_peer {
|
|
|
|
|
struct list_head list;
|
|
|
|
|
struct ieee80211_sta *sta;
|
|
|
|
|
int vdev_id;
|
|
|
|
|
u8 addr[ETH_ALEN];
|
|
|
|
|
int peer_id;
|
|
|
|
|
u16 ast_hash;
|
2020-04-08 16:33:15 +05:30
|
|
|
u8 pdev_idx;
|
2021-02-08 13:32:11 +02:00
|
|
|
u16 hw_peer_id;
|
2019-11-23 09:58:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* protected by ab->data_lock */
|
|
|
|
|
struct ieee80211_key_conf *keys[WMI_MAX_KEY_INDEX + 1];
|
|
|
|
|
struct dp_rx_tid rx_tid[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1];
|
ath11k: handle RX fragments
IPQ8074 HW has support to verify the PN of the received frames.
For all frames except for fragmented ones, HW checks the PN and
delivers them to the driver. For fragmented frames, driver is
required to do a little more; it has to reassemble the fragments
and then reinject them to the HW for verifying the PN. Currently,
to keep the logic simple, PN verifcation is disabled in HW and is
handled in mac80211 for all the frames (fragmented and unfragmented).
On the contrary, offloading PN Validation to the HW brings important
benefits. It reduces CPU cycles spent on the host CPU for verifying
the same; helps in enabling features which improve performance like
mac80211 fast RX path, enabling multiple REO rings for parallel RX
processing, 802.11 decapsulation offloading. All these features are
dependent on PN offload which in turn is dependent on handling of
the received fragments in the driver.
When TKIP security is used, additional handling is required while
processing the fragments; since MIC is computed on an MSDU in TKIP,
only the last fragment has the MIC info. In this case, driver has to
compute the MIC after reassembly and compare it against the MIC
present in the frame. For this, MICHAEL_MIC kernel crypto library
APIs are used and the dependencies are appropriately set.
Signed-off-by: Manikanta Pubbisetty <mpubbise@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
2020-03-16 07:37:19 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-03-23 11:14:17 +02:00
|
|
|
/* peer id based rhashtable list pointer */
|
|
|
|
|
struct rhash_head rhash_id;
|
|
|
|
|
/* peer addr based rhashtable list pointer */
|
|
|
|
|
struct rhash_head rhash_addr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
ath11k: handle RX fragments
IPQ8074 HW has support to verify the PN of the received frames.
For all frames except for fragmented ones, HW checks the PN and
delivers them to the driver. For fragmented frames, driver is
required to do a little more; it has to reassemble the fragments
and then reinject them to the HW for verifying the PN. Currently,
to keep the logic simple, PN verifcation is disabled in HW and is
handled in mac80211 for all the frames (fragmented and unfragmented).
On the contrary, offloading PN Validation to the HW brings important
benefits. It reduces CPU cycles spent on the host CPU for verifying
the same; helps in enabling features which improve performance like
mac80211 fast RX path, enabling multiple REO rings for parallel RX
processing, 802.11 decapsulation offloading. All these features are
dependent on PN offload which in turn is dependent on handling of
the received fragments in the driver.
When TKIP security is used, additional handling is required while
processing the fragments; since MIC is computed on an MSDU in TKIP,
only the last fragment has the MIC info. In this case, driver has to
compute the MIC after reassembly and compare it against the MIC
present in the frame. For this, MICHAEL_MIC kernel crypto library
APIs are used and the dependencies are appropriately set.
Signed-off-by: Manikanta Pubbisetty <mpubbise@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
2020-03-16 07:37:19 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Info used in MMIC verification of
|
|
|
|
|
* RX fragments
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
struct crypto_shash *tfm_mmic;
|
|
|
|
|
u8 mcast_keyidx;
|
|
|
|
|
u8 ucast_keyidx;
|
2020-03-17 16:52:38 +02:00
|
|
|
u16 sec_type;
|
|
|
|
|
u16 sec_type_grp;
|
2021-11-12 10:03:40 +02:00
|
|
|
bool is_authorized;
|
2023-04-04 00:11:54 +05:30
|
|
|
bool dp_setup_done;
|
2019-11-23 09:58:40 +02:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void ath11k_peer_unmap_event(struct ath11k_base *ab, u16 peer_id);
|
|
|
|
|
void ath11k_peer_map_event(struct ath11k_base *ab, u8 vdev_id, u16 peer_id,
|
2021-02-08 13:32:11 +02:00
|
|
|
u8 *mac_addr, u16 ast_hash, u16 hw_peer_id);
|
2019-11-23 09:58:40 +02:00
|
|
|
struct ath11k_peer *ath11k_peer_find(struct ath11k_base *ab, int vdev_id,
|
|
|
|
|
const u8 *addr);
|
|
|
|
|
struct ath11k_peer *ath11k_peer_find_by_addr(struct ath11k_base *ab,
|
|
|
|
|
const u8 *addr);
|
|
|
|
|
struct ath11k_peer *ath11k_peer_find_by_id(struct ath11k_base *ab, int peer_id);
|
|
|
|
|
void ath11k_peer_cleanup(struct ath11k *ar, u32 vdev_id);
|
|
|
|
|
int ath11k_peer_delete(struct ath11k *ar, u32 vdev_id, u8 *addr);
|
|
|
|
|
int ath11k_peer_create(struct ath11k *ar, struct ath11k_vif *arvif,
|
|
|
|
|
struct ieee80211_sta *sta, struct peer_create_params *param);
|
2020-11-24 17:59:14 +02:00
|
|
|
int ath11k_wait_for_peer_delete_done(struct ath11k *ar, u32 vdev_id,
|
|
|
|
|
const u8 *addr);
|
2020-12-11 00:13:58 -05:00
|
|
|
struct ath11k_peer *ath11k_peer_find_by_vdev_id(struct ath11k_base *ab,
|
|
|
|
|
int vdev_id);
|
2022-03-23 11:14:17 +02:00
|
|
|
int ath11k_peer_rhash_tbl_init(struct ath11k_base *ab);
|
|
|
|
|
void ath11k_peer_rhash_tbl_destroy(struct ath11k_base *ab);
|
|
|
|
|
int ath11k_peer_rhash_delete(struct ath11k_base *ab, struct ath11k_peer *peer);
|
2019-11-23 09:58:40 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* _PEER_H_ */
|