2020-01-09 22:41:24 -08:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/* Copyright (c) 2020 Facebook */
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#include <stddef.h>
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#include <linux/bpf.h>
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2020-01-20 14:06:45 +01:00
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#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
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2023-02-15 20:59:53 -08:00
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#include "bpf_misc.h"
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2020-01-09 22:41:24 -08:00
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bpf: Fix test verif_scale_strobemeta_subprogs failure due to llvm19
With latest llvm19, I hit the following selftest failures with
$ ./test_progs -j
libbpf: prog 'on_event': BPF program load failed: Permission denied
libbpf: prog 'on_event': -- BEGIN PROG LOAD LOG --
combined stack size of 4 calls is 544. Too large
verification time 1344153 usec
stack depth 24+440+0+32
processed 51008 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 19 total_states 1467 peak_states 303 mark_read 146
-- END PROG LOAD LOG --
libbpf: prog 'on_event': failed to load: -13
libbpf: failed to load object 'strobemeta_subprogs.bpf.o'
scale_test:FAIL:expect_success unexpected error: -13 (errno 13)
#498 verif_scale_strobemeta_subprogs:FAIL
The verifier complains too big of the combined stack size (544 bytes) which
exceeds the maximum stack limit 512. This is a regression from llvm19 ([1]).
In the above error log, the original stack depth is 24+440+0+32.
To satisfy interpreter's need, in verifier the stack depth is adjusted to
32+448+32+32=544 which exceeds 512, hence the error. The same adjusted
stack size is also used for jit case.
But the jitted codes could use smaller stack size.
$ egrep -r stack_depth | grep round_up
arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: ctx->stack_size = round_up(prog->aux->stack_depth, 16);
loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c: bpf_stack_adjust = round_up(ctx->prog->aux->stack_depth, 16);
powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: cgctx.stack_size = round_up(fp->aux->stack_depth, 16);
riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c: round_up(ctx->prog->aux->stack_depth, STACK_ALIGN);
riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c: bpf_stack_adjust = round_up(ctx->prog->aux->stack_depth, 16);
s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: u32 stack_depth = round_up(fp->aux->stack_depth, 8);
sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c: stack_needed += round_up(stack_depth, 16);
x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: EMIT3_off32(0x48, 0x81, 0xEC, round_up(stack_depth, 8));
x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: int tcc_off = -4 - round_up(stack_depth, 8);
x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: round_up(stack_depth, 8));
x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: int tcc_off = -4 - round_up(stack_depth, 8);
x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: EMIT3_off32(0x48, 0x81, 0xC4, round_up(stack_depth, 8));
In the above, STACK_ALIGN in riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c is defined as 16.
So stack is aligned in either 8 or 16, x86/s390 having 8-byte stack alignment and
the rest having 16-byte alignment.
This patch calculates total stack depth based on 16-byte alignment if jit is requested.
For the above failing case, the new stack size will be 32+448+0+32=512 and no verification
failure. llvm19 regression will be discussed separately in llvm upstream.
The verifier change caused three test failures as these tests compared messages
with stack size. More specifically,
- test_global_funcs/global_func1: fail with interpreter mode and success with jit mode.
Adjusted stack sizes so both jit and interpreter modes will fail.
- async_stack_depth/{pseudo_call_check, async_call_root_check}: since jit and interpreter
will calculate different stack sizes, the failure msg is adjusted to omit those
specific stack size numbers.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/32bde0f0-1881-46c9-931a-673be566c61d@linux.dev/
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240214232951.4113094-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-02-14 15:29:51 -08:00
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#define MAX_STACK 260
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2020-01-09 22:41:24 -08:00
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static __attribute__ ((noinline))
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int f0(int var, struct __sk_buff *skb)
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{
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selftests/bpf: Fix selftest test_global_funcs/global_func1 failure with latest clang
The selftest test_global_funcs/global_func1 failed with the latest clang17.
The reason is due to upstream ArgumentPromotionPass ([1]),
which may manipulate static function parameters and cause inlining
although the funciton is marked as noinline.
The original code:
static __attribute__ ((noinline))
int f0(int var, struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
return skb->len;
}
__attribute__ ((noinline))
int f1(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
...
return f0(0, skb) + skb->len;
}
...
SEC("tc")
__failure __msg("combined stack size of 4 calls is 544")
int global_func1(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
return f0(1, skb) + f1(skb) + f2(2, skb) + f3(3, skb, 4);
}
After ArgumentPromotionPass, the code is translated to
static __attribute__ ((noinline))
int f0(int var, int skb_len)
{
return skb_len;
}
__attribute__ ((noinline))
int f1(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
...
return f0(0, skb->len) + skb->len;
}
...
SEC("tc")
__failure __msg("combined stack size of 4 calls is 544")
int global_func1(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
return f0(1, skb->len) + f1(skb) + f2(2, skb) + f3(3, skb, 4);
}
And later llvm InstCombine phase recognized that f0()
simplify returns the value of the second argument and removed f0()
completely and the final code looks like:
__attribute__ ((noinline))
int f1(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
...
return skb->len + skb->len;
}
...
SEC("tc")
__failure __msg("combined stack size of 4 calls is 544")
int global_func1(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
return skb->len + f1(skb) + f2(2, skb) + f3(3, skb, 4);
}
If f0() is not inlined, the verification will fail with stack size
544 for a particular callchain. With f0() inlined, the maximum
stack size is 512 which is in the limit.
Let us add a `asm volatile ("")` in f0() to prevent ArgumentPromotionPass
from hoisting the code to its caller, and this fixed the test failure.
[1] https://reviews.llvm.org/D148269
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230425174744.1758515-1-yhs@fb.com
2023-04-25 10:47:44 -07:00
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asm volatile ("");
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2020-01-09 22:41:24 -08:00
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return skb->len;
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}
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__attribute__ ((noinline))
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int f1(struct __sk_buff *skb)
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{
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volatile char buf[MAX_STACK] = {};
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2023-03-08 21:40:14 -08:00
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__sink(buf[MAX_STACK - 1]);
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2020-01-09 22:41:24 -08:00
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return f0(0, skb) + skb->len;
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}
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int f3(int, struct __sk_buff *skb, int);
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__attribute__ ((noinline))
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int f2(int val, struct __sk_buff *skb)
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{
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bpf: Fix test verif_scale_strobemeta_subprogs failure due to llvm19
With latest llvm19, I hit the following selftest failures with
$ ./test_progs -j
libbpf: prog 'on_event': BPF program load failed: Permission denied
libbpf: prog 'on_event': -- BEGIN PROG LOAD LOG --
combined stack size of 4 calls is 544. Too large
verification time 1344153 usec
stack depth 24+440+0+32
processed 51008 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 19 total_states 1467 peak_states 303 mark_read 146
-- END PROG LOAD LOG --
libbpf: prog 'on_event': failed to load: -13
libbpf: failed to load object 'strobemeta_subprogs.bpf.o'
scale_test:FAIL:expect_success unexpected error: -13 (errno 13)
#498 verif_scale_strobemeta_subprogs:FAIL
The verifier complains too big of the combined stack size (544 bytes) which
exceeds the maximum stack limit 512. This is a regression from llvm19 ([1]).
In the above error log, the original stack depth is 24+440+0+32.
To satisfy interpreter's need, in verifier the stack depth is adjusted to
32+448+32+32=544 which exceeds 512, hence the error. The same adjusted
stack size is also used for jit case.
But the jitted codes could use smaller stack size.
$ egrep -r stack_depth | grep round_up
arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: ctx->stack_size = round_up(prog->aux->stack_depth, 16);
loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c: bpf_stack_adjust = round_up(ctx->prog->aux->stack_depth, 16);
powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: cgctx.stack_size = round_up(fp->aux->stack_depth, 16);
riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c: round_up(ctx->prog->aux->stack_depth, STACK_ALIGN);
riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c: bpf_stack_adjust = round_up(ctx->prog->aux->stack_depth, 16);
s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: u32 stack_depth = round_up(fp->aux->stack_depth, 8);
sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c: stack_needed += round_up(stack_depth, 16);
x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: EMIT3_off32(0x48, 0x81, 0xEC, round_up(stack_depth, 8));
x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: int tcc_off = -4 - round_up(stack_depth, 8);
x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: round_up(stack_depth, 8));
x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: int tcc_off = -4 - round_up(stack_depth, 8);
x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: EMIT3_off32(0x48, 0x81, 0xC4, round_up(stack_depth, 8));
In the above, STACK_ALIGN in riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c is defined as 16.
So stack is aligned in either 8 or 16, x86/s390 having 8-byte stack alignment and
the rest having 16-byte alignment.
This patch calculates total stack depth based on 16-byte alignment if jit is requested.
For the above failing case, the new stack size will be 32+448+0+32=512 and no verification
failure. llvm19 regression will be discussed separately in llvm upstream.
The verifier change caused three test failures as these tests compared messages
with stack size. More specifically,
- test_global_funcs/global_func1: fail with interpreter mode and success with jit mode.
Adjusted stack sizes so both jit and interpreter modes will fail.
- async_stack_depth/{pseudo_call_check, async_call_root_check}: since jit and interpreter
will calculate different stack sizes, the failure msg is adjusted to omit those
specific stack size numbers.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/32bde0f0-1881-46c9-931a-673be566c61d@linux.dev/
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240214232951.4113094-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-02-14 15:29:51 -08:00
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volatile char buf[MAX_STACK] = {};
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__sink(buf[MAX_STACK - 1]);
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2020-01-09 22:41:24 -08:00
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return f1(skb) + f3(val, skb, 1);
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}
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__attribute__ ((noinline))
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int f3(int val, struct __sk_buff *skb, int var)
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{
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volatile char buf[MAX_STACK] = {};
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2023-03-08 21:40:14 -08:00
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__sink(buf[MAX_STACK - 1]);
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2020-01-09 22:41:24 -08:00
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return skb->ifindex * val * var;
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}
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2021-09-28 09:19:39 -07:00
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SEC("tc")
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bpf: Fix test verif_scale_strobemeta_subprogs failure due to llvm19
With latest llvm19, I hit the following selftest failures with
$ ./test_progs -j
libbpf: prog 'on_event': BPF program load failed: Permission denied
libbpf: prog 'on_event': -- BEGIN PROG LOAD LOG --
combined stack size of 4 calls is 544. Too large
verification time 1344153 usec
stack depth 24+440+0+32
processed 51008 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 19 total_states 1467 peak_states 303 mark_read 146
-- END PROG LOAD LOG --
libbpf: prog 'on_event': failed to load: -13
libbpf: failed to load object 'strobemeta_subprogs.bpf.o'
scale_test:FAIL:expect_success unexpected error: -13 (errno 13)
#498 verif_scale_strobemeta_subprogs:FAIL
The verifier complains too big of the combined stack size (544 bytes) which
exceeds the maximum stack limit 512. This is a regression from llvm19 ([1]).
In the above error log, the original stack depth is 24+440+0+32.
To satisfy interpreter's need, in verifier the stack depth is adjusted to
32+448+32+32=544 which exceeds 512, hence the error. The same adjusted
stack size is also used for jit case.
But the jitted codes could use smaller stack size.
$ egrep -r stack_depth | grep round_up
arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: ctx->stack_size = round_up(prog->aux->stack_depth, 16);
loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c: bpf_stack_adjust = round_up(ctx->prog->aux->stack_depth, 16);
powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: cgctx.stack_size = round_up(fp->aux->stack_depth, 16);
riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c: round_up(ctx->prog->aux->stack_depth, STACK_ALIGN);
riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c: bpf_stack_adjust = round_up(ctx->prog->aux->stack_depth, 16);
s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: u32 stack_depth = round_up(fp->aux->stack_depth, 8);
sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c: stack_needed += round_up(stack_depth, 16);
x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: EMIT3_off32(0x48, 0x81, 0xEC, round_up(stack_depth, 8));
x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: int tcc_off = -4 - round_up(stack_depth, 8);
x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: round_up(stack_depth, 8));
x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: int tcc_off = -4 - round_up(stack_depth, 8);
x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c: EMIT3_off32(0x48, 0x81, 0xC4, round_up(stack_depth, 8));
In the above, STACK_ALIGN in riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c is defined as 16.
So stack is aligned in either 8 or 16, x86/s390 having 8-byte stack alignment and
the rest having 16-byte alignment.
This patch calculates total stack depth based on 16-byte alignment if jit is requested.
For the above failing case, the new stack size will be 32+448+0+32=512 and no verification
failure. llvm19 regression will be discussed separately in llvm upstream.
The verifier change caused three test failures as these tests compared messages
with stack size. More specifically,
- test_global_funcs/global_func1: fail with interpreter mode and success with jit mode.
Adjusted stack sizes so both jit and interpreter modes will fail.
- async_stack_depth/{pseudo_call_check, async_call_root_check}: since jit and interpreter
will calculate different stack sizes, the failure msg is adjusted to omit those
specific stack size numbers.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/32bde0f0-1881-46c9-931a-673be566c61d@linux.dev/
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240214232951.4113094-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-02-14 15:29:51 -08:00
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__failure __msg("combined stack size of 3 calls is")
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2023-02-15 20:59:53 -08:00
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int global_func1(struct __sk_buff *skb)
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2020-01-09 22:41:24 -08:00
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{
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return f0(1, skb) + f1(skb) + f2(2, skb) + f3(3, skb, 4);
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}
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