linux/security/ipe/policy_fs.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
*/
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include "ipe.h"
#include "policy.h"
#include "eval.h"
#include "fs.h"
ipe: add errno field to IPE policy load auditing Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails, allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified of potentially malicious actions on their systems with respect to IPE. This patch introduces a new error field to the AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD event to log policy loading failures. Currently, IPE only logs successful policy loads, but not failures. Tracking failures is crucial to detect malicious attempts and ensure a complete audit trail for security events. The new error field will capture the following error codes: * -ENOKEY: Key used to sign the IPE policy not found in the keyring * -ESTALE: Attempting to update an IPE policy with an older version * -EKEYREJECTED: IPE signature verification failed * -ENOENT: Policy was deleted while updating * -EEXIST: Same name policy already deployed * -ERANGE: Policy version number overflow * -EINVAL: Policy version parsing error * -EPERM: Insufficient permission * -ENOMEM: Out of memory (OOM) * -EBADMSG: Policy is invalid Here are some examples of the updated audit record types: AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422): audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name="Test_Policy" policy_version=0.0.1 policy_digest=sha256:84EFBA8FA71E62AE0A537FAB962F8A2BD1053964C4299DCA 92BFFF4DB82E86D3 auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=1 errno=0 The above record shows a new policy has been successfully loaded into the kernel with the policy name, version, and hash with the errno=0. AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422) with error: audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name=? policy_version=? policy_digest=? auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=0 errno=-74 The above record shows a policy load failure due to an invalid policy (-EBADMSG). By adding this error field, we ensure that all policy load attempts, whether successful or failed, are logged, providing a comprehensive audit trail for IPE policy management. Signed-off-by: Jasjiv Singh <jasjivsingh@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
2025-03-13 14:51:01 -07:00
#include "audit.h"
#define MAX_VERSION_SIZE ARRAY_SIZE("65535.65535.65535")
/**
* struct ipefs_file - defines a file in securityfs.
*
* @name: file name inside the policy subdirectory
* @access: file permissions
* @fops: &file_operations specific to this file
*/
struct ipefs_file {
const char *name;
umode_t access;
const struct file_operations *fops;
};
/**
* read_pkcs7() - Read handler for "ipe/policies/$name/pkcs7".
* @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
* @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
* @len: Supplies the length of @data.
* @offset: unused.
*
* @data will be populated with the pkcs7 blob representing the policy
* on success. If the policy is unsigned (like the boot policy), this
* will return -ENOENT.
*
* Return:
* * Length of buffer written - Success
* * %-ENOENT - Policy initializing/deleted or is unsigned
*/
static ssize_t read_pkcs7(struct file *f, char __user *data,
size_t len, loff_t *offset)
{
const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
struct inode *root = NULL;
int rc = 0;
root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
inode_lock_shared(root);
p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private;
if (!p) {
rc = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
if (!p->pkcs7) {
rc = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, p->pkcs7, p->pkcs7len);
out:
inode_unlock_shared(root);
return rc;
}
/**
* read_policy() - Read handler for "ipe/policies/$name/policy".
* @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
* @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
* @len: Supplies the length of @data.
* @offset: unused.
*
* @data will be populated with the plain-text version of the policy
* on success.
*
* Return:
* * Length of buffer written - Success
* * %-ENOENT - Policy initializing/deleted
*/
static ssize_t read_policy(struct file *f, char __user *data,
size_t len, loff_t *offset)
{
const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
struct inode *root = NULL;
int rc = 0;
root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
inode_lock_shared(root);
p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private;
if (!p) {
rc = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, p->text, p->textlen);
out:
inode_unlock_shared(root);
return rc;
}
/**
* read_name() - Read handler for "ipe/policies/$name/name".
* @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
* @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
* @len: Supplies the length of @data.
* @offset: unused.
*
* @data will be populated with the policy_name attribute on success.
*
* Return:
* * Length of buffer written - Success
* * %-ENOENT - Policy initializing/deleted
*/
static ssize_t read_name(struct file *f, char __user *data,
size_t len, loff_t *offset)
{
const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
struct inode *root = NULL;
int rc = 0;
root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
inode_lock_shared(root);
p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private;
if (!p) {
rc = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, p->parsed->name,
strlen(p->parsed->name));
out:
inode_unlock_shared(root);
return rc;
}
/**
* read_version() - Read handler for "ipe/policies/$name/version".
* @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
* @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
* @len: Supplies the length of @data.
* @offset: unused.
*
* @data will be populated with the version string on success.
*
* Return:
* * Length of buffer written - Success
* * %-ENOENT - Policy initializing/deleted
*/
static ssize_t read_version(struct file *f, char __user *data,
size_t len, loff_t *offset)
{
char buffer[MAX_VERSION_SIZE] = { 0 };
const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
struct inode *root = NULL;
size_t strsize = 0;
ssize_t rc = 0;
root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
inode_lock_shared(root);
p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private;
if (!p) {
rc = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
strsize = scnprintf(buffer, ARRAY_SIZE(buffer), "%hu.%hu.%hu",
p->parsed->version.major, p->parsed->version.minor,
p->parsed->version.rev);
rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, buffer, strsize);
out:
inode_unlock_shared(root);
return rc;
}
/**
* setactive() - Write handler for "ipe/policies/$name/active".
* @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
* @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
* @len: Supplies the length of @data.
* @offset: unused.
*
* Return:
* * Length of buffer written - Success
* * %-EPERM - Insufficient permission
* * %-EINVAL - Invalid input
* * %-ENOENT - Policy initializing/deleted
*/
static ssize_t setactive(struct file *f, const char __user *data,
size_t len, loff_t *offset)
{
const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
struct inode *root = NULL;
bool value = false;
int rc = 0;
if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &value);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (!value)
return -EINVAL;
root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
inode_lock(root);
p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private;
if (!p) {
rc = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
rc = ipe_set_active_pol(p);
out:
inode_unlock(root);
return (rc < 0) ? rc : len;
}
/**
* getactive() - Read handler for "ipe/policies/$name/active".
* @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
* @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
* @len: Supplies the length of @data.
* @offset: unused.
*
* @data will be populated with the 1 or 0 depending on if the
* corresponding policy is active.
*
* Return:
* * Length of buffer written - Success
* * %-ENOENT - Policy initializing/deleted
*/
static ssize_t getactive(struct file *f, char __user *data,
size_t len, loff_t *offset)
{
const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
struct inode *root = NULL;
const char *str;
int rc = 0;
root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
inode_lock_shared(root);
p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private;
if (!p) {
inode_unlock_shared(root);
return -ENOENT;
}
inode_unlock_shared(root);
str = (p == rcu_access_pointer(ipe_active_policy)) ? "1" : "0";
rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, str, 1);
return rc;
}
/**
* update_policy() - Write handler for "ipe/policies/$name/update".
* @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
* @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
* @len: Supplies the length of @data.
* @offset: unused.
*
* On success this updates the policy represented by $name,
* in-place.
*
ipe: add errno field to IPE policy load auditing Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails, allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified of potentially malicious actions on their systems with respect to IPE. This patch introduces a new error field to the AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD event to log policy loading failures. Currently, IPE only logs successful policy loads, but not failures. Tracking failures is crucial to detect malicious attempts and ensure a complete audit trail for security events. The new error field will capture the following error codes: * -ENOKEY: Key used to sign the IPE policy not found in the keyring * -ESTALE: Attempting to update an IPE policy with an older version * -EKEYREJECTED: IPE signature verification failed * -ENOENT: Policy was deleted while updating * -EEXIST: Same name policy already deployed * -ERANGE: Policy version number overflow * -EINVAL: Policy version parsing error * -EPERM: Insufficient permission * -ENOMEM: Out of memory (OOM) * -EBADMSG: Policy is invalid Here are some examples of the updated audit record types: AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422): audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name="Test_Policy" policy_version=0.0.1 policy_digest=sha256:84EFBA8FA71E62AE0A537FAB962F8A2BD1053964C4299DCA 92BFFF4DB82E86D3 auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=1 errno=0 The above record shows a new policy has been successfully loaded into the kernel with the policy name, version, and hash with the errno=0. AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422) with error: audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name=? policy_version=? policy_digest=? auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=0 errno=-74 The above record shows a policy load failure due to an invalid policy (-EBADMSG). By adding this error field, we ensure that all policy load attempts, whether successful or failed, are logged, providing a comprehensive audit trail for IPE policy management. Signed-off-by: Jasjiv Singh <jasjivsingh@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
2025-03-13 14:51:01 -07:00
* Return:
* * Length of buffer written - Success
* * %-EPERM - Insufficient permission
* * %-ENOMEM - Out of memory (OOM)
* * %-ENOENT - Policy was deleted while updating
* * %-EINVAL - Policy name mismatch
* * %-ESTALE - Policy version too old
*/
static ssize_t update_policy(struct file *f, const char __user *data,
size_t len, loff_t *offset)
{
struct inode *root = NULL;
char *copy = NULL;
int rc = 0;
ipe: add errno field to IPE policy load auditing Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails, allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified of potentially malicious actions on their systems with respect to IPE. This patch introduces a new error field to the AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD event to log policy loading failures. Currently, IPE only logs successful policy loads, but not failures. Tracking failures is crucial to detect malicious attempts and ensure a complete audit trail for security events. The new error field will capture the following error codes: * -ENOKEY: Key used to sign the IPE policy not found in the keyring * -ESTALE: Attempting to update an IPE policy with an older version * -EKEYREJECTED: IPE signature verification failed * -ENOENT: Policy was deleted while updating * -EEXIST: Same name policy already deployed * -ERANGE: Policy version number overflow * -EINVAL: Policy version parsing error * -EPERM: Insufficient permission * -ENOMEM: Out of memory (OOM) * -EBADMSG: Policy is invalid Here are some examples of the updated audit record types: AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422): audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name="Test_Policy" policy_version=0.0.1 policy_digest=sha256:84EFBA8FA71E62AE0A537FAB962F8A2BD1053964C4299DCA 92BFFF4DB82E86D3 auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=1 errno=0 The above record shows a new policy has been successfully loaded into the kernel with the policy name, version, and hash with the errno=0. AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422) with error: audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name=? policy_version=? policy_digest=? auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=0 errno=-74 The above record shows a policy load failure due to an invalid policy (-EBADMSG). By adding this error field, we ensure that all policy load attempts, whether successful or failed, are logged, providing a comprehensive audit trail for IPE policy management. Signed-off-by: Jasjiv Singh <jasjivsingh@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
2025-03-13 14:51:01 -07:00
if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
rc = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
copy = memdup_user(data, len);
ipe: add errno field to IPE policy load auditing Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails, allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified of potentially malicious actions on their systems with respect to IPE. This patch introduces a new error field to the AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD event to log policy loading failures. Currently, IPE only logs successful policy loads, but not failures. Tracking failures is crucial to detect malicious attempts and ensure a complete audit trail for security events. The new error field will capture the following error codes: * -ENOKEY: Key used to sign the IPE policy not found in the keyring * -ESTALE: Attempting to update an IPE policy with an older version * -EKEYREJECTED: IPE signature verification failed * -ENOENT: Policy was deleted while updating * -EEXIST: Same name policy already deployed * -ERANGE: Policy version number overflow * -EINVAL: Policy version parsing error * -EPERM: Insufficient permission * -ENOMEM: Out of memory (OOM) * -EBADMSG: Policy is invalid Here are some examples of the updated audit record types: AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422): audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name="Test_Policy" policy_version=0.0.1 policy_digest=sha256:84EFBA8FA71E62AE0A537FAB962F8A2BD1053964C4299DCA 92BFFF4DB82E86D3 auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=1 errno=0 The above record shows a new policy has been successfully loaded into the kernel with the policy name, version, and hash with the errno=0. AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422) with error: audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name=? policy_version=? policy_digest=? auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=0 errno=-74 The above record shows a policy load failure due to an invalid policy (-EBADMSG). By adding this error field, we ensure that all policy load attempts, whether successful or failed, are logged, providing a comprehensive audit trail for IPE policy management. Signed-off-by: Jasjiv Singh <jasjivsingh@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
2025-03-13 14:51:01 -07:00
if (IS_ERR(copy)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(copy);
copy = NULL;
goto out;
}
root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
inode_lock(root);
rc = ipe_update_policy(root, NULL, 0, copy, len);
inode_unlock(root);
ipe: add errno field to IPE policy load auditing Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails, allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified of potentially malicious actions on their systems with respect to IPE. This patch introduces a new error field to the AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD event to log policy loading failures. Currently, IPE only logs successful policy loads, but not failures. Tracking failures is crucial to detect malicious attempts and ensure a complete audit trail for security events. The new error field will capture the following error codes: * -ENOKEY: Key used to sign the IPE policy not found in the keyring * -ESTALE: Attempting to update an IPE policy with an older version * -EKEYREJECTED: IPE signature verification failed * -ENOENT: Policy was deleted while updating * -EEXIST: Same name policy already deployed * -ERANGE: Policy version number overflow * -EINVAL: Policy version parsing error * -EPERM: Insufficient permission * -ENOMEM: Out of memory (OOM) * -EBADMSG: Policy is invalid Here are some examples of the updated audit record types: AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422): audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name="Test_Policy" policy_version=0.0.1 policy_digest=sha256:84EFBA8FA71E62AE0A537FAB962F8A2BD1053964C4299DCA 92BFFF4DB82E86D3 auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=1 errno=0 The above record shows a new policy has been successfully loaded into the kernel with the policy name, version, and hash with the errno=0. AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422) with error: audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name=? policy_version=? policy_digest=? auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=0 errno=-74 The above record shows a policy load failure due to an invalid policy (-EBADMSG). By adding this error field, we ensure that all policy load attempts, whether successful or failed, are logged, providing a comprehensive audit trail for IPE policy management. Signed-off-by: Jasjiv Singh <jasjivsingh@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
2025-03-13 14:51:01 -07:00
out:
kfree(copy);
ipe: add errno field to IPE policy load auditing Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails, allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified of potentially malicious actions on their systems with respect to IPE. This patch introduces a new error field to the AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD event to log policy loading failures. Currently, IPE only logs successful policy loads, but not failures. Tracking failures is crucial to detect malicious attempts and ensure a complete audit trail for security events. The new error field will capture the following error codes: * -ENOKEY: Key used to sign the IPE policy not found in the keyring * -ESTALE: Attempting to update an IPE policy with an older version * -EKEYREJECTED: IPE signature verification failed * -ENOENT: Policy was deleted while updating * -EEXIST: Same name policy already deployed * -ERANGE: Policy version number overflow * -EINVAL: Policy version parsing error * -EPERM: Insufficient permission * -ENOMEM: Out of memory (OOM) * -EBADMSG: Policy is invalid Here are some examples of the updated audit record types: AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422): audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name="Test_Policy" policy_version=0.0.1 policy_digest=sha256:84EFBA8FA71E62AE0A537FAB962F8A2BD1053964C4299DCA 92BFFF4DB82E86D3 auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=1 errno=0 The above record shows a new policy has been successfully loaded into the kernel with the policy name, version, and hash with the errno=0. AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422) with error: audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name=? policy_version=? policy_digest=? auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=0 errno=-74 The above record shows a policy load failure due to an invalid policy (-EBADMSG). By adding this error field, we ensure that all policy load attempts, whether successful or failed, are logged, providing a comprehensive audit trail for IPE policy management. Signed-off-by: Jasjiv Singh <jasjivsingh@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
2025-03-13 14:51:01 -07:00
if (rc) {
ipe_audit_policy_load(ERR_PTR(rc));
return rc;
ipe: add errno field to IPE policy load auditing Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails, allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified of potentially malicious actions on their systems with respect to IPE. This patch introduces a new error field to the AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD event to log policy loading failures. Currently, IPE only logs successful policy loads, but not failures. Tracking failures is crucial to detect malicious attempts and ensure a complete audit trail for security events. The new error field will capture the following error codes: * -ENOKEY: Key used to sign the IPE policy not found in the keyring * -ESTALE: Attempting to update an IPE policy with an older version * -EKEYREJECTED: IPE signature verification failed * -ENOENT: Policy was deleted while updating * -EEXIST: Same name policy already deployed * -ERANGE: Policy version number overflow * -EINVAL: Policy version parsing error * -EPERM: Insufficient permission * -ENOMEM: Out of memory (OOM) * -EBADMSG: Policy is invalid Here are some examples of the updated audit record types: AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422): audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name="Test_Policy" policy_version=0.0.1 policy_digest=sha256:84EFBA8FA71E62AE0A537FAB962F8A2BD1053964C4299DCA 92BFFF4DB82E86D3 auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=1 errno=0 The above record shows a new policy has been successfully loaded into the kernel with the policy name, version, and hash with the errno=0. AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422) with error: audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name=? policy_version=? policy_digest=? auid=1000 ses=3 lsm=ipe res=0 errno=-74 The above record shows a policy load failure due to an invalid policy (-EBADMSG). By adding this error field, we ensure that all policy load attempts, whether successful or failed, are logged, providing a comprehensive audit trail for IPE policy management. Signed-off-by: Jasjiv Singh <jasjivsingh@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
2025-03-13 14:51:01 -07:00
}
return len;
}
/**
* delete_policy() - write handler for "ipe/policies/$name/delete".
* @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node.
* @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall.
* @len: Supplies the length of @data.
* @offset: unused.
*
* On success this deletes the policy represented by $name.
*
* Return:
* * Length of buffer written - Success
* * %-EPERM - Insufficient permission/deleting active policy
* * %-EINVAL - Invalid input
* * %-ENOENT - Policy initializing/deleted
*/
static ssize_t delete_policy(struct file *f, const char __user *data,
size_t len, loff_t *offset)
{
struct ipe_policy *ap = NULL;
struct ipe_policy *p = NULL;
struct inode *root = NULL;
bool value = false;
int rc = 0;
if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &value);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (!value)
return -EINVAL;
root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
inode_lock(root);
p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private;
if (!p) {
inode_unlock(root);
return -ENOENT;
}
mutex_lock(&ipe_policy_lock);
ap = rcu_dereference_protected(ipe_active_policy,
lockdep_is_held(&ipe_policy_lock));
if (p == ap) {
mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock);
inode_unlock(root);
return -EPERM;
}
mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock);
root->i_private = NULL;
inode_unlock(root);
synchronize_rcu();
ipe_free_policy(p);
return len;
}
static const struct file_operations content_fops = {
.read = read_policy,
};
static const struct file_operations pkcs7_fops = {
.read = read_pkcs7,
};
static const struct file_operations name_fops = {
.read = read_name,
};
static const struct file_operations ver_fops = {
.read = read_version,
};
static const struct file_operations active_fops = {
.write = setactive,
.read = getactive,
};
static const struct file_operations update_fops = {
.write = update_policy,
};
static const struct file_operations delete_fops = {
.write = delete_policy,
};
/*
* policy_subdir - files under a policy subdirectory
*/
static const struct ipefs_file policy_subdir[] = {
{ "pkcs7", 0444, &pkcs7_fops },
{ "policy", 0444, &content_fops },
{ "name", 0444, &name_fops },
{ "version", 0444, &ver_fops },
{ "active", 0600, &active_fops },
{ "update", 0200, &update_fops },
{ "delete", 0200, &delete_fops },
};
/**
* ipe_del_policyfs_node() - Delete a securityfs entry for @p.
* @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to delete a securityfs entry for.
*/
void ipe_del_policyfs_node(struct ipe_policy *p)
{
securityfs_remove(p->policyfs);
p->policyfs = NULL;
}
/**
* ipe_new_policyfs_node() - Create a securityfs entry for @p.
* @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to create a securityfs entry for.
*
* Return: %0 on success. If an error occurs, the function will return
* the -errno.
*/
int ipe_new_policyfs_node(struct ipe_policy *p)
{
const struct ipefs_file *f = NULL;
struct dentry *policyfs = NULL;
struct inode *root = NULL;
struct dentry *d = NULL;
size_t i = 0;
int rc = 0;
if (p->policyfs)
return 0;
policyfs = securityfs_create_dir(p->parsed->name, policy_root);
if (IS_ERR(policyfs))
return PTR_ERR(policyfs);
root = d_inode(policyfs);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(policy_subdir); ++i) {
f = &policy_subdir[i];
d = securityfs_create_file(f->name, f->access, policyfs,
NULL, f->fops);
if (IS_ERR(d)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(d);
goto err;
}
}
inode_lock(root);
p->policyfs = policyfs;
root->i_private = p;
inode_unlock(root);
return 0;
err:
securityfs_remove(policyfs);
return rc;
}