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159 lines
8.4 KiB
ReStructuredText
159 lines
8.4 KiB
ReStructuredText
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.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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==============================
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Falcon (FAst Logic Controller)
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==============================
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The following sections describe the Falcon core and the ucode running on it.
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The descriptions are based on the Ampere GPU or earlier designs; however, they
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should mostly apply to future designs as well, but everything is subject to
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change. The overview provided here is mainly tailored towards understanding the
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interactions of nova-core driver with the Falcon.
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NVIDIA GPUs embed small RISC-like microcontrollers called Falcon cores, which
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handle secure firmware tasks, initialization, and power management. Modern
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NVIDIA GPUs may have multiple such Falcon instances (e.g., GSP (the GPU system
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processor) and SEC2 (the security engine)) and also may integrate a RISC-V core.
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This core is capable of running both RISC-V and Falcon code.
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The code running on the Falcon cores is also called 'ucode', and will be
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referred to as such in the following sections.
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Falcons have separate instruction and data memories (IMEM/DMEM) and provide a
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small DMA engine (via the FBIF - "Frame Buffer Interface") to load code from
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system memory. The nova-core driver must reset and configure the Falcon, load
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its firmware via DMA, and start its CPU.
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Falcon security levels
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======================
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Falcons can run in Non-secure (NS), Light Secure (LS), or Heavy Secure (HS)
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modes.
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Heavy Secured (HS) also known as Privilege Level 3 (PL3)
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--------------------------------------------------------
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HS ucode is the most trusted code and has access to pretty much everything on
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the chip. The HS binary includes a signature in it which is verified at boot.
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This signature verification is done by the hardware itself, thus establishing a
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root of trust. For example, the FWSEC-FRTS command (see fwsec.rst) runs on the
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GSP in HS mode. FRTS, which involves setting up and loading content into the WPR
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(Write Protect Region), has to be done by the HS ucode and cannot be done by the
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host CPU or LS ucode.
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Light Secured (LS or PL2) and Non Secured (NS or PL0)
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-----------------------------------------------------
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These modes are less secure than HS. Like HS, the LS or NS ucode binary also
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typically includes a signature in it. To load firmware in LS or NS mode onto a
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Falcon, another Falcon needs to be running in HS mode, which also establishes the
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root of trust. For example, in the case of an Ampere GPU, the CPU runs the "Booter"
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ucode in HS mode on the SEC2 Falcon, which then authenticates and runs the
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run-time GSP binary (GSP-RM) in LS mode on the GSP Falcon. Similarly, as an
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example, after reset on an Ampere, FWSEC runs on the GSP which then loads the
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devinit engine onto the PMU in LS mode.
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Root of trust establishment
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---------------------------
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To establish a root of trust, the code running on a Falcon must be immutable and
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hardwired into a read-only memory (ROM). This follows industry norms for
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verification of firmware. This code is called the Boot ROM (BROM). The nova-core
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driver on the CPU communicates with Falcon's Boot ROM through various Falcon
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registers prefixed with "BROM" (see regs.rs).
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After nova-core driver reads the necessary ucode from VBIOS, it programs the
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BROM and DMA registers to trigger the Falcon to load the HS ucode from the system
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memory into the Falcon's IMEM/DMEM. Once the HS ucode is loaded, it is verified
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by the Falcon's Boot ROM.
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Once the verified HS code is running on a Falcon, it can verify and load other
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LS/NS ucode binaries onto other Falcons and start them. The process of signature
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verification is the same as HS; just in this case, the hardware (BROM) doesn't
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compute the signature, but the HS ucode does.
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The root of trust is therefore established as follows:
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Hardware (Boot ROM running on the Falcon) -> HS ucode -> LS/NS ucode.
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On an Ampere GPU, for example, the boot verification flow is:
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Hardware (Boot ROM running on the SEC2) ->
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HS ucode (Booter running on the SEC2) ->
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LS ucode (GSP-RM running on the GSP)
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.. note::
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While the CPU can load HS ucode onto a Falcon microcontroller and have it
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verified by the hardware and run, the CPU itself typically does not load
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LS or NS ucode and run it. Loading of LS or NS ucode is done mainly by the
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HS ucode. For example, on an Ampere GPU, after the Booter ucode runs on the
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SEC2 in HS mode and loads the GSP-RM binary onto the GSP, it needs to run
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the "SEC2-RTOS" ucode at runtime. This presents a problem: there is no
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component to load the SEC2-RTOS ucode onto the SEC2. The CPU cannot load
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LS code, and GSP-RM must run in LS mode. To overcome this, the GSP is
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temporarily made to run HS ucode (which is itself loaded by the CPU via
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the nova-core driver using a "GSP-provided sequencer") which then loads
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the SEC2-RTOS ucode onto the SEC2 in LS mode. The GSP then resumes
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running its own GSP-RM LS ucode.
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Falcon memory subsystem and DMA engine
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======================================
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Falcons have separate instruction and data memories (IMEM/DMEM)
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and contains a small DMA engine called FBDMA (Framebuffer DMA) which does
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DMA transfers to/from the IMEM/DMEM memory inside the Falcon via the FBIF
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(Framebuffer Interface), to external memory.
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DMA transfers are possible from the Falcon's memory to both the system memory
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and the framebuffer memory (VRAM).
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To perform a DMA via the FBDMA, the FBIF is configured to decide how the memory
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is accessed (also known as aperture type). In the nova-core driver, this is
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determined by the `FalconFbifTarget` enum.
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The IO-PMP block (Input/Output Physical Memory Protection) unit in the Falcon
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controls access by the FBDMA to the external memory.
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Conceptual diagram (not exact) of the Falcon and its memory subsystem is as follows::
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External Memory (Framebuffer / System DRAM)
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^ |
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| v
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+-----------------------------------------------------+
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| +---------------+ | |
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| | FBIF |-------+ | FALCON
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| | (FrameBuffer | Memory Interface | PROCESSOR
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| | InterFace) | |
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| | Apertures | |
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| | Configures | |
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| | mem access | |
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| +-------^-------+ |
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| | FBDMA uses configured FBIF apertures |
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| | to access External Memory
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| +-------v--------+ +---------------+
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| | FBDMA | cfg | RISC |
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| | (FrameBuffer |<---->| CORE |----->. Direct Core Access
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| | DMA Engine) | | | |
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| | - Master dev. | | (can run both | |
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| +-------^--------+ | Falcon and | |
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| | cfg--->| RISC-V code) | |
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| | / | | |
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| | | +---------------+ | +------------+
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| | | | | BROM |
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| | | <--->| (Boot ROM) |
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| | / | +------------+
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| +---------------+ |
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| | IO-PMP | Controls access by FBDMA |
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| | (IO Physical | and other IO Masters |
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| | Memory Protect) |
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| +-------^-------+ |
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| | Protected Access Path for FBDMA |
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| v |
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| +---------------------------------------+ |
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| | Memory | |
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| | +---------------+ +------------+ | |
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| | | IMEM | | DMEM | |<-----+
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| | | (Instruction | | (Data | |
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| | | Memory) | | Memory) | |
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| | +---------------+ +------------+ |
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| +---------------------------------------+
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+-----------------------------------------------------+
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