linux/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h

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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* Ultravisor Interfaces
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2019, 2024
*
* Author(s):
* Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
* Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
*/
#ifndef _ASM_S390_UV_H
#define _ASM_S390_UV_H
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#define UVC_CC_OK 0
#define UVC_CC_ERROR 1
#define UVC_CC_BUSY 2
#define UVC_CC_PARTIAL 3
#define UVC_RC_EXECUTED 0x0001
#define UVC_RC_INV_CMD 0x0002
#define UVC_RC_INV_STATE 0x0003
#define UVC_RC_INV_LEN 0x0005
#define UVC_RC_NO_RESUME 0x0007
#define UVC_RC_MORE_DATA 0x0100
#define UVC_RC_NEED_DESTROY 0x8000
#define UVC_CMD_QUI 0x0001
#define UVC_CMD_QUERY_KEYS 0x0002
#define UVC_CMD_INIT_UV 0x000f
#define UVC_CMD_CREATE_SEC_CONF 0x0100
#define UVC_CMD_DESTROY_SEC_CONF 0x0101
#define UVC_CMD_DESTROY_SEC_CONF_FAST 0x0102
#define UVC_CMD_CREATE_SEC_CPU 0x0120
#define UVC_CMD_DESTROY_SEC_CPU 0x0121
s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests This provides the basic ultravisor calls and page table handling to cope with secure guests: - provide arch_make_page_accessible - make pages accessible after unmapping of secure guests - provide the ultravisor commands convert to/from secure - provide the ultravisor commands pin/unpin shared - provide callbacks to make pages secure (inacccessible) - we check for the expected pin count to only make pages secure if the host is not accessing them - we fence hugetlbfs for secure pages - add missing radix-tree include into gmap.h The basic idea is that a page can have 3 states: secure, normal or shared. The hypervisor can call into a firmware function called ultravisor that allows to change the state of a page: convert from/to secure. The convert from secure will encrypt the page and make it available to the host and host I/O. The convert to secure will remove the host capability to access this page. The design is that on convert to secure we will wait until writeback and page refs are indicating no host usage. At the same time the convert from secure (export to host) will be called in common code when the refcount or the writeback bit is already set. This avoids races between convert from and to secure. Then there is also the concept of shared pages. Those are kind of secure where the host can still access those pages. We need to be notified when the guest "unshares" such a page, basically doing a convert to secure by then. There is a call "pin shared page" that we use instead of convert from secure when possible. We do use PG_arch_1 as an optimization to minimize the convert from secure/pin shared. Several comments have been added in the code to explain the logic in the relevant places. Co-developed-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
2020-01-21 09:48:44 +01:00
#define UVC_CMD_CONV_TO_SEC_STOR 0x0200
#define UVC_CMD_CONV_FROM_SEC_STOR 0x0201
#define UVC_CMD_DESTR_SEC_STOR 0x0202
#define UVC_CMD_SET_SEC_CONF_PARAMS 0x0300
#define UVC_CMD_UNPACK_IMG 0x0301
#define UVC_CMD_VERIFY_IMG 0x0302
#define UVC_CMD_CPU_RESET 0x0310
#define UVC_CMD_CPU_RESET_INITIAL 0x0311
#define UVC_CMD_PREPARE_RESET 0x0320
#define UVC_CMD_CPU_RESET_CLEAR 0x0321
#define UVC_CMD_CPU_SET_STATE 0x0330
#define UVC_CMD_SET_UNSHARE_ALL 0x0340
s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests This provides the basic ultravisor calls and page table handling to cope with secure guests: - provide arch_make_page_accessible - make pages accessible after unmapping of secure guests - provide the ultravisor commands convert to/from secure - provide the ultravisor commands pin/unpin shared - provide callbacks to make pages secure (inacccessible) - we check for the expected pin count to only make pages secure if the host is not accessing them - we fence hugetlbfs for secure pages - add missing radix-tree include into gmap.h The basic idea is that a page can have 3 states: secure, normal or shared. The hypervisor can call into a firmware function called ultravisor that allows to change the state of a page: convert from/to secure. The convert from secure will encrypt the page and make it available to the host and host I/O. The convert to secure will remove the host capability to access this page. The design is that on convert to secure we will wait until writeback and page refs are indicating no host usage. At the same time the convert from secure (export to host) will be called in common code when the refcount or the writeback bit is already set. This avoids races between convert from and to secure. Then there is also the concept of shared pages. Those are kind of secure where the host can still access those pages. We need to be notified when the guest "unshares" such a page, basically doing a convert to secure by then. There is a call "pin shared page" that we use instead of convert from secure when possible. We do use PG_arch_1 as an optimization to minimize the convert from secure/pin shared. Several comments have been added in the code to explain the logic in the relevant places. Co-developed-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
2020-01-21 09:48:44 +01:00
#define UVC_CMD_PIN_PAGE_SHARED 0x0341
#define UVC_CMD_UNPIN_PAGE_SHARED 0x0342
#define UVC_CMD_DUMP_INIT 0x0400
#define UVC_CMD_DUMP_CONF_STOR_STATE 0x0401
#define UVC_CMD_DUMP_CPU 0x0402
#define UVC_CMD_DUMP_COMPLETE 0x0403
#define UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS 0x1000
#define UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS 0x1001
#define UVC_CMD_RETR_ATTEST 0x1020
#define UVC_CMD_ADD_SECRET 0x1031
#define UVC_CMD_LIST_SECRETS 0x1033
#define UVC_CMD_LOCK_SECRETS 0x1034
#define UVC_CMD_RETR_SECRET 0x1035
/* Bits in installed uv calls */
enum uv_cmds_inst {
BIT_UVC_CMD_QUI = 0,
BIT_UVC_CMD_INIT_UV = 1,
BIT_UVC_CMD_CREATE_SEC_CONF = 2,
BIT_UVC_CMD_DESTROY_SEC_CONF = 3,
BIT_UVC_CMD_CREATE_SEC_CPU = 4,
BIT_UVC_CMD_DESTROY_SEC_CPU = 5,
s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests This provides the basic ultravisor calls and page table handling to cope with secure guests: - provide arch_make_page_accessible - make pages accessible after unmapping of secure guests - provide the ultravisor commands convert to/from secure - provide the ultravisor commands pin/unpin shared - provide callbacks to make pages secure (inacccessible) - we check for the expected pin count to only make pages secure if the host is not accessing them - we fence hugetlbfs for secure pages - add missing radix-tree include into gmap.h The basic idea is that a page can have 3 states: secure, normal or shared. The hypervisor can call into a firmware function called ultravisor that allows to change the state of a page: convert from/to secure. The convert from secure will encrypt the page and make it available to the host and host I/O. The convert to secure will remove the host capability to access this page. The design is that on convert to secure we will wait until writeback and page refs are indicating no host usage. At the same time the convert from secure (export to host) will be called in common code when the refcount or the writeback bit is already set. This avoids races between convert from and to secure. Then there is also the concept of shared pages. Those are kind of secure where the host can still access those pages. We need to be notified when the guest "unshares" such a page, basically doing a convert to secure by then. There is a call "pin shared page" that we use instead of convert from secure when possible. We do use PG_arch_1 as an optimization to minimize the convert from secure/pin shared. Several comments have been added in the code to explain the logic in the relevant places. Co-developed-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
2020-01-21 09:48:44 +01:00
BIT_UVC_CMD_CONV_TO_SEC_STOR = 6,
BIT_UVC_CMD_CONV_FROM_SEC_STOR = 7,
BIT_UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS = 8,
BIT_UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS = 9,
BIT_UVC_CMD_SET_SEC_PARMS = 11,
BIT_UVC_CMD_UNPACK_IMG = 13,
BIT_UVC_CMD_VERIFY_IMG = 14,
BIT_UVC_CMD_CPU_RESET = 15,
BIT_UVC_CMD_CPU_RESET_INITIAL = 16,
BIT_UVC_CMD_CPU_SET_STATE = 17,
BIT_UVC_CMD_PREPARE_RESET = 18,
BIT_UVC_CMD_CPU_PERFORM_CLEAR_RESET = 19,
BIT_UVC_CMD_UNSHARE_ALL = 20,
s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests This provides the basic ultravisor calls and page table handling to cope with secure guests: - provide arch_make_page_accessible - make pages accessible after unmapping of secure guests - provide the ultravisor commands convert to/from secure - provide the ultravisor commands pin/unpin shared - provide callbacks to make pages secure (inacccessible) - we check for the expected pin count to only make pages secure if the host is not accessing them - we fence hugetlbfs for secure pages - add missing radix-tree include into gmap.h The basic idea is that a page can have 3 states: secure, normal or shared. The hypervisor can call into a firmware function called ultravisor that allows to change the state of a page: convert from/to secure. The convert from secure will encrypt the page and make it available to the host and host I/O. The convert to secure will remove the host capability to access this page. The design is that on convert to secure we will wait until writeback and page refs are indicating no host usage. At the same time the convert from secure (export to host) will be called in common code when the refcount or the writeback bit is already set. This avoids races between convert from and to secure. Then there is also the concept of shared pages. Those are kind of secure where the host can still access those pages. We need to be notified when the guest "unshares" such a page, basically doing a convert to secure by then. There is a call "pin shared page" that we use instead of convert from secure when possible. We do use PG_arch_1 as an optimization to minimize the convert from secure/pin shared. Several comments have been added in the code to explain the logic in the relevant places. Co-developed-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
2020-01-21 09:48:44 +01:00
BIT_UVC_CMD_PIN_PAGE_SHARED = 21,
BIT_UVC_CMD_UNPIN_PAGE_SHARED = 22,
BIT_UVC_CMD_DESTROY_SEC_CONF_FAST = 23,
BIT_UVC_CMD_DUMP_INIT = 24,
BIT_UVC_CMD_DUMP_CONFIG_STOR_STATE = 25,
BIT_UVC_CMD_DUMP_CPU = 26,
BIT_UVC_CMD_DUMP_COMPLETE = 27,
BIT_UVC_CMD_RETR_ATTEST = 28,
BIT_UVC_CMD_ADD_SECRET = 29,
BIT_UVC_CMD_LIST_SECRETS = 30,
BIT_UVC_CMD_LOCK_SECRETS = 31,
BIT_UVC_CMD_RETR_SECRET = 33,
BIT_UVC_CMD_QUERY_KEYS = 34,
};
enum uv_feat_ind {
BIT_UV_FEAT_MISC = 0,
BIT_UV_FEAT_AIV = 1,
BIT_UV_FEAT_AP = 4,
BIT_UV_FEAT_AP_INTR = 5,
};
struct uv_cb_header {
u16 len;
u16 cmd; /* Command Code */
u16 rc; /* Response Code */
u16 rrc; /* Return Reason Code */
} __packed __aligned(8);
/* Query Ultravisor Information */
struct uv_cb_qui {
struct uv_cb_header header; /* 0x0000 */
u64 reserved08; /* 0x0008 */
u64 inst_calls_list[4]; /* 0x0010 */
u64 reserved30[2]; /* 0x0030 */
u64 uv_base_stor_len; /* 0x0040 */
u64 reserved48; /* 0x0048 */
u64 conf_base_phys_stor_len; /* 0x0050 */
u64 conf_base_virt_stor_len; /* 0x0058 */
u64 conf_virt_var_stor_len; /* 0x0060 */
u64 cpu_stor_len; /* 0x0068 */
u32 reserved70[3]; /* 0x0070 */
u32 max_num_sec_conf; /* 0x007c */
u64 max_guest_stor_addr; /* 0x0080 */
u8 reserved88[0x9e - 0x88]; /* 0x0088 */
u16 max_guest_cpu_id; /* 0x009e */
u64 uv_feature_indications; /* 0x00a0 */
u64 reserveda8; /* 0x00a8 */
u64 supp_se_hdr_versions; /* 0x00b0 */
u64 supp_se_hdr_pcf; /* 0x00b8 */
u64 reservedc0; /* 0x00c0 */
u64 conf_dump_storage_state_len; /* 0x00c8 */
u64 conf_dump_finalize_len; /* 0x00d0 */
u64 reservedd8; /* 0x00d8 */
u64 supp_att_req_hdr_ver; /* 0x00e0 */
u64 supp_att_pflags; /* 0x00e8 */
u64 reservedf0; /* 0x00f0 */
u64 supp_add_secret_req_ver; /* 0x00f8 */
u64 supp_add_secret_pcf; /* 0x0100 */
u64 supp_secret_types; /* 0x0108 */
u16 max_assoc_secrets; /* 0x0110 */
u16 max_retr_secrets; /* 0x0112 */
u8 reserved114[0x120 - 0x114]; /* 0x0114 */
} __packed __aligned(8);
struct uv_key_hash {
u64 dword[4];
} __packed __aligned(8);
#define UVC_QUERY_KEYS_IDX_HK 0
#define UVC_QUERY_KEYS_IDX_BACK_HK 1
/* Query Ultravisor Keys */
struct uv_cb_query_keys {
struct uv_cb_header header; /* 0x0000 */
u64 reserved08[3]; /* 0x0008 */
struct uv_key_hash key_hashes[15]; /* 0x0020 */
} __packed __aligned(8);
static_assert(sizeof(struct uv_cb_query_keys) == 0x200);
/* Initialize Ultravisor */
struct uv_cb_init {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[2];
u64 stor_origin;
u64 stor_len;
u64 reserved28[4];
} __packed __aligned(8);
/* Create Guest Configuration */
struct uv_cb_cgc {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[2];
u64 guest_handle;
u64 conf_base_stor_origin;
u64 conf_virt_stor_origin;
u8 reserved30[6];
union {
struct {
u16 : 14;
u16 ap_instr_intr : 1;
u16 ap_allow_instr : 1;
};
u16 raw;
} flags;
u64 guest_stor_origin;
u64 guest_stor_len;
u64 guest_sca;
u64 guest_asce;
u64 reserved58[5];
} __packed __aligned(8);
/* Create Secure CPU */
struct uv_cb_csc {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[2];
u64 cpu_handle;
u64 guest_handle;
u64 stor_origin;
u8 reserved30[6];
u16 num;
u64 state_origin;
u64 reserved40[4];
} __packed __aligned(8);
/* Convert to Secure */
s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests This provides the basic ultravisor calls and page table handling to cope with secure guests: - provide arch_make_page_accessible - make pages accessible after unmapping of secure guests - provide the ultravisor commands convert to/from secure - provide the ultravisor commands pin/unpin shared - provide callbacks to make pages secure (inacccessible) - we check for the expected pin count to only make pages secure if the host is not accessing them - we fence hugetlbfs for secure pages - add missing radix-tree include into gmap.h The basic idea is that a page can have 3 states: secure, normal or shared. The hypervisor can call into a firmware function called ultravisor that allows to change the state of a page: convert from/to secure. The convert from secure will encrypt the page and make it available to the host and host I/O. The convert to secure will remove the host capability to access this page. The design is that on convert to secure we will wait until writeback and page refs are indicating no host usage. At the same time the convert from secure (export to host) will be called in common code when the refcount or the writeback bit is already set. This avoids races between convert from and to secure. Then there is also the concept of shared pages. Those are kind of secure where the host can still access those pages. We need to be notified when the guest "unshares" such a page, basically doing a convert to secure by then. There is a call "pin shared page" that we use instead of convert from secure when possible. We do use PG_arch_1 as an optimization to minimize the convert from secure/pin shared. Several comments have been added in the code to explain the logic in the relevant places. Co-developed-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
2020-01-21 09:48:44 +01:00
struct uv_cb_cts {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[2];
u64 guest_handle;
u64 gaddr;
} __packed __aligned(8);
/* Convert from Secure / Pin Page Shared */
s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests This provides the basic ultravisor calls and page table handling to cope with secure guests: - provide arch_make_page_accessible - make pages accessible after unmapping of secure guests - provide the ultravisor commands convert to/from secure - provide the ultravisor commands pin/unpin shared - provide callbacks to make pages secure (inacccessible) - we check for the expected pin count to only make pages secure if the host is not accessing them - we fence hugetlbfs for secure pages - add missing radix-tree include into gmap.h The basic idea is that a page can have 3 states: secure, normal or shared. The hypervisor can call into a firmware function called ultravisor that allows to change the state of a page: convert from/to secure. The convert from secure will encrypt the page and make it available to the host and host I/O. The convert to secure will remove the host capability to access this page. The design is that on convert to secure we will wait until writeback and page refs are indicating no host usage. At the same time the convert from secure (export to host) will be called in common code when the refcount or the writeback bit is already set. This avoids races between convert from and to secure. Then there is also the concept of shared pages. Those are kind of secure where the host can still access those pages. We need to be notified when the guest "unshares" such a page, basically doing a convert to secure by then. There is a call "pin shared page" that we use instead of convert from secure when possible. We do use PG_arch_1 as an optimization to minimize the convert from secure/pin shared. Several comments have been added in the code to explain the logic in the relevant places. Co-developed-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
2020-01-21 09:48:44 +01:00
struct uv_cb_cfs {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[2];
u64 paddr;
} __packed __aligned(8);
/* Set Secure Config Parameter */
struct uv_cb_ssc {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[2];
u64 guest_handle;
u64 sec_header_origin;
u32 sec_header_len;
u32 reserved2c;
u64 reserved30[4];
} __packed __aligned(8);
/* Unpack */
struct uv_cb_unp {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[2];
u64 guest_handle;
u64 gaddr;
u64 tweak[2];
u64 reserved38[3];
} __packed __aligned(8);
#define PV_CPU_STATE_OPR 1
#define PV_CPU_STATE_STP 2
#define PV_CPU_STATE_CHKSTP 3
#define PV_CPU_STATE_OPR_LOAD 5
struct uv_cb_cpu_set_state {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[2];
u64 cpu_handle;
u8 reserved20[7];
u8 state;
u64 reserved28[5];
};
/*
* A common UV call struct for calls that take no payload
* Examples:
* Destroy cpu/config
* Verify
*/
struct uv_cb_nodata {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[2];
u64 handle;
u64 reserved20[4];
} __packed __aligned(8);
/* Destroy Configuration Fast */
struct uv_cb_destroy_fast {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[2];
u64 handle;
u64 reserved20[5];
} __packed __aligned(8);
/* Set Shared Access */
struct uv_cb_share {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[3];
u64 paddr;
u64 reserved28;
} __packed __aligned(8);
/* Retrieve Attestation Measurement */
struct uv_cb_attest {
struct uv_cb_header header; /* 0x0000 */
u64 reserved08[2]; /* 0x0008 */
u64 arcb_addr; /* 0x0018 */
u64 cont_token; /* 0x0020 */
u8 reserved28[6]; /* 0x0028 */
u16 user_data_len; /* 0x002e */
u8 user_data[256]; /* 0x0030 */
u32 reserved130[3]; /* 0x0130 */
u32 meas_len; /* 0x013c */
u64 meas_addr; /* 0x0140 */
u8 config_uid[16]; /* 0x0148 */
u32 reserved158; /* 0x0158 */
u32 add_data_len; /* 0x015c */
u64 add_data_addr; /* 0x0160 */
u64 reserved168[4]; /* 0x0168 */
} __packed __aligned(8);
struct uv_cb_dump_cpu {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[2];
u64 cpu_handle;
u64 dump_area_origin;
u64 reserved28[5];
} __packed __aligned(8);
struct uv_cb_dump_stor_state {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[2];
u64 config_handle;
u64 dump_area_origin;
u64 gaddr;
u64 reserved28[4];
} __packed __aligned(8);
struct uv_cb_dump_complete {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[2];
u64 config_handle;
u64 dump_area_origin;
u64 reserved30[5];
} __packed __aligned(8);
/*
* A common UV call struct for pv guests that contains a single address
* Examples:
* Add Secret
*/
struct uv_cb_guest_addr {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[3];
u64 addr;
u64 reserved28[4];
} __packed __aligned(8);
#define UVC_RC_RETR_SECR_BUF_SMALL 0x0109
#define UVC_RC_RETR_SECR_STORE_EMPTY 0x010f
#define UVC_RC_RETR_SECR_INV_IDX 0x0110
#define UVC_RC_RETR_SECR_INV_SECRET 0x0111
struct uv_cb_retr_secr {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[2];
u16 secret_idx;
u16 reserved1a;
u32 buf_size;
u64 buf_addr;
u64 reserved28[4];
} __packed __aligned(8);
struct uv_cb_list_secrets {
struct uv_cb_header header;
u64 reserved08[2];
u8 reserved18[6];
u16 start_idx;
u64 list_addr;
u64 reserved28[4];
} __packed __aligned(8);
enum uv_secret_types {
UV_SECRET_INVAL = 0x0,
UV_SECRET_NULL = 0x1,
UV_SECRET_ASSOCIATION = 0x2,
UV_SECRET_PLAIN = 0x3,
UV_SECRET_AES_128 = 0x4,
UV_SECRET_AES_192 = 0x5,
UV_SECRET_AES_256 = 0x6,
UV_SECRET_AES_XTS_128 = 0x7,
UV_SECRET_AES_XTS_256 = 0x8,
UV_SECRET_HMAC_SHA_256 = 0x9,
UV_SECRET_HMAC_SHA_512 = 0xa,
/* 0x0b - 0x10 reserved */
UV_SECRET_ECDSA_P256 = 0x11,
UV_SECRET_ECDSA_P384 = 0x12,
UV_SECRET_ECDSA_P521 = 0x13,
UV_SECRET_ECDSA_ED25519 = 0x14,
UV_SECRET_ECDSA_ED448 = 0x15,
};
/**
* uv_secret_list_item_hdr - UV secret metadata.
* @index: Index of the secret in the secret list.
* @type: Type of the secret. See `enum uv_secret_types`.
* @length: Length of the stored secret.
*/
struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr {
u16 index;
u16 type;
u32 length;
} __packed __aligned(8);
#define UV_SECRET_ID_LEN 32
/**
* uv_secret_list_item - UV secret entry.
* @hdr: The metadata of this secret.
* @id: The ID of this secret, not the secret itself.
*/
struct uv_secret_list_item {
struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr hdr;
u64 reserverd08;
u8 id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN];
} __packed __aligned(8);
/**
* uv_secret_list - UV secret-metadata list.
* @num_secr_stored: Number of secrets stored in this list.
* @total_num_secrets: Number of secrets stored in the UV for this guest.
* @next_secret_idx: positive number if there are more secrets available or zero.
* @secrets: Up to 85 UV-secret metadata entries.
*/
struct uv_secret_list {
u16 num_secr_stored;
u16 total_num_secrets;
u16 next_secret_idx;
u16 reserved_06;
u64 reserved_08;
struct uv_secret_list_item secrets[85];
} __packed __aligned(8);
static_assert(sizeof(struct uv_secret_list) == PAGE_SIZE);
static inline int __uv_call(unsigned long r1, unsigned long r2)
{
int cc;
asm volatile(
" .insn rrf,0xb9a40000,%[r1],%[r2],0,0\n"
CC_IPM(cc)
: CC_OUT(cc, cc)
: [r1] "a" (r1), [r2] "a" (r2)
: CC_CLOBBER_LIST("memory"));
return CC_TRANSFORM(cc);
}
static inline int uv_call(unsigned long r1, unsigned long r2)
{
int cc;
do {
cc = __uv_call(r1, r2);
} while (cc > 1);
return cc;
}
/* Low level uv_call that avoids stalls for long running busy conditions */
static inline int uv_call_sched(unsigned long r1, unsigned long r2)
{
int cc;
do {
cc = __uv_call(r1, r2);
cond_resched();
} while (cc > 1);
return cc;
}
/*
* special variant of uv_call that only transports the cpu or guest
* handle and the command, like destroy or verify.
*/
static inline int uv_cmd_nodata(u64 handle, u16 cmd, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)
{
struct uv_cb_nodata uvcb = {
.header.cmd = cmd,
.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
.handle = handle,
};
int cc;
WARN(!handle, "No handle provided to Ultravisor call cmd %x\n", cmd);
cc = uv_call_sched(0, (u64)&uvcb);
*rc = uvcb.header.rc;
*rrc = uvcb.header.rrc;
return cc ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
/**
* uv_list_secrets() - Do a List Secrets UVC.
*
* @buf: Buffer to write list into; size of one page.
* @start_idx: The smallest index that should be included in the list.
* For the fist invocation use 0.
* @rc: Pointer to store the return code or NULL.
* @rrc: Pointer to store the return reason code or NULL.
*
* This function calls the List Secrets UVC. The result is written into `buf`,
* that needs to be at least one page of writable memory.
* `buf` consists of:
* * %struct uv_secret_list_hdr
* * %struct uv_secret_list_item (multiple)
*
* For `start_idx` use _0_ for the first call. If there are more secrets available
* but could not fit into the page then `rc` is `UVC_RC_MORE_DATA`.
* In this case use `uv_secret_list_hdr.next_secret_idx` for `start_idx`.
*
* Context: might sleep.
*
* Return: The UVC condition code.
*/
static inline int uv_list_secrets(struct uv_secret_list *buf, u16 start_idx,
u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)
{
struct uv_cb_list_secrets uvcb = {
.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_LIST_SECRETS,
.start_idx = start_idx,
.list_addr = (u64)buf,
};
int cc = uv_call_sched(0, (u64)&uvcb);
if (rc)
*rc = uvcb.header.rc;
if (rrc)
*rrc = uvcb.header.rrc;
return cc;
}
struct uv_info {
unsigned long inst_calls_list[4];
unsigned long uv_base_stor_len;
unsigned long guest_base_stor_len;
unsigned long guest_virt_base_stor_len;
unsigned long guest_virt_var_stor_len;
unsigned long guest_cpu_stor_len;
unsigned long max_sec_stor_addr;
unsigned int max_num_sec_conf;
unsigned short max_guest_cpu_id;
unsigned long uv_feature_indications;
unsigned long supp_se_hdr_ver;
unsigned long supp_se_hdr_pcf;
unsigned long conf_dump_storage_state_len;
unsigned long conf_dump_finalize_len;
unsigned long supp_att_req_hdr_ver;
unsigned long supp_att_pflags;
unsigned long supp_add_secret_req_ver;
unsigned long supp_add_secret_pcf;
unsigned long supp_secret_types;
unsigned short max_assoc_secrets;
unsigned short max_retr_secrets;
};
extern struct uv_info uv_info;
static inline bool uv_has_feature(u8 feature_bit)
{
if (feature_bit >= sizeof(uv_info.uv_feature_indications) * 8)
return false;
return test_bit_inv(feature_bit, &uv_info.uv_feature_indications);
}
extern int prot_virt_guest;
static inline int is_prot_virt_guest(void)
{
return prot_virt_guest;
}
static inline int share(unsigned long addr, u16 cmd)
{
struct uv_cb_share uvcb = {
.header.cmd = cmd,
.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
.paddr = addr
};
if (!is_prot_virt_guest())
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/*
* Sharing is page wise, if we encounter addresses that are
* not page aligned, we assume something went wrong. If
* malloced structs are passed to this function, we could leak
* data to the hypervisor.
*/
BUG_ON(addr & ~PAGE_MASK);
if (!uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb))
return 0;
2024-08-01 13:25:48 +02:00
pr_err("%s UVC failed (rc: 0x%x, rrc: 0x%x), possible hypervisor bug.\n",
uvcb.header.cmd == UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS ? "Share" : "Unshare",
uvcb.header.rc, uvcb.header.rrc);
panic("System security cannot be guaranteed unless the system panics now.\n");
}
/*
* Guest 2 request to the Ultravisor to make a page shared with the
* hypervisor for IO.
*
* @addr: Real or absolute address of the page to be shared
*/
static inline int uv_set_shared(unsigned long addr)
{
return share(addr, UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS);
}
/*
* Guest 2 request to the Ultravisor to make a page unshared.
*
* @addr: Real or absolute address of the page to be unshared
*/
static inline int uv_remove_shared(unsigned long addr)
{
return share(addr, UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS);
}
int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
struct uv_secret_list *list,
struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret);
int uv_retrieve_secret(u16 secret_idx, u8 *buf, size_t buf_size);
extern int prot_virt_host;
static inline int is_prot_virt_host(void)
{
return prot_virt_host;
}
int uv_pin_shared(unsigned long paddr);
int uv_destroy_folio(struct folio *folio);
int uv_destroy_pte(pte_t pte);
int uv_convert_from_secure_pte(pte_t pte);
int make_hva_secure(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long hva, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb);
int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr);
int uv_convert_from_secure_folio(struct folio *folio);
s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests This provides the basic ultravisor calls and page table handling to cope with secure guests: - provide arch_make_page_accessible - make pages accessible after unmapping of secure guests - provide the ultravisor commands convert to/from secure - provide the ultravisor commands pin/unpin shared - provide callbacks to make pages secure (inacccessible) - we check for the expected pin count to only make pages secure if the host is not accessing them - we fence hugetlbfs for secure pages - add missing radix-tree include into gmap.h The basic idea is that a page can have 3 states: secure, normal or shared. The hypervisor can call into a firmware function called ultravisor that allows to change the state of a page: convert from/to secure. The convert from secure will encrypt the page and make it available to the host and host I/O. The convert to secure will remove the host capability to access this page. The design is that on convert to secure we will wait until writeback and page refs are indicating no host usage. At the same time the convert from secure (export to host) will be called in common code when the refcount or the writeback bit is already set. This avoids races between convert from and to secure. Then there is also the concept of shared pages. Those are kind of secure where the host can still access those pages. We need to be notified when the guest "unshares" such a page, basically doing a convert to secure by then. There is a call "pin shared page" that we use instead of convert from secure when possible. We do use PG_arch_1 as an optimization to minimize the convert from secure/pin shared. Several comments have been added in the code to explain the logic in the relevant places. Co-developed-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
2020-01-21 09:48:44 +01:00
void setup_uv(void);
#endif /* _ASM_S390_UV_H */