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linux/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst

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Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory Move L!TF to a separate directory so the MDS stuff can be added at the side. Otherwise the all hardware vulnerabilites have their own top level entry. Should have done that right away. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
2019-02-19 11:10:49 +01:00
========================
Hardware vulnerabilities
========================
This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 1
Documentation/x86: Document new attack vector controls Document the 5 new attack vector command line options, how they interact with existing vulnerability controls, and recommendations on when they can be disabled. Note that while mitigating against untrusted userspace requires both user-to-kernel and user-to-user protection, these are kept separate. The kernel can control what code executes inside of it and that may affect the risk associated with vulnerabilities especially if new kernel mitigations are implemented. The same isn't typically true of userspace. In other words, the risk associated with user-to-user or guest-to-guest attacks is unlikely to change over time. While the risk associated with user-to-kernel or guest-to-host attacks may change. Therefore, these controls are separated. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250709155731.3279419-1-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-09 10:57:31 -05:00
attack_vector_controls
Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre Add documentation for Spectre vulnerability and the mitigation mechanisms: - Explain the problem and risks - Document the mitigation mechanisms - Document the command line controls - Document the sysfs files Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2019-06-20 16:10:50 -07:00
spectre
Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory Move L!TF to a separate directory so the MDS stuff can be added at the side. Otherwise the all hardware vulnerabilites have their own top level entry. Should have done that right away. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
2019-02-19 11:10:49 +01:00
l1tf
Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation Add the initial MDS vulnerability documentation. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
2019-02-19 00:02:31 +01:00
mds
x86/speculation/taa: Add documentation for TSX Async Abort Add the documenation for TSX Async Abort. Include the description of the issue, how to check the mitigation state, control the mitigation, guidance for system administrators. [ bp: Add proper SPDX tags, touch ups by Josh and me. ] Co-developed-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias <antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias <antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2019-10-23 12:32:55 +02:00
tsx_async_abort
Documentation/hw-vuln: Unify filename specification in index Most of the index.rst files in Documentation/ refer to other rst files without their file extension in the name. Do that here too. No functional changes. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809102700.29449-2-bp@alien8.de
2023-07-29 16:53:02 +02:00
multihit
special-register-buffer-data-sampling
core-scheduling
l1d_flush
processor_mmio_stale_data
cross-thread-rsb
x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow vulnerability found on AMD processors. The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the retpoline sequence. To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return' sequence. To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3 and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns. In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and srso_safe_ret(). Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
2023-06-28 11:02:39 +02:00
srso
Documentation/hw-vuln: Unify filename specification in index Most of the index.rst files in Documentation/ refer to other rst files without their file extension in the name. Do that here too. No functional changes. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809102700.29449-2-bp@alien8.de
2023-07-29 16:53:02 +02:00
gather_data_sampling
Documentation/hw-vuln: Add documentation for RFDS Add the documentation for transient execution vulnerability Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) that affects Intel Atom CPUs. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
2024-03-11 12:29:43 -07:00
reg-file-data-sampling
x86/bugs: Add RSB mitigation document Create a document to summarize hard-earned knowledge about RSB-related mitigations, with references, and replace the overly verbose yet incomplete comments with a reference to the document. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ab73f4659ba697a974759f07befd41ae605e33dd.1744148254.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
2025-04-08 14:47:35 -07:00
rsb
x86/cpu: Add "Old Microcode" docs to hw-vuln toctree Sphinx reports missing toctree entry warning: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/old_microcode.rst: WARNING: document isn't included in any toctree Add entry for "Old Microcode" docs to fix the warning. Fixes: 4e2c719782a847 ("x86/cpu: Help users notice when running old Intel microcode") Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250502023358.14846-1-bagasdotme%40gmail.com
2025-05-02 09:33:57 +07:00
old_microcode
Documentation: x86/bugs/its: Add ITS documentation Add the admin-guide for Indirect Target Selection (ITS). Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
2025-04-11 15:36:38 -07:00
indirect-target-selection
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