License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 15:07:57 +01:00
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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2015-03-10 09:47:44 +01:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:41 -05:00
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menu "Accelerated Cryptographic Algorithms for CPU (arm)"
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2015-03-10 09:47:44 +01:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:43 -05:00
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config CRYPTO_CURVE25519_NEON
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2025-02-27 15:48:39 +08:00
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tristate
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2022-08-20 13:41:43 -05:00
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depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
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2025-02-27 15:48:39 +08:00
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select CRYPTO_KPP
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2022-08-20 13:41:43 -05:00
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select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC
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2025-02-27 15:48:39 +08:00
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select CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519
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default CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_INTERNAL
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2022-08-20 13:41:45 -05:00
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help
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Curve25519 algorithm
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Architecture: arm with
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- NEON (Advanced SIMD) extensions
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2022-08-20 13:41:43 -05:00
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config CRYPTO_GHASH_ARM_CE
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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tristate "Hash functions: GHASH (PMULL/NEON/ARMv8 Crypto Extensions)"
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2022-08-20 13:41:43 -05:00
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depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
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2023-01-16 12:01:48 +01:00
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select CRYPTO_AEAD
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2022-08-20 13:41:43 -05:00
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select CRYPTO_HASH
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select CRYPTO_CRYPTD
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2023-01-16 12:01:48 +01:00
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select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
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2022-11-03 20:22:57 +01:00
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select CRYPTO_LIB_GF128MUL
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2022-08-20 13:41:43 -05:00
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help
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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GCM GHASH function (NIST SP800-38D)
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Architecture: arm using
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- PMULL (Polynomial Multiply Long) instructions
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- NEON (Advanced SIMD) extensions
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- ARMv8 Crypto Extensions
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2022-08-20 13:41:43 -05:00
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Use an implementation of GHASH (used by the GCM AEAD chaining mode)
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that uses the 64x64 to 128 bit polynomial multiplication (vmull.p64)
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that is part of the ARMv8 Crypto Extensions, or a slower variant that
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uses the vmull.p8 instruction that is part of the basic NEON ISA.
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config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_NEON
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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tristate "Hash functions: NHPoly1305 (NEON)"
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2022-08-20 13:41:43 -05:00
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depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
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select CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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help
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NHPoly1305 hash function (Adiantum)
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Architecture: arm using:
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- NEON (Advanced SIMD) extensions
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2022-08-20 13:41:43 -05:00
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config CRYPTO_BLAKE2B_NEON
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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tristate "Hash functions: BLAKE2b (NEON)"
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2022-08-20 13:41:43 -05:00
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depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
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select CRYPTO_BLAKE2B
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help
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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BLAKE2b cryptographic hash function (RFC 7693)
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Architecture: arm using
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- NEON (Advanced SIMD) extensions
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2022-08-20 13:41:43 -05:00
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BLAKE2b digest algorithm optimized with ARM NEON instructions.
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On ARM processors that have NEON support but not the ARMv8
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Crypto Extensions, typically this BLAKE2b implementation is
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2022-08-20 13:41:48 -05:00
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much faster than the SHA-2 family and slightly faster than
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SHA-1.
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2022-08-20 13:41:43 -05:00
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2015-03-10 09:47:44 +01:00
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config CRYPTO_AES_ARM
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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tristate "Ciphers: AES"
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2015-03-10 09:47:44 +01:00
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select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
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select CRYPTO_AES
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help
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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Block ciphers: AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197)
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Architecture: arm
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2015-03-10 09:47:44 +01:00
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2018-10-17 21:37:59 -07:00
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On ARM processors without the Crypto Extensions, this is the
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fastest AES implementation for single blocks. For multiple
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blocks, the NEON bit-sliced implementation is usually faster.
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This implementation may be vulnerable to cache timing attacks,
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since it uses lookup tables. However, as countermeasures it
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disables IRQs and preloads the tables; it is hoped this makes
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such attacks very difficult.
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2015-03-10 09:47:44 +01:00
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config CRYPTO_AES_ARM_BS
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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tristate "Ciphers: AES, modes: ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS (bit-sliced NEON)"
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2015-03-10 09:47:44 +01:00
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depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
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crypto: arm/aes-neonbs - go back to using aes-arm directly
In aes-neonbs, instead of going through the crypto API for the parts
that the bit-sliced AES code doesn't handle, namely AES-CBC encryption
and single-block AES, just call the ARM scalar AES cipher directly.
This basically goes back to the original approach that was used before
commit b56f5cbc7e08 ("crypto: arm/aes-neonbs - resolve fallback cipher
at runtime"). Calling the ARM scalar AES cipher directly is faster,
simpler, and avoids any chance of bugs specific to the use of fallback
ciphers such as module loading deadlocks which have happened twice. The
deadlocks turned out to be fixable in other ways, but there's no need to
rely on anything so fragile in the first place.
The rationale for the above-mentioned commit was to allow people to
choose to use a time-invariant AES implementation for the fallback
cipher. There are a couple problems with that rationale, though:
- In practice the ARM scalar AES cipher (aes-arm) was used anyway, since
it has a higher priority than aes-fixed-time. Users *could* go out of
their way to disable or blacklist aes-arm, or to lower its priority
using NETLINK_CRYPTO, but very few users customize the crypto API to
this extent. Systems with the ARMv8 Crypto Extensions used aes-ce,
but the bit-sliced algorithms are irrelevant on such systems anyway.
- Since commit 913a3aa07d16 ("crypto: arm/aes - add some hardening
against cache-timing attacks"), the ARM scalar AES cipher is partially
hardened against cache-timing attacks. It actually works like
aes-fixed-time, in that it disables interrupts and prefetches its
lookup table. It does use a larger table than aes-fixed-time, but
even so, it is not clear that aes-fixed-time is meaningfully more
time-invariant than aes-arm. And of course, the real solution for
time-invariant AES is to use a CPU that supports AES instructions.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2024-08-09 16:11:49 -07:00
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select CRYPTO_AES_ARM
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2019-10-25 12:41:13 -07:00
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select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
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2019-07-02 21:41:29 +02:00
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select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
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2015-03-10 09:47:44 +01:00
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help
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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Length-preserving ciphers: AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197)
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with block cipher modes:
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- ECB (Electronic Codebook) mode (NIST SP800-38A)
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- CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode (NIST SP800-38A)
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- CTR (Counter) mode (NIST SP800-38A)
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- XTS (XOR Encrypt XOR with ciphertext stealing) mode (NIST SP800-38E
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and IEEE 1619)
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2015-03-10 09:47:44 +01:00
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Bit sliced AES gives around 45% speedup on Cortex-A15 for CTR mode
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and for XTS mode encryption, CBC and XTS mode decryption speedup is
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around 25%. (CBC encryption speed is not affected by this driver.)
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crypto: arm/aes-neonbs - go back to using aes-arm directly
In aes-neonbs, instead of going through the crypto API for the parts
that the bit-sliced AES code doesn't handle, namely AES-CBC encryption
and single-block AES, just call the ARM scalar AES cipher directly.
This basically goes back to the original approach that was used before
commit b56f5cbc7e08 ("crypto: arm/aes-neonbs - resolve fallback cipher
at runtime"). Calling the ARM scalar AES cipher directly is faster,
simpler, and avoids any chance of bugs specific to the use of fallback
ciphers such as module loading deadlocks which have happened twice. The
deadlocks turned out to be fixable in other ways, but there's no need to
rely on anything so fragile in the first place.
The rationale for the above-mentioned commit was to allow people to
choose to use a time-invariant AES implementation for the fallback
cipher. There are a couple problems with that rationale, though:
- In practice the ARM scalar AES cipher (aes-arm) was used anyway, since
it has a higher priority than aes-fixed-time. Users *could* go out of
their way to disable or blacklist aes-arm, or to lower its priority
using NETLINK_CRYPTO, but very few users customize the crypto API to
this extent. Systems with the ARMv8 Crypto Extensions used aes-ce,
but the bit-sliced algorithms are irrelevant on such systems anyway.
- Since commit 913a3aa07d16 ("crypto: arm/aes - add some hardening
against cache-timing attacks"), the ARM scalar AES cipher is partially
hardened against cache-timing attacks. It actually works like
aes-fixed-time, in that it disables interrupts and prefetches its
lookup table. It does use a larger table than aes-fixed-time, but
even so, it is not clear that aes-fixed-time is meaningfully more
time-invariant than aes-arm. And of course, the real solution for
time-invariant AES is to use a CPU that supports AES instructions.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2024-08-09 16:11:49 -07:00
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The bit sliced AES code does not use lookup tables, so it is believed
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to be invulnerable to cache timing attacks. However, since the bit
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sliced AES code cannot process single blocks efficiently, in certain
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cases table-based code with some countermeasures against cache timing
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attacks will still be used as a fallback method; specifically CBC
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encryption (not CBC decryption), the encryption of XTS tweaks, XTS
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ciphertext stealing when the message isn't a multiple of 16 bytes, and
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CTR when invoked in a context in which NEON instructions are unusable.
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2015-03-10 09:47:44 +01:00
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2015-03-10 09:47:47 +01:00
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config CRYPTO_AES_ARM_CE
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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tristate "Ciphers: AES, modes: ECB/CBC/CTS/CTR/XTS (ARMv8 Crypto Extensions)"
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2020-01-22 19:38:21 +00:00
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depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
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2019-10-25 12:41:13 -07:00
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select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
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2019-09-17 09:50:01 +01:00
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select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
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2015-03-10 09:47:47 +01:00
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help
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2022-08-20 13:41:50 -05:00
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Length-preserving ciphers: AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197)
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with block cipher modes:
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- ECB (Electronic Codebook) mode (NIST SP800-38A)
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- CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode (NIST SP800-38A)
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- CTR (Counter) mode (NIST SP800-38A)
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- CTS (Cipher Text Stealing) mode (NIST SP800-38A)
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- XTS (XOR Encrypt XOR with ciphertext stealing) mode (NIST SP800-38E
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and IEEE 1619)
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Architecture: arm using:
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- ARMv8 Crypto Extensions
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2015-03-10 09:47:47 +01:00
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2022-08-20 13:41:41 -05:00
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endmenu
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2022-08-20 13:41:43 -05:00
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