linux/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with no license Many user space API headers are missing licensing information, which makes it hard for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default are files without license information under the default license of the kernel, which is GPLV2. Marking them GPLV2 would exclude them from being included in non GPLV2 code, which is obviously not intended. The user space API headers fall under the syscall exception which is in the kernels COPYING file: NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work". otherwise syscall usage would not be possible. Update the files which contain no license information with an SPDX license identifier. The chosen identifier is 'GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note' which is the officially assigned identifier for the Linux syscall exception. SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. See the previous patch in this series for the methodology of how this patch was researched. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 15:08:43 +01:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
#define MAP_32BIT 0x40 /* only give out 32bit addresses */
x86/mm: Introduce MAP_ABOVE4G The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which require some core mm changes to function properly. One of the properties is that the shadow stack pointer (SSP), which is a CPU register that points to the shadow stack like the stack pointer points to the stack, can't be pointing outside of the 32 bit address space when the CPU is executing in 32 bit mode. It is desirable to prevent executing in 32 bit mode when shadow stack is enabled because the kernel can't easily support 32 bit signals. On x86 it is possible to transition to 32 bit mode without any special interaction with the kernel, by doing a "far call" to a 32 bit segment. So the shadow stack implementation can use this address space behavior as a feature, by enforcing that shadow stack memory is always mapped outside of the 32 bit address space. This way userspace will trigger a general protection fault which will in turn trigger a segfault if it tries to transition to 32 bit mode with shadow stack enabled. This provides a clean error generating border for the user if they try attempt to do 32 bit mode shadow stack, rather than leave the kernel in a half working state for userspace to be surprised by. So to allow future shadow stack enabling patches to map shadow stacks out of the 32 bit address space, introduce MAP_ABOVE4G. The behavior is pretty much like MAP_32BIT, except that it has the opposite address range. The are a few differences though. If both MAP_32BIT and MAP_ABOVE4G are provided, the kernel will use the MAP_ABOVE4G behavior. Like MAP_32BIT, MAP_ABOVE4G is ignored in a 32 bit syscall. Since the default search behavior is top down, the normal kaslr base can be used for MAP_ABOVE4G. This is unlike MAP_32BIT which has to add its own randomization in the bottom up case. For MAP_32BIT, only the bottom up search path is used. For MAP_ABOVE4G both are potentially valid, so both are used. In the bottomup search path, the default behavior is already consistent with MAP_ABOVE4G since mmap base should be above 4GB. Without MAP_ABOVE4G, the shadow stack will already normally be above 4GB. So without introducing MAP_ABOVE4G, trying to transition to 32 bit mode with shadow stack enabled would usually segfault anyway. This is already pretty decent guard rails. But the addition of MAP_ABOVE4G is some small complexity spent to make it make it more complete. Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-21-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
2023-06-12 17:10:46 -07:00
#define MAP_ABOVE4G 0x80 /* only map above 4GB */
#include <asm-generic/mman.h>
#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */