2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note
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#
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# system call numbers and entry vectors for parisc
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#
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# The format is:
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# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> <compat entry point>
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#
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# The <abi> can be common, 64, or 32 for this file.
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#
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0 common restart_syscall sys_restart_syscall
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1 common exit sys_exit
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2 common fork sys_fork_wrapper
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3 common read sys_read
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4 common write sys_write
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5 common open sys_open compat_sys_open
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6 common close sys_close
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7 common waitpid sys_waitpid
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8 common creat sys_creat
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9 common link sys_link
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10 common unlink sys_unlink
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11 common execve sys_execve compat_sys_execve
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12 common chdir sys_chdir
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y2038: rename old time and utime syscalls
The time, stime, utime, utimes, and futimesat system calls are only
used on older architectures, and we do not provide y2038 safe variants
of them, as they are replaced by clock_gettime64, clock_settime64,
and utimensat_time64.
However, for consistency it seems better to have the 32-bit architectures
that still use them call the "time32" entry points (leaving the
traditional handlers for the 64-bit architectures), like we do for system
calls that now require two versions.
Note: We used to always define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME and only set __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME32 for compat mode on 64-bit kernels. Now this is
reversed: only 64-bit architectures set __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME/UTIME, while
we need __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME32/UTIME32 for 32-bit architectures and compat
mode. The resulting asm/unistd.h changes look a bit counterintuitive.
This is only a cleanup patch and it should not change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2019-01-06 23:45:29 +01:00
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13 32 time sys_time32
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13 64 time sys_time
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2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
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14 common mknod sys_mknod
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15 common chmod sys_chmod
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16 common lchown sys_lchown
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17 common socket sys_socket
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18 common stat sys_newstat compat_sys_newstat
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19 common lseek sys_lseek compat_sys_lseek
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20 common getpid sys_getpid
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2020-09-17 10:22:34 +02:00
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21 common mount sys_mount
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2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
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22 common bind sys_bind
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23 common setuid sys_setuid
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24 common getuid sys_getuid
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y2038: rename old time and utime syscalls
The time, stime, utime, utimes, and futimesat system calls are only
used on older architectures, and we do not provide y2038 safe variants
of them, as they are replaced by clock_gettime64, clock_settime64,
and utimensat_time64.
However, for consistency it seems better to have the 32-bit architectures
that still use them call the "time32" entry points (leaving the
traditional handlers for the 64-bit architectures), like we do for system
calls that now require two versions.
Note: We used to always define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME and only set __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME32 for compat mode on 64-bit kernels. Now this is
reversed: only 64-bit architectures set __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME/UTIME, while
we need __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME32/UTIME32 for 32-bit architectures and compat
mode. The resulting asm/unistd.h changes look a bit counterintuitive.
This is only a cleanup patch and it should not change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2019-01-06 23:45:29 +01:00
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25 32 stime sys_stime32
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25 64 stime sys_stime
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2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
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26 common ptrace sys_ptrace compat_sys_ptrace
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27 common alarm sys_alarm
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28 common fstat sys_newfstat compat_sys_newfstat
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29 common pause sys_pause
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y2038: rename old time and utime syscalls
The time, stime, utime, utimes, and futimesat system calls are only
used on older architectures, and we do not provide y2038 safe variants
of them, as they are replaced by clock_gettime64, clock_settime64,
and utimensat_time64.
However, for consistency it seems better to have the 32-bit architectures
that still use them call the "time32" entry points (leaving the
traditional handlers for the 64-bit architectures), like we do for system
calls that now require two versions.
Note: We used to always define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME and only set __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME32 for compat mode on 64-bit kernels. Now this is
reversed: only 64-bit architectures set __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME/UTIME, while
we need __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME32/UTIME32 for 32-bit architectures and compat
mode. The resulting asm/unistd.h changes look a bit counterintuitive.
This is only a cleanup patch and it should not change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2019-01-06 23:45:29 +01:00
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30 32 utime sys_utime32
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30 64 utime sys_utime
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2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
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31 common connect sys_connect
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32 common listen sys_listen
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33 common access sys_access
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34 common nice sys_nice
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35 common accept sys_accept
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36 common sync sys_sync
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37 common kill sys_kill
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38 common rename sys_rename
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39 common mkdir sys_mkdir
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40 common rmdir sys_rmdir
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41 common dup sys_dup
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42 common pipe sys_pipe
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43 common times sys_times compat_sys_times
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44 common getsockname sys_getsockname
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45 common brk sys_brk
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46 common setgid sys_setgid
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47 common getgid sys_getgid
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48 common signal sys_signal
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49 common geteuid sys_geteuid
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50 common getegid sys_getegid
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51 common acct sys_acct
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52 common umount2 sys_umount
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53 common getpeername sys_getpeername
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54 common ioctl sys_ioctl compat_sys_ioctl
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55 common fcntl sys_fcntl compat_sys_fcntl
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56 common socketpair sys_socketpair
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57 common setpgid sys_setpgid
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58 common send sys_send
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59 common uname sys_newuname
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60 common umask sys_umask
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61 common chroot sys_chroot
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62 common ustat sys_ustat compat_sys_ustat
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63 common dup2 sys_dup2
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64 common getppid sys_getppid
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65 common getpgrp sys_getpgrp
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66 common setsid sys_setsid
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67 common pivot_root sys_pivot_root
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68 common sgetmask sys_sgetmask sys32_unimplemented
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69 common ssetmask sys_ssetmask sys32_unimplemented
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70 common setreuid sys_setreuid
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71 common setregid sys_setregid
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72 common mincore sys_mincore
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73 common sigpending sys_sigpending compat_sys_sigpending
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74 common sethostname sys_sethostname
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75 common setrlimit sys_setrlimit compat_sys_setrlimit
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76 common getrlimit sys_getrlimit compat_sys_getrlimit
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77 common getrusage sys_getrusage compat_sys_getrusage
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78 common gettimeofday sys_gettimeofday compat_sys_gettimeofday
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79 common settimeofday sys_settimeofday compat_sys_settimeofday
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80 common getgroups sys_getgroups
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81 common setgroups sys_setgroups
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82 common sendto sys_sendto
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83 common symlink sys_symlink
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84 common lstat sys_newlstat compat_sys_newlstat
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85 common readlink sys_readlink
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86 common uselib sys_ni_syscall
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87 common swapon sys_swapon
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88 common reboot sys_reboot
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89 common mmap2 sys_mmap2
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90 common mmap sys_mmap
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91 common munmap sys_munmap
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92 common truncate sys_truncate compat_sys_truncate
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93 common ftruncate sys_ftruncate compat_sys_ftruncate
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94 common fchmod sys_fchmod
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95 common fchown sys_fchown
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96 common getpriority sys_getpriority
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97 common setpriority sys_setpriority
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2024-06-19 14:27:55 +02:00
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98 common recv sys_recv compat_sys_recv
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2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
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99 common statfs sys_statfs compat_sys_statfs
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100 common fstatfs sys_fstatfs compat_sys_fstatfs
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101 common stat64 sys_stat64
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# 102 was socketcall
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103 common syslog sys_syslog
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104 common setitimer sys_setitimer compat_sys_setitimer
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105 common getitimer sys_getitimer compat_sys_getitimer
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106 common capget sys_capget
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107 common capset sys_capset
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108 32 pread64 parisc_pread64
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108 64 pread64 sys_pread64
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109 32 pwrite64 parisc_pwrite64
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109 64 pwrite64 sys_pwrite64
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110 common getcwd sys_getcwd
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111 common vhangup sys_vhangup
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112 common fstat64 sys_fstat64
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113 common vfork sys_vfork_wrapper
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114 common wait4 sys_wait4 compat_sys_wait4
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115 common swapoff sys_swapoff
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116 common sysinfo sys_sysinfo compat_sys_sysinfo
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117 common shutdown sys_shutdown
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118 common fsync sys_fsync
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2022-12-11 19:50:20 +01:00
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119 common madvise parisc_madvise
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2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
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120 common clone sys_clone_wrapper
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121 common setdomainname sys_setdomainname
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122 common sendfile sys_sendfile compat_sys_sendfile
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2024-06-19 14:27:55 +02:00
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123 common recvfrom sys_recvfrom compat_sys_recvfrom
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2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
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124 32 adjtimex sys_adjtimex_time32
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124 64 adjtimex sys_adjtimex
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2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
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125 common mprotect sys_mprotect
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126 common sigprocmask sys_sigprocmask compat_sys_sigprocmask
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# 127 was create_module
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128 common init_module sys_init_module
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129 common delete_module sys_delete_module
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# 130 was get_kernel_syms
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131 common quotactl sys_quotactl
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132 common getpgid sys_getpgid
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133 common fchdir sys_fchdir
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2021-06-29 15:11:44 -05:00
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134 common bdflush sys_ni_syscall
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2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
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135 common sysfs sys_sysfs
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136 32 personality parisc_personality
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136 64 personality sys_personality
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# 137 was afs_syscall
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138 common setfsuid sys_setfsuid
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139 common setfsgid sys_setfsgid
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140 common _llseek sys_llseek
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141 common getdents sys_getdents compat_sys_getdents
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142 common _newselect sys_select compat_sys_select
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143 common flock sys_flock
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144 common msync sys_msync
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2020-09-25 06:51:43 +02:00
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145 common readv sys_readv
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146 common writev sys_writev
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2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
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147 common getsid sys_getsid
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148 common fdatasync sys_fdatasync
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2020-08-14 17:31:07 -07:00
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149 common _sysctl sys_ni_syscall
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2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
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150 common mlock sys_mlock
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151 common munlock sys_munlock
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152 common mlockall sys_mlockall
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153 common munlockall sys_munlockall
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154 common sched_setparam sys_sched_setparam
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155 common sched_getparam sys_sched_getparam
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156 common sched_setscheduler sys_sched_setscheduler
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157 common sched_getscheduler sys_sched_getscheduler
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158 common sched_yield sys_sched_yield
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159 common sched_get_priority_max sys_sched_get_priority_max
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160 common sched_get_priority_min sys_sched_get_priority_min
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2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
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161 32 sched_rr_get_interval sys_sched_rr_get_interval_time32
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161 64 sched_rr_get_interval sys_sched_rr_get_interval
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162 32 nanosleep sys_nanosleep_time32
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162 64 nanosleep sys_nanosleep
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2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
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163 common mremap sys_mremap
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164 common setresuid sys_setresuid
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165 common getresuid sys_getresuid
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166 common sigaltstack sys_sigaltstack compat_sys_sigaltstack
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# 167 was query_module
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168 common poll sys_poll
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# 169 was nfsservctl
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170 common setresgid sys_setresgid
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171 common getresgid sys_getresgid
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172 common prctl sys_prctl
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173 common rt_sigreturn sys_rt_sigreturn_wrapper
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174 common rt_sigaction sys_rt_sigaction compat_sys_rt_sigaction
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175 common rt_sigprocmask sys_rt_sigprocmask compat_sys_rt_sigprocmask
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176 common rt_sigpending sys_rt_sigpending compat_sys_rt_sigpending
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2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
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177 32 rt_sigtimedwait sys_rt_sigtimedwait_time32 compat_sys_rt_sigtimedwait_time32
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177 64 rt_sigtimedwait sys_rt_sigtimedwait
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2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
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178 common rt_sigqueueinfo sys_rt_sigqueueinfo compat_sys_rt_sigqueueinfo
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179 common rt_sigsuspend sys_rt_sigsuspend compat_sys_rt_sigsuspend
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180 common chown sys_chown
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2020-07-17 08:23:15 +02:00
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181 common setsockopt sys_setsockopt sys_setsockopt
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182 common getsockopt sys_getsockopt sys_getsockopt
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2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
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183 common sendmsg sys_sendmsg compat_sys_sendmsg
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184 common recvmsg sys_recvmsg compat_sys_recvmsg
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185 common semop sys_semop
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186 common semget sys_semget
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187 common semctl sys_semctl compat_sys_semctl
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188 common msgsnd sys_msgsnd compat_sys_msgsnd
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189 common msgrcv sys_msgrcv compat_sys_msgrcv
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190 common msgget sys_msgget
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191 common msgctl sys_msgctl compat_sys_msgctl
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192 common shmat sys_shmat compat_sys_shmat
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193 common shmdt sys_shmdt
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194 common shmget sys_shmget
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195 common shmctl sys_shmctl compat_sys_shmctl
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# 196 was getpmsg
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# 197 was putpmsg
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198 common lstat64 sys_lstat64
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199 32 truncate64 parisc_truncate64
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199 64 truncate64 sys_truncate64
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200 32 ftruncate64 parisc_ftruncate64
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200 64 ftruncate64 sys_ftruncate64
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201 common getdents64 sys_getdents64
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202 common fcntl64 sys_fcntl64 compat_sys_fcntl64
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# 203 was attrctl
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# 204 was acl_get
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# 205 was acl_set
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206 common gettid sys_gettid
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207 32 readahead parisc_readahead
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207 64 readahead sys_readahead
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208 common tkill sys_tkill
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209 common sendfile64 sys_sendfile64 compat_sys_sendfile64
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2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
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210 32 futex sys_futex_time32
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210 64 futex sys_futex
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2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
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211 common sched_setaffinity sys_sched_setaffinity compat_sys_sched_setaffinity
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212 common sched_getaffinity sys_sched_getaffinity compat_sys_sched_getaffinity
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# 213 was set_thread_area
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# 214 was get_thread_area
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215 common io_setup sys_io_setup compat_sys_io_setup
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216 common io_destroy sys_io_destroy
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2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
217 32 io_getevents sys_io_getevents_time32
|
|
|
|
|
217 64 io_getevents sys_io_getevents
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
218 common io_submit sys_io_submit compat_sys_io_submit
|
|
|
|
|
219 common io_cancel sys_io_cancel
|
|
|
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|
# 220 was alloc_hugepages
|
|
|
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|
# 221 was free_hugepages
|
|
|
|
|
222 common exit_group sys_exit_group
|
2023-07-10 18:51:24 +00:00
|
|
|
223 common lookup_dcookie sys_ni_syscall
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
224 common epoll_create sys_epoll_create
|
|
|
|
|
225 common epoll_ctl sys_epoll_ctl
|
|
|
|
|
226 common epoll_wait sys_epoll_wait
|
|
|
|
|
227 common remap_file_pages sys_remap_file_pages
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
228 32 semtimedop sys_semtimedop_time32
|
|
|
|
|
228 64 semtimedop sys_semtimedop
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
229 common mq_open sys_mq_open compat_sys_mq_open
|
|
|
|
|
230 common mq_unlink sys_mq_unlink
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
231 32 mq_timedsend sys_mq_timedsend_time32
|
|
|
|
|
231 64 mq_timedsend sys_mq_timedsend
|
|
|
|
|
232 32 mq_timedreceive sys_mq_timedreceive_time32
|
|
|
|
|
232 64 mq_timedreceive sys_mq_timedreceive
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
233 common mq_notify sys_mq_notify compat_sys_mq_notify
|
|
|
|
|
234 common mq_getsetattr sys_mq_getsetattr compat_sys_mq_getsetattr
|
|
|
|
|
235 common waitid sys_waitid compat_sys_waitid
|
|
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|
|
236 32 fadvise64_64 parisc_fadvise64_64
|
|
|
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|
236 64 fadvise64_64 sys_fadvise64_64
|
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|
|
237 common set_tid_address sys_set_tid_address
|
|
|
|
|
238 common setxattr sys_setxattr
|
|
|
|
|
239 common lsetxattr sys_lsetxattr
|
|
|
|
|
240 common fsetxattr sys_fsetxattr
|
|
|
|
|
241 common getxattr sys_getxattr
|
|
|
|
|
242 common lgetxattr sys_lgetxattr
|
|
|
|
|
243 common fgetxattr sys_fgetxattr
|
|
|
|
|
244 common listxattr sys_listxattr
|
|
|
|
|
245 common llistxattr sys_llistxattr
|
|
|
|
|
246 common flistxattr sys_flistxattr
|
|
|
|
|
247 common removexattr sys_removexattr
|
|
|
|
|
248 common lremovexattr sys_lremovexattr
|
|
|
|
|
249 common fremovexattr sys_fremovexattr
|
|
|
|
|
250 common timer_create sys_timer_create compat_sys_timer_create
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
251 32 timer_settime sys_timer_settime32
|
|
|
|
|
251 64 timer_settime sys_timer_settime
|
|
|
|
|
252 32 timer_gettime sys_timer_gettime32
|
|
|
|
|
252 64 timer_gettime sys_timer_gettime
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
253 common timer_getoverrun sys_timer_getoverrun
|
|
|
|
|
254 common timer_delete sys_timer_delete
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
255 32 clock_settime sys_clock_settime32
|
|
|
|
|
255 64 clock_settime sys_clock_settime
|
|
|
|
|
256 32 clock_gettime sys_clock_gettime32
|
|
|
|
|
256 64 clock_gettime sys_clock_gettime
|
|
|
|
|
257 32 clock_getres sys_clock_getres_time32
|
|
|
|
|
257 64 clock_getres sys_clock_getres
|
|
|
|
|
258 32 clock_nanosleep sys_clock_nanosleep_time32
|
|
|
|
|
258 64 clock_nanosleep sys_clock_nanosleep
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
259 common tgkill sys_tgkill
|
2021-09-08 15:18:25 -07:00
|
|
|
260 common mbind sys_mbind
|
|
|
|
|
261 common get_mempolicy sys_get_mempolicy
|
|
|
|
|
262 common set_mempolicy sys_set_mempolicy
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
# 263 was vserver
|
|
|
|
|
264 common add_key sys_add_key
|
|
|
|
|
265 common request_key sys_request_key
|
|
|
|
|
266 common keyctl sys_keyctl compat_sys_keyctl
|
|
|
|
|
267 common ioprio_set sys_ioprio_set
|
|
|
|
|
268 common ioprio_get sys_ioprio_get
|
|
|
|
|
269 common inotify_init sys_inotify_init
|
|
|
|
|
270 common inotify_add_watch sys_inotify_add_watch
|
|
|
|
|
271 common inotify_rm_watch sys_inotify_rm_watch
|
|
|
|
|
272 common migrate_pages sys_migrate_pages
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
273 32 pselect6 sys_pselect6_time32 compat_sys_pselect6_time32
|
|
|
|
|
273 64 pselect6 sys_pselect6
|
|
|
|
|
274 32 ppoll sys_ppoll_time32 compat_sys_ppoll_time32
|
|
|
|
|
274 64 ppoll sys_ppoll
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
275 common openat sys_openat compat_sys_openat
|
|
|
|
|
276 common mkdirat sys_mkdirat
|
|
|
|
|
277 common mknodat sys_mknodat
|
|
|
|
|
278 common fchownat sys_fchownat
|
y2038: rename old time and utime syscalls
The time, stime, utime, utimes, and futimesat system calls are only
used on older architectures, and we do not provide y2038 safe variants
of them, as they are replaced by clock_gettime64, clock_settime64,
and utimensat_time64.
However, for consistency it seems better to have the 32-bit architectures
that still use them call the "time32" entry points (leaving the
traditional handlers for the 64-bit architectures), like we do for system
calls that now require two versions.
Note: We used to always define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME and only set __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME32 for compat mode on 64-bit kernels. Now this is
reversed: only 64-bit architectures set __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME/UTIME, while
we need __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME32/UTIME32 for 32-bit architectures and compat
mode. The resulting asm/unistd.h changes look a bit counterintuitive.
This is only a cleanup patch and it should not change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2019-01-06 23:45:29 +01:00
|
|
|
279 32 futimesat sys_futimesat_time32
|
|
|
|
|
279 64 futimesat sys_futimesat
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
280 common fstatat64 sys_fstatat64
|
|
|
|
|
281 common unlinkat sys_unlinkat
|
|
|
|
|
282 common renameat sys_renameat
|
|
|
|
|
283 common linkat sys_linkat
|
|
|
|
|
284 common symlinkat sys_symlinkat
|
|
|
|
|
285 common readlinkat sys_readlinkat
|
|
|
|
|
286 common fchmodat sys_fchmodat
|
|
|
|
|
287 common faccessat sys_faccessat
|
|
|
|
|
288 common unshare sys_unshare
|
|
|
|
|
289 common set_robust_list sys_set_robust_list compat_sys_set_robust_list
|
|
|
|
|
290 common get_robust_list sys_get_robust_list compat_sys_get_robust_list
|
|
|
|
|
291 common splice sys_splice
|
|
|
|
|
292 32 sync_file_range parisc_sync_file_range
|
|
|
|
|
292 64 sync_file_range sys_sync_file_range
|
|
|
|
|
293 common tee sys_tee
|
2020-09-25 06:51:44 +02:00
|
|
|
294 common vmsplice sys_vmsplice
|
2021-09-08 15:18:25 -07:00
|
|
|
295 common move_pages sys_move_pages
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
296 common getcpu sys_getcpu
|
|
|
|
|
297 common epoll_pwait sys_epoll_pwait compat_sys_epoll_pwait
|
|
|
|
|
298 common statfs64 sys_statfs64 compat_sys_statfs64
|
|
|
|
|
299 common fstatfs64 sys_fstatfs64 compat_sys_fstatfs64
|
|
|
|
|
300 common kexec_load sys_kexec_load compat_sys_kexec_load
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
301 32 utimensat sys_utimensat_time32
|
|
|
|
|
301 64 utimensat sys_utimensat
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
302 common signalfd sys_signalfd compat_sys_signalfd
|
|
|
|
|
# 303 was timerfd
|
|
|
|
|
304 common eventfd sys_eventfd
|
|
|
|
|
305 32 fallocate parisc_fallocate
|
|
|
|
|
305 64 fallocate sys_fallocate
|
2020-10-22 18:40:07 +02:00
|
|
|
306 common timerfd_create parisc_timerfd_create
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
307 32 timerfd_settime sys_timerfd_settime32
|
|
|
|
|
307 64 timerfd_settime sys_timerfd_settime
|
|
|
|
|
308 32 timerfd_gettime sys_timerfd_gettime32
|
|
|
|
|
308 64 timerfd_gettime sys_timerfd_gettime
|
2020-10-22 18:40:07 +02:00
|
|
|
309 common signalfd4 parisc_signalfd4 parisc_compat_signalfd4
|
|
|
|
|
310 common eventfd2 parisc_eventfd2
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
311 common epoll_create1 sys_epoll_create1
|
|
|
|
|
312 common dup3 sys_dup3
|
2020-10-22 18:40:07 +02:00
|
|
|
313 common pipe2 parisc_pipe2
|
|
|
|
|
314 common inotify_init1 parisc_inotify_init1
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
315 common preadv sys_preadv compat_sys_preadv
|
|
|
|
|
316 common pwritev sys_pwritev compat_sys_pwritev
|
|
|
|
|
317 common rt_tgsigqueueinfo sys_rt_tgsigqueueinfo compat_sys_rt_tgsigqueueinfo
|
|
|
|
|
318 common perf_event_open sys_perf_event_open
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
319 32 recvmmsg sys_recvmmsg_time32 compat_sys_recvmmsg_time32
|
|
|
|
|
319 64 recvmmsg sys_recvmmsg
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
320 common accept4 sys_accept4
|
|
|
|
|
321 common prlimit64 sys_prlimit64
|
|
|
|
|
322 common fanotify_init sys_fanotify_init
|
parisc: use generic sys_fanotify_mark implementation
The sys_fanotify_mark() syscall on parisc uses the reverse word order
for the two halves of the 64-bit argument compared to all syscalls on
all 32-bit architectures. As far as I can tell, the problem is that
the function arguments on parisc are sorted backwards (26, 25, 24, 23,
...) compared to everyone else, so the calling conventions of using an
even/odd register pair in native word order result in the lower word
coming first in function arguments, matching the expected behavior
on little-endian architectures. The system call conventions however
ended up matching what the other 32-bit architectures do.
A glibc cleanup in 2020 changed the userspace behavior in a way that
handles all architectures consistently, but this inadvertently broke
parisc32 by changing to the same method as everyone else.
The change made it into glibc-2.35 and subsequently into debian 12
(bookworm), which is the latest stable release. This means we
need to choose between reverting the glibc change or changing the
kernel to match it again, but either hange will leave some systems
broken.
Pick the option that is more likely to help current and future
users and change the kernel to match current glibc. This also
means the behavior is now consistent across architectures, but
it breaks running new kernels with old glibc builds before 2.35.
Link: https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commitdiff;h=d150181d73d9
Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/history/history.git/commit/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c?h=57b1dfbd5b4a39d
Cc: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
I found this through code inspection, please double-check to make
sure I got the bug and the fix right.
The alternative is to fix this by reverting glibc back to the
unusual behavior.
2024-06-07 13:40:45 +02:00
|
|
|
323 common fanotify_mark sys_fanotify_mark compat_sys_fanotify_mark
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
324 32 clock_adjtime sys_clock_adjtime32
|
|
|
|
|
324 64 clock_adjtime sys_clock_adjtime
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
325 common name_to_handle_at sys_name_to_handle_at
|
|
|
|
|
326 common open_by_handle_at sys_open_by_handle_at compat_sys_open_by_handle_at
|
|
|
|
|
327 common syncfs sys_syncfs
|
|
|
|
|
328 common setns sys_setns
|
|
|
|
|
329 common sendmmsg sys_sendmmsg compat_sys_sendmmsg
|
2020-09-25 06:51:45 +02:00
|
|
|
330 common process_vm_readv sys_process_vm_readv
|
|
|
|
|
331 common process_vm_writev sys_process_vm_writev
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
332 common kcmp sys_kcmp
|
|
|
|
|
333 common finit_module sys_finit_module
|
|
|
|
|
334 common sched_setattr sys_sched_setattr
|
|
|
|
|
335 common sched_getattr sys_sched_getattr
|
y2038: rename old time and utime syscalls
The time, stime, utime, utimes, and futimesat system calls are only
used on older architectures, and we do not provide y2038 safe variants
of them, as they are replaced by clock_gettime64, clock_settime64,
and utimensat_time64.
However, for consistency it seems better to have the 32-bit architectures
that still use them call the "time32" entry points (leaving the
traditional handlers for the 64-bit architectures), like we do for system
calls that now require two versions.
Note: We used to always define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME and only set __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_TIME and
__ARCH_WANT_SYS_UTIME32 for compat mode on 64-bit kernels. Now this is
reversed: only 64-bit architectures set __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME/UTIME, while
we need __ARCH_WANT_SYS_TIME32/UTIME32 for 32-bit architectures and compat
mode. The resulting asm/unistd.h changes look a bit counterintuitive.
This is only a cleanup patch and it should not change any behavior.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2019-01-06 23:45:29 +01:00
|
|
|
336 32 utimes sys_utimes_time32
|
|
|
|
|
336 64 utimes sys_utimes
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
337 common renameat2 sys_renameat2
|
|
|
|
|
338 common seccomp sys_seccomp
|
|
|
|
|
339 common getrandom sys_getrandom
|
|
|
|
|
340 common memfd_create sys_memfd_create
|
|
|
|
|
341 common bpf sys_bpf
|
|
|
|
|
342 common execveat sys_execveat compat_sys_execveat
|
|
|
|
|
343 common membarrier sys_membarrier
|
2020-10-22 18:40:07 +02:00
|
|
|
344 common userfaultfd parisc_userfaultfd
|
2018-09-09 07:22:50 +05:30
|
|
|
345 common mlock2 sys_mlock2
|
|
|
|
|
346 common copy_file_range sys_copy_file_range
|
|
|
|
|
347 common preadv2 sys_preadv2 compat_sys_preadv2
|
|
|
|
|
348 common pwritev2 sys_pwritev2 compat_sys_pwritev2
|
|
|
|
|
349 common statx sys_statx
|
2019-01-01 01:13:32 +01:00
|
|
|
350 32 io_pgetevents sys_io_pgetevents_time32 compat_sys_io_pgetevents
|
|
|
|
|
350 64 io_pgetevents sys_io_pgetevents
|
2018-12-31 23:12:32 +01:00
|
|
|
351 common pkey_mprotect sys_pkey_mprotect
|
|
|
|
|
352 common pkey_alloc sys_pkey_alloc
|
|
|
|
|
353 common pkey_free sys_pkey_free
|
|
|
|
|
354 common rseq sys_rseq
|
2019-09-08 11:33:05 +02:00
|
|
|
355 common kexec_file_load sys_kexec_file_load sys_kexec_file_load
|
2023-05-26 10:59:15 +02:00
|
|
|
356 common cacheflush sys_cacheflush
|
2019-09-08 11:33:05 +02:00
|
|
|
# up to 402 is unassigned and reserved for arch specific syscalls
|
2019-01-10 12:45:11 +01:00
|
|
|
403 32 clock_gettime64 sys_clock_gettime sys_clock_gettime
|
|
|
|
|
404 32 clock_settime64 sys_clock_settime sys_clock_settime
|
|
|
|
|
405 32 clock_adjtime64 sys_clock_adjtime sys_clock_adjtime
|
|
|
|
|
406 32 clock_getres_time64 sys_clock_getres sys_clock_getres
|
|
|
|
|
407 32 clock_nanosleep_time64 sys_clock_nanosleep sys_clock_nanosleep
|
|
|
|
|
408 32 timer_gettime64 sys_timer_gettime sys_timer_gettime
|
|
|
|
|
409 32 timer_settime64 sys_timer_settime sys_timer_settime
|
|
|
|
|
410 32 timerfd_gettime64 sys_timerfd_gettime sys_timerfd_gettime
|
|
|
|
|
411 32 timerfd_settime64 sys_timerfd_settime sys_timerfd_settime
|
|
|
|
|
412 32 utimensat_time64 sys_utimensat sys_utimensat
|
|
|
|
|
413 32 pselect6_time64 sys_pselect6 compat_sys_pselect6_time64
|
|
|
|
|
414 32 ppoll_time64 sys_ppoll compat_sys_ppoll_time64
|
2022-08-01 17:36:15 +02:00
|
|
|
416 32 io_pgetevents_time64 sys_io_pgetevents compat_sys_io_pgetevents_time64
|
2019-01-10 12:45:11 +01:00
|
|
|
417 32 recvmmsg_time64 sys_recvmmsg compat_sys_recvmmsg_time64
|
|
|
|
|
418 32 mq_timedsend_time64 sys_mq_timedsend sys_mq_timedsend
|
|
|
|
|
419 32 mq_timedreceive_time64 sys_mq_timedreceive sys_mq_timedreceive
|
|
|
|
|
420 32 semtimedop_time64 sys_semtimedop sys_semtimedop
|
|
|
|
|
421 32 rt_sigtimedwait_time64 sys_rt_sigtimedwait compat_sys_rt_sigtimedwait_time64
|
|
|
|
|
422 32 futex_time64 sys_futex sys_futex
|
|
|
|
|
423 32 sched_rr_get_interval_time64 sys_sched_rr_get_interval sys_sched_rr_get_interval
|
2019-02-28 13:59:19 +01:00
|
|
|
424 common pidfd_send_signal sys_pidfd_send_signal
|
|
|
|
|
425 common io_uring_setup sys_io_uring_setup
|
|
|
|
|
426 common io_uring_enter sys_io_uring_enter
|
|
|
|
|
427 common io_uring_register sys_io_uring_register
|
2019-05-16 12:52:34 +01:00
|
|
|
428 common open_tree sys_open_tree
|
|
|
|
|
429 common move_mount sys_move_mount
|
|
|
|
|
430 common fsopen sys_fsopen
|
|
|
|
|
431 common fsconfig sys_fsconfig
|
|
|
|
|
432 common fsmount sys_fsmount
|
|
|
|
|
433 common fspick sys_fspick
|
2019-05-24 12:44:59 +02:00
|
|
|
434 common pidfd_open sys_pidfd_open
|
2019-07-15 22:33:26 +02:00
|
|
|
435 common clone3 sys_clone3_wrapper
|
2019-05-24 11:31:44 +02:00
|
|
|
436 common close_range sys_close_range
|
open: introduce openat2(2) syscall
/* Background. */
For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags
are present[1].
This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to
being added to openat(2).
Userspace also has a hard time figuring out whether a particular flag is
supported on a particular kernel. While it is now possible with
contemporary kernels (thanks to [3]), older kernels will expose unknown
flag bits through fcntl(F_GETFL). Giving a clear -EINVAL during
openat(2) time matches modern syscall designs and is far more
fool-proof.
In addition, the newly-added path resolution restriction LOOKUP flags
(which we would like to expose to user-space) don't feel related to the
pre-existing O_* flag set -- they affect all components of path lookup.
We'd therefore like to add a new flag argument.
Adding a new syscall allows us to finally fix the flag-ignoring problem,
and we can make it extensible enough so that we will hopefully never
need an openat3(2).
/* Syscall Prototype. */
/*
* open_how is an extensible structure (similar in interface to
* clone3(2) or sched_setattr(2)). The size parameter must be set to
* sizeof(struct open_how), to allow for future extensions. All future
* extensions will be appended to open_how, with their zero value
* acting as a no-op default.
*/
struct open_how { /* ... */ };
int openat2(int dfd, const char *pathname,
struct open_how *how, size_t size);
/* Description. */
The initial version of 'struct open_how' contains the following fields:
flags
Used to specify openat(2)-style flags. However, any unknown flag
bits or otherwise incorrect flag combinations (like O_PATH|O_RDWR)
will result in -EINVAL. In addition, this field is 64-bits wide to
allow for more O_ flags than currently permitted with openat(2).
mode
The file mode for O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.
Must be set to zero if flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.
resolve
Restrict path resolution (in contrast to O_* flags they affect all
path components). The current set of flags are as follows (at the
moment, all of the RESOLVE_ flags are implemented as just passing
the corresponding LOOKUP_ flag).
RESOLVE_NO_XDEV => LOOKUP_NO_XDEV
RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS
RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS
RESOLVE_BENEATH => LOOKUP_BENEATH
RESOLVE_IN_ROOT => LOOKUP_IN_ROOT
open_how does not contain an embedded size field, because it is of
little benefit (userspace can figure out the kernel open_how size at
runtime fairly easily without it). It also only contains u64s (even
though ->mode arguably should be a u16) to avoid having padding fields
which are never used in the future.
Note that as a result of the new how->flags handling, O_PATH|O_TMPFILE
is no longer permitted for openat(2). As far as I can tell, this has
always been a bug and appears to not be used by userspace (and I've not
seen any problems on my machines by disallowing it). If it turns out
this breaks something, we can special-case it and only permit it for
openat(2) but not openat2(2).
After input from Florian Weimer, the new open_how and flag definitions
are inside a separate header from uapi/linux/fcntl.h, to avoid problems
that glibc has with importing that header.
/* Testing. */
In a follow-up patch there are over 200 selftests which ensure that this
syscall has the correct semantics and will correctly handle several
attack scenarios.
In addition, I've written a userspace library[4] which provides
convenient wrappers around openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) (this is necessary
because no other syscalls support RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, and thus lots of care
must be taken when using RESOLVE_IN_ROOT'd file descriptors with other
syscalls). During the development of this patch, I've run numerous
verification tests using libpathrs (showing that the API is reasonably
usable by userspace).
/* Future Work. */
Additional RESOLVE_ flags have been suggested during the review period.
These can be easily implemented separately (such as blocking auto-mount
during resolution).
Furthermore, there are some other proposed changes to the openat(2)
interface (the most obvious example is magic-link hardening[5]) which
would be a good opportunity to add a way for userspace to restrict how
O_PATH file descriptors can be re-opened.
Another possible avenue of future work would be some kind of
CHECK_FIELDS[6] flag which causes the kernel to indicate to userspace
which openat2(2) flags and fields are supported by the current kernel
(to avoid userspace having to go through several guesses to figure it
out).
[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/588444/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyyxJL1LyXZeBsf2ypriraj5ut1XkNDsunRBqgVjZU_6Q@mail.gmail.com
[3]: commit 629e014bb834 ("fs: completely ignore unknown open flags")
[4]: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17523
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190930183316.10190-2-cyphar@cyphar.com/
[6]: https://youtu.be/ggD-eb3yPVs
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-01-18 23:07:59 +11:00
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437 common openat2 sys_openat2
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2020-01-07 09:59:26 -08:00
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438 common pidfd_getfd sys_pidfd_getfd
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2020-05-14 16:44:25 +02:00
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439 common faccessat2 sys_faccessat2
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mm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory hinting API
There is usecase that System Management Software(SMS) want to give a
memory hint like MADV_[COLD|PAGEEOUT] to other processes and in the
case of Android, it is the ActivityManagerService.
The information required to make the reclaim decision is not known to the
app. Instead, it is known to the centralized userspace
daemon(ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate
reclaim on its own without any app involvement.
To solve the issue, this patch introduces a new syscall
process_madvise(2). It uses pidfd of an external process to give the
hint. It also supports vector address range because Android app has
thousands of vmas due to zygote so it's totally waste of CPU and power if
we should call the syscall one by one for each vma.(With testing 2000-vma
syscall vs 1-vector syscall, it showed 15% performance improvement. I
think it would be bigger in real practice because the testing ran very
cache friendly environment).
Another potential use case for the vector range is to amortize the cost
ofTLB shootdowns for multiple ranges when using MADV_DONTNEED; this could
benefit users like TCP receive zerocopy and malloc implementations. In
future, we could find more usecases for other advises so let's make it
happens as API since we introduce a new syscall at this moment. With
that, existing madvise(2) user could replace it with process_madvise(2)
with their own pid if they want to have batch address ranges support
feature.
ince it could affect other process's address range, only privileged
process(PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) or something else(e.g., being the same
UID) gives it the right to ptrace the process could use it successfully.
The flag argument is reserved for future use if we need to extend the API.
I think supporting all hints madvise has/will supported/support to
process_madvise is rather risky. Because we are not sure all hints make
sense from external process and implementation for the hint may rely on
the caller being in the current context so it could be error-prone. Thus,
I just limited hints as MADV_[COLD|PAGEOUT] in this patch.
If someone want to add other hints, we could hear the usecase and review
it for each hint. It's safer for maintenance rather than introducing a
buggy syscall but hard to fix it later.
So finally, the API is as follows,
ssize_t process_madvise(int pidfd, const struct iovec *iovec,
unsigned long vlen, int advice, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
The process_madvise() system call is used to give advice or directions
to the kernel about the address ranges from external process as well as
local process. It provides the advice to address ranges of process
described by iovec and vlen. The goal of such advice is to improve
system or application performance.
The pidfd selects the process referred to by the PID file descriptor
specified in pidfd. (See pidofd_open(2) for further information)
The pointer iovec points to an array of iovec structures, defined in
<sys/uio.h> as:
struct iovec {
void *iov_base; /* starting address */
size_t iov_len; /* number of bytes to be advised */
};
The iovec describes address ranges beginning at address(iov_base)
and with size length of bytes(iov_len).
The vlen represents the number of elements in iovec.
The advice is indicated in the advice argument, which is one of the
following at this moment if the target process specified by pidfd is
external.
MADV_COLD
MADV_PAGEOUT
Permission to provide a hint to external process is governed by a
ptrace access mode PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS check; see ptrace(2).
The process_madvise supports every advice madvise(2) has if target
process is in same thread group with calling process so user could
use process_madvise(2) to extend existing madvise(2) to support
vector address ranges.
RETURN VALUE
On success, process_madvise() returns the number of bytes advised.
This return value may be less than the total number of requested
bytes, if an error occurred. The caller should check return value
to determine whether a partial advice occurred.
FAQ:
Q.1 - Why does any external entity have better knowledge?
Quote from Sandeep
"For Android, every application (including the special SystemServer)
are forked from Zygote. The reason of course is to share as many
libraries and classes between the two as possible to benefit from the
preloading during boot.
After applications start, (almost) all of the APIs end up calling into
this SystemServer process over IPC (binder) and back to the
application.
In a fully running system, the SystemServer monitors every single
process periodically to calculate their PSS / RSS and also decides
which process is "important" to the user for interactivity.
So, because of how these processes start _and_ the fact that the
SystemServer is looping to monitor each process, it does tend to *know*
which address range of the application is not used / useful.
Besides, we can never rely on applications to clean things up
themselves. We've had the "hey app1, the system is low on memory,
please trim your memory usage down" notifications for a long time[1].
They rely on applications honoring the broadcasts and very few do.
So, if we want to avoid the inevitable killing of the application and
restarting it, some way to be able to tell the OS about unimportant
memory in these applications will be useful.
- ssp
Q.2 - How to guarantee the race(i.e., object validation) between when
giving a hint from an external process and get the hint from the target
process?
process_madvise operates on the target process's address space as it
exists at the instant that process_madvise is called. If the space
target process can run between the time the process_madvise process
inspects the target process address space and the time that
process_madvise is actually called, process_madvise may operate on
memory regions that the calling process does not expect. It's the
responsibility of the process calling process_madvise to close this
race condition. For example, the calling process can suspend the
target process with ptrace, SIGSTOP, or the freezer cgroup so that it
doesn't have an opportunity to change its own address space before
process_madvise is called. Another option is to operate on memory
regions that the caller knows a priori will be unchanged in the target
process. Yet another option is to accept the race for certain
process_madvise calls after reasoning that mistargeting will do no
harm. The suggested API itself does not provide synchronization. It
also apply other APIs like move_pages, process_vm_write.
The race isn't really a problem though. Why is it so wrong to require
that callers do their own synchronization in some manner? Nobody
objects to write(2) merely because it's possible for two processes to
open the same file and clobber each other's writes --- instead, we tell
people to use flock or something. Think about mmap. It never
guarantees newly allocated address space is still valid when the user
tries to access it because other threads could unmap the memory right
before. That's where we need synchronization by using other API or
design from userside. It shouldn't be part of API itself. If someone
needs more fine-grained synchronization rather than process level,
there were two ideas suggested - cookie[2] and anon-fd[3]. Both are
applicable via using last reserved argument of the API but I don't
think it's necessary right now since we have already ways to prevent
the race so don't want to add additional complexity with more
fine-grained optimization model.
To make the API extend, it reserved an unsigned long as last argument
so we could support it in future if someone really needs it.
Q.3 - Why doesn't ptrace work?
Injecting an madvise in the target process using ptrace would not work
for us because such injected madvise would have to be executed by the
target process, which means that process would have to be runnable and
that creates the risk of the abovementioned race and hinting a wrong
VMA. Furthermore, we want to act the hint in caller's context, not the
callee's, because the callee is usually limited in cpuset/cgroups or
even freezed state so they can't act by themselves quick enough, which
causes more thrashing/kill. It doesn't work if the target process are
ptraced(e.g., strace, debugger, minidump) because a process can have at
most one ptracer.
[1] https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory"
[2] process_getinfo for getting the cookie which is updated whenever
vma of process address layout are changed - Daniel Colascione -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190520035254.57579-1-minchan@kernel.org/T/#m7694416fd179b2066a2c62b5b139b14e3894e224
[3] anonymous fd which is used for the object(i.e., address range)
validation - Michal Hocko -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200120112722.GY18451@dhcp22.suse.cz/
[minchan@kernel.org: fix process_madvise build break for arm64]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303145756.GA219683@google.com
[minchan@kernel.org: fix build error for mips of process_madvise]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508052517.GA197378@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix patch ordering issue]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arm64 whoops]
[minchan@kernel.org: make process_madvise() vlen arg have type size_t, per Florian]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 build]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix syscall numbering]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200905142639.49fc3f1a@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: madvise.c needs compat.h]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908204547.285646b4@canb.auug.org.au
[minchan@kernel.org: fix mips build]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200909173655.GC2435453@google.com
[yuehaibing@huawei.com: remove duplicate header which is included twice]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915121550.30584-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
[minchan@kernel.org: do not use helper functions for process_madvise]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200921175539.GB387368@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: pidfd_get_pid() gained an argument]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix up for "iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec"]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200928212542.468e1fef@canb.auug.org.au
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-3-minchan@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508183320.GA125527@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-4-minchan@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-4-minchan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-17 16:14:59 -07:00
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440 common process_madvise sys_process_madvise
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2020-12-18 14:05:41 -08:00
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441 common epoll_pwait2 sys_epoll_pwait2 compat_sys_epoll_pwait2
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fs: add mount_setattr()
This implements the missing mount_setattr() syscall. While the new mount
api allows to change the properties of a superblock there is currently
no way to change the properties of a mount or a mount tree using file
descriptors which the new mount api is based on. In addition the old
mount api has the restriction that mount options cannot be applied
recursively. This hasn't changed since changing mount options on a
per-mount basis was implemented in [1] and has been a frequent request
not just for convenience but also for security reasons. The legacy
mount syscall is unable to accommodate this behavior without introducing
a whole new set of flags because MS_REC | MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND |
MS_RDONLY | MS_NOEXEC | [...] only apply the mount option to the topmost
mount. Changing MS_REC to apply to the whole mount tree would mean
introducing a significant uapi change and would likely cause significant
regressions.
The new mount_setattr() syscall allows to recursively clear and set
mount options in one shot. Multiple calls to change mount options
requesting the same changes are idempotent:
int mount_setattr(int dfd, const char *path, unsigned flags,
struct mount_attr *uattr, size_t usize);
Flags to modify path resolution behavior are specified in the @flags
argument. Currently, AT_EMPTY_PATH, AT_RECURSIVE, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW,
and AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT are supported. If useful, additional lookup flags to
restrict path resolution as introduced with openat2() might be supported
in the future.
The mount_setattr() syscall can be expected to grow over time and is
designed with extensibility in mind. It follows the extensible syscall
pattern we have used with other syscalls such as openat2(), clone3(),
sched_{set,get}attr(), and others.
The set of mount options is passed in the uapi struct mount_attr which
currently has the following layout:
struct mount_attr {
__u64 attr_set;
__u64 attr_clr;
__u64 propagation;
__u64 userns_fd;
};
The @attr_set and @attr_clr members are used to clear and set mount
options. This way a user can e.g. request that a set of flags is to be
raised such as turning mounts readonly by raising MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY in
@attr_set while at the same time requesting that another set of flags is
to be lowered such as removing noexec from a mount tree by specifying
MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC in @attr_clr.
Note, since the MOUNT_ATTR_<atime> values are an enum starting from 0,
not a bitmap, users wanting to transition to a different atime setting
cannot simply specify the atime setting in @attr_set, but must also
specify MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME in the @attr_clr field. So we ensure that
MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME can't be partially set in @attr_clr and that @attr_set
can't have any atime bits set if MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME isn't set in
@attr_clr.
The @propagation field lets callers specify the propagation type of a
mount tree. Propagation is a single property that has four different
settings and as such is not really a flag argument but an enum.
Specifically, it would be unclear what setting and clearing propagation
settings in combination would amount to. The legacy mount() syscall thus
forbids the combination of multiple propagation settings too. The goal
is to keep the semantics of mount propagation somewhat simple as they
are overly complex as it is.
The @userns_fd field lets user specify a user namespace whose idmapping
becomes the idmapping of the mount. This is implemented and explained in
detail in the next patch.
[1]: commit 2e4b7fcd9260 ("[PATCH] r/o bind mounts: honor mount writer counts at remount")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-35-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-21 14:19:53 +01:00
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442 common mount_setattr sys_mount_setattr
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2021-05-31 18:42:58 +02:00
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443 common quotactl_fd sys_quotactl_fd
|
2021-04-22 17:41:19 +02:00
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444 common landlock_create_ruleset sys_landlock_create_ruleset
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|
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445 common landlock_add_rule sys_landlock_add_rule
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446 common landlock_restrict_self sys_landlock_restrict_self
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2021-09-02 15:00:33 -07:00
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# 447 reserved for memfd_secret
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448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease
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2021-11-16 13:11:26 +01:00
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449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv
|
2022-01-14 14:08:21 -08:00
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450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
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2023-05-10 12:58:06 -07:00
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451 common cachestat sys_cachestat
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2023-07-11 18:16:05 +02:00
|
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452 common fchmodat2 sys_fchmodat2
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2023-09-14 18:58:03 +00:00
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453 common map_shadow_stack sys_map_shadow_stack
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2023-09-21 12:45:10 +02:00
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454 common futex_wake sys_futex_wake
|
2023-09-21 12:45:12 +02:00
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455 common futex_wait sys_futex_wait
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2023-09-21 12:45:15 +02:00
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456 common futex_requeue sys_futex_requeue
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2023-10-25 16:02:04 +02:00
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457 common statmount sys_statmount
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458 common listmount sys_listmount
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lsm/stable-6.8 PR 20240105
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull security module updates from Paul Moore:
- Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and
lsm_set_self_attr().
The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and
third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these
syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under
/proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple,
simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current
/proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM
was allowed to be active at a given time.
We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the
existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and
even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel
API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had
established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls.
Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly
unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he
is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more
difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM
community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to
continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as
pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g.
syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain.
My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing
out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to
support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step
forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our
reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic
for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api
folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of
their concerns.
- Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit
ioctls on 64-bit systems problem.
This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which
provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually
cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while
Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this
patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes.
- Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled
at boot.
While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something
users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and
then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via
NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense.
Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take
this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like
the best fit.
- Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about
our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc.
I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated
MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been
working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if
they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role;
hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to
look after it.
- Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits)
lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook
lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx
calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass()
selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test
MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM
MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry
mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts
mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses
lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static
lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user()
lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx()
lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()
lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr()
lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr()
lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation
lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA
LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls
SELinux: Add selfattr hooks
AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks
Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks
...
2024-01-09 12:57:46 -08:00
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459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
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460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
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461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
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mseal: wire up mseal syscall
Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10.
This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel.
In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range
against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits.
Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and
no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel
version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves
the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot
simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory
must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur.
Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data
structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the
VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type.
Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example,
such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees
since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable
or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be
applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and
applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A
similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall
[4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and
this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case.
Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal().
The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature:
int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
addr/len: memory range.
flags: reserved.
mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range.
1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can
be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
via mremap().
3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific
risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is
unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA.
5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous
memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those
behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a
memset(0) for anonymous memory.
The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in
V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this
API.
Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing,
which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the
case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute
(RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from
becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime
of the process.
Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed
by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively
but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM
permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not
tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is
sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory.
For example, with madvise(DONTNEED).
However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security
risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the
second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros
and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard
operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case,
the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write
permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow
integrity.
Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome
browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions
that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a
complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases.
The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and
sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to
glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all
non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all
applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new
protections.
In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable
contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in
shaping this patch:
Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the
destructive madvise operations.
Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization.
Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope.
Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from
implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD.
MM perf benchmarks
==================
This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to
check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made,
when any segment within the given memory range is sealed.
To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed.
[8]
The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call,
by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using
PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have
similar results.
The tests have roughly below sequence:
for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++)
create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA)
start the sampling
for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++)
mprotect one mapping
stop and save the sample
delete 1000 mappings
calculates all samples.
Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz,
4G memory, Chromebook.
Based on the latest upstream code:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104%
munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107%
munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106%
munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107%
munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104%
munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105%
mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106%
mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105%
mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104%
mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103%
mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103%
mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104%
madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109%
madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121%
madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121%
madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119%
madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115%
madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106%
munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108%
munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106%
munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106%
munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108%
munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107%
mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107%
mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106%
mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107%
mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105%
mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105%
mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105%
madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115%
madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120%
madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115%
madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116%
madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113%
madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111%
Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds
20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA.
In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109%
munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105%
munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103%
munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112%
munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114%
munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99%
mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97%
mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94%
mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103%
mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100%
mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101%
mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103%
madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109%
madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108%
madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105%
madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107%
madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108%
madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105%
munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104%
munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104%
munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102%
munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99%
munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103%
mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112%
mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107%
mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103%
mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103%
mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99%
mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103%
madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108%
madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109%
madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107%
madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109%
madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108%
madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114%
For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30
CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases.
It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254%
munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316%
munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398%
munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396%
munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352%
munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287%
mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187%
mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335%
mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506%
mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471%
mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465%
mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433%
madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125%
madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122%
madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138%
madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147%
madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145%
madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262%
munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327%
munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419%
munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413%
munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341%
munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303%
mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228%
mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409%
mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504%
mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423%
mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412%
mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415%
madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123%
madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133%
madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151%
madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151%
madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140%
madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142%
From 5.10 to 6.8
munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma.
mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma.
madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma.
In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the
increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times
greater for munmap and mprotect.
When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked
on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance
benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may
not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database
service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data
from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best to
take this data with a grain of salt.
This patch (of 5):
Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-2-jeffxu@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> [Bug #2]
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-04-15 16:35:20 +00:00
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462 common mseal sys_mseal
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fs/xattr: add *at family syscalls
Add the four syscalls setxattrat(), getxattrat(), listxattrat() and
removexattrat(). Those can be used to operate on extended attributes,
especially security related ones, either relative to a pinned directory
or on a file descriptor without read access, avoiding a
/proc/<pid>/fd/<fd> detour, requiring a mounted procfs.
One use case will be setfiles(8) setting SELinux file contexts
("security.selinux") without race conditions and without a file
descriptor opened with read access requiring SELinux read permission.
Use the do_{name}at() pattern from fs/open.c.
Pass the value of the extended attribute, its length, and for
setxattrat(2) the command (XATTR_CREATE or XATTR_REPLACE) via an added
struct xattr_args to not exceed six syscall arguments and not
merging the AT_* and XATTR_* flags.
[AV: fixes by Christian Brauner folded in, the entire thing rebased on
top of {filename,file}_...xattr() primitives, treatment of empty
pathnames regularized. As the result, AT_EMPTY_PATH+NULL handling
is cheap, so f...(2) can use it]
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240426162042.191916-1-cgoettsche@seltendoof.de
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
CC: x86@kernel.org
CC: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
CC: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
CC: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
CC: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
CC: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org
CC: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
CC: audit@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
CC: selinux@vger.kernel.org
[brauner: slight tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2024-04-26 18:20:14 +02:00
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463 common setxattrat sys_setxattrat
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464 common getxattrat sys_getxattrat
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465 common listxattrat sys_listxattrat
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466 common removexattrat sys_removexattrat
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2025-01-28 11:33:41 +01:00
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467 common open_tree_attr sys_open_tree_attr
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2025-06-30 18:20:16 +02:00
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468 common file_getattr sys_file_getattr
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469 common file_setattr sys_file_setattr
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