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License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with no license Many user space API headers are missing licensing information, which makes it hard for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default are files without license information under the default license of the kernel, which is GPLV2. Marking them GPLV2 would exclude them from being included in non GPLV2 code, which is obviously not intended. The user space API headers fall under the syscall exception which is in the kernels COPYING file: NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work". otherwise syscall usage would not be possible. Update the files which contain no license information with an SPDX license identifier. The chosen identifier is 'GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note' which is the officially assigned identifier for the Linux syscall exception. SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. See the previous patch in this series for the methodology of how this patch was researched. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 15:08:43 +01:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
#ifndef _UAPI__SVM_H
#define _UAPI__SVM_H
#define SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0 0x000
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
#define SVM_EXIT_READ_CR2 0x002
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
#define SVM_EXIT_READ_CR3 0x003
#define SVM_EXIT_READ_CR4 0x004
#define SVM_EXIT_READ_CR8 0x008
#define SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0 0x010
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
#define SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR2 0x012
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
#define SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR3 0x013
#define SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR4 0x014
#define SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR8 0x018
#define SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0 0x020
#define SVM_EXIT_READ_DR1 0x021
#define SVM_EXIT_READ_DR2 0x022
#define SVM_EXIT_READ_DR3 0x023
#define SVM_EXIT_READ_DR4 0x024
#define SVM_EXIT_READ_DR5 0x025
#define SVM_EXIT_READ_DR6 0x026
#define SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7 0x027
#define SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR0 0x030
#define SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR1 0x031
#define SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR2 0x032
#define SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR3 0x033
#define SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR4 0x034
#define SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR5 0x035
#define SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR6 0x036
#define SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7 0x037
#define SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE 0x040
x86/boot/compressed/64: Setup a GHCB-based VC Exception handler Install an exception handler for #VC exception that uses a GHCB. Also add the infrastructure for handling different exit-codes by decoding the instruction that caused the exception and error handling. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-24-joro@8bytes.org
2020-09-07 15:15:24 +02:00
#define SVM_EXIT_LAST_EXCP 0x05f
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
#define SVM_EXIT_INTR 0x060
#define SVM_EXIT_NMI 0x061
#define SVM_EXIT_SMI 0x062
#define SVM_EXIT_INIT 0x063
#define SVM_EXIT_VINTR 0x064
#define SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE 0x065
#define SVM_EXIT_IDTR_READ 0x066
#define SVM_EXIT_GDTR_READ 0x067
#define SVM_EXIT_LDTR_READ 0x068
#define SVM_EXIT_TR_READ 0x069
#define SVM_EXIT_IDTR_WRITE 0x06a
#define SVM_EXIT_GDTR_WRITE 0x06b
#define SVM_EXIT_LDTR_WRITE 0x06c
#define SVM_EXIT_TR_WRITE 0x06d
#define SVM_EXIT_RDTSC 0x06e
#define SVM_EXIT_RDPMC 0x06f
#define SVM_EXIT_PUSHF 0x070
#define SVM_EXIT_POPF 0x071
#define SVM_EXIT_CPUID 0x072
#define SVM_EXIT_RSM 0x073
#define SVM_EXIT_IRET 0x074
#define SVM_EXIT_SWINT 0x075
#define SVM_EXIT_INVD 0x076
#define SVM_EXIT_PAUSE 0x077
#define SVM_EXIT_HLT 0x078
#define SVM_EXIT_INVLPG 0x079
#define SVM_EXIT_INVLPGA 0x07a
#define SVM_EXIT_IOIO 0x07b
#define SVM_EXIT_MSR 0x07c
#define SVM_EXIT_TASK_SWITCH 0x07d
#define SVM_EXIT_FERR_FREEZE 0x07e
#define SVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN 0x07f
#define SVM_EXIT_VMRUN 0x080
#define SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL 0x081
#define SVM_EXIT_VMLOAD 0x082
#define SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE 0x083
#define SVM_EXIT_STGI 0x084
#define SVM_EXIT_CLGI 0x085
#define SVM_EXIT_SKINIT 0x086
#define SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP 0x087
#define SVM_EXIT_ICEBP 0x088
#define SVM_EXIT_WBINVD 0x089
#define SVM_EXIT_MONITOR 0x08a
#define SVM_EXIT_MWAIT 0x08b
#define SVM_EXIT_MWAIT_COND 0x08c
#define SVM_EXIT_XSETBV 0x08d
kvm: svm: Intercept RDPRU The RDPRU instruction gives the guest read access to the IA32_APERF MSR and the IA32_MPERF MSR. According to volume 3 of the APM, "When virtualization is enabled, this instruction can be intercepted by the Hypervisor. The intercept bit is at VMCB byte offset 10h, bit 14." Since we don't enumerate the instruction in KVM_SUPPORTED_CPUID, intercept it and synthesize #UD. Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Drew Schmitt <dasch@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jacob Xu <jacobhxu@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-09-19 15:59:17 -07:00
#define SVM_EXIT_RDPRU 0x08e
KVM: SVM: Add support for EFER write traps for an SEV-ES guest For SEV-ES guests, the interception of EFER write access is not recommended. EFER interception occurs prior to EFER being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify EFER itself because the register is located in the encrypted register state. SEV-ES support introduces a new EFER write trap. This trap provides intercept support of an EFER write after it has been modified. The new EFER value is provided in the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting of the guest EFER. Add support to track the value of the guest EFER value using the EFER write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating mode. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <8993149352a3a87cd0625b3b61bfd31ab28977e1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-10 11:09:55 -06:00
#define SVM_EXIT_EFER_WRITE_TRAP 0x08f
KVM: SVM: Add support for CR0 write traps for an SEV-ES guest For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify the control register itself because the register is located in the encrypted register state. SEV-ES support introduces new control register write traps. These traps provide intercept support of a control register write after the control register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting of the guest control registers. Add support to track the value of the guest CR0 register using the control register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating mode. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <182c9baf99df7e40ad9617ff90b84542705ef0d7.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-10 11:09:56 -06:00
#define SVM_EXIT_CR0_WRITE_TRAP 0x090
#define SVM_EXIT_CR1_WRITE_TRAP 0x091
#define SVM_EXIT_CR2_WRITE_TRAP 0x092
#define SVM_EXIT_CR3_WRITE_TRAP 0x093
#define SVM_EXIT_CR4_WRITE_TRAP 0x094
#define SVM_EXIT_CR5_WRITE_TRAP 0x095
#define SVM_EXIT_CR6_WRITE_TRAP 0x096
#define SVM_EXIT_CR7_WRITE_TRAP 0x097
#define SVM_EXIT_CR8_WRITE_TRAP 0x098
#define SVM_EXIT_CR9_WRITE_TRAP 0x099
#define SVM_EXIT_CR10_WRITE_TRAP 0x09a
#define SVM_EXIT_CR11_WRITE_TRAP 0x09b
#define SVM_EXIT_CR12_WRITE_TRAP 0x09c
#define SVM_EXIT_CR13_WRITE_TRAP 0x09d
#define SVM_EXIT_CR14_WRITE_TRAP 0x09e
#define SVM_EXIT_CR15_WRITE_TRAP 0x09f
KVM: SVM: Enable INVPCID feature on AMD The following intercept bit has been added to support VMEXIT for INVPCID instruction: Code Name Cause A2h VMEXIT_INVPCID INVPCID instruction The following bit has been added to the VMCB layout control area to control intercept of INVPCID: Byte Offset Bit(s) Function 14h 2 intercept INVPCID Enable the interceptions when the the guest is running with shadow page table enabled and handle the tlbflush based on the invpcid instruction type. For the guests with nested page table (NPT) support, the INVPCID feature works as running it natively. KVM does not need to do any special handling in this case. AMD documentation for INVPCID feature is available at "AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual Volume 2: System Programming, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.34(or later)" The documentation can be obtained at the links below: Link: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537 Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Message-Id: <159985255929.11252.17346684135277453258.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-09-11 14:29:19 -05:00
#define SVM_EXIT_INVPCID 0x0a2
KVM: SVM: Add architectural definitions/assets for Bus Lock Threshold Virtual machines can exploit bus locks to degrade the performance of the system. Bus locks can be caused by Non-WB(Write back) and misaligned locked RMW (Read-modify-Write) instructions and require systemwide synchronization among all processors which can result into significant performance penalties. To address this issue, the Bus Lock Threshold feature is introduced to provide ability to hypervisor to restrict guests' capability of initiating mulitple buslocks, thereby preventing system slowdowns. Support for the buslock threshold is indicated via CPUID function 0x8000000A_EDX[29]. On the processors that support the Bus Lock Threshold feature, the VMCB provides a Bus Lock Threshold enable bit and an unsigned 16-bit Bus Lock threshold count. VMCB intercept bit VMCB Offset Bits Function 14h 5 Intercept bus lock operations Bus lock threshold count VMCB Offset Bits Function 120h 15:0 Bus lock counter When a VMRUN instruction is executed, the bus lock threshold count is loaded into an internal count register. Before the processor executes a bus lock in the guest, it checks the value of this register: - If the value is greater than '0', the processor successfully executes the bus lock and decrements the count. - If the value is '0', the bus lock is not executed, and a #VMEXIT to the VMM is taken. The bus lock threshold #VMEXIT is reported to the VMM with the VMEXIT code A5h, SVM_EXIT_BUS_LOCK. Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Co-developed-by: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250502050346.14274-4-manali.shukla@amd.com [sean: rewrite shortlog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2025-05-02 05:03:44 +00:00
#define SVM_EXIT_BUS_LOCK 0x0a5
KVM: SVM: Add Idle HLT intercept support Add support for "Idle HLT" interception on AMD CPUs, and enable Idle HLT interception instead of "normal" HLT interception for all VMs for which HLT-exiting is enabled. Idle HLT provides a mild performance boost for all VM types, by avoiding a VM-Exit in the scenario where KVM would immediately "wake" and resume the vCPU. Idle HLT makes HLT-exiting conditional on the vCPU not having a valid, unmasked interrupt. Specifically, a VM-Exit occurs on execution of HLT if and only if there are no pending V_IRQ or V_NMI events. Note, Idle is a replacement for full HLT interception, i.e. enabling HLT interception would result in all HLT instructions causing unconditional VM-Exits. Per the APM: When both HLT and Idle HLT intercepts are active at the same time, the HLT intercept takes priority. This intercept occurs only if a virtual interrupt is not pending (V_INTR or V_NMI). For KVM's use of V_IRQ (also called V_INTR in the APM) to detect interrupt windows, the net effect of enabling Idle HLT is that, if a virtual interupt is pending and unmasked at the time of HLT, the vCPU will take a V_IRQ intercept instead of a HLT intercept. When AVIC is enabled, Idle HLT works as intended: the vCPU continues unimpeded and services the pending virtual interrupt. Note, the APM's description of V_IRQ interaction with AVIC is quite confusing, and requires piecing together implied behavior. Per the APM, when AVIC is enabled, V_IRQ *from the VMCB* is ignored: When AVIC mode is enabled for a virtual processor, the V_IRQ, V_INTR_PRIO, V_INTR_VECTOR, and V_IGN_TPR fields in the VMCB are ignored. Which seems to contradict the behavior of Idle HLT: This intercept occurs only if a virtual interrupt is not pending (V_INTR or V_NMI). What's not explicitly stated is that hardware's internal copy of V_IRQ (and related fields) *are* still active, i.e. are presumably used to cache information from the virtual APIC. Handle Idle HLT exits as if they were normal HLT exits, e.g. don't try to optimize the handling under the assumption that there isn't a pending IRQ. Irrespective of AVIC, Idle HLT is inherently racy with respect to the vIRR, as KVM can set vIRR bits asychronously. No changes are required to support KVM's use Idle HLT while running L2. In fact, supporting Idle HLT is actually a bug fix to some extent. If L1 wants to intercept HLT, recalc_intercepts() will enable HLT interception in vmcb02 and forward the intercept to L1 as normal. But if L1 does not want to intercept HLT, then KVM will run L2 with Idle HLT enabled and HLT interception disabled. If a V_IRQ or V_NMI for L2 becomes pending and L2 executes HLT, then use of Idle HLT will do the right thing, i.e. not #VMEXIT and instead deliver the virtual event. KVM currently doesn't handle this scenario correctly, e.g. doesn't check V_IRQ or V_NMI in vmcs02 as part of kvm_vcpu_has_events(). Do not expose Idle HLT to L1 at this time, as supporting nested Idle HLT is more complex than just enumerating the feature, e.g. requires KVM to handle the aforementioned scenarios of V_IRQ and V_NMI at the time of exit. Signed-off-by: Manali Shukla <Manali.Shukla@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250128124812.7324-3-manali.shukla@amd.com [sean: rewrite changelog, drop nested "support"] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2025-01-28 12:48:11 +00:00
#define SVM_EXIT_IDLE_HLT 0x0a6
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
#define SVM_EXIT_NPF 0x400
svm: Add VMEXIT handlers for AVIC This patch introduces VMEXIT handlers, avic_incomplete_ipi_interception() and avic_unaccelerated_access_interception() along with two trace points (trace_kvm_avic_incomplete_ipi and trace_kvm_avic_unaccelerated_access). Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-04 14:09:48 -05:00
#define SVM_EXIT_AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI 0x401
#define SVM_EXIT_AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS 0x402
KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT SEV-ES adds a new VMEXIT reason code, VMGEXIT. Initial support for a VMGEXIT includes mapping the GHCB based on the guest GPA, which is obtained from a new VMCB field, and then validating the required inputs for the VMGEXIT exit reason. Since many of the VMGEXIT exit reasons correspond to existing VMEXIT reasons, the information from the GHCB is copied into the VMCB control exit code areas and KVM register areas. The standard exit handlers are invoked, similar to standard VMEXIT processing. Before restarting the vCPU, the GHCB is updated with any registers that have been updated by the hypervisor. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <c6a4ed4294a369bd75c44d03bd7ce0f0c3840e50.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-10 11:09:47 -06:00
#define SVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT 0x403
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events Add a handler for #VC exceptions caused by MMIO intercepts. These intercepts come along as nested page faults on pages with reserved bits set. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> [ jroedel@suse.de: Adapt to VC handling framework ] Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-50-joro@8bytes.org
2020-09-07 15:15:50 +02:00
/* SEV-ES software-defined VMGEXIT events */
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ 0x80000001
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE 0x80000002
x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State When running under SEV-ES, the kernel has to tell the hypervisor when to open the NMI window again after an NMI was injected. This is done with an NMI-complete message to the hypervisor. Add code to the kernel's NMI handler to send this message right at the beginning of do_nmi(). This always allows nesting NMIs. [ bp: Mark __sev_es_nmi_complete() noinstr: vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: exc_nmi()+0x17: call to __sev_es_nmi_complete() leaves .noinstr.text section While at it, use __pa_nodebug() for the same reason due to CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y: vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __sev_es_nmi_complete()+0xd9: call to __phys_addr() leaves .noinstr.text section ] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-71-joro@8bytes.org
2020-09-07 15:16:11 +02:00
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE 0x80000003
x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online Add a play_dead handler when running under SEV-ES. This is needed because the hypervisor can't deliver an SIPI request to restart the AP. Instead, the kernel has to issue a VMGEXIT to halt the VCPU until the hypervisor wakes it up again. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-70-joro@8bytes.org
2020-09-07 15:16:10 +02:00
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP 0x80000004
x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table As part of the GHCB specification, the booting of APs under SEV-ES requires an AP jump table when transitioning from one layer of code to another (e.g. when going from UEFI to the OS). As a result, each layer that parks an AP must provide the physical address of an AP jump table to the next layer via the hypervisor. Upon booting of the kernel, read the AP jump table address from the hypervisor. Under SEV-ES, APs are started using the INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence. Before issuing the first SIPI request for an AP, the start CS and IP is programmed into the AP jump table. Upon issuing the SIPI request, the AP will awaken and jump to that start CS:IP address. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> [ jroedel@suse.de: - Adapted to different code base - Moved AP table setup from SIPI sending path to real-mode setup code - Fix sparse warnings ] Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-67-joro@8bytes.org
2020-09-07 15:16:07 +02:00
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE 0x80000005
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SET_AP_JUMP_TABLE 0
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_GET_AP_JUMP_TABLE 1
x86/mm: Validate memory when changing the C-bit Add the needed functionality to change pages state from shared to private and vice-versa using the Page State Change VMGEXIT as documented in the GHCB spec. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-22-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2022-02-24 10:56:01 -06:00
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC 0x80000010
x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Version 2 of GHCB specification provides SNP_GUEST_REQUEST and SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST NAE that can be used by the SNP guest to communicate with the PSP. While at it, add a snp_issue_guest_request() helper that will be used by driver or other subsystem to issue the request to PSP. See SEV-SNP firmware and GHCB spec for more details. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-42-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2022-03-07 15:33:51 -06:00
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST 0x80000011
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST 0x80000012
x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs To provide a more secure way to start APs under SEV-SNP, use the SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event. This allows for guest control over the AP register state rather than trusting the hypervisor with the SEV-ES Jump Table address. During native_smp_prepare_cpus(), invoke an SEV-SNP function that, if SEV-SNP is active, will set/override apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu. This will allow the SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event method to be used to boot the APs. As a result of installing the override when SEV-SNP is active, this method of starting the APs becomes the required method. The override function will fail to start the AP if the hypervisor does not have support for AP creation. [ bp: Work in forgotten review comments. ] Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-23-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2022-03-07 15:33:32 -06:00
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATION 0x80000013
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE_ON_INIT 0
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE 1
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY 2
x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas The SVSM Calling Area (CA) is used to communicate between Linux and the SVSM. Since the firmware supplied CA for the BSP is likely to be in reserved memory, switch off that CA to a kernel provided CA so that access and use of the CA is available during boot. The CA switch is done using the SVSM core protocol SVSM_CORE_REMAP_CA call. An SVSM call is executed by filling out the SVSM CA and setting the proper register state as documented by the SVSM protocol. The SVSM is invoked by by requesting the hypervisor to run VMPL0. Once it is safe to allocate/reserve memory, allocate a CA for each CPU. After allocating the new CAs, the BSP will switch from the boot CA to the per-CPU CA. The CA for an AP is identified to the SVSM when creating the VMSA in preparation for booting the AP. [ bp: Heavily simplify svsm_issue_call() asm, other touchups. ] Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fa8021130bcc3bcf14d722a25548cb0cdf325456.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
2024-06-05 10:18:46 -05:00
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SNP_RUN_VMPL 0x80000018
x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Version 2 of the GHCB specification added the advertisement of features that are supported by the hypervisor. If the hypervisor supports SEV-SNP then it must set the SEV-SNP features bit to indicate that the base functionality is supported. Check that feature bit while establishing the GHCB; if failed, terminate the guest. Version 2 of the GHCB specification adds several new Non-Automatic Exits (NAEs), most of them are optional except the hypervisor feature. Now that the hypervisor feature NAE is implemented, bump the GHCB maximum supported protocol version. While at it, move the GHCB protocol negotiation check from the #VC exception handler to sev_enable() so that all feature detection happens before the first #VC exception. While at it, document why the GHCB page cannot be setup from load_stage2_idt(). [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2022-02-09 12:10:06 -06:00
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES 0x8000fffd
x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support The hypervisor can enable various new features (SEV_FEATURES[1:63]) and start a SNP guest. Some of these features need guest side implementation. If any of these features are enabled without it, the behavior of the SNP guest will be undefined. It may fail booting in a non-obvious way making it difficult to debug. Instead of allowing the guest to continue and have it fail randomly later, detect this early and fail gracefully. The SEV_STATUS MSR indicates features which the hypervisor has enabled. While booting, SNP guests should ascertain that all the enabled features have guest side implementation. In case a feature is not implemented in the guest, the guest terminates booting with GHCB protocol Non-Automatic Exit(NAE) termination request event, see "SEV-ES Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block Standardization" document (currently at https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf), section "Termination Request". Populate SW_EXITINFO2 with mask of unsupported features that the hypervisor can easily report to the user. More details in the AMD64 APM Vol 2, Section "SEV_STATUS MSR". [ bp: - Massage. - Move snp_check_features() call to C code. Note: the CC:stable@ aspect here is to be able to protect older, stable kernels when running on newer hypervisors. Or not "running" but fail reliably and in a well-defined manner instead of randomly. ] Fixes: cbd3d4f7c4e5 ("x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support") Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230118061943.534309-1-nikunj@amd.com
2023-01-18 11:49:43 +05:30
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST 0x8000fffe
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON(reason_set, reason_code) \
/* SW_EXITINFO1[3:0] */ \
(((((u64)reason_set) & 0xf)) | \
/* SW_EXITINFO1[11:4] */ \
((((u64)reason_code) & 0xff) << 4))
x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events Add a handler for #VC exceptions caused by MMIO intercepts. These intercepts come along as nested page faults on pages with reserved bits set. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> [ jroedel@suse.de: Adapt to VC handling framework ] Co-developed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-50-joro@8bytes.org
2020-09-07 15:15:50 +02:00
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT 0x8000ffff
KVM: SVM: Software reserved fields SVM added support for certain reserved fields to be used by software or hypervisor. Add the following reserved fields: - VMCB offset 0x3e0 - 0x3ff - Clean bit 31 - SVM intercept exit code 0xf0000000 Later patches will make use of this for supporting Hyper-V nested virtualization enhancements. Signed-off-by: Vineeth Pillai <viremana@linux.microsoft.com> Message-Id: <a1f17a43a8e9e751a1a9cc0281649d71bdbf721b.1622730232.git.viremana@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-03 15:14:37 +00:00
/* Exit code reserved for hypervisor/software use */
#define SVM_EXIT_SW 0xf0000000
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
#define SVM_EXIT_ERR -1
#define SVM_EXIT_REASONS \
{ SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0, "read_cr0" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
{ SVM_EXIT_READ_CR2, "read_cr2" }, \
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_READ_CR3, "read_cr3" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_READ_CR4, "read_cr4" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_READ_CR8, "read_cr8" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0, "write_cr0" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
{ SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR2, "write_cr2" }, \
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR3, "write_cr3" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR4, "write_cr4" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR8, "write_cr8" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0, "read_dr0" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_READ_DR1, "read_dr1" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_READ_DR2, "read_dr2" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_READ_DR3, "read_dr3" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
{ SVM_EXIT_READ_DR4, "read_dr4" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_READ_DR5, "read_dr5" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_READ_DR6, "read_dr6" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7, "read_dr7" }, \
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR0, "write_dr0" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR1, "write_dr1" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR2, "write_dr2" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR3, "write_dr3" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
{ SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR4, "write_dr4" }, \
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR5, "write_dr5" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
{ SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR6, "write_dr6" }, \
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7, "write_dr7" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + DE_VECTOR, "DE excp" }, \
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + DB_VECTOR, "DB excp" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + BP_VECTOR, "BP excp" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + OF_VECTOR, "OF excp" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + BR_VECTOR, "BR excp" }, \
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + UD_VECTOR, "UD excp" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + NM_VECTOR, "NM excp" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + DF_VECTOR, "DF excp" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + TS_VECTOR, "TS excp" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + NP_VECTOR, "NP excp" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + SS_VECTOR, "SS excp" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + GP_VECTOR, "GP excp" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + PF_VECTOR, "PF excp" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + MF_VECTOR, "MF excp" }, \
KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the effects (CVE-2015-5307). Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2015-11-03 18:03:53 +01:00
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + AC_VECTOR, "AC excp" }, \
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + MC_VECTOR, "MC excp" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
{ SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + XM_VECTOR, "XF excp" }, \
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_INTR, "interrupt" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_NMI, "nmi" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_SMI, "smi" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_INIT, "init" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_VINTR, "vintr" }, \
svm: Add VMEXIT handlers for AVIC This patch introduces VMEXIT handlers, avic_incomplete_ipi_interception() and avic_unaccelerated_access_interception() along with two trace points (trace_kvm_avic_incomplete_ipi and trace_kvm_avic_unaccelerated_access). Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-04 14:09:48 -05:00
{ SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE, "cr0_sel_write" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
{ SVM_EXIT_IDTR_READ, "read_idtr" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_GDTR_READ, "read_gdtr" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_LDTR_READ, "read_ldtr" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_TR_READ, "read_rt" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_IDTR_WRITE, "write_idtr" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_GDTR_WRITE, "write_gdtr" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_LDTR_WRITE, "write_ldtr" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_TR_WRITE, "write_rt" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_RDTSC, "rdtsc" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_RDPMC, "rdpmc" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_PUSHF, "pushf" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_POPF, "popf" }, \
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_CPUID, "cpuid" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
{ SVM_EXIT_RSM, "rsm" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_IRET, "iret" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_SWINT, "swint" }, \
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_INVD, "invd" }, \
svm: Add VMEXIT handlers for AVIC This patch introduces VMEXIT handlers, avic_incomplete_ipi_interception() and avic_unaccelerated_access_interception() along with two trace points (trace_kvm_avic_incomplete_ipi and trace_kvm_avic_unaccelerated_access). Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-04 14:09:48 -05:00
{ SVM_EXIT_PAUSE, "pause" }, \
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_HLT, "hlt" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_INVLPG, "invlpg" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_INVLPGA, "invlpga" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_IOIO, "io" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_MSR, "msr" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_TASK_SWITCH, "task_switch" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
{ SVM_EXIT_FERR_FREEZE, "ferr_freeze" }, \
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN, "shutdown" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_VMRUN, "vmrun" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL, "hypercall" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_VMLOAD, "vmload" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE, "vmsave" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_STGI, "stgi" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_CLGI, "clgi" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_SKINIT, "skinit" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
{ SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP, "rdtscp" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_ICEBP, "icebp" }, \
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_WBINVD, "wbinvd" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_MONITOR, "monitor" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_MWAIT, "mwait" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_XSETBV, "xsetbv" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add support for EFER write traps for an SEV-ES guest For SEV-ES guests, the interception of EFER write access is not recommended. EFER interception occurs prior to EFER being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify EFER itself because the register is located in the encrypted register state. SEV-ES support introduces a new EFER write trap. This trap provides intercept support of an EFER write after it has been modified. The new EFER value is provided in the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting of the guest EFER. Add support to track the value of the guest EFER value using the EFER write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating mode. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <8993149352a3a87cd0625b3b61bfd31ab28977e1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-10 11:09:55 -06:00
{ SVM_EXIT_EFER_WRITE_TRAP, "write_efer_trap" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add support for CR0 write traps for an SEV-ES guest For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify the control register itself because the register is located in the encrypted register state. SEV-ES support introduces new control register write traps. These traps provide intercept support of a control register write after the control register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting of the guest control registers. Add support to track the value of the guest CR0 register using the control register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating mode. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <182c9baf99df7e40ad9617ff90b84542705ef0d7.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-10 11:09:56 -06:00
{ SVM_EXIT_CR0_WRITE_TRAP, "write_cr0_trap" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add support for CR4 write traps for an SEV-ES guest For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify the control register itself because the register is located in the encrypted register state. SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps provide intercept support of a control register write after the control register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting of the guest control registers. Add support to track the value of the guest CR4 register using the control register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating mode. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <c3880bf2db8693aa26f648528fbc6e967ab46e25.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-10 11:09:57 -06:00
{ SVM_EXIT_CR4_WRITE_TRAP, "write_cr4_trap" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add support for CR8 write traps for an SEV-ES guest For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify the control register itself because the register is located in the encrypted register state. SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps provide intercept support of a control register write after the control register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting of the guest control registers. Add support to track the value of the guest CR8 register using the control register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating mode. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <5a01033f4c8b3106ca9374b7cadf8e33da852df1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-10 11:09:58 -06:00
{ SVM_EXIT_CR8_WRITE_TRAP, "write_cr8_trap" }, \
KVM: SVM: Enable INVPCID feature on AMD The following intercept bit has been added to support VMEXIT for INVPCID instruction: Code Name Cause A2h VMEXIT_INVPCID INVPCID instruction The following bit has been added to the VMCB layout control area to control intercept of INVPCID: Byte Offset Bit(s) Function 14h 2 intercept INVPCID Enable the interceptions when the the guest is running with shadow page table enabled and handle the tlbflush based on the invpcid instruction type. For the guests with nested page table (NPT) support, the INVPCID feature works as running it natively. KVM does not need to do any special handling in this case. AMD documentation for INVPCID feature is available at "AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual Volume 2: System Programming, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.34(or later)" The documentation can be obtained at the links below: Link: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537 Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Message-Id: <159985255929.11252.17346684135277453258.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-09-11 14:29:19 -05:00
{ SVM_EXIT_INVPCID, "invpcid" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add architectural definitions/assets for Bus Lock Threshold Virtual machines can exploit bus locks to degrade the performance of the system. Bus locks can be caused by Non-WB(Write back) and misaligned locked RMW (Read-modify-Write) instructions and require systemwide synchronization among all processors which can result into significant performance penalties. To address this issue, the Bus Lock Threshold feature is introduced to provide ability to hypervisor to restrict guests' capability of initiating mulitple buslocks, thereby preventing system slowdowns. Support for the buslock threshold is indicated via CPUID function 0x8000000A_EDX[29]. On the processors that support the Bus Lock Threshold feature, the VMCB provides a Bus Lock Threshold enable bit and an unsigned 16-bit Bus Lock threshold count. VMCB intercept bit VMCB Offset Bits Function 14h 5 Intercept bus lock operations Bus lock threshold count VMCB Offset Bits Function 120h 15:0 Bus lock counter When a VMRUN instruction is executed, the bus lock threshold count is loaded into an internal count register. Before the processor executes a bus lock in the guest, it checks the value of this register: - If the value is greater than '0', the processor successfully executes the bus lock and decrements the count. - If the value is '0', the bus lock is not executed, and a #VMEXIT to the VMM is taken. The bus lock threshold #VMEXIT is reported to the VMM with the VMEXIT code A5h, SVM_EXIT_BUS_LOCK. Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Co-developed-by: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Manali Shukla <manali.shukla@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250502050346.14274-4-manali.shukla@amd.com [sean: rewrite shortlog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2025-05-02 05:03:44 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_BUS_LOCK, "buslock" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add Idle HLT intercept support Add support for "Idle HLT" interception on AMD CPUs, and enable Idle HLT interception instead of "normal" HLT interception for all VMs for which HLT-exiting is enabled. Idle HLT provides a mild performance boost for all VM types, by avoiding a VM-Exit in the scenario where KVM would immediately "wake" and resume the vCPU. Idle HLT makes HLT-exiting conditional on the vCPU not having a valid, unmasked interrupt. Specifically, a VM-Exit occurs on execution of HLT if and only if there are no pending V_IRQ or V_NMI events. Note, Idle is a replacement for full HLT interception, i.e. enabling HLT interception would result in all HLT instructions causing unconditional VM-Exits. Per the APM: When both HLT and Idle HLT intercepts are active at the same time, the HLT intercept takes priority. This intercept occurs only if a virtual interrupt is not pending (V_INTR or V_NMI). For KVM's use of V_IRQ (also called V_INTR in the APM) to detect interrupt windows, the net effect of enabling Idle HLT is that, if a virtual interupt is pending and unmasked at the time of HLT, the vCPU will take a V_IRQ intercept instead of a HLT intercept. When AVIC is enabled, Idle HLT works as intended: the vCPU continues unimpeded and services the pending virtual interrupt. Note, the APM's description of V_IRQ interaction with AVIC is quite confusing, and requires piecing together implied behavior. Per the APM, when AVIC is enabled, V_IRQ *from the VMCB* is ignored: When AVIC mode is enabled for a virtual processor, the V_IRQ, V_INTR_PRIO, V_INTR_VECTOR, and V_IGN_TPR fields in the VMCB are ignored. Which seems to contradict the behavior of Idle HLT: This intercept occurs only if a virtual interrupt is not pending (V_INTR or V_NMI). What's not explicitly stated is that hardware's internal copy of V_IRQ (and related fields) *are* still active, i.e. are presumably used to cache information from the virtual APIC. Handle Idle HLT exits as if they were normal HLT exits, e.g. don't try to optimize the handling under the assumption that there isn't a pending IRQ. Irrespective of AVIC, Idle HLT is inherently racy with respect to the vIRR, as KVM can set vIRR bits asychronously. No changes are required to support KVM's use Idle HLT while running L2. In fact, supporting Idle HLT is actually a bug fix to some extent. If L1 wants to intercept HLT, recalc_intercepts() will enable HLT interception in vmcb02 and forward the intercept to L1 as normal. But if L1 does not want to intercept HLT, then KVM will run L2 with Idle HLT enabled and HLT interception disabled. If a V_IRQ or V_NMI for L2 becomes pending and L2 executes HLT, then use of Idle HLT will do the right thing, i.e. not #VMEXIT and instead deliver the virtual event. KVM currently doesn't handle this scenario correctly, e.g. doesn't check V_IRQ or V_NMI in vmcs02 as part of kvm_vcpu_has_events(). Do not expose Idle HLT to L1 at this time, as supporting nested Idle HLT is more complex than just enumerating the feature, e.g. requires KVM to handle the aforementioned scenarios of V_IRQ and V_NMI at the time of exit. Signed-off-by: Manali Shukla <Manali.Shukla@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250128124812.7324-3-manali.shukla@amd.com [sean: rewrite changelog, drop nested "support"] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2025-01-28 12:48:11 +00:00
{ SVM_EXIT_IDLE_HLT, "idle-halt" }, \
svm: Add VMEXIT handlers for AVIC This patch introduces VMEXIT handlers, avic_incomplete_ipi_interception() and avic_unaccelerated_access_interception() along with two trace points (trace_kvm_avic_incomplete_ipi and trace_kvm_avic_unaccelerated_access). Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-04 14:09:48 -05:00
{ SVM_EXIT_NPF, "npf" }, \
{ SVM_EXIT_AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI, "avic_incomplete_ipi" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
{ SVM_EXIT_AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS, "avic_unaccelerated_access" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT SEV-ES adds a new VMEXIT reason code, VMGEXIT. Initial support for a VMGEXIT includes mapping the GHCB based on the guest GPA, which is obtained from a new VMCB field, and then validating the required inputs for the VMGEXIT exit reason. Since many of the VMGEXIT exit reasons correspond to existing VMEXIT reasons, the information from the GHCB is copied into the VMCB control exit code areas and KVM register areas. The standard exit handlers are invoked, similar to standard VMEXIT processing. Before restarting the vCPU, the GHCB is updated with any registers that have been updated by the hypervisor. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <c6a4ed4294a369bd75c44d03bd7ce0f0c3840e50.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-12-10 11:09:47 -06:00
{ SVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT, "vmgexit" }, \
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ, "vmgexit_mmio_read" }, \
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE, "vmgexit_mmio_write" }, \
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE, "vmgexit_nmi_complete" }, \
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP, "vmgexit_ap_hlt_loop" }, \
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE, "vmgexit_ap_jump_table" }, \
x86/mm: Validate memory when changing the C-bit Add the needed functionality to change pages state from shared to private and vice-versa using the Page State Change VMGEXIT as documented in the GHCB spec. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-22-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2022-02-24 10:56:01 -06:00
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC, "vmgexit_page_state_change" }, \
x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Version 2 of GHCB specification provides SNP_GUEST_REQUEST and SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST NAE that can be used by the SNP guest to communicate with the PSP. While at it, add a snp_issue_guest_request() helper that will be used by driver or other subsystem to issue the request to PSP. See SEV-SNP firmware and GHCB spec for more details. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-42-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2022-03-07 15:33:51 -06:00
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST, "vmgexit_guest_request" }, \
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST, "vmgexit_ext_guest_request" }, \
x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs To provide a more secure way to start APs under SEV-SNP, use the SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event. This allows for guest control over the AP register state rather than trusting the hypervisor with the SEV-ES Jump Table address. During native_smp_prepare_cpus(), invoke an SEV-SNP function that, if SEV-SNP is active, will set/override apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu. This will allow the SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event method to be used to boot the APs. As a result of installing the override when SEV-SNP is active, this method of starting the APs becomes the required method. The override function will fail to start the AP if the hypervisor does not have support for AP creation. [ bp: Work in forgotten review comments. ] Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-23-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2022-03-07 15:33:32 -06:00
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATION, "vmgexit_ap_creation" }, \
x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Version 2 of the GHCB specification added the advertisement of features that are supported by the hypervisor. If the hypervisor supports SEV-SNP then it must set the SEV-SNP features bit to indicate that the base functionality is supported. Check that feature bit while establishing the GHCB; if failed, terminate the guest. Version 2 of the GHCB specification adds several new Non-Automatic Exits (NAEs), most of them are optional except the hypervisor feature. Now that the hypervisor feature NAE is implemented, bump the GHCB maximum supported protocol version. While at it, move the GHCB protocol negotiation check from the #VC exception handler to sev_enable() so that all feature detection happens before the first #VC exception. While at it, document why the GHCB page cannot be setup from load_stage2_idt(). [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2022-02-09 12:10:06 -06:00
{ SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES, "vmgexit_hypervisor_feature" }, \
KVM: SVM: Add more SVM_EXIT_REASONS Useful when tracing nested setups where the guest may trigger more than the host usually does. But even some typical host exits were missing. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-05-23 08:43:31 +02:00
{ SVM_EXIT_ERR, "invalid_guest_state" }
UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate arch/x86/include/asm Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-12-14 22:37:13 +00:00
#endif /* _UAPI__SVM_H */
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